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ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of this study was to gain an understanding of the nature and problems of 
cooperative governance and intergovernmental relations (IGR) between provincial 
and local government in general and in the Gauteng province in particular. The primary 
guiding research question of the thesis encapsulates the problem: To what extent do 
the existing institutional context and management (administrative) mechanisms, 
systems, and practices in the Gauteng Provincial Government and municipalities 
affect IGR and cooperative governance in the province?  
This thesis provides a broad systematic conceptualisation and contextualisation of the 
key statutory, regulatory, policy, and institutional factors that impede effective IGR and 
cooperative governance in the Gauteng province. It includes existing administrative 
mechanisms, systems, and practices in the provincial government and municipalities 
to support intergovernmental planning, budgeting, implementation, performance 
management, and reporting in the Gauteng province.  
This study is grounded on documentary and literature conceptual and contextual 
analyses and qualitative data-collection techniques and interviews. Constant 
comparative methods of data analysis were used to search for recurring variables and 
themes. The empirical analysis identified a fragmented application of IGR in the 
Gauteng province, as well as silo-based planning, budgeting, performance monitoring, 
evaluation, and reporting mechanisms, which further hampered effective and efficient 
cooperative governance. The study proposes management and administrative 
reforms to improve the structure and practice of IGR practices and cooperative 
governance in the Gauteng province.   
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Provincial Government; intergovernmental relations (IGR); municipalities; New Public 
Management (NPM); systems theory; service delivery. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND SCIENTIFIC AND METHODOLOGICAL 
ORIENTATION 
1.1  Introduction  
This thesis focuses on cooperative governance and intergovernmental relations (IGR) 
between provincial and local government in the Gauteng province. 
Chapter One provides the background, research rationale, and the problem statement 
of this study. The primary guiding research question and the secondary research 
questions and research objectives are provided. The methodological approach, 
research design, and research methods of the study are discussed. To clarify these 
approaches, it is necessary to explain the qualitative research design, as well as 
unobtrusive research methods in terms of the conceptual analysis and the 
historical/comparative analysis. This chapter explains the context of the literature 
review as applied in the study. The data-collection methods are also highlighted. In 
addition, terms that are used frequently in the thesis are defined. The chapter 
concludes with an overview of all the chapters contained in this dissertation. 
1.2  Background, research rationale, and problem statement 
The 1994 transition from apartheid to a constitutional democracy brought in a new 
system of IGR and cooperative governance in South Africa. The post-apartheid 
democratic Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 (hereafter 
referred to as the Constitution) provides for national, provincial, and local government 
and allocates concurrent (shared) and exclusive powers and functions to these three 
different spheres of government. The Constitution explicitly states that all spheres of 
government are distinctive, interdependent, and interrelated. The concept of spheres 
means that different levels of government are founded on the relationship of equality 
rather than hierarchy (Ajam 2001:129; Cameron 2010:682; Levy and Tapscott 2001:5; 
Tapscott 2000:121). This represents a departure from the previous system where 
provincial and local governments were subordinated to the national government. 
The Constitution furthermore provides key normative principles and values that should 
underpin the country’s system of IGR and cooperative governance in order to promote 
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a mutual relationship and cooperation between the spheres of government. The 
system also aims to promote democracy and service delivery to all citizens (Levy and 
Tapscott 2001:1). IGR are therefore crucial for public sector efficiency and 
effectiveness and improved service delivery (Fjeldstad 2001:144; Ile 2010:56). In other 
words, IGR are central to the organisation and capacity of the state to deliver quality 
services to the citizens.  
South Africa’s system of IGR is based on the principles and values of cooperative 
governance as set out in Chapter 3 of the Constitution. The term “distinctive”in the 
Constitution is about “respect for the constitutional status of institutions and the powers 
and functions of government in other spheres of governance” (Ile 2010:54). It also 
means that “each sphere of government has its own status with a clear mandate” (Ile 
2010:54). In other words, “each sphere has its own unique area of operation” 
(Holtzhausen and Naidoo 2011:737). “Interdependent” means that all spheres of 
government must cooperate (Holtzhausen and Naidoo 2011:737-738; Ile 2010:54). It 
also means that “no sphere can operate in isolation ... [as] … all spheres are inter-
reliant, mutually dependent and supportive with each other” (Ile 2010:54). 
“Interrelated” is about the idea that “spheres are crucial parts that collectively form the 
government of the country … [as] … spheres are parts of a holistic system of 
government” (Ile 2010:55). 
According to Reddy (2001:29), “the IGR system in South Africa has been evolving 
since 1994”. The current system of IGR distinguishes itself from the system associated 
with the previous political regime “in its ambitions to advance democracy and to 
improve service delivery to all South Africans” (Levy and Tapscott 2001:1). This 
defines the unique character and normative values and principles that should underpin 
South Africa’s system of IGR and cooperative governance.  
IGR and cooperative governance are different, but related conceptual twins. The 
concept of cooperative governance has its origin in the German tradition, which 
involves a set of unwritten fundamental principles and thrusts such as trust, 
partnership, and respect that should underpin the relations between national and 
regional governments (Mathebula 2011b:840). According to Edwards (2008a:68; 
2008b:90), cooperative governance is a philosophy that underpins the work of the 
government. It is about a partnership between all spheres of government (Edwards 
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2008b:90; Malan 2005:230). It is also about key values such as national unity, peace, 
cooperation, coordination, communication, and conflict avoidance (Malan 2005:230). 
Overall, the concept of cooperative governance enjoins all spheres of government to 
function as a whole (Edwards 2008b:90). The concept of cooperative governance 
therefore implies the notion of a joined-up or integrated government.  
Cooperative governance is also associated with the notion of IGR. According to 
Edwards (2008a:68), “IGR are concerned with the political, financial and institutional 
arrangements regarding interactions between the different spheres of government and 
organs of state within each sphere”. Malan (2005:228) defines IGR as “a set of formal 
and informal processes as well as institutional arrangements and structures for 
bilateral and multilateral cooperation within and among the three spheres of 
government”. Reddy (2001:22) defines IGR as “the mutual horizontal and vertical 
relations and interactions between governmental institutions”. Geldenhuys (2005:54) 
provides a more simplified definition by referring to IGR as simply the relations 
between spheres of government. IGR are a key instrument of cooperative governance. 
They aim to facilitate and promote cooperative governance (Edwards 2008a:66; 
2008b:90). Cooperative governance is not, however, an end in itself, but a means to 
help the government achieve certain development objectives and outcomes. The 
system should lead to “better coordination and integrated planning, budgeting and 
service delivery within and across spheres of government” (Edwards 2008a:74).   
Although there is no universally common definition of IGR and cooperative 
governance, there is equally no major conceptual definitional controversy and 
divergence on these concepts in the literature. For example, the above definitional 
perspectives, although characterised by some minor variations, have a great deal of 
commonality and convergence. The common thrust across all these definitional 
perspectives relates to IGR as institutional arrangements to facilitate vertical and 
horizontal cooperation between different spheres of government to achieve common 
objectives. In other words, IGR provide institutional mechanisms to facilitate 
collaborative relationships and partnerships between spheres of government in pursuit 
of common overall objectives and ideals.  
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As a result of the failure of centralisation, decentralisation is seen as a mechanism to 
promote a more responsive government and efficient public service delivery (Bardhan 
2002:185-188).  
The theory of decentralisation identifies the economics and efficiency of public service 
delivery as important considerations in the design of government systems and the 
allocation of functions to different spheres of government. This is based more 
specifically on the theory of fiscal decentralisation. This theoretical perspective as 
presented above sees a decentralised system of government (i.e. multi-sphere 
government system) as the appropriate system or model of government for several 
reasons. Firstly, it contends that a decentralised system of government promotes 
efficient allocation of resources (allocative efficiency) as the sub-national governments 
are better positioned to understand the needs of the citizens. It further asserts that this 
understanding enables the sub-national government to allocate resources in line with 
the needs of the citizens, thus leading to better service delivery quality and outcomes. 
Secondly, the theory argues that a decentralised system of government enhances 
governance and public sector performance, accountability, and responsiveness to the 
needs of the citizens. It furthermore contends that decentralisation allows for 
experimentation and learning what works and what does not work. Powers and 
functions allocated to different levels of government also need to be clearly defined to 
support effective decentralisation and ultimately effective service delivery.  
There is a strong relationship between decentralisation and IGR. Decentralisation 
creates a decentralised system or model of government. This system or model in turn 
creates different levels or layers of government that need to be properly coordinated 
to ensure the overall efficiency and effectiveness of government. More importantly, 
different levels of government require coordination to promote effective governance 
and public service delivery. The effective coordination and integration of the activities 
of different levels of government require effective IGR. In other words, effective service 
delivery requires effective IGR. Overall, the theory of decentralisation provides a 
theoretical and foundational backdrop for the understanding of IGR.  
In the South African context, the study of IGR and cooperative governance should 
consider and appreciate the country’s apartheid history and its enduring legacy and 
impact on the capacity of the state and especially the capacity of the public service. 
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State capacity challenges, especially administrative capacity, in relation to the 
implementation of IGR and cooperative governance, are manifested through 
fragmentation and misalignment in planning, budgeting, implementation, and 
performance management across the different spheres of government.  
There is, however, a limited body of knowledge on the effect of the administrative 
mechanisms, systems, and practices on IGR and cooperative governance in the 
country. In other words, how the administrative context in different spheres of 
government affects IGR and cooperative governance is not well understood due to the 
paucity of knowledge on this subject. This study therefore aims to understand and 
provide a coherent theoretical account of how the institutional context and 
management (administrative) mechanisms, systems, and practices in the Gauteng 
Provincial Government and municipalities affect IGR and cooperative governance in 
the province. 
The literature locates the concept of IGR within the theory of decentralisation. 
Decentralisation deals with the transfer of power and authority (Mollah 2007:2) and 
assignment of service functions (Andrews and Schroeder 2003:29) from the national 
government to the lower levels of government. Decentralisation has political, 
administrative, and fiscal dimensions (Mehrotra 2006:266; Mollah 2007:5). Within the 
broad theory of decentralisation, the concept of IGR can better be explained and 
understood by examining the theory of fiscal decentralisation.  
The systematic analysis of fiscal decentralisation became possible with the 
introduction of the concept of fiscal federalism into public finance theory in the mid-
20th century (Vo 2010:658). Fiscal decentralisation is concerned with the devolution of 
fiscal powers and responsibilities (i.e. expenditure, taxes, revenue, borrowing, and 
fiscal transfers) from national to sub-national governments (Vo 2010:657-658). 
Richard Musgrave’s public finance theory on fiscal federalism provides a framework 
that helps to set boundaries to and limits on fiscal decentralisation (Vo 2010:659). The 
theory defines three branches of public finance or public economics, namely economic 
stabilisation, income distribution, and resource allocation (Vo 2010 659-660).  
Fiscal decentralisation is motivated in terms of resource allocation (allocation 
efficiency) based on the argument that sub-national governments are better positioned 
to maximise the efficiency of resource allocation and welfare services (Vo 2010:658-
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667). This perspective is associated with the broad theory generally referred to as the 
“traditional theory of fiscal federalism” or “first-generation theory of fiscal federalism or 
fiscal decentralisation” (Oates 2008:314; Vo 2010:658-660). 
The resource allocation efficiency notion advanced from a public finance perspective 
contrasts with a public choice perspective that views decentralisation as a mechanism 
to protect liberty and limit the power of central government (Sharma 2012:105). There 
is also another perspective that views fiscal decentralisation as a notion that can 
undermine the effective functioning of government as sub-national governments may 
be inclined to make irresponsible fiscal decisions knowing that higher levels of 
government will bail them out in the event of fiscal difficulties (Oates 2008:319).  
The traditional theoretical perspective (i.e. a traditional theory of fiscal 
decentralisation) makes a case for fiscal decentralisation on the basis of efficiency 
gains with respect to resource allocation and public service delivery (Oates 2008:314-
318). This therefore implies a link between decentralisation as a governance model 
and public service delivery. Decentralisation as a system of government has globally 
become a key element of public sector reforms (Aslam and Yilmaz 2011:160) in 
response to discontent with the performance of centralised systems of planning and 
administration (Ingham and Kalam 1992:374). It is also seen as a response to state 
failure (Mehrotra 2006:266). 
A multi-sphere system of government (i.e. a decentralised government system) 
facilitates efficient public service delivery better than a unitary system of government 
(Vo 2010:663). This is because “subnational governments are more easily able to 
tailor the mix and mode of service delivery to meet local priorities” (Ajam 2001:126). 
Decentralisation also brings the government closer to the citizens (Barle and Uys 
2002:141; Brinkerhoff and Wetterberg 2013:436; Malan 2002:237; Mubangizi 
2011:80). It is also key to ensuring government accountability for service delivery 
(Aslam and Yilmaz 2011:161; Rosaria Alfano 2009:18). In addition, decentralisation 
promotes public sector responsiveness to the needs of the citizens (Bardhan 
2002:185; Vo 2010:658-659; Ingham and Kalam 1992:374; Rosaria Alfano 2009:18). 
Government accountability and responsiveness are part of the fundamental principles 
that underpin South Africa’s democratic dispensation. This means that public service 
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delivery in South Africa must be accountable and responsive to the diverse needs of 
the country’s citizens.   
Overall, the theory of decentralisation suggests that a unitary system of government 
(i.e. a centralised government system) is inimical to effective and efficient public 
service delivery and government innovation, responsiveness, and accountability. It is 
therefore against this background that decentralisation is viewed as a mechanism to 
improve public sector performance and to enhance governance and service delivery 
quality and outcomes, thus ensuring better public service delivery (Aslam and Yilmaz 
2011:159-161; Oates 2008:318). This is because it facilitates a better understanding 
of local needs and allows for the alignment of resource allocation to local demands 
and preferences (Oates 2008:314; Vo 2010:658-666).  
Effective decentralisation needs public sector capacity (see Andrews and Schroeder 
2003). Key dimensions of capacity required to make decentralisation work include 
management and technical capacity at the local level, institutional capacity for 
intergovernmental coordination, and fiscal management capacity (Andrews and 
Schroeder 2003:37). In the South African context, public sector capacity extends to 
issues of public sector leadership (Naidoo and Xollie 2011). The challenges of 
leadership in the public service in South Africa affect the effectiveness of public service 
delivery in the country (Naidoo and Xollie 2011:1). Effective leadership is therefore 
required in the country’s public service to drive effective public service delivery (Naidoo 
and Xollie 2011:5). 
The allocation of powers and functions, including fiscal powers, to different levels or 
spheres of government is considered an important issue in IGR literature. A clear 
division and definition of roles and functions between different levels or spheres of 
government are important to ensure stable and meaningful decentralisation and to 
avoid instability and misunderstandings (Zigiene 2012:112). Functions must be 
allocated to spheres of government that can implement them effectively (Zigiene 
2012:112).  
No single universal model of IGR exists, however, because there are various IGR 
arrangements in different countries (Watts 2001:23). There is also no absolute best 
model to allocate functions to different spheres of government as each country’s 
conditions and circumstances should be taken into consideration in the assignment of 
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functions (Zigiene 2012:113-115). The lack of universal models on IGR does not 
mean, however, that international comparative analysis is irrelevant in the study of 
IGR. International comparative lessons can be learned regarding the successes and 
failures of IGR mechanisms elsewhere, as well as the structures, mechanisms, and 
processes required to make IGR effective (Watts 2001:23).  
Placing IGR and cooperative governance at the core of service delivery has significant 
implications for the manner in which all spheres of government should relate to one 
another and implement public policy. It is for this reason that Chapter 3 of the 
Constitution provides for a system of IGR and cooperative governance based on the 
principles of mutual cooperation, respect, trust, and good faith. The Constitution is 
supported in this regard by various pieces of legislation such as the Intergovernmental 
Fiscal Relations Act (IFRA) (No. 7 of 1997) and the Intergovernmental Relations 
Framework Act (IGRFA) (No. 13 of 2005). These acts provide detailed guidelines for 
practical implementation of IGR and cooperative government in South Africa, including 
key issues such as intergovernmental fiscal relations, intergovernmental structures, 
and intergovernmental dispute-resolution mechanisms and procedures, which are the 
focus of this thesis. 
South Africa’s system of IGR has experienced numerous challenges (Murray 
2001:81). The key challenges can be summarised as:  
 the confusion regarding the powers and functions of the different spheres of 
government (Levy and Tapscott 2001:6; Amusa and Mathane 2007);  
 the limited capacity and mechanisms of provincial governments to monitor local 
government (Levy 2001:97-99; Levy and Tapscott 2001:12-13);  
 the inability of the provincial governments to analyse local government budgets 
(Levy 2001:98); and  
 poor relationships between provincial and local government (Levy 2001:97). 
Other difficulties relate to intergovernmental fiscal relations, which are a key 
component of the country’s system of IGR. These include challenges related to 
expenditure assignment, revenue assignment, intergovernmental transfers, and fiscal 
management (Amusa and Mathane 2007:273). These include administrative and 
technical capacity (e.g. budget planning and spending capacity), accounting and 
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financial control systems, unfunded mandates, lack of clarity on norms and standards 
for service delivery, revenue collection and debt management, fiscal autonomy, and 
the mismatch between functions and financial resources (Amusa and Mathane 
2007:273-289). These issues point to deeper systemic challenges that require far-
reaching measures to improve the efficacy of South Africa’s system of 
intergovernmental fiscal relations. Effective resourcing and financing for service 
delivery depend on effective intergovernmental fiscal relations.   
The literature further points to poor integration and coordination between different 
spheres of government (Everatt and Gwagwa 2011:268; Levin 2011:252; Levy 
2001:97; Levy and Tapscott 2001:17; Mello and Maserumule 2010:291; Murray 
2001:80; Tapscott 2000:127). In this regard, Levy and Tapscott (2001:19) and 
Tapscott (2000:127) contend that poor intergovernmental coordination and integration 
are problems of capacity and efficiency. The lack of capacity at the provincial level has 
generally been responsible for the difficulties in relation to both vertical and horizontal 
intergovernmental coordination and integration in South Africa (Levy and Tapscott 
2001:17-18). All the above difficulties paint a more general picture of the state of IGR 
and cooperative governance in South Africa. It is a picture of an ineffective system of 
IGR and cooperative governance characterised by institutional challenges of 
intergovernmental fragmentation in planning, budgeting, and implementation.  
The effective implementation of a system of IGR and cooperative governance depends 
mainly on the capacity of the state and more specifically the capacity of the public 
service. The capacity of the public service is important because “IGR are conducted 
within a public administration environment” (Edwards 2008b:92). In this regard, 
Mathebula (2011a:1420) contends that South Africa’s IGR system depends on “the 
state’s capacity to coordinate policy, planning, budgeting, implementation, monitoring 
and evaluation between the three spheres of government”. Mathebula (2011a:1425) 
further argues that “the institutional capacity of organs of state is a critical variable in 
the exercise of effectual IGR”.   
There are, however, a number of key systemic factors and challenges that influence 
the state’s capacity to implement an effective system of IGR and cooperative 
governance. As previously indicated, these factors and challenges have to do with the 
legacy of the apartheid system, the inherited public service culture and administrative 
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practices, and the policy and legislative environment. Different public service traditions 
and cultures inherited from the former homelands and self-governing territories have 
an effect on IGR (Mubangizi 2005:639). Bureaucratic issues also hamper cooperative 
governance between the different spheres of government (Edwards 2008a:75). Mello 
and Maserumule (2010:291) contend that “various instances of fragmentation and silo 
approaches continue to characterise the modus operandi of government”. 
Misalignment in planning and budgeting cycles between national and provincial 
government on the one hand and local government on the other hand also impedes 
effective intergovernmental planning (Mello and Maserumule 2010:291).  
South Africa has a unique history. The country’s evolution from colonialism and 
apartheid to a democratic dispensation is a long journey that has shaped the current 
South African reality. The concepts of IGR and cooperative governance therefore have 
their own permutations and dynamics in the South African context. A complex interplay 
of historical, political, economic, social, and cultural factors has shaped the 
conceptualisation, design, evolution, structure, and practice of the system of IGR and 
cooperative governance in South Africa.  
IGR take place within a public administration context (Edwards 2008:92b). In South 
Africa, the state of IGR and public administration (public service) cannot be analysed 
and understood outside the country’s historical context. According to Harrison-Rockey 
(1999:169), the South African government has historically been associated with 
bureaucracy and ineffective and inefficient organisation. Bureaucracy often implies red 
tape, obstacles, delays, and rigidity (Esau 2006:48).  
The White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service of 1995 indicates that 
the problems inherited from the past apartheid regime include a centralised, rule-
based culture and a vertical, top-down management approach (i.e. a more 
bureaucratic culture) characterised by a lack of creativity and responsiveness to the 
needs of citizens, as well as poor accountability for public service delivery (Ministry for 
Public Service and Administration 1995). Harrison-Rockey (1999:169) also contends 
that in 1994, the democratic government inherited a flawed, rule-based organisation 
and weak administration.  
The South African state was then transformed from a fragmented apartheid state 
comprising independent and self-governing states into one sovereign state (Thornhill 
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2005:578). This transformation included the amalgamation and integration of different 
public services with different values (Thornhill 2005:579); hence the values and modus 
operandi of the public service had to change as part of the transition to a democratic 
dispensation (Fraser-Moleketi and Van Dyk-Robertson 2005:559). The values that 
underpinned the administrative and managerial practices also had to be reformed 
(Thornhill 2005:579). The amalgamation of the different public service systems of the 
former homelands and self-governing territories into the current public service system 
brought with it different traditions and cultures that have an impact on IGR (Mubangizi 
2005:639).   
This points to the fact that the post-apartheid public service has not made a full 
transition from the administrative and managerial practices associated with the past 
dispensation. According to Sindane (2009:493), “a major problem facing the South 
African public service is the legacy of apartheid”. Thornhill (2005:581) argues that 
“organisational cultures are difficult to change”. This may explain the impact of the 
lingering legacy of the apartheid system on the administrative culture and practices of 
the post-apartheid public service at the national, provincial, and local government 
level, which in turn impacts on intergovernmental integration and alignment. 
According to Layman (2003:26-27), joint work between the different spheres of 
government is hampered by public service cultures and practices, which still promote 
a line-function rather than a cross-sectoral approach to service delivery, as well as 
poor participation of national and provincial government in municipal Integrated 
Development Plans (IDPs). It could therefore be argued that the post-apartheid public 
service has not made a full transition from a more bureaucratic, inward-looking, silo-
based approach to a collaborative approach to public service delivery. This institutional 
culture remains one of the systemic legacies of the apartheid dispensation that 
continues to bedevil the post-apartheid public service, despite many public service 
reform measures that were introduced since 1994 as part of the broader 
transformation and democratisation of the state. Administratively, this culture 
continues to manifest in the post-apartheid democratic dispensation through 
fragmented and silo-based planning, budgeting, implementation, performance 
management, and accountability across all spheres of government in South Africa.  
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What this implies is that there are no effective intergovernmental administrative 
structures, systems, and mechanisms to support cooperative government and 
integrated service delivery across the spheres of government, thus militating against 
the principles and values of cooperative government. The officials would therefore 
need to change their mindset in order to make intergovernmental cooperation possible 
(Malan 2005:240). In this regard, Mubangizi (2005:639) points out the importance of 
implementing proper systems and monitoring to ensure effective IGR that support 
service delivery. This means that IGR should be institutionalised through 
administrative processes to provide capacity and mechanisms for service delivery 
(Mathebula 2011a:1427). 
At a practical level, as noted before, these intergovernmental challenges are 
manifested through silo-based and fragmented planning, budgeting, implementation, 
performance management, and accountability across all spheres of government in 
South Africa, thereby militating against the principles and values of cooperative 
governance as enshrined in the country’s constitution (Abrahams, Fitzgerald and 
Cameron 2009:1055; Everatt and Gwagwa 2011:277). Overall, these challenges point 
to poor or little institutionalisation of IGR in South Africa (Mubangizi 2005:636). 
In this regard, Levy and Tapscott (2001:19) and Tapscott (2000:127) identified 
capacity as a key factor that hampers effective intergovernmental coordination and 
integration across government. Edwards (2008a:66) echoes this sentiment and 
maintains that “ineffective IGR and coordination are often problems of capacity and 
management rather than of structures and procedures”. IGR depend on “the state’s 
capacity to coordinate policy, planning, budgeting, implementation and monitoring and 
evaluation between the three spheres of government” (Mathebula 2011a:1420). State 
capacity is not only limited to human resources (Chikane 2011:48). It also extends to 
organisational structures, systems, and processes (Levin 2011:263). South Africa’s 
Twenty-Year Review of Government Performance for the Period 1994-2014 (Twenty-
Year Review of Government Performance for the Period 1994-2014 Internet Source) 
also identified the capacity of provincial and local government administrations as a key 
challenge to the country’s system of IGR and cooperative governance.   
In a similar vein, this study also contends that poor IGR and cooperative governance 
in South Africa are a result of poor institutional environmental and management 
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(administrative) mechanisms, systems, and practices in provincial government and 
municipalities to support effective intergovernmental planning, budgeting, 
implementation, performance management, and reporting. In other words, 
intergovernmental fragmentation is due to poor administrative IGR, which Malan 
(2005:236) defines as “the relations between officials and structures that exist for 
administrative purposes”.  
Little research has been conducted on administrative IGR. As a result, there is a limited 
available knowledge in the literature in relation to management (administrative) 
mechanisms, systems, and practices that exist in the provincial government and 
municipalities to coordinate and drive intergovernmental planning, budgeting, 
implementation, performance management, and reporting across the spheres of 
government. This knowledge gap limits the understanding of the underlying 
institutional and administrative challenges that impede effective intergovernmental 
cooperation and the kinds of strategic reforms that are required to remedy the 
situation.  
This study will contribute to a better understanding of the extent to which the existing 
institutional context (environment) and management (administrative) mechanisms, 
practices, and systems in the Gauteng Provincial Government and municipalities 
affect IGR and cooperative governance in the province in relation to intergovernmental 
planning, budgeting, implementation, and performance management. In other words, 
this study will provide new insights in relation to how the operating institutional 
environmental and management (administrative) mechanisms, systems, and practices 
affect the overall state capacity to coordinate and drive effective IGR and cooperative 
governance in the Gauteng province.  
In the final analysis, the significance of this study will deepen the understanding of the 
nuances, intricacies, and complexities of the institutional context and administrative 
capacity within which IGR and cooperative government take place in South Africa, with 
specific reference to the Gauteng province. Overall conclusions and implications that 
arise from the findings of the study will contribute to both the body of knowledge and 
public policy discourse in terms of the nature and mix of reforms required to re-
engineer and improve the structure and practice of IGR and cooperative governance 
in the Gauteng province and beyond. The totality of the study will therefore make a 
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significant contribution to the theory and practice of IGR and cooperative governance 
in South Africa. 
Addressing this knowledge gap is imperative because poor IGR and cooperative 
governance hold serious implications and consequences for both governance and 
service delivery. Poor service delivery, public protests, and instability are considered 
to be associated with poor intergovernmental cooperation, implementation, and 
coordination (Coetzee 2010:85). The Twenty-Year Review of Government 
Performance for the Period 1994-2014 (Twenty-Year Review of Government 
Performance for the Period 1994-2014 Internet Source) identified poor service delivery 
as a contributory factor in the escalation of service delivery protests in the country. It 
is against this background that this thesis focuses on management (administrative) 
mechanisms, systems and practices, as well as the institutional context (environment) 
for IGR and cooperative governance in the Gauteng province.  
In light of the above, the overarching primary research question posed by this thesis 
is: To what extent do the existing institutional context and management 
(administrative) mechanisms, systems, and practices in the Gauteng Provincial 
Government and municipalities affect IGR and cooperative governance in the 
province?  
1.3   Secondary research questions  
The aim of this study is to find possible solutions to the main research problem. The 
following secondary research questions, which could provide possible solutions to the 
problem, will be pursued:  
 What do the concept, context, and variations of federalism entail? 
 How are powers and functions institutionally assigned in a federal state? 
 What are the key implications of federalism for IGR?  
 What do the concept and context of decentralisation entail? 
 What are the key implications of decentralisation for IGR? 
 What do the concept and context of cooperative governance entail? 
 How does cooperative governance influence IGR? 
 What do the concept and context of IGR entail? 
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 What do the theoretical and conceptual foundations and key aspects related to 
bureaucracy in a public sector organisational setting entail? 
 What do the theoretical and conceptual foundations and key aspects related to 
New Public Management (NPM) and modernisation of the public sector entail? 
 What do the theoretical and conceptual foundations and key aspects related to 
systems thinking in a public sector setting entail?  
 How can cooperative governance be conceptualised? 
 What are the key benefits and considerations to promote collaborative 
management? 
 How can collaborative planning be conceptualised and contextualised? 
 How can performance management be conceptualised and contextualised to 
promote collaborative performance management in a public sector setting? 
 How can a multi-theoretical analytical framework for IGR be conceptualised? 
 How can the Australian IGR framework be conceptualised and contextualised 
to determine the relevance of its strengths and weaknesses for the purposes of 
this study?  
 How can the Canadian IGR framework be conceptualised and contextualised 
to determine the relevance of its strengths and weaknesses for the purposes of 
this study?  
 How can the German IGR framework be conceptualised and contextualised to 
determine the relevance of its strengths and weaknesses for the purposes of 
this study?  
 How can the Nigerian IGR framework be conceptualised and contextualised to 
determine the relevance of its strengths and weaknesses for the purposes of 
this study?  
 What does the constitutional framework for the post-apartheid democratic state, 
the state transformation, and public management reforms entail? 
 What do the structure and practice of IGR and cooperative governance in terms 
of the rationale for IGR and the IGR strategy and policy framework in South 
Africa entail?  
 What do the IGR model, institutions, and structures; intergovernmental fiscal 
relations; and funding model in South Africa entail?  
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 What are the institutional, structural, and systemic weaknesses of IGR in the 
Gauteng province?  
 How does the current institutional context (environment) in the Gauteng 
Provincial Government and municipalities affect IGR and cooperative 
governance in the province? 
 How do existing management (administrative) mechanisms, systems, and 
practices in the Gauteng Provincial Government and municipalities support 
intergovernmental planning, budgeting, implementation, performance 
management, and reporting in the province? 
 What kind of reforms are required to improve the structure and practice of IGR 
and cooperative governance in the Gauteng province? 
1.4   Key research objectives of the study 
The main objectives of this study are to:  
 provide a systematic conceptualisation and contextualisation of the variables 
that influence IGR; 
 conceptualise and contextualise the theoretical and conceptual underpinnings 
to develop an analytical framework for IGR; 
 provide a systematic conceptualisation and contextualisation of the variables 
that influence comparative international intergovernmental systems and 
practices; 
 provide a contextualisation of the empirical variables that influence the context 
of IGR in South Africa and the Gauteng province; 
 identify the key institutional factors that impede effective IGR and cooperative 
governance in the Gauteng province;  
 explore how the existing administrative mechanisms, systems, and practices in 
the provincial government and municipalities support intergovernmental 
planning, budgeting, implementation, performance management, and reporting 
in the Gauteng province; and 
 explain the nature of reforms required to improve the structure and practice of 
IGR and cooperative governance in the Gauteng province.   
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1.5  Methodological approach 
It is important to clarify the philosophical premise or point of departure of this study. 
All research studies are based on ontological and epistemological assumptions and 
principles (Neuman 2011:91). Ontology deals with “the fundamental nature of reality”, 
whereas epistemology is about “the creation of knowledge” (Neuman 2011:92-93).  
There are three main paradigms on social science research, namely positivist social 
science, interpretive social science, and critical social science (Neuman 2011:94). 
Positivist social science is associated with the natural sciences and emphasises 
objective and value-free research (Neuman 2011:95-99). Quantitative research is 
mainly associated with positivist principles, variables, and hypotheses (Neuman 
2011:165). By contrast, interpretive social science emphasises the social construction 
of meaning and multiple interpretations of reality (Neuman 2011:101-103). This school 
of thought is associated with qualitative research and regards social context as 
important in the creation and understanding of social meaning and reality (Neuman 
2011:106-165).  
The nature of this study lends itself to an interpretive research paradigm and a 
qualitative research method. IGR are inherently an interpersonal activity that is shaped 
and defined by socio-cultural and political context. The understanding, meaning, 
character, and practice of IGR vary from context to context. These point to the fluidity 
and context-specific nature (i.e. qualitative nature of ontological reality) of IGR, thus 
rejecting the notions and principles of objectivity and value neutrality associated with 
the positivist research paradigm and associated quantitative methods.  
Overall, the researcher is of the view that the dynamic, fluid, and context-specific 
nature (i.e. qualitative nature of the ontological reality) of IGR and the central questions 
and objectives of the study can better be addressed through the application of 
ontological and epistemological perspectives and principles associated with the 
interpretive research paradigm and qualitative research methods. The flexibility and 
open-ended nature of qualitative research (Leedy and Ormrod 2013:149) provide the 
study with an opportunity to explore and delve in detail into various dimensions and 
issues associated with the research questions. Positivist and critical social science 
paradigms are therefore not relevant and applicable to this study. 
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1.5.1  Qualitative research approach to the methodology 
The term “qualitative research usually means any kind of research that produces 
findings that are not based on statistical procedures, or other means of quantification” 
(Creswell 1998 in Auriacombe 2007:89). “Qualitative research is an inquiry of 
understanding that is based on distinct methodological traditions of inquiry that explore 
social or human problems. The researcher builds a complex, holistic picture; analyses 
words or concepts; reports detailed views of informants; and conducts the study in a 
natural setting” (Creswell 1998 in Auriacombe 2007:98).   
Notably, qualitative researchers’ perceptions of how to best understand the subjective 
meanings and interpretations of the actors’ and the researchers’ beliefs of how 
knowledge should be generated are, to say the least, not uniform. Qualitative 
researchers differ in their ontological, epistemological, methodological beliefs and in 
their choice of specific methods. Denzin and Lincoln (2005:xv) state: “There is no one 
way to do interpretive, qualitative inquiry because we are all interpretive bricolage 
stuck in the present working against the past as we move into a politically charged and 
challenging future”. Therefore, one of the main ongoing issues in qualitative research 
is the ethical dilemma that researchers face concerning the question of how the 
“other”, or subjects, should best be represented to provide the most truthful picture of 
their reality.  
Therefore, a discussion to understand and learn about qualitative methods requires 
clarification and explication of the respective qualitative-methodological models of 
knowledge production (Breuer and Schreier 2007). In fact, the same phenomena are 
“investigated, analysed and interpreted differently depending on the researcher’s 
beliefs of what social reality is (ontology), as well as how social phenomena can best 
be known (epistemology)” (Breuer and Schreier 2007:1).  
Contrary to quantitative researchers’ approach, qualitative researchers believe that 
data can only be interpreted effectively when the researcher maintains a close 
relationship with the object of study and comes as close as possible to it (Mouton in 
Webb and Auriacombe 2006:597). Qualitative research refers to an approach to the 
study of the world, which seeks to describe and analyse the behaviour of humans from 
the point of view of those being studied. Rather than observe the behaviour of an 
object during experimental research, and thus attempting to control all factors and 
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variables that might distort the validity of the research findings, the qualitative 
researcher seeks to become immersed in the object of study (Webb and Auriacombe 
2006:597). 
In light of the above, it is clear that there is no uniform definition of qualitative research. 
As Denzin and Lincoln (2005:xv) state: “The open-ended nature of the qualitative 
research project leads to a perpetual resistance against attempts to impose a single, 
umbrella paradigm over the entire project”. Denzin and Lincoln (2005:xv) further state 
that “[q]ualitative research is an interdisciplinary, trans-disciplinary, and sometimes 
counter-disciplinary field, it crosscuts the humanities, social sciences and physical 
sciences and is many things simultaneously”. Qualitative research “is multi-
paradigmatic in focus and its practitioners are sensitive to the value of the multi-
method approach and they are committed to the naturalistic perspective and to the 
interpretive understanding of human experience. At the same time, the field is 
inherently political and shaped by multiple ethical and political allegiances” (Denzin 
and Lincoln 2005:xv).  
Qualitative research displays a number of characteristics. Firstly, this research method 
is dedicated to viewing events, norms, and values from the point of view of the people 
who are being studied. Secondly, qualitative researchers provide detailed descriptions 
of the social settings they explore. This enables them to understand the subject’s 
interpretation of what is going on. Thirdly, as a participant-observer, the researcher 
follows a holistic approach as he/she attempts to understand events and behaviour in 
the context in which they occur. This is a significantly different standpoint from the 
natural scientist who attempts to isolate the subject from undue interference. Fourthly, 
qualitative research views life as streams of interconnecting events, an interlocking 
series of events, and as a process of constant change (Bryman in Webb and 
Auriacombe 2006:599).   
Therefore, qualitative research could be seen as an umbrella term for different 
approaches. Notably, each approach has its own theoretical background, 
methodological principles, and aims (Flick 2007:6 in Auriacombe 2011:36). The 
manner in which qualitative research methods and methodology are understood is 
closely linked to the ways in which qualitative researchers conceptualise the research 
they are conducting. In this respect, qualitative research can be arranged along a 
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continuum, with the one dimension marked by a “holistic – somewhat paradigm-like – 
conception and the other by situational pragmatic and opportunistic methodological 
practices” (Breuer and Schreier 2007:2).  
The researcher opted for a modernist research approach, and particularly as 
approached by Patton (in Swanson and Holton 1997), Taylor and Bogdan (1998), and 
Schurink (2005). Patton (in Swanson and Holton 1997) lists the following nine themes 
that form part of a qualitative research strategy: 
 Inductive analysis: Begins with the collection of data, which leads to 
generalisation. 
 Holistic perspective: Phenomena are understood in terms of a complex system. 
 Qualitative information: Detailed descriptions are given. 
 Personal contact: The researcher has personal discussions with participants 
and gains insight. 
 Dynamic systems: Views the research participants and the study as dynamic 
objects that can change during the course of the study. 
   Unique case orientation: Each research case is unique and special. 
 Contextual alignment: Aligns findings to the social, historical, and temporal 
context. 
 Empathetic neutrality: Although the researcher cannot be completely objective, 
he/she should not use the process to advance a personal agenda. 
 Design flexibility: The inquiry process is adaptive and potentially changing as 
the research process is conducted. 
The qualitative research paradigm provides the researcher with the perspective of 
target audience members through immersion in a culture or situation and direct 
interaction with the people under study (an “insider” view) (Auriacombe 2013:120). 
Qualitative research methods used in social research include observations, in-depth 
interviews, focus groups, and the analysis of personal documents. It aims to gain 
insight into the meaning (“Verstehen”) that the subject gives to his/her life world 
(Weber in Auriacombe 2013:120). These methods are designed to help researchers 
understand the meanings people assign to their innermost experiences. In the 
qualitative paradigm, the researcher becomes the instrument of data collection, and 
results may vary greatly depending upon who conducts the research. 
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The advantage of using qualitative methods is that they generate rich, detailed data 
that leave the participants’ perspectives intact and provide a context for understanding 
behaviour. The focus on processes and “reasons why” differ from that of quantitative 
research, which addresses correlations between variables and explanations thereof. 
A disadvantage is that data collection and analysis may be labour-intensive and time-
consuming (Auriacombe 2013:121). 
Qualitative researchers mostly use an inductive form of reasoning (arguing from the 
particular to the general). Researchers who apply the qualitative research approach 
believe that the object of study in the social sciences exhibits fundamental differences 
compared to the object of study in the natural sciences (Auriacombe 2013:122).  
Qualitative research follows a research strategy that is relatively open and 
unstructured. Even when interview questionnaires are used as the research technique, 
the researcher provides minimal guidance to interviewees and allows considerable 
latitude when responding to questions. When the interviewee moves away from the 
researcher’s designated area, the advantage arises that data are provided that are 
central to the interviewee (Bryman 1995:46). 
The qualitative researcher starts with a research question that clarifies the focus and 
logic of the study (Schram 2006). This open approach allows social scientists access 
to unexpectedly important topics that may not have been visible to them had they 
followed a rigid and structured research strategy. Finally, qualitative researchers often 
reject the formulation of theories and concepts at the beginning of their fieldwork. 
These researchers prefer to formulate and test theories and concepts in tandem with 
the data-collection phase. The research strategy is thus not to impose an alien 
theoretical framework on their subject of study (Bryman 1995:66-69). This is not to say 
that qualitative research could and should not be explanatory. For the purposes of this 
thesis, the researcher used both deductive and inductive reasoning in theory 
development (cf. Hammersley 2010). 
The methodological paradigm chosen, either the quantitative or the qualitative 
research approach, reflects not only those methods and techniques that are to be used 
in the project, but also a number of assumptions and values held by the researcher 
about the nature of the social world or the researcher’s ontology (Mouton 1996:36-37). 
Hence, for the purposes of this thesis, the researcher selected a case study approach 
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as a qualitative technique and triangulated the results with unobtrusive techniques 
where content analysis and a comparative documentary analysis supplemented the 
case study approach.  
1.5.2 The case study approach 
There are different types of qualitative research designs, including the case study 
method, ethnography, phenomenology, grounded theory, and content analysis (Leedy 
and Ormrod 2013:140-150). This research has chosen a qualitative research design 
method, in terms of a case study approach. A case study allows for an in-depth study 
and analysis (see Leedy and Ormrod 2013:141). This approach provides explanatory 
insights (Babbie 2013:338).  
This research is based on a case study of IGR and cooperative governance in the 
Gauteng province. The focus (i.e. unit of analysis) of the study is a selected number 
of provincial government departments and municipalities in the Gauteng province. In 
other words, the study focuses on provincial-local government IGR and cooperative 
governance. Although the full spectrum of IGR and cooperative governance in South 
Africa covers the relations between the national, provincial, and local spheres of 
government, in this context the national government is not relevant to the central 
research problem and questions of this study.  
The national government, in the main, sets national policy frameworks, norms, and 
standards, as well as funding mechanisms for service delivery. It is not directly 
involved in the technical and administrative details of service delivery implementation 
in communities. In contrast, the provincial and local spheres of government are mainly 
responsible for policy implementation, which requires effective intergovernmental 
administrative systems and mechanisms to coordinate and integrate planning, 
budgeting, implementation, and performance management for effective service 
delivery. Provincial and local government spheres are therefore central as this study 
focuses on administrative IGR. The role of the national government is covered by or 
referred to mainly in relation to broader macro policy, legislative, and institutional 
issues that underpin or affect the structure and practice of IGR and cooperative 
governance in South Africa.  
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The Gauteng province has fundamentally unique circumstances that make it a 
compelling case for a study of IGR and cooperative governance. The province is the 
main contributor to the South African economy (Gauteng Provincial Treasury 2012). 
According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 
2011), Gauteng is the most urbanised and wealthiest province in South Africa, 
accounting for 34% of the country’s gross domestic product. This makes the province 
the economic centrepiece of South Africa. Gauteng is also the province with the 
highest in-migration and the largest population in South Africa (Statistics South Africa 
2012). The province’s aspirational vision is to become an equitable, prosperous, and 
socially inclusive global city region underpinned by good governance (Gauteng 
Planning Commission 2012).  
All these unique socioeconomic factors have significant practical implications for the 
management of IGR and cooperative governance in the province. The increasing 
service delivery pressures occasioned by high in-migration and population growth and 
the complexities associated with managing a major globally competitive economy 
create complex governance challenges that require a more sophisticated approach to 
IGR and cooperative governance in the province. Increasing service delivery protests 
in Gauteng have also heightened the need to strengthen IGR and cooperative 
governance for effective service delivery and governance in the province. 
1.5.3   Unobtrusive research methods  
For the purposes of this thesis, the conceptual framework can be seen as the 
operationalisation of the study’s theoretical framework. As such, it forms a key 
component in the research design. Qualitative research methods use a conceptual 
framework to develop typologies, models, and theories from the bottom up (cf. 
Auriacombe 2016:99).  
The conceptual framework serves as an analytical tool to make sense of the social 
reality studied by the researcher. It consists of a set of interrelated 
concepts/definitions/propositions that present a systematic view of the piece of social 
reality under study. Qualitative researchers use critical analysis, reflexivity, and mostly 
an inductive logic to develop a conceptual framework for their research because, in 
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reality, the relationships and the possibilities for meaning are extremely complex 
(Auriacombe 2016:99). 
There are also many layers that overlap and connect, and depending on where the 
researcher stands, his/her perspective will vary. This process of “conceptualisation is 
much like an artist taking clay of different colours, gradually mixing and shaping it to 
create a new shape with a new colour” (Auriacombe 2016:100). This entails that “this 
process of meaning-making, the researcher’s own perspective and experiences are 
continuously mixed with existing knowledge (literature review) and theory as well as 
the findings of the study to create new insight and knowledge (abduction)” 
(Auriacombe 2016:100). 
To develop a conceptual framework, this study therefore mostly applied unobtrusive 
methods as the main research techniques. Unobtrusive research techniques involve 
studying social behaviour without affecting it and to counteract, or completely 
eliminate, bias and to promote conceptual and contextual analysis. With the exception 
of qualitative field research, all other modes of observation require researchers to 
intrude to some degree on the subject they are studying. This is the main difference 
between obtrusive and unobtrusive research techniques (cf. Auriacombe 2016).  
Like all other research methods, unobtrusive research has strengths and weaknesses. 
Importantly, unobtrusive measures involve the process of studying social behaviour 
without affecting it. With the exception of action research (qualitative field research), 
all other modes of observations require the researcher to intrude to some degree on 
whatever is being studied. This aspect of intrusion is the main difference between 
obtrusive and unobtrusive measures (Auriacombe 2016:100). 
The thesis aims develop a general understanding of unobtrusive methodological 
approaches to improve the theoretical foundations of scholarly work. The nature of the 
process of how to apply unobtrusive research techniques is still subject to debate and 
specific aspects are typically either over- or under-emphasised (cf. Boell and Cecez-
Kecmanovic in Auriacombe 2017).  
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1.5.3.1  Conceptual analysis 
According to Nuopponen (2010:7), “concepts have to be sorted out, ordered and 
defined … at various stages of the research work”. According to Nuopponen (2010:7), 
“the first step is to define the purpose for the analysis and delimit its scope, i.e. the 
domain and the number of concepts to be dealt with”. The goal of the “whole study 
may be to clarify concepts and concept systems in a domain, in which case concept 
analysis plays a major role in the whole research process” (Nuopponen 2010:7). For 
example, “concepts in a new field of knowledge may still be in a quite chaotic or 
undeveloped state, and need clarification … Concept analysis may be integrated in 
the framework of a wider investigation … inside a certain domain or to compare 
concepts over domain borders … in order to find an answer to one or more research 
questions, e.g. to establish a clarified conceptual foundations for further research” 
(Nuopponen 2010:7). This process may reveal that some sources use different terms 
for the concept to be analysed.  
According to Donne (in Nuopponen 2010:14), “the idea behind systematic concept 
analysis is that no concept is an island … every concept analysis involves other 
concepts and the relations need to be scrutinized … much of concept analysis is done 
by presenting different views, definitions, or classifications”. 
“A conceptual analysis refers to the process of developing the empirical study’s 
conceptual framework” (Auriacombe 2012:157). According to Maxwell (2005 in 
Auriacombe 2011:96), “it encompasses the system of concepts, assumptions, 
expectations, beliefs and theories informing the research and is generally regarded as 
an explanation proposed to reach a better understanding of the social 
reality/phenomena that is being investigated”. According to Eriksson and Kovalainen 
(in Auriacombe 2011:97), a “conceptual framework’s assumption is to assess and 
refine the goals; develop realistic and relevant research questions; substantiate 
arguments; clarify the theoretical framework and logic or reasoning used; define 
concepts; justify decisions; and direct data collection and analysis. The conceptual 
framework is the operationalisation of the theoretical framework of a study and 
therefore forms an intricate part of the research design. Qualitative researchers utilise 
a conceptual framework to develop typologies, models and theories from the bottom 
up”.   
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Badenhorst (2007 in Auriacombe 2012:98) states that conceptualising includes the 
following: “A researchable problem that is relevant ... an appropriate research design 
... and appropriate conceptual framework”. Furthermore, the conceptual analysis 
needs to indicate which interpretations of concepts, theories, phenomena, and 
variables the researcher believes to be most valid, and this must be supported by 
evidence (Badenhorst 2007 in Auriacombe 2012:65).  
The following aspects are important in the application of conceptual analysis in order 
to develop a conceptual framework: 
 A conceptual framework serves as a precursor to the actual research study. It 
unpacks key concepts, theories, and phenomena and determines relationships 
and variables that are used to develop themes and categories (Badenhorst 
2007 in Auriacombe 2012:65). 
 The conceptual framework also provides the basic outline for data analysis in 
order to draw conclusions. It can be seen as the golden thread that runs through 
the entire study (Badenhorst 2007 in Auriacombe 2012:65).  
 The conceptual framework is usually unpacked in the content chapters based 
on the literature review (Badenhorst 2007 in Auriacombe 2012:65).   
1.5.3.2  Historical and comparative analysis  
Historical and  comparative analysis is “a qualitative method of which the main 
resources for observation and analysis are historical records … Comparative is 
included in this method’s name to distinguish it from historians who may attempt to 
describe a particular set of events” (Auriacombe 2007:468). Historical/comparative 
social science researchers seek to discover common patterns that recur in different 
times and places (Babbie 2001 in Auriacombe 2007). “Historical/comparative research 
extends beyond a mere collection of incidents, facts, dates, or figures. It includes the 
study of the relationships among issues that have influenced the past, continue to 
influence that present, and will probably affect the future” (Glass 1989 in Auriacombe 
2007:468).  
Understanding the “historical nature of phenomena, events, people, agencies, and 
even institutions is important … In many ways, it may be as important as 
understanding the items themselves” (Auriacombe 2007:468). One cannot fully 
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evaluate or appreciate advances made in knowledge, policy, science, or technology, 
without some understanding of the circumstances within which these developments 
occurred. “Knowledge of the past provides necessary information to be used in the 
present in order to determine how things may develop in the future” (Auriacombe 
2007:468). 
(a)  Sources of historical/comparative data 
According to Auriacombe (2007:468), “[t]here is no limit to the data available for 
analysis in historical/comparative research … Four types of historical data sources are 
used: (1) oral records, (2) artefacts, (3) quantitative records, and (4) secondary 
sources”. Primary sources are documents written by a witness to the events, whereas 
secondary sources are secondary versions and, therefore, less accurate. Primary 
sources include documents, artefacts/relics, and oral testimony (Auriacombe 
2007:468). 
Documents and secondary sources were used for the purposes of this dissertation. 
Documents are records kept and written by actual people in, or witnesses of, an event. 
Other examples are minutes and records of formal and informal organisations, books, 
reports, newspapers, and so on. Secondary sources are used as back-up data and 
when primary data are not available. The author of the secondary source merely 
reports what the person who was actually present said or wrote. It is secondary source 
material and does not have as much worth or validity as a primary source. “Errors 
often result when information is transmitted from one person to another … A history 
textbook is obviously a secondary source” (Auriacombe 2007:468). 
(b)  Data collection and data analysis 
Historical/comparative researchers cannot create data. They work with what already 
exists, although some of it may be unknown at the start of the research and only comes 
to light through the investigation. In general, quality historical/comparative research 
depends on sufficient primary data rather than secondary data (Singleton and Straits 
2004). This is because emphasis is placed on credible testimony and the accurate 
description of the past event (Auriacombe 2007:468). 
Data used in “historical/comparative research have lives of their own, in that they were 
not created in the first place for research purposes” (Auriacombe 2007:468). The data 
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were created for someone else’s purpose or [an] administrative function. Therefore, 
“the data may be biased, distorted, and somewhat invalid when used for other 
purposes” (Auriacombe 2007). For this reason, researchers must evaluate data in a 
critical way, establishing the authenticity of the source, including the date and author, 
and “evaluating the accuracy and worth of the statements” (Auriacombe 2007:468). 
The central role of a researcher is the interpretation of data in light of historical 
criticism. Each fact and supposition must be carefully weighed and added to the case, 
leading to the research conclusion. Most researchers organise either by date or by 
concept/issue (Auriacombe 2007:468).   
Historical/comparative evidence is obtained from historical data by means of historical 
criticism. This can be either external or internal criticism. According to Auriacombe 
2007:46), “[e]xternal criticism establishes the genuineness or authenticity of the date 
… Is the document a forgery? In terms of internal criticism, after authenticity has been 
established, the researcher still needs to evaluate the accuracy and validity of the data. 
He or she needs to ensure that the data reveal a true picture … Were the writers 
honest? Biased? Too antagonistic or too sympathetic? Were they sufficiently 
acquainted with the topic? What motives did they have to write about or record the 
event or person? How long after the event was the record made? Does the account 
agree with other accounts? What was the purpose and in what circumstances was it 
produced? Is it complete, edited, or altered? Was the author an expert on the subject 
or lay person? How long after the event was the document produced? Is it liable to 
memory distortion? Was the author partisan, supporter of a particular course of 
action?” (Auriacombe 2007:469).   
Historical/comparative evidence, like a single case study, cannot be repeated 
(Auriacombe 2007:469). There is no control group; with the result that the researcher 
cannot be sure that one event caused another. The best that can be done is to 
establish a plausible connection between the presumed cause and the effect 
(Auriacombe 2007:469). Even if bias is detected, it does not mean that the document 
is useless. A prejudiced account can reveal the pressures and political processes that 
were being brought to bear at the time. The principal aim of document analysis is that 
everything should be questioned (Auriacombe 2007).   
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As data collection and analysis progress, the historical/comparative researcher 
synthesises the data and writes it up (Auriacombe 2007:469). This is analogous to the 
creation of a literature review. “It is a case of constantly revising, reflecting, obtaining 
criticism, and advice from others, in order to develop the most logical organisation and 
valid conclusions from the evidence analysed … It is a difficult task to take seemingly 
disparate pieces of information in order to integrate them into a meaningful whole” 
(Auriacombe 2007).  
In this analytical process, Babbie (2001) suggests that “it is the researcher’s 
imaginative understanding that breathes life and meaning into the evidence being 
analysed … The researcher also tries to find patterns among voluminous details 
describing the subject matter of study … Lastly, often, historical/comparative research 
is informed by a particular theoretical paradigm”.  
Singleton and Straits (2004 in Auriacombe 2007) provide five elements of a 
historical/comparative analysis, which consist of the following: 
 “Reconstruction of past events, which emphasise the accurate description of 
what happened. 
 Application of a general theory to a particular historical case(s), which focus on 
how the theory applies. 
 Tests of explanations of historical events, which examines why a specific event 
occurred. 
 The development of causal explanations of historical patterns, which also 
analyse why [an] event occurred but seeks a more general understanding of 
social phenomena. 
 The use of history to understand the present, or explain how and why particular 
phenomena came to be”. 
1.5.4   Sampling method and approach 
The literature on research methodology makes a distinction between two main types 
of sampling designs, namely probability and non-probability sampling (see Babbie 
2013; Leedy and Ormrod 2013; Neuman 2011). Probability sampling is associated 
with quantitative research (Neuman 2013) and non-probability sampling with 
qualitative research (Leedy and Ormrod 2013; Strydom and Delport 2011). 
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Sampling is used in quantitative research to create a representative sample in order 
to enable generalisation (Neuman 2011:240-241). Qualitative sampling is non-random 
and purposeful in that it selects the people with the most information about the subject 
matter of the research (Leedy and Ormrod 2013:152). Its main purpose “is to collect 
the richest data” (Strydom and Delport 2011:391). Qualitative sampling allows the 
researcher to gather key information that provides deeper insights and understanding 
regarding the issues or aspects of a study (Neuman 2011:241). 
Since this study is located within a qualitative research paradigm, qualitative sampling 
in the form of the non-probability purposive sampling technique was applied to select 
officials for interviews in the Gauteng Provincial Government and municipalities. A total 
of 15 officials were selected for interviews from the provincial government and 
municipalities in Gauteng. All selected officials were managers; the majority of whom 
were heads of planning and performance monitoring and evaluation in the provincial 
government departments and municipalities in the province. Table 1.1 provides a 
sampling summary.  
Table 1.1: Sampling summary  
Name of the organisation No. of officials interviewed Dates of the interviews 
Gauteng Department of Economic 
Development 
2 30 May 2017 
19 September 2017 
Mogale City Local Municipality 2 22 June 2017 
Emfuleni Local Municipality 2 23 June 2017 
City of Johannesburg Metropolitan 
Municipality 
2 26 June 2017 
29 June 2017 
Sedibeng District Municipality 2 27 June 2017 
West Rand District Municipality 1 28 June 2017 
City of Ekurhuleni Metropolitan 
Municipality 
1 28 June 2017 
Gauteng Department of Social 
Development 
1 26 July 2017 
Gauteng Department of Human 
Settlements 
1 18 September 2017 
Gauteng Department of Cooperative 
Governance and Traditional Affairs 
1 05 October 2017 
  
 31 
1.5.5   Data-collection tools  
Qualitative research uses different methods of data collection (Creswell 2003:205). 
These include observations, interviews, and documentary and other literature sources 
for analysis in the literature review (Leedy and Ormrod 2013:141-151). 
1.5.5.1  Literature and documentary sources 
The approach followed in this thesis was designed to incorporate elements that 
scholars in the field have highlighted as important factors that must be considered to 
conduct an impartial assessment of the topic of this thesis. Therefore, the choice of 
method for this study was based on the following primary and secondary sources: 
 Relevant published textbooks; 
 Unpublished dissertations and theses; 
 Relevant legislation;  
 White Papers and official and unofficial documents;  
 Published and unpublished documentation, as well as research reports and 
documents of national, provincial, and municipal governments and 
administrations;  
 Political speeches, unpublished lectures, and documented interviews; 
 Articles from scientific journals;  
 Reference reports and articles, dictionaries, newspaper reports, and magazine 
reports; and 
 Internet sources.  
1.5.5.2  Interviews 
Interviews are a common data-collection tool in qualitative research, more typically 
unstructured and semi-structured interviews (Greeff 2011:342-347). Qualitative field 
research allows for flexibility and in-depth understanding of issues (Babbie 2013:353). 
For example, unstructured interviews allow for issues in a study to be explored in detail 
(Greeff 2011:348).  
This study employed interviews as a supplementary data-collection tool. Semi-
structured face-to-face interviews were used to collect primary data from officials in 
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the provincial government departments and municipalities in Gauteng. As noted above 
a total of 15 officials were interviewed from the provincial government departments 
and municipalities in Gauteng. In this regard, ata were collected in relation to the 
central research questions and objectives of the study. The organisations involved had 
different organograms and functional arrangements. In some organisations, the 
interviews were conducted with one official mainly because such an official was 
responsible for all key functions pertaining to the study.  
Individual interviews were conducted using an interview guide based on the central 
questions and objectives of the study. While the interview guide ensured a structured 
approach to the interviews, it also allowed for more flexible and deeper conversations 
and the probing of issues between the researcher and the respondents. The 
researcher provided a formal consent form from the University of Johannesburg that 
explained the purpose of the interviews, which was completed by all the respondents 
who participated in the interviews. The purpose of the interviews was fully explained 
and the respondents were informed that their participation in the interviews was 
voluntary and that they were under no obligation to participate. Overall, the interviews 
focused on the following broad thematic areas with some key guiding questions under 
each theme:  
 General state of IGR and cooperative governance in the Gauteng province; 
 Institutional and organisational context for IGR in the Gauteng province; 
 Existing management (administrative) practices and IGR in the Gauteng 
province; 
 Systems approach and IGR in the Gauteng province; and 
 Collaborative management and IGR in the Gauteng province. 
The researcher explained the meaning of systems and collaborative management 
approaches in the context of the study to establish the respondents’ conceptual and 
contextual understanding and to facilitate their meaningful and effective participation 
in the interviews.  
After all the interviews were conducted, the data analysis followed. Reasonable efforts 
were made as far as possible to ensure that the data analysis was conducted with due 
care and diligence to maintain objectivity. Although data analysis started at the onset 
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of the research during the process of collecting and compiling material (Auriacombe 
2009:156 in Jarbandhan 2012:241), the data analysis by no means occurred in a linear 
fashion; instead, the process was arduous and inventive (Rossman 2003:150). 
Nevertheless, the analysis of the qualitative data required the researcher to constantly 
generate order so as to ensure accurate interpretation. Data analysis was conducted 
by categorising and classifying the interviews between the interviewer (the researcher) 
and the respondents.  
The primary data collected through individual interviews and the documentary analysis 
were categorised into key themes (i.e. thematic analysis) to allow the researcher to 
make sense of the data. This process involved grouping the data into themes and 
several sub-themes that emerged from the research questions used in the interviews 
(Denscombe 2007:252). The data were validated by comparing the data with the 
literature review (Denscombe 2007:252). According to Mouton (1996:112), validity is 
“the best approximation of the truth”. This is very important when a researcher 
presents data. 
Finally, the empirical data were synthesised with information from the literature review 
and the theoretical and conceptual framework to allow the study to make well-informed 
interpretations, theoretical abstractions, and conclusions. The presentation of key 
findings from the interview data and overall synthesis of the results are provided in 
Chapter Five.   
1.6  Terminology 
Each appropriate chapter contains comprehensive conceptual clarification of terms 
specific to the research. However, to avoid uncertainty and ambiguity in the 
interpretation of the concepts, the terms used in the dissertation are also concisely 
defined as follows.   
 Accountability  
Accountability is an obligation to expose, explain, and justify actions within the context 
of governance (Hanekom 1987:34). Politicians and public servants must be 
accountable to the citizens of the particular state for their actions. 
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 Centralisation 
Centralisation “occurs when an organisation’s decisions are primarily made by a small 
group of individuals at the top of its organisation while it delegates little or no authority 
to the lower levels of its organisation. A centralised organisation can be described 
according to Max Weber as bureaucracy” (Auriacombe 2011:1). 
Auriacombe (2011:1) further states that in the system of government of South Africa, 
the national government’s decision-making power may be centralised in parliament, 
but certain powers are delegated to provincial and local spheres. 
 Cooperative governance 
According to Edwards (2008a:66), cooperative governance can be traced back to the 
German Bundestreue concept, which entails a set of unwritten principles on which 
relationships between national and provincial government are based. It means that the 
German Constitutional Court ensured that different parts of the German federation act 
in good faith and mutual trust. Cooperative governance therefore implies that sub-
national and national jurisdictions have certain political and legal obligations to support 
and consult one another on matters of common concern, to cooperate and maintain 
friendly relations.  
 Decentralisation 
Decentralisation is when there is a clear movement towards delegated state functions 
away from central government control. Some functions are delegated to subordinate 
government levels, while other powers and functions are horizontally transferred and 
outsourced to private sector enterprises and community agencies. The trend 
characterises both developed and developing countries. In South Africa, particularly, 
the trend away from a state-led, interventionist approach to development, to a focus 
on cooperative governance, is evident in the Constitution, where independent 
functions and powers are transferred to the local government sphere (Simon 2003:141 
in Rabie 2011:200). “This type of planning may be more challenging to implement, but 
holds out the prospect of more sensitive and responsive local environments where 
individual circumstances, rather than national blueprints, determine outcomes” (Simon 
2003:141 in Rabie 2011:200). 
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 Federal system 
In terms of federal and unitary government, the South African government structure 
has a basic unitary system but with very strong and broad federal characteristics. An 
important reason for this is that the Constitutional Assembly, in an attempt to 
democratise South African society by bringing the government closer to the people, 
conferred specific constitutional mandates on provinces and local authorities. The 
government has, however, retained a component of central control to regulate and 
improve this transformation or democratisation, and to facilitate and coordinate the 
reconstruction and development of disadvantaged communities. This is what makes 
South Africa’s governmental structure unique and difficult to classify in terms of the 
traditional differentiation between federal and unitary states (Du Toit in Doyle, Naudé 
and Kalema 2007:51). 
Du Toit (in Doyle et al. 2007:46) states that a federal government can be defined as a 
government in which authority is decentralised to sub-national units and relationships 
are characterised by both unity (cooperative and uniform action by units) and 
independence, such as states in the United States of America (USA). 
 Good governance 
It is crucial to define good governance in the context of urban service delivery and the 
local government’s role in it. In this regard, Gildenhuys and Knipe (2000:91) state that 
“good governance is when government attains its ultimate goal of creating conditions 
for a good and satisfactory quality of life for each citizen”. From this description, Hirst 
(2000 in Molinyane 2012:14) concludes that “good governance refers to a government 
that actively and purposefully creates an effective political framework conducive to 
private economic action – stable regimes, the rule of law, efficient state administration 
adapted to the roles that governments can actually perform, and a strong civil society 
independent of the state”.  
The manner in which governments govern is frequently judged as either good or bad. 
The level of trust in government institutions, the legitimacy of political leadership, the 
responsiveness of the government to address societal concerns and aspirations, as 
well as the level of openness, health, security, education, and justice, all influence the 
way governments are perceived. Characteristics associated with good governance 
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reforms generally relate to accountability, rule of law, human rights, judicial 
independence, and anti-corruption strategies. 
 Governance 
Du Toit et al. (2002:64) define governance as “the actions undertaken to improve the 
general welfare of a society by means of the services delivered”. Auriacombe 
(2009:78) argues that “this definition does not define what good governance entails … 
the fact that certain actions are taken and services are delivered does not necessarily 
imply good governance … the question is therefore, what constitutes good 
governance?”.  
Just like “government”, the concept of “governance” is multidimensional (Rhodes 
1997). The concept can be applied to various fields, such as: 
 global governance, referring to intra- and international cooperation;  
 corporate governance, referring to the way corporations are governed by a 
board of directors; and 
 public governance, referring to the interrelationship between civil society, 
government, business, and other stakeholders in a network to address societal 
challenges. 
 Government 
According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2017), three meanings can be ascribed 
to the concept “government”, namely:  
 “the group of people who control and make decisions for a country, state, or 
nation; 
 a particular system to control a country, state, or nation; and 
 the process or manner of controlling a country, state, or nation”. 
This definition accentuates three aspects of government, namely people, system, and 
process. The people dimension generally refers to elected political representatives 
who perform a policymaking, monitoring, and oversight function over the executive 
institutions of government. It also includes civil servants (e.g. public officials, public 
managers, administrative staff, etc.). The system typically refers to the manner in 
which a government is organised into legislative, executive, and judiciary authorities, 
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as well as different spheres, such as national, provincial, and local. The process 
dimension emphasises the way or manner in which a government fulfils its obligations 
and responsibilities. This includes controlling, protecting, and promoting the general 
wellbeing of society. The controlling process generally refers to the making and 
enforcing of policies to guide societal activities and the type of services and goods 
rendered by them, including health, education, prosperity through job creation, and 
housing. In this regard, Osborne and Gaebler (1992:23) view a government as 
primarily the “steering” agent of society. Governments have to establish a common 
vision for society and then steer all socioeconomic and political activities toward that 
vision. 
 Governmental relations 
Governmental relations are influenced by the horizontal and vertical division of powers 
and functions (Doyle et al. 2007:8). As the responsibilities of government increased 
and the number of government institutions expanded to carry out the new 
responsibilities, the regulations that control orderly relations between government 
bodies became more complex and comprehensive (Doyle et al. 2007:9).   
The classification of governmental relations according to Doyle et al. (2007:18-26) 
follows. Informally, it is people who are needed to create these relationships and 
maintain them, in terms of the provisions set out by legislature. Governmental relations 
can be positively or negatively affected by the following actions and behaviour of 
people (e.g. it can lead to the establishment of an informal organisation and channels): 
 IGR (between governments – vertical, which is in different spheres, and 
horizontal, which is in the same sphere – as specified in the Constitution and 
other legislation); 
 Intragovernmental relations (within government institutions); 
 Extragovernmental relations (between the government and the community); 
and 
 Interstate or international relations. 
With the focus in this thesis being more on IGR, the following is also important. 
Relations at the horizontal intergovernmental level differ from vertical relations in three 
respects (Hattingh, Levy and Tapscott in Doyle et al. 2007:20): 
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 There is no formal concept of power, although power may still be a factor in 
relations between a smaller and larger body, even if only perceived in terms of 
size. 
 There should be no difference in the negotiating ability and powers of 
governmental authorities on the same level of government. 
 Although there is still interdependence on the horizontal level, it differs in terms 
of the resources needed. In vertical relations, resources such as policy and 
finances are relevant, while at the horizontal level, resources such as 
information and physical assistance are more applicable. 
 Integrated Development Plan (IDP)  
An IDP is a plan for an area that provides an overall framework for development. It 
aims to coordinate the work of local government and the other spheres of government 
in a coherent plan to improve the quality of life for all the people living in the area 
concerned. The IDP should take into account the existing conditions and problems, as 
well as the development resources available. The plan should look at economic and 
social development for the area as a whole. It must create a framework for how land 
is to be used, what infrastructure and services are needed, and how the environment 
should be protected (IDP 2006). 
 Management 
The concept of management has its origin in the private sector, especially large 
enterprises (Lane 2008:15; Lane and Wallis 2009:102). The concept of management 
can be traced to the Latin term “Manu agere”, which means to lead by hand (Mahmood 
and Basharat 2012:513). In the context of this study, this thesis adopts the following 
definition of management: “Management is the activity of getting things done with the 
help of other people and resources. Management is [also the] art of getting things done 
with the help of other people … Management is a process that includes strategic 
planning, setting objectives, managing resources, developing the human and financial 
assets needed to achieve objectives and measuring results. Planning, organizing, 
staffing, directing, controlling, leading, monitoring, communicating and coordinating 
are the functions of management … Management is the most important part of any 
organisation. No any organisation can achieve its objectives without proper 
management” (Mahmood and Basharat 2012:512-514). Tools of management are 
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required to ensure the proper governance and management of public sector resources 
(employees and budgets) for effective and efficient public service delivery (Lane and 
Wallis 2009:102).   
 Municipality, local authority, and local government  
According to Ismail, Bayat and Meyer (1997:3), it is “that level of government which is 
commonly defined as a decentralised representative institution with general and 
specific powers devolved to it by a higher tier of government within a geographical 
area”. Local authorities comprise that sphere of government consisting of 
municipalities, and which must be put in place for the entire country (Craythorne 
2003:6). 
In terms of Section 151(1) of the Constitution, the local sphere of government consists 
of municipalities that must be created for the entire South Africa, and derives its 
powers from the Constitution. A municipality is a “geographical area of an urban 
system for which a city council, town council, village council or a similar local 
government body has been established to govern and manage local public activities 
of the inhabitants” (Gildenhuys and Knipe 2000:228). Municipalities have the right to 
govern according to their own initiative the local affairs of their communities (Section 
152 of the Constitution of 1996). A municipality publishes local laws in order to govern 
the local community and it provides and manages local public service delivery. 
A municipality is a political subdivision that has substantial control over local affairs. 
This includes the power to impose taxes or to exact labour for prescribed purposes. In 
terms of Section 156(1) of the Constitution, it has the right to govern and administer 
on its own initiative but it is subject to constitutional provisions, as well as national and 
provincial legislation. The national and provincial spheres may not compromise or 
impede a municipality’s ability to exercise its powers or perform its functions. For the 
purposes of this thesis, the terms “local government” and “municipality” are used 
interchangeably.  
 Partnerships  
“A partnership is an arrangement and agreement between a government institution 
and one or more parties (inside or outside government), where there is an agreement 
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to work cooperatively to achieve public policy objectives” (Department of Public 
Service and Administration 2000:15). 
 Provincial government departments 
There are currently nine provinces in South Africa. (Provinces are regulated through 
Chapter 6 of the Constitution. According to the Parliamentary Monitoring Group (2011 
in Greyling 2014:45), the executive in each province is called the Executive Council 
and is headed by the premier. Members of the Executive Councils (MECs) are 
accountable to their legislatures in the same way the cabinet is accountable to 
parliament. The premier is elected by the Members of the Provincial Legislature 
(MPLs) from among themselves at the first sitting of that legislature after an election. 
The premier appoints the MECs from among the MPLs. There may be up to 10 MECs 
in each province (the exception is the Western Cape, whose provincial constitution 
allows for the additional appointment of up to two non-voting MECs from outside the 
legislature). MECs are accountable to their premiers. Like ministers, MECs are 
responsible for departments. These provincial departments deal only with those 
matters that provinces are allowed to control or those over which they share control 
with national government (as per the schedules contained in the Constitution). These 
departments are uneven per province and exclude the legislature and royal 
households, which are listed as departments by some provinces, like KwaZulu-Natal. 
It is also noticeable that the names of the departments at provincial level do not match 
those at national level, and in some cases, more than one national department is 
combined to constitute one provincial department; for example, the Department of 
Housing and Local Government in Gauteng represents the national departments of 
Human Settlements and Cooperative Governance. Political leadership at provincial 
level is provided by MECs. 
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 Unitary system 
Craythorne (1990:33), in describing a unitary state, makes reference to the 
Westminster system or model that consists of the following elements and also depicts 
South Africa’s system of government: 
 “Universal elections in which the party which can capture the most 
constituencies forms the government of the day. 
 A head of state (sovereign or president). 
 A chief executive or Prime Minister. 
 A parliament, which may consist of one or two houses, and which is the 
supreme or sovereign legislative body of the state and all other legislative 
bodies and their legislation, are subordinate to the parliament. 
 A cabinet as the head of the executive arm, and which is accountable to the 
parliament. 
 A civil service which carries out the will of the executive. 
 An independent judiciary but a judiciary which does not have the power to rule 
on the validity of laws passed by the parliament. 
 The idea of equality of all before the law, and of the rule of law”. 
In the modern state, a unitary government can be defined as a government in which 
authority is centralised on a national level and the power levels of government have 
little or no autonomy (Du Toit and Hattingh in Doyle et al. 2007:48).   
1.7   Ethical considerations 
The literature on research methodology identifies broad categories of ethical issues 
that require attention and care when conducting research. These include ethical 
considerations such as protection of participants from harm, voluntary and informed 
consent, privacy, anonymity and confidentiality, and honesty (Babbie 2013; Leedy and 
Ormrod 2013; Neuman 2011).  
During the interviews, special care was taken to manage ethical issues applicable to 
this study. The purpose of this study was made clear to the participants before the 
interviews to allow them to make informed decisions about their participation in the 
study. The researcher explained to the participants that their participation in the study 
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was voluntary. The participants were also assured of the anonymity and confidentiality 
of the information during the data-collection, -analysis, and -reporting processes.   
In addition, the researcher also managed ethical challenges arising from his status as 
a public servant working for the Gauteng Provincial Government in relation to access 
to information and separating his role as an employee and academic researcher in 
order to ensure objectivity and independence. In this regard, the researcher conducted 
himself with professionalism, integrity, and honesty during the entire research process, 
including respecting the government’s confidential and classified information.   
Finally, the ethical considerations of the University of Johannesburg were taken into 
account during the data collection and interpretation thereof during this study. 
1.8   Structure of the thesis 
The following section provides an outline of the chapters that constitute this thesis. 
Chapter One: General introduction and scientific and methodological 
orientation 
Chapter One provides the background, research rationale, and the problem statement 
of the study. The primary guiding research question and the secondary research 
questions and research objectives are provided. The methodological approach, 
research design, research methods, the qualitative research design, and unobtrusive 
research methods in terms of the conceptual analysis and the historical/comparative 
analysis are explained. The context of the literature review as applied in the study and 
the data-collection methods are also highlighted. Terms that are used frequently in the 
thesis are defined or explained. 
Chapter Two: Conceptual and contextual variables that influence 
intergovernmental relations (IGR) 
Chapter Two provides the context for understanding the concept of federalism. It 
defines federalism and provides different typologies and variations of federalism. It 
also explains fiscal federalism and explains how powers and functions are 
institutionally assigned to a federal state. The key implications of federalism for IGR 
are highlighted. This chapter provides the context for understanding the concept of 
decentralisation, the rationale and key strategic preconditions for decentralisation, as 
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well as the key implications of decentralisation for IGR. This is followed by a discussion 
of the context of IGR in terms of cooperative governance. It also defines cooperative 
governance and IGR and explains the core purpose and role of IGR. Different models 
and other contextual factors that shape IGR practices are also provided. It explains 
intergovernmental fiscal relations and, finally, the institutional mechanisms for IGR.  
Chapter Three: Conceptualising and contextualising the theoretical and 
conceptual underpinnings of a framework for IGR 
This chapter pays attention the theoretical and conceptual foundations and key 
aspects related to bureaucracy in a public sector organisation. It discusses the 
theoretical and conceptual foundations and key aspects related to NPM and the 
modernisation of the public sector, as well as the theoretical and conceptual 
foundations and key aspects related to systems thinking in a public sector setting. This 
is followed by a conceptualisation of collaborative management theory in the public 
sector and then by a discussion of planning and collaborative planning. Performance 
management is then conceptualised and contextualised to promote collaborative 
performance management in a public sector setting. The chapter conceptualises a 
multi-theoretical analytical framework for IGR. These aspects includes systems 
thinking as an approach to IGR and a collaborative approach to IGR.  
Chapter Four: Variables that influence comparative international 
intergovernmental systems and practices 
This chapter provides international comparative perspectives, experiences, and 
lessons of various systems and practices of IGR and cooperative governance by 
drawing on countries from different continents, namely Australia, Canada, Germany, 
and Nigeria. This chapter aims to identify key lessons for the structure and practice of 
IGR and cooperative governance in South Africa, with specific reference to the 
Gauteng province as the case setting for this study.   
Chapter Five: Contextual and empirical variables that influence the context of 
IGR in South Africa and the Gauteng province  
Chapter Five discusses the constitutional framework for the post-apartheid democratic 
state. It then pays attention to state transformation and public management reforms. 
This is followed by a discussion of the structure and practice of IGR and cooperative 
 44 
governance in terms of the rationale for IGR, the IGR strategy and policy framework, 
the IGR model, institutions and structures, intergovernmental fiscal relations and 
funding model, and the institutional, structural, and systemic weaknesses of the IGR 
system (including poor bureaucratic practices and culture, poor integrated planning, 
poor intergovernmental performance management, and the overall effects and 
consequences of poor IGR).   
The chapter also contextualises the key empirical findings focusing on the Gauteng 
province, in terms of the institutional context for IGR and cooperation (including the 
institutional configuration of the provincial and local government and the institutional 
culture and politics of provincial government). This is followed by a presentation of the 
findings in terms of the existing management practices and IGR (including the 
coordination of internal organisational business functions, the coordination of 
intergovernmental business functions, and IGR resources and capacity). The chapter 
then discusses the findings in terms of systems thinking applications and practices 
and concludes with collaborative management and IGR.  
Chapter 6: Synthesis, conclusions, and proposals 
This chapter provides a synthesis and overall conclusion in terms of addressing to 
what extent the existing institutional environment (context) and management 
(administrative) mechanisms, systems, and practices in the Gauteng Provincial 
Government and municipalities affect IGR and cooperative governance in the Gauteng 
province. Overall, several key conclusions are drawn from this research in relation to 
key fundamental factors or issues that undermine effective IGR and cooperative 
governance between the different spheres of government in the Gauteng province.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
CONCEPTUAL AND CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES THAT INFLUENCE 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS (IGR) 
2.1  Introduction 
There are certain theoretical and conceptual issues that underpin the concept of IGR 
and cooperative governance. In this regard, the concept of IGR and cooperative 
governance cannot be understood outside the context of the broader theoretical and 
conceptual issues that relate to the configuration of the state and the system of 
government. Also, almost all countries have multi-level systems of government but 
differ in their degree of centralisation or decentralisation, as well as the structure, 
status, roles, and powers of their different levels of government (Fenna and Hollander 
2013:220).   
The systems of government affect the distribution of state powers and functions within 
countries (Bello 2014:74). The integration (unitarisation) or fragmentation 
(federalisation) of powers has a bearing on the capacity of the state to perform its 
functions (Aiyede 2009:250). The choices between the unitarisation or federalisation 
of state powers and functions determine the nature and character of a country’s 
system of IGR.  
Chapter Two attempts to address the following research objective posed in Chapter 
One (see Section 1.4): To provide a systematic conceptualisation and 
contextualisation of the variables that influence IGR. Against this background, this 
chapter, in general, addresses key concepts of federalism, decentralisation, and IGR, 
including intergovernmental fiscal relations, to provide theoretical and conceptual 
clarity and foundation for this study. Particular attention will be paid to the relevant 
aspects related to the above variables that influence IGR.  
Hence, the chapter firstly provides the context for understanding the concept of 
federalism. It defines federalism and provides different typologies and variations of 
federalism. It also explains fiscal federalism and describes how powers and functions 
are institutionally assigned to a federal state. The key implications of federalism for 
IGR are highlighted.  
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It then proceeds to provide the context for understanding the concept of 
decentralisation, the rationale and key strategic preconditions for decentralisation, as 
well as the key implications of decentralisation for IGR. This is followed by a discussion 
of the context of IGR in terms of cooperative governance. It also defines cooperative 
governance. The chapter then defines IGR and explains the core purpose and role of 
IGR. Different models and other contextual factors that shape IGR practices are also 
provided. It explains intergovernmental fiscal relations and finally the institutional 
mechanisms of IGR.  
2.2   Understanding the concept of federalism 
Federalism and IGR are different but closely interrelated concepts (Bassey 2014:226). 
The concept of IGR can therefore not be studied without reference to the concept of 
federalism. In other words, the concept of IGR cannot be better understood outside 
the context of federalism. It is therefore important to first provide an understanding of 
the concept of federalism in order to lay a sound theoretical foundation for the 
understanding of the concept of IGR and cooperative governance. This section begins 
with the origin and exposition of key definitional issues related to the concepts of 
federalism and decentralisation. Key issues related to the typologies and variations of 
federalism and institutional allocation of powers and functions in a federal system are 
also discussed, as well as key implications of the concept of federalism for IGR.   
Federalism has a long history and tradition as a system of government. The origin of 
the concept of federalism dates back to many years ago in the USA (Fenna 2007:300; 
Law 2012:542). The concept of federalism is rooted in the Latin word foedus, which 
means treaty, pact, or covenant (Law 2012:542). The federal idea influenced the 
experimentation with the federal system of government in the USA after independence 
from Britain in 1776 (Law 2012:542). Following its adoption as a system of government 
in the USA, federalism was embraced by Switzerland in 1848 and Canada in 1867 
(Fenna 2007:300). Federalism has since evolved and gained widespread practice in 
many countries. The configuration of government has since come to be understood in 
dichotomous terms as a choice between a unitary and federal system (Hooghe and 
Marks 2012:179).   
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2.2.1  Defining the concept of federalism 
Like many social science concepts, federalism lacks a simple straightforward definition 
(Babalola 2015:77; Bolaji 2013:95-96). There is no ideal system of federalism because 
the design of each federal system depends on country-specific contextual factors and 
conditions (Adejumobi 2004:215).  
Federalism can be better understood in comparison with other systems of government. 
There are three main systems of government, namely confederal, federal, and unitary 
systems (Breton 2000:4). The confederal system is not relevant to this study. A unitary 
system of government operates on a “principle of overriding central authority” (Fenna 
and Hollander 2013:220). This means that real power and authority in a unitary state 
rests with the central or national government, and sub-national governments are 
subject to the authority of the national government (Bello 2014:74; Breton 2000:4; 
Hooghe and Marks 2012:179; Suberu 2009:68). The sub-national governments in a 
unitary system derive their existence from the central government (Lane and Ersson 
2005:176). This institutional configuration of powers and authority creates a different 
character and dynamics of IGR, as will be shown later in this chapter. 
In contrast to a unitary system, federalism is based on a “principle of shared 
sovereignty” (Fenna and Hollander 2013:220). The literature offers various definitions 
of the concept of federalism. Federalism refers to a system of government in which 
political power or authority is divided between the national and sub-national 
governments in a state (Anderson 2014:16; Ibbih and Idiagi 2015:111; Osunbor 
2006:15). It is mainly about “the sharing of powers, functions or responsibilities and 
resources among levels of government” (Bassey 2014:226). In simple terms, 
federalism is mainly about self-rule and shared rule (Béland and Lecours 2011:199; 
Ojo 2014:43; also see Breton 2000:4). The constitutionally guaranteed autonomy of 
the sub-national governments is a key institutional feature of federalism, which is 
absent in a unitary system (Suberu 2009:68; also see Adejumobi 2004:215; Dickovick: 
2014:554). 
At a more complex level, federalism is defined in terms of a more abstract concept of 
sovereignty. According to Cameron (2001:121), “federalism divides the sovereignty of 
the state between a central government and regional governments”. Law (2012:541) 
contends that federalism is commonly defined as “a division of sovereignty between 
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two levels of government”. Law (2012:542) disagrees with this definition and asserts 
that sovereignty is indivisible and cannot be divided and shared. Law (2012:549) then 
defines federalism as “a division of powers flowing from sovereignty between two 
levels of government of equal status”. Although there is a slight variation, some 
important commonalities exist between these definitions. The common thread across 
all definitions is the notion of sharing state power or authority between the different 
levels of government. From these definitions, it can therefore be concluded that 
federalism means a division of state power or authority between the different levels of 
government. However, contrary to a common classical view in the literature, which 
limits federalism to two levels of government, federalism is a much broader concept 
that involves more than two levels of government.  
Federal systems are usually large in geographic and demographic terms and are often 
non-hierarchical in structure (Bakvis 2013:204-206). In a federal system, both the 
existence and autonomy of the different levels of government are guaranteed by a 
constitution (Feld 2014:233). Autonomy is the main defining institutional character of 
a federal system, which makes it different from a unitary system of government. In 
other words, the degree of institutional (constitutional) autonomy in fiscal matters and 
legislative competencies differentiates federalism from unitarism. The definition and 
the significance of autonomy in the configuration of power relations between the 
different levels of government in a federal system are better summarised below.  
“Autonomy means that the constituent units of a federal state structure enjoy more 
than just some delegated competencies. They are autonomous in many ways: they 
have their own institutions and organs; they have their own laws and regulations; they 
have a constitution; they have legislators, governments and judges; they have at least 
some financial autonomy, meaning that they may raise taxes and decide freely upon 
their affectation. Constituent units thus have their own legal order. Federalism thus 
consists of a specific combination of self-rule (autonomy), of limited rule 
(superposition) and of shared rule (participation). The two levels of government are 
strongly and closely dependent on each other. Without the constituent units, the 
federal unit cannot exist” (Auer 2005:421-422).  
Autonomy and cooperation are therefore two important concepts associated with 
federalism (see Simeon 2001:151). Autonomy in a federal system allows levels of 
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government to respond to the needs of their citizens, and cooperation is important to 
deal with issues of concurrency and interdependence (Simeon 2001:151). The main 
weakness of autonomy is that it can lead to duplication, competition, and regional 
tensions (Simeon 2001:151). On the other hand, cooperation can lead to delays as 
different levels of government strive to reach an agreement or consensus (Simeon 
2001:151). The concept of cooperation will be revisited later when dealing with the 
concept of IGR.   
Furthermore, it needs to be noted that federal states come about through a union of 
previously independent states or political power devolution in previously unitary states 
due to a combination of political and socioeconomic factors (Anderson 2014:16; also 
see Williams 2005a:351). Federalism is often viewed and adopted as a suitable 
institutional option and mechanism to balance and promote national unity and 
diversity, political stability, social cohesion, and harmonious co-existence of different 
groups in multi-ethnic nation states (Aiyede 2009:249; Anderson 2014:16; Adejumobi 
2004:214; Akume 2014:171; Béland and Lecours 2011:201; Fenna and Hollander 
2013:222; Ikeji 2011:122; Lane and Ersson 2005:163; Odubajo 2011:1; Agranoff 
2004:27). 
2.2.2   Different typologies and variations of federalism  
There are many different types and variations of federalism. The institutional 
configurations of federalism manifest in different forms, ranging from parliamentary 
federalism, presidential federalism, executive federalism, cooperative federalism, to 
competitive federalism (Blume and Voigt 2011:239; Inman and Rubinfeld 1997:45-53; 
Zheng 2005:102). Competitive federalism promotes economic and spatial competition 
between regions in a federal state (Keating 2012:217). Asymmetrical federalism refers 
to differentiated approaches and arrangements in the manner in which powers and 
functions are assigned to different regions within a federal state (Bolaji 2009:115-116). 
This section only examines two types of federalism in terms of the division of powers 
and functions between the national and sub-national governments, namely power-
separation (jurisdictional/dual/legislative/coordinate federalism) and power-sharing 
(cooperative/administrative federalism) models of federalism. This is because the 
institutional configuration of power in a federal state has significant implications for 
IGR.  
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The power-separation model of federalism (jurisdictional/dual/legislative/coordinate 
federalism) refers to a federal system based on a horizontal division of powers and 
functions where there are separate and autonomous spheres of government with 
distinct legislative jurisdictions and autonomy in different policy areas (Braun, Bullinger 
and Wälti 2002:117; Fenna 2007:303-304; Halberstam and Hills 2001:175; Ibbih and 
Idiagi 2015:112; also see Keating 2012:215-216). This system places a higher 
premium on jurisdictional autonomy and independence of spheres and less emphasis 
on functional overlaps and intergovernmental cooperation (Braun et al. 2002:117; 
Fenna 2007:304). The system is also characterised by non-hierarchical horizontal 
relationships and greater policy differences between the different spheres of 
government (Bakvis and Brown 2010:484). The design of the American, Canadian, 
and Australian federations represents a classic example of this model of federalism 
(Fenna 2007:303). Further analysis of Canadian and Australian federalism is provided 
in Chapter Four.   
In contrast to the power-separation model of federalism is the power-sharing model of 
federalism as typified mainly by German federalism (Braun et al. 2002:116). This 
system of federalism, sometimes referred to as administrative federalism, assigns 
powers and functions vertically between the different spheres of government, and 
gives policy and legislative powers to the national (federal) government and 
administrative (implementation) functions to the sub-national governments (Bakvis 
and Brown 2010:487; Fenna 2007:303; Fenna and Hollander 2013:222; Halberstam 
and Hills 2001:175; Schwager 1999:284). This federal design creates a greater degree 
of functional and policy interdependence between the different spheres of government 
in a federal state (see Braun et al. 2002:116-117).  
This power-sharing institutional model has, in turn, brought about the concept of 
cooperative (concurrent) federalism, with Germany being a classic example of this 
federal system (Döring and Schnellenbach 2011:84-89; also see Fenna and Hollander 
2013:222). The concept of cooperative federalism simply refers to a system of 
federalism based on the principles of friendly relations and mutual interdependence, 
coordination, cooperation, and partnership between the different spheres of 
government in a federal state (Bolleyer and Bytzek 2009:376; Braun et al. 2002:116-
117; Erk 2003:301-302; Ibbih and Idiagi 2015:112; Scharpf 2008:511). This concept 
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dates back to the 1960s in Germany (Erk 2003:302). The efficacy of this federal 
system depends on effective IGR (see Fenna and Hollander 2013:222).  
Cooperative federalism is sometimes also referred to or associated with the notion of 
unitary federalism (see Capano 2015:325). Unitary federalism is characterised by 
shared functions and interdependence, as well as a cooperative, but more 
hierarchical, system of IGR and decision making dominated by central or national 
government (Capano 2015:325). Unitary federalism often aims to achieve uniform or 
comparable standards of services or living for all citizens within the federation (Capano 
2015:325). It is this concept of cooperative federalism that has inspired the concept of 
cooperative governance as a governance philosophy that underpins the South African 
system of IGR. The concept of cooperative governance will be further discussed later 
in this chapter as part of the discussion of the concept of IGR.  
Both power-separation and power-sharing models of federalism represent common 
and dominant models of federal design in developed countries. Federal practice is, 
however, somewhat different in African countries. Contrary to conventional federal 
practices in developed countries, African countries “have the formal-legal trappings of 
federalism – including territorial upper chambers, elected subnational officials and 
constitutional protections for SNGs [sub-national governments] – but are quite distinct 
among contemporary federations in the power of their centripetal forces” (Dickovick 
2014:555).  
According to Dickovick (2014:559-563), key centripetal (centralising) forces or factors 
that mainly characterise African federalism include dominant governing party political 
control (political centralism), national control of sub-national expenditure 
(administrative centralism), and limited fiscal autonomy (limited own revenue sources) 
of the sub-national governments and their greater reliance on national 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers (fiscal centralism). This state of affairs points to the 
notion of Africa’s procedural federalism as opposed to substantive federalism as 
practised in many developed federations. Overall, the structural and institutional 
limitations of federalism in the African context can be summarised as “a system of 
governance that combines self-rule with shared government, the federal solution has 
failed in much of Africa because the continent’s aspiring federations have lacked the 
institutional and structural resources needed to secure the authority of the central state 
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against potential centrifugal challenges and/or to preserve the autonomy of 
subnational administrations against central usurpation” (Suberu 2009:83).  
2.3   Fiscal federalism 
Fiscal and financial arrangements are important considerations in the design and 
operation of a federal system. The allocation of powers and functions, including 
revenue and expenditure responsibilities, between the federal and sub-national 
governments, is one of the key institutional features of federalism (Akindele, Olaopa 
and Obiyan 2002:562; Angahar 2013:114). The theory of fiscal federalism is important 
in this regard. The main contribution of the theory of fiscal federalism to the 
configuration of the state relates to the allocation of powers and functions between the 
different levels of government in a federal system of government. The traditional theory 
of fiscal federalism provides broader theoretical principles and general guidelines for 
the division and allocation of powers and functions, as well as fiscal instruments to 
support the performance of these functions in a federal state (Ajam 2001:126; Ibbih 
and Idiagi 2015:110). Put differently, fiscal federalism provides guidance and an 
important framework regarding the design of efficient and effective government (Rubin 
and Feeley 2008:187).   
These broad guidelines, based mainly on public finance theory of fiscal federalism, 
direct that macroeconomic stabilisation functions (monetary and fiscal policy) and 
redistributive functions (income tax) should be administered at the national 
government level, while allocative functions (service delivery functions) should be 
performed at the sub-national levels of government (Ajam 2001:126; Ibbih and Idiagi 
2015:110; Keating 2012:218; Vo 2010:659-660). In this regard, the decentralisation of 
allocative functions (service delivery functions) to the sub-national governments is 
justified based on efficiency gains (cost and allocative efficiency) in terms of 
expenditure and delivery of public services (Ajam 2001:126; Vo 2010:659-660; 
Williams 2005a:352).  
In other words, functions that are national in character and scope (i.e. national 
defence, foreign affairs, fiscal and monetary policy, etc.) should be reserved 
exclusively for the federal government, while functions with local benefits, i.e. health, 
education, etc., should be shared between the national and sub-national governments 
 53 
with purely local functions (i.e. local roads, refuse removal, etc.) being assigned to 
local government (Akindele et al. 2002:562). Key policy considerations such as 
national socioeconomic stability, as well as service delivery efficiency and 
effectiveness, underpin the theoretical logic and rationale behind this assignment and 
devolution of powers and functions. In addition, fiscal federalism literature further 
provides guidelines on the assignment of tax powers and contends that mobile tax 
bases (such as income taxes) and value-added tax (VAT) should be administered at 
the central government level and taxes on fixed tax bases (such as land) should be 
levied at the local level (Ajam 2001:126). 
Fiscal imbalances inherent in most federal systems of government have also brought 
more attention to the concept of fiscal federalism. These relate mainly to imbalances 
in fiscal powers and expenditure responsibilities in which national or federal 
government possesses more fiscal powers and the sub-national governments have 
more service delivery responsibilities (Simeon 2001:148). The other inherent problem 
in federal systems relate to the differences in the wealth and fiscal capacities of the 
different levels of government (Simeon 2001:148).  
Simeon (2001:148-149) identifies three key elements of fiscal federalism. The first 
element relates to the allocation of fiscal powers and how they match expenditure 
responsibilities. The second element pertains to the harmonisation of revenue 
instruments across the different levels of government for macroeconomic stability and 
efficiency. The third element entails the equalisation of revenues between richer and 
poorer areas to achieve social justice in a federal system. It is therefore against this 
background that intergovernmental fiscal transfers provide a key fiscal instrument in 
federal systems (Simeon 2001:149). Further detail on mechanisms to address fiscal 
imbalances in a multi-sphere system of government will be provided later in this 
chapter when discussing intergovernmental fiscal relations.  
2.4  Institutional assignment of powers and functions in a federal state  
There is a vast difference in the institutional configuration of functional powers and 
legislative competencies between federal and unitary states. As indicated above, a 
unitary state is based on the principle of “single locus of sovereignty” (centralised 
sovereignty) (Fenna and Hollander 2013:220). Formal constitutional powers in a 
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unitary state rest with the central government, and sub-national governments derive 
their powers and functions from the central government (Bello 2014:67; Ibietan 
2011:54; Zimmermann and Finlay 2011:191).  
The sub-national governments in a unitary state lack the real jurisdictional powers and 
autonomy found in a federal state as the central government can at any time decide 
to change or withdraw sub-national government powers without their consent or 
consulting with them (Bello 2014:67; Law 2012:547; Phillimore 2013:228; 
Zimmermann and Finlay 2011:191; also see Agranoff 2004:28). It is for this reason 
that the sub-national governments are considered “subordinate” in a unitary system 
as opposed to “coordinate” in a federal system (Ibietan 2011:54). Contrary to a 
horizontal relationship of equality found in a federal system, a unitary system of 
government displays a vertical hierarchical relationship between the central and sub-
national governments.  
In contrast to a unitary system, there is a clear constitutional separation, division, and 
allocation of powers and functions between the national and sub-national 
governments in a federal state (Babalola 2015:78; Osadolor 2010:194). The sub-
national governments in a federal state derive their jurisdictional powers and autonomy 
directly from the Constitution and not from the central government (Zimmermann and 
Finlay 2011:191). This constitutional protection is important to guarantee and 
safeguard the institutional autonomy of the different levels of government in a federal 
system (see Agranoff 2004:34-42).  
Functional powers and competencies in federal systems are normally classified into 
exclusive, concurrent, and residual legislative powers (Akindele et al. 2002:562; also 
see Baier 2005:210). The term “shared (concurrent) competencies” means that the 
different levels of government in a state share powers and jurisdiction on the same 
policy or functional area (Bolleyer and Thorlakson 2012:571-572). Shared 
competencies create interdependence between the national and sub-national 
governments (Bolleyer and Thorlakson 2012:571-572). This institutional configuration 
creates more incentives and necessity for cooperation between the different levels of 
government (Leon and Ferrin Pereira 2011:517).  
Apart from shared competencies, the different levels of government can also be 
assigned exclusive legislative powers and competencies. Exclusive competencies 
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refer to a situation whereby one level of government is assigned full legislative and 
implementation (administrative) powers in a policy or functional area (Bolleyer and 
Thorlakson 2012:571-572). Exclusive competencies promote and maximise the 
legislative autonomy of each level of government (Bolleyer and Thorlakson 2012:571-
573). In contrast to concurrent competencies, exclusive competencies allow each level 
of government to take full control over the development and implementation of its own 
policies and laws in its own jurisdiction with minimum cooperation and coordination 
with other levels of government.  
Key questions that need to be addressed in relation the configuration of powers and 
functions in a federal state mainly relate to which level of government is better placed 
to perform which functions of government, how such functions are to be funded, and 
how different levels of government should relate to one another (Williams 2005a:351). 
It is against this background that the subsidiarity principle is central to federal design.  
In this context, the subsidiarity principle posits that “authority should be retained locally 
unless functions cannot be adequately exercised at that level and that governance 
arrangements ought to be organised in as thoroughly devolved a manner as possible” 
(Fenna and Hollander 2013:221). Clarity on the allocation of powers and functions is 
crucial to ensure stability and the effective functioning of a federal system (Rubin and 
Feeley 2008:178). As previously indicated, the theory of fiscal federalism provides 
guidelines on the allocation of functions between the different levels of government in 
a federal state.  
It must be noted, however, that watertight compartmentalisation of powers and 
functions in a federal state is almost impossible; hence the necessity for cooperation 
between the national and sub-national governments in many functional and policy 
areas (Akindele et al. 2002:562). This is where the concepts of IGR and cooperative 
governance come into the picture, as discussed in detail later in this chapter. 
2.5  Key implications of federalism for IGR 
The concept of federalism has significant and far-reaching implications for the concept 
of IGR. It is clear from the theory of federalism that any federal system of government 
cannot function successfully without an effective system of IGR. In this regard, it is the 
assignment of legislative and administrative powers and competencies between the 
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different levels of government in a federal state that has profound implications for the 
structure and practice of IGR. The way legislative, administrative, and fiscal 
competencies are assigned shapes the relations and interactions between the 
different levels of government (Bolleyer and Thorlakson 2012:567).  
The system of IGR is important to federalism for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
federalism heightens the need for policy coordination between the different levels of 
government (Biela, Hennl and Zons 2014:3). This is because federalism creates 
inherent institutional challenges related to policy overlaps, duplication, and 
fragmentation (Baracskay 2013:252; Simeon 2001:146). Secondly, the division of 
powers in a federal system creates interdependencies between the different levels of 
government (Cameron 2001:121). Thirdly, the division and distribution of state powers 
in a federal system give rise to disputes and conflicts between the different levels of 
government (Crommelin 2001:139). It is these key institutional issues that accentuate 
the necessity for intergovernmental cooperation to ensure proper policy coordination 
and sound relations between governments in a federal state. IGR also shape the 
manner in which federal systems operate (Cameron 2001:121). A more detailed 
analysis of the concept of IGR is provided later in this chapter.  
2.6  Understanding the concept of decentralisation  
Federalism and decentralisation are related but different concepts. It is therefore 
important to start with the clarification of the conceptual distinction between federalism 
and decentralisation to avoid confusion and conflation of these concepts. Fiscal 
federalism and public choice theory often confuse federalism with decentralisation 
(Rubin and Feeley 2008:188). This creates and perpetuates conceptual confusion 
between these concepts. The conceptual distinction between federalism and 
decentralisation is important because these two concepts have different implications 
for governance (Rubin and Feeley 2008:172). 
The literature frames the differences between federalism and decentralisation in terms 
of constitutional design and policy choices. According to Blume and Voigt (2011:238-
239), federalism is a product of a constitutional choice, and decentralisation is a result 
of a policy choice. Rubin and Feeley (2008:172-174) view decentralisation as a 
managerial strategy used to achieve defined goals and objectives. In other words, 
 57 
decentralisation is concerned mainly with the question of how best to achieve identified 
goals and objectives (Rubin and Feeley 2008:174). It has different dimensions, 
including political, administrative, and fiscal decentralisation. Administrative 
decentralisation relates to the decentralisation of the planning, financing, and 
management responsibilities of certain public functions from national government to 
lower levels of government (Mollah 2007:1). Political decentralisation is about the 
transfer of power from the national government to the sub-national governments 
relating to the appointment of sub-national government leaders or legislators 
(Mardones 2007:335-336).  
The concept of fiscal decentralisation deals with the decentralisation of revenue and 
expenditure functions to lower levels of government (De Mello 2000:365; Barankay 
and Lockwood 2007:1198; Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya 2007:2262). In other words, 
fiscal decentralisation is concerned with the transfer of fiscal powers and resources 
from the central government to sub-national governments (Boex 2009:2). Fiscal 
decentralisation also necessitates decentralisation of fiscal policymaking, including 
autonomy with respect to issues of debt management, tax administration, and budget 
management (De Mello 2000:365). Fiscal decentralisation requires the central 
government to surrender a certain degree of fiscal autonomy and financial resources 
to the sub-national governments, including powers to impose certain taxes (Mardones 
2007:335-6). In this regard, the fiscal system is highly decentralised if sub-national 
governments have greater discretion over issues of taxation, expenditure, and 
borrowing (Ajam 2001:125).  
Fiscal decentralisation has been used as part of public sector reforms in many 
countries (Barankay and Lockwood 2007:1198). There are key strategic 
considerations and critical success factors that are important to ensure the effective 
implementation of fiscal decentralisation. The effective implementation and functioning 
of a system of fiscal decentralisation require sound intergovernmental and sub-
national institutions, including effective local political and administrative institutions 
(Boex 2009:10). 
The literature argues the merits of fiscal decentralisation mainly from the efficiency 
point of view. It is generally argued that fiscal decentralisation promotes and improves 
allocative and service delivery efficiency (Ajam 2001:126; Barankay and Lockwood 
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2007:1197-1198; De Mello 2000:365; Vo 2010:660-667). Ajam (2001:126) warns that 
the efficiency gains associated with fiscal decentralisation are just potentialities that 
depend mainly on how the system of IGR is operationalised for them to be practically 
realised. Other benefits of fiscal decentralisation include policy and service delivery 
accountability and transparency, as well as improved public sector performance (De 
Mello 2000:365-375). Fiscal decentralisation is also seen as a mechanism to limit the 
size and powers of the government (Vo 2010:664). Fiscal decentralisation also has 
potential pitfalls. These could include macroeconomic instability, poor fiscal discipline, 
and inefficient public expenditure due to administrative capacity challenges at the local 
level (Boex 2009:3).   
Decentralisation is a relatively new concept compared to federalism. Decentralisation 
dates back to the 1970s and 1980s and emerged in response to the failure of or 
dissatisfaction with the performance of the centralised state (Ingham and Kalam 
1992:374). Because of its failures, the centralised state lost its legitimacy and 
decentralisation came to be viewed as a key mechanism to promote government 
efficiency and responsiveness (Bardhan 2002:185). It is important to note that 
decentralisation can be applied to both federal and unitary systems (Blume and Voigt 
2011:238-242; Rubin and Feeley 2008:172; Williams 2005a:351).  
Although it is hard to make a clear-cut distinction between the concepts of federalism 
and decentralisation, especially between fiscal federalism and fiscal decentralisation, 
it is clear from the conceptual and theoretical analysis in this chapter that federalism 
speaks to the constitutional and governance design of the state, while decentralisation 
is more about practical institutional arrangements for policy and service delivery 
implementation.  
In other words, federalism deals with the fundamental questions relating to the nature 
and institutional (constitutional) configuration of the state, while decentralisation is 
more about the most efficient mechanisms for better policy implementation and 
improved service delivery. Put differently, federalism is about the institutional character 
and identity of the state, while decentralisation is about practical modalities for policy 
implementation. Federalism is a longer-term and more deeply institutionalised system 
of governance than decentralisation, which can easily be affected by policy changes, 
especially the electoral change of power from one political party to another. In this 
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regard, Rubin and Feeley (2008:172) further amplify the difference between federalism 
and decentralisation as follows: “While federalism generally results in a fairly high level 
of decentralisation, decentralisation does not necessarily lead to federalism. In a 
decentralised regime, the central authority can always override the decisions of the 
subdivisions if they fail to achieve the purpose that the centralized authority intended 
when it authorized the subdivisions to decide. In a federal regime, there are some 
decisions that the centre cannot override, although, depending on specific 
circumstances, it may be able to influence the decision by threat or by inducement. In 
a decentralised regime, a constitutional court could never strike down an intrusion on 
a subdivision’s authority by the supreme policymaker. In a federal regime, there are 
some intrusions on the subdivision’s decision making that the court is obligated to 
strike down, on the basis that these intrusions violate the subdivision’s constitutionally 
established rights”.  
2.7   Rationale and key strategic preconditions for decentralisation  
The literature broadly advances economic (efficiency) and political (democracy) 
considerations as the key justification for decentralisation. Decentralisation measures 
have often been pursued as part of the broader public sector reforms to improve public 
sector (government) performance. It is argued in the literature that the key objective 
of decentralisation is to promote economic and administrative efficiency and improved 
service delivery (Andrews and Schroeder 2003:30-38; Bardhan 2002:188; Boex 
2009:5-18; Ingham and Kalam 1992:374; Kulipossa 2004:769; Malan 2002:237; 
Oechssler 1997:119). This theoretical postulation is based on the assumption and 
belief that local government is best placed to meet local preferences and needs better 
than national and provincial governments (De Mello 2000:365; Hankla and Downs 
2010:761; Linder 2009:9). 
The political considerations that underpin decentralisation theory pertains mainly to 
local democratic governance. In this regard, the objectives of decentralisation include 
bringing the government closer to the people in order to promote local democracy, 
participatory governance, public accountability, and responsiveness to the needs of 
the people (Boex 2009:5; De Mello 2000:373; Kulipossa 2004:769-778; Linder 2009:1-
9). Decentralisation can also be used as a political mechanism to promote cultural and 
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political unity and autonomy in states that are riddled with ethnic and political conflicts 
(Bardhan 2002:185). 
There are key preconditions and strategic considerations that need to be considered 
for the successful implementation of decentralisation processes and measures. 
Decentralisation theory contends that the decentralisation of services is preferable if 
the demand and supply conditions are highly localised (Andrews and Schroeder 
2003:31). Andrews and Schroeder (2003:30) maintain that decentralisation should 
meet the following key conditions:  
 Local demands for a service differ across localities. 
 No substantial economies of scale are associated with the service. 
 There are no substantial spillovers of costs or benefits from the service. 
 The service is amenable to at least partial local financing through taxes or 
charges. 
 Local governments have the capacity to deliver the service. 
 The service is not meant to provide substantial redistribution of income or 
wealth. 
In addition to the broader conditions articulated above, other key institutional 
considerations also need more attention before decentralisation can be implemented. 
A decentralised system requires a sound intergovernmental fiscal system and strong, 
decentralised political and administrative institutions (Boex 2009:11). This includes 
strong managerial and technical capacity at the local level (Andrews and Schroeder 
2003:37). 
2.8  Key implications of decentralisation for IGR 
Decentralisation, like federalism, has far-reaching implications for IGR. Ensuring 
intergovernmental cooperation is one of the key challenges that decentralised systems 
must contend with (Leon and Ferrin Pereira 2011:513). This is because 
decentralisation brings about changes in institutional configuration that affect IGR (see 
Andrews and Schroeder 2003:31). The most important implication of decentralisation 
is the need to strengthen institutional and fiscal capacity for the effective 
intergovernmental coordination of decentralised functions (see Andrews and 
Schroeder 2003:37). The overall implication of the above analysis of the theory of 
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federalism and decentralisation is that the importance of IGR extends far beyond 
federal systems to any decentralised system of government, including decentralised 
unitary systems.  
2.9  Understanding IGR and cooperative governance 
The concepts of IGR and cooperative governance have become important institutional 
mechanisms in modern states and public governance across the world. The concept 
of IGR is related to and embedded in the theory and practice of federalism, which 
originated in America (Bassey 2014:226; Bolaji 2009:115; Edwards 2008a:66; Ojo 
2014:45).  
IGR were necessitated by the need to foster intergovernmental cooperation in 
response to serious problems that confronted the different levels of government at the 
time (Ojo 2014:45). The growth in the size, scale, and scope of governments, as well 
as increased policy complexities, overlaps, and spillover effects, rendered coordinate 
federalism (watertight separation of government functions and responsibilities) 
irrelevant and brought about cooperative (concurrent) federalism, which necessitated 
IGR and cooperation between the different spheres of government (Phillimore 
2013:229).  
As previously indicated in this chapter, the core problem of IGR originates from the 
division and assignment of powers and functions between the different levels of 
government in a federal state (Painter 1998a:52). The division of powers and functions 
often creates interdependencies, concurrency, overlaps, and duplication in a federal 
state (Hollander 2009:138; Horgan 2003:13-14; Painter 1998a:52). These inherent 
institutional flaws necessitate policy coordination and cooperation between and 
among the different levels of government, hence the centrality of the concept of IGR 
(see Bakvis and Brown 2010:484; Phillimore 2013:229). Although the concept of IGR 
is originally associated with federal systems, it has evolved to become a key 
institutional feature of any multi-level system of government in modern political 
systems, including unitary systems (Angahar 2013:112; Bello 2014:67; Horgan 
2003:12-13; Phillimore 2013:228-229; Watts 2001:22-23). IGR have further evolved 
towards a collaborative and cooperative philosophy and approach (Baracskay 
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2013:259). This is the philosophy that enjoins the different levels of government to 
collaborate to achieve common objectives.  
2.10  Defining cooperative governance 
IGR and cooperative governance are different but closely related concepts. In this 
regard, Edwards (2008a:67) and Malan (2005:230) maintain that there is a conceptual 
difference between cooperative government and IGR. It is therefore important to clarify 
this conceptual difference through the definition of these concepts. It is worth noting 
that the literature on comparative federalism does not talk about cooperative 
governance, but cooperative federalism. This is because the concept of cooperative 
governance, although inspired by international experience, is mainly a South African 
construct related to and underpinning the country’s system of IGR. It enjoys 
prominence in the South African political and governance literature. In this context, the 
term “cooperative governance” as used in this study carries the same meaning as the 
term “cooperative government”, as often referred to in the literature and the 
Constitution of South Africa.   
The concept of cooperative governance owes its origin and inspiration to the German 
Bundestreue concept, which provides the principles that underpin the relationship 
between national and regional governments (Edwards 2008a:66; Mathebula 
2011b:840). It requires the different levels of government to function in good faith and 
mutual trust and cooperate, support, and consult with one another on matters of 
common interest (Edwards 2008a:66). The respect for each sphere’s constitutional 
jurisdiction and responsibilities is also the main thrust that underpins the concept of 
cooperative governance (Mathebula 2011b:840).     
The concept of cooperative government relates to the political philosophy that 
underpins all aspects of government (Edwards 2008a:68; Malan 2002:234). According 
to Mathebula (2011b:840), “co-operative government is simply a governance 
philosophy based on a reciprocal obligation of spheres of government to trust, support 
and assist one another in co-ordinating service delivery to the community”. He further 
maintains that the concept includes “a legal, political and moral obligation to inform 
and consult one another as well as co-operating with and co-ordinating efforts on 
matters of common concern and joint projects, thus patterning intergovernmental 
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collaboration and co-operation to ensure the success of national development 
projects” (Mathebula 2011b:840).  
Cooperative government is also defined as the basic values of government (Malan 
2002:234). These include national unity, peace, cooperation, coordination, 
communication, and conflict avoidance (Malan 2002:235; Malan 2005:230). It is also 
seen as a partnership between spheres of government (Edwards 2008a:68; Malan 
2002:234-235; Malan 2005:229-230). Cooperative governance is also based on the 
philosophy that all spheres of government can more effectively address challenges if 
they work together than if they work alone or compete with one another (Reddy 
2001:26). It is against this backdrop that cooperation is seen as important for effective 
service delivery (Coetzee 2010:85). In other words, cooperative governance, rather 
than competitive governance, is a philosophy that aims to bind, rather than divide, all 
levels of government to common national policy objectives and outcomes.  
2.11   Defining IGR 
The concept of IGR does not lend itself to a simple and straightforward definition. The 
literature provides a myriad of different definitions of the concept of IGR. Various labels 
are also attached to IGR such as multi-tiered government and central-local relations 
(Agranoff 2004:30). The concept of IGR commonly refers to relations between the 
different levels of government (national, regional, and local governments) to facilitate 
the achievement of common goals (Opeskin 2001:129). It also refers to the processes 
and institutions of interactions between governments within a political system 
(Phillimore 2013:229).  
According to Malan (2002:233), IGR refer to formal and informal processes and 
institutional arrangements and structures to facilitate bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation within and between spheres of government. In other words, IGR deal with 
political, financial, and institutional arrangements for interactions between the different 
levels of government (Edwards 2008a:68). Reddy (2001:22) defines IGR as “the 
mutual horizontal and vertical relations and interactions between governmental 
institutions”.  
Horgan (2003:13) defines IGR as “the structures and processes … for 
intergovernmental consultation, coordination, and cooperation”. It is also referred to 
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as the interactions between (and among) the different levels of government within a 
state (Bello 2014:67; Bassey 2014:227). Ojo (2014:45) describes IGR as “the 
relationship between multi-level governments for the achievement of common goals”. 
Akume (2014:172) views IGR as “the grease that lubricates the complex wheel of 
interactions that transpire daily between the divergent groups and their institutions in 
a federal state”.  
Despite some variations and divergence, there is a greater degree of scholarly threads 
and convergence in the above definitions. Overall, a common thrust that cuts across 
most of the above conceptual definitions is that the concept of IGR is about institutions, 
structures, and processes that facilitate interactions, cooperation, and relationships 
between and among governments in a state. It is also about vertical and horizontal 
relations and interactions within and between governments in a political system 
through a combination of formal and informal mechanisms and processes. In simple 
terms, IGR are the “glue” that holds the different levels of government together (Bello 
2014:67). IGR are therefore necessary for the effective functioning of any political 
system (Ojo 2014:48). It is important to further note that a system of IGR can be 
voluntary or coercive  (Keating 2012:214-215).  
Vertical, horizontal, and sectoral dimensions of IGR encompass different levels of 
interactions covering central-state, central-state-local, central-local, state-local, state-
state, and local relations (Bowman 2004:535; Lawson 2011:201; Phillimore, 2013:230; 
Watts 2001:26). The vertical dimension pertains to relations between the different 
spheres of government (national-provincial, national-local, and provincial-local), and 
the horizontal dimension speaks to the relations of governments within the same 
sphere (interprovincial or interlocal relations) (Watts 2001:26). IGR differ in the degree 
of institutionalisation, decision-making character, and transparency (Cameron 
2001:124-125). These relate to the formality or informality of IGR structures and 
processes and the decision-making powers of the IGR structures, as well as the 
openness or otherwise of the IGR processes to public scrutiny (Cameron 2001:124-
125).  
Furthermore, certain key operational terms are associated with the broader concept 
of IGR. These include terms such as consultation, coordination, and joint action or 
decision making. In this context, consultation refers to a process whereby the 
 65 
government shares and exchanges views and information with other levels of 
government before taking an action that may affect other government levels (Watts 
2001:28). Coordination is about different levels of government developing and 
implementing mutually acceptable common policies and objectives, while joint 
decision making means joint action and commitment by government levels to a course 
or programme of action, including shared-cost programmes (Watts 2001:28). 
2.12  The core purpose and role of IGR 
A system of IGR exists in multi-level governments to serve different purposes. At a 
more general level, IGR seek to promote and foster “co-operation, co-existence and 
friendship” between and among the different levels of government in a state (Bassey 
2014:226; see Bolleyer and Bytzek 2009:371). A more specific role of IGR includes 
conflict or dispute resolution over jurisdictional powers and functions; management of 
policy overlaps, externalities, and spillovers arising from exercise of competencies by 
the different spheres of government; harmonisation of public policies; and helping 
governments to respond to complex cross-cutting policy challenges (Keating 
2012:214-215; also see Akume 2014:172).  
The harmonisation of public policies across the different spheres and sectors of 
government means that coordination of national, provincial, and local policies is 
required in areas of concurrent or shared competencies, as well as areas of 
complementarities (Watts 2001:25). The role of IGR as a conflict-resolution 
mechanism extends to conflicts that arise in relation to intergovernmental planning 
and financing and programme and project implementation (Akume 2014:173). As a 
dispute-resolution mechanism, IGR represent a relatively cheaper and less hostile 
political alternative to judicial mechanisms for the settlement of disputes through the 
courts of law. 
More importantly, IGR aim to promote cooperative governance to ensure effective 
service delivery to meet the needs of the citizens (Edwards 2008a:66). In this regard, 
it could well be argued that the foremost important and overriding objective of IGR and 
cooperative governance is to promote effective service delivery. Conversely, the lack 
of IGR would lead to the failure of public policies and programmes within the states 
(Ojo 2014:46). In the contemporary context, IGR have also become a key mechanism 
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to respond to the complexities of modern governance and public policymaking within 
the states (Baier 2005:207).  
In summary, Malan (2002:235) captures the main essence of IGR as follows: “… to 
promote cooperative decision making; to ensure the execution of policies through an 
effective flow of communication; to coordinate priorities and budgets across different 
sectors and the prevention of disputes and conflicts among spheres/tiers/levels of 
government”. Therefore, an overall deduction from this analysis is that IGR provide an 
important framework and mechanism through which to manage or eliminate policy 
duplication and fragmentation in order to promote more efficient and seamless service 
delivery and governance. 
2.13   Different models and contextual factors that shape IGR practices  
The literature identifies three key models of IGR, namely partnership or overlapping-
authority model, principal/agents or inclusive-authority model, and functional dualism 
or coordinate-authority model (Bello 2014:68). The partnership model of IGR treats 
the different levels of government as equals and places a higher premium on 
intergovernmental cooperation (Bello 2014:68; Ibietan 2011:57). This model 
represents a cooperative model of IGR.  
In contrast, the principal/agent model of IGR is characterised by a Weberian-based 
hierarchical superior-subordinate relationship between the central and sub-national 
governments, in which the sub-national governments are merely administrative or 
implementation (delivery) agencies for national policies and functions without real 
independence (Bello 2014:68; Ibietan 2011:58). This model accords with a unitary 
system of government in which real power rests with the central (national) government. 
In a unitary system, the sub-national governments lack real powers and autonomy due 
to their subordination to the authority of the central government (Bello 2014:67). It is 
the central government that determines the content (substance) and character (style) 
of IGR in a unitary state (Ibietan 2011:54). 
The functional dualism or coordinate-authority model of IGR differs from the other 
models in that it emphasises functional and jurisdictional autonomy of the different 
levels of governments, thereby treating IGR as a relationship between different 
autonomous governments (Bello 2014:68; Ibietan 2011:59). This model mainly typifies 
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a jurisdictional or coordinate system of federalism in which there are non-hierarchical 
relationships and policy variations between the different levels of government (see 
Bakvis and Brown 2010:484; Gamkhar and Vickers 2010:354). 
There is, however, no universal model of IGR that is ideal and appropriate for all 
countries, hence no model can be applied off the shelf (Watts 2001:23). This is 
because there are country-specific contextual factors that have a significant bearing 
on the structure and practice of IGR. Political and socio-cultural factors (e.g. politics, 
race, religion, language, and culture), as well as historical, constitutional, and 
institutional factors, shape and influence the nature and character of IGR (Cameron 
2001:121-124).  
It is therefore for the above reasons that Watts (2001:24) advises that 
“intergovernmental institutions and processes have to be adapted to meet the 
particular constitutional, political, economic and social conditions of the polity within 
which they operate”. This therefore means that the structure and practice of IGR vary 
from country to country; hence the existence of a diverse and wide range of IGR 
models. 
2.14   Intergovernmental fiscal relations 
The concept of intergovernmental fiscal relations is closely related to the concepts of 
fiscal federalism and fiscal decentralisation, as discussed in the previous sections of 
this chapter. In short, fiscal federalism deals with the fundamental questions relating 
to which government functions should be assigned to which level of government. In 
other words, it provides a broad guiding framework for the assignment and allocation 
of functions across the different levels of government in a federal or multi-sphere 
system of government.  
In the main, fiscal federalism is about the constitutional and institutional configuration 
of fiscal and financial arrangements in a federal state. Fiscal decentralisation deals 
with decentralisation of fiscal functions such as revenue and expenditure functions to 
lower levels of government (De Mello 2000:365; Barankay and Lockwood 2007:1198; 
Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya 2007:2262).  
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The assignment of revenue and expenditure functions forms the basis of the concept 
of intergovernmental fiscal relations (see Akindele et al. 2002:562). Intergovernmental 
fiscal relations, sometimes referred to as intergovernmental financial relations, are 
about the relationship between the national and sub-national governments in relation 
to revenue and expenditure issues, including sharing of revenue between the national 
and sub-national governments (vertical revenue sharing) and between the sub-
national governments (horizontal revenue distribution) (Ajam 2001:125-126; Angahar 
2013:112-114; Ikeji 2011:122).  
In this regard, the theory argues for a match between the revenue (taxation) and 
expenditure (service delivery) functions to enable the different spheres of government 
in a federal state to effectively perform their constitutional functions (Angahar 
2013:113). However, the sharing and distribution of revenue (funding) to the different 
levels of government remain the most contentious issue faced by many countries 
(Babalola 2015; Bassey 2014:229; Levy and Tapscott 2001:18). Intergovernmental 
fiscal relations provide a practical institutional framework and mechanism to manage 
and address intergovernmental fiscal tensions. Chapter Four further unpacks 
intergovernmental fiscal tensions in the context of international (cross-country) 
comparative analysis. 
The understanding of the centrality of intergovernmental fiscal relations to a multi-level 
system of government requires proper perspective and context. There are vertical and 
horizontal fiscal imbalances that exist in every multi-level system of government (Watts 
2001:32). Vertical fiscal imbalances relate to a situation where the revenue and 
expenditure responsibilities of the sub-national governments do not match or coincide 
due to the assignment of taxation or revenue collection powers to the national 
government and service delivery responsibilities to the sub-national governments 
(Watts 2001:32).  
On the one hand, horizontal fiscal imbalances have to do with the differences in the 
revenue capacity and needs of sub-national governments (Fjeldstad 2001:156; Vo 
2010:669; Watts 2001:32). These fiscal imbalances in relation to revenue and 
expenditure (cost) arise mainly due to differences in tax bases (wealth) and the 
demographic and social compositions of regions in many countries (Williams 
2005a:355-356). It is against this background that many states have found it 
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appropriate to correct these fiscal imbalances through fiscal transfers to ensure that 
sub-national governments are able to provide comparable levels of public services to 
citizens (Williams 2005a:354). 
To correct vertical fiscal imbalances, many governments in multi-sphere systems 
apply intergovernmental financial transfers in the form of tax shares and conditional 
and unconditional grants, usually from the national government to the sub-national 
governments (Watts 2001:33). Horizontal fiscal imbalances between the sub-national 
governments are usually addressed through equalisation grants (sometimes called 
solidarity grants), which are meant to enable the sub-national governments to provide 
public services of comparable standards and quality (Fjeldstad 2001:154; Watts 
2001:34).  
Equalisation grants are a key financial instrument to compensate for regional 
disparities in wealth, tax bases, and cost of service delivery (mainly due to factors such 
as population density and geographic location) to promote horizontal equity in the 
fiscal capacity of the sub-national governments to deliver equivalent level of services 
to their citizens (Fjeldstad 2001:157). The system of equalisation grants, however, has 
downsides and moral hazards. The main problem with equalisation grants is that they 
may disincentivise the sub-national governments from raising their own taxes and 
revenue (Fjeldstad 2001:157).  
There are also other broader issues and questions raised in the literature in relation to 
intergovernmental fiscal relations. In this regard, one of the fundamental issues raised 
in the literature is that revenue collection and distribution by the national government 
may compromise the fiscal autonomy or sovereignty of the sub-national governments 
(Fjeldstad 2001:153). The other argument is that the fiscal autonomy of the sub-
national governments is improved when grants from the national government flow to 
the sub-national governments without conditions attached to them (Vo 2010:669). This 
is because unconditional grants provide much greater discretion to the sub-national 
governments in terms of how and where they spend their budgets. The opposite is 
true with conditional grants, as the national government often has more say and 
influence on the spending of these grants by the sub-national governments. The 
literature also points to the importance of paying attention to policy, institutional, and 
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technical issues in the design and implementation of an intergovernmental fiscal 
system (Boex 2009:21).  
2.15  Institutional mechanisms for IGR 
The quality of public administration affects the effectiveness of the state (Linder 
2009:17). In almost all countries, the public service occupies a central place as the 
“engine room” where detailed technical work on IGR is performed by officials 
(Phillimore 2013:233). In this regard, it is worth noting that, in many parliamentary 
systems, the executive branches of governments tend to dominate IGR through 
political office bearers and public officials (Phillimore 2013:231-232). This notion or 
practice is commonly referred to in the literature as “executive federalism” (Phillimore 
2013:232). 
Various key institutional channels and mechanisms exist to coordinate and facilitate 
IGR in different countries. These include political, administrative, legislative, and 
judicial mechanisms (Bassey 2014:228; Bello 2014:67). In practice, these 
intergovernmental mechanisms take the form of executive and administrative 
interactions that involve consultations, coordination, and joint decisions between 
ministers or officials; legislative interactions and cooperation between legislators on 
legislative matters; intergovernmental fiscal relations, including financial transfers 
between governments; and judicial and non-judicial processes to deal with 
intergovernmental disputes (Watts 2001:29).  
Institutional mechanisms and processes for IGR vary from formal to informal 
mechanisms (Phillimore 2013:231). Formal mechanisms for IGR often include 
constitutional and statutory institutions, agreements, and processes (Phillimore 
2013:231). Intergovernmental structures and processes promote consultation, 
cooperation, and coordination between the different levels of government to make 
intergovernmental cooperation effective (Watts 2001:29). 
Formal intergovernmental agreements or contracts are traditional mechanisms that 
have been used to promote intergovernmental cooperation between governments 
(Bowman 2004:537). Such agreements vary in their legal status and often provide for 
the roles and responsibilities of different governments and outline financial and 
reporting arrangements (Phillimore 2013:233). The importance of intergovernmental 
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agreements, sometimes referred to as treaties, compacts, and accords, does not only 
relate to legal enforceability but also to political pressure and mutual support brought 
about by these instruments, which in turn promote cooperation (Opeskin 2001:130-
131). 
At a more practical and operational level, formal and informal mechanisms of 
intergovernmental cooperation include meetings and telephone and email 
communications at political and administrative levels (Cameron 2001:124; Opeskin 
2001:132). Intergovernmental meetings are often institutionalised and supported by 
administrative structures to promote more effective cooperation (Leon and Ferrin 
Pereira 2011:519).  
There are key fundamental conditions or critical success factors for effective 
intergovernmental cooperation. Key IGR institutions and mechanisms need to be 
formalised and institutionalised, clear principles and values to guide behaviour must 
be established, and more investment in IGR capacity is required at all levels of 
government and the IGR system as a whole to achieve better outcomes (Phillimore 
2013:236-237). Furthermore, intergovernmental structures and processes should be 
underpinned by the principles of simplicity, flexibility, and adaptability to sustain 
effective IGR (Watts 2001:40). More importantly, upholding a political culture of 
cooperation and mutual trust, respect, assistance, and support, as well as friendly 
relations, is more crucial for effective intergovernmental cooperation than prescribed 
legal requirements and procedures (Watts 2001:39). 
2.16  Summary 
This chapter established the theoretical and conceptual foundation of the 
interrelationship of IGR and cooperative governance to lay the basis for the following 
chapters in this study.  
This chapter provided the context for understanding the concept of federalism and 
defined federalism. It also provided different typologies and variations of federalism. It 
also explained fiscal federalism and explained how powers and functions are 
institutionally assigned to a federal state. The key implications of federalism for IGR 
were highlighted.  
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The context for understanding the concept of decentralisation, the rationale and key 
strategic preconditions for decentralisation, as well as the key implications of 
decentralisation for IGR were discussed. This was followed by a discussion of the 
context of IGR in terms of cooperative governance. It also defined cooperative 
governance. The chapter then defined IGR and explained the core purpose and role 
of IGR. Different models and other contextual factors that influence IGR practices were 
also discussed. It explained intergovernmental fiscal relations, as well as the 
institutional mechanisms for IGR.  
The concept of federalism relates to the division of state power and authority 
(sovereignty) between the different levels of government in a political system. The 
institutional existence and autonomy of the different levels of governments in a federal 
system are constitutionally protected and guaranteed. This creates a non-hierarchical 
relationship between national and sub-national governments, thus configuring power 
relations and politics of equality between governments in a federal political system. 
Federal systems tend to exist in countries with large populations and vast geography. 
Federalism stands out in the literature as a more suitable institutional mechanism to 
bring about national unity and stability in countries characterised by ethnic and cultural 
diversity.  
The literature on federalism also deals with fiscal federalism, which speaks to the 
financial and fiscal arrangements in a federal system. There is also the related concept 
of fiscal decentralisation, which relates to the decentralisation of fiscal functions from 
the national government to the sub-national governments. Overall, the concept of 
federalism gave rise to the concept of IGR as an institutional mechanism to address 
challenges of policy overlaps, duplication, and fragmentation inherent in a federal 
system. 
A unitary system differs significantly from a federal system in that the sub-national 
governments in a unitary system derive their existence and authority from the central 
government. Unitarism is about the centralisation of state power and authority in the 
central government. This power configuration renders the sub-national governments 
subservient and subordinate to the central government, thus creating a relationship of 
hierarchy and dominance by the central government. In contrast to federalism, which 
is central to the structure and character of the state, decentralisation is more about 
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policy choices and service delivery modalities. In simple terms, decentralisation is 
about the best possible mechanisms to improve public sector performance, efficiency, 
and effectiveness. Decentralisation requires intergovernmental capacity to coordinate 
and manage decentralised functions.   
The concept of cooperative governance is closely related to the concept of IGR. While 
IGR are concerned mainly with institutional mechanisms and processes, cooperative 
governance deals with the governance philosophy and values that should underpin 
the relationships and interactions between governments in a political system. Although 
it draws inspiration from the German system of cooperative federalism, cooperative 
governance is mainly a South African philosophy that defines and underpins the 
character, principles, and values of the country’s system of IGR.   
Despite its original and traditional association with federalism, IGR evolved over time 
to become an important institutional mechanism for policy coordination in many multi-
level systems of government, including decentralised unitary systems. IGR enable 
governments to address intergovernmental disputes and policy overlaps, duplication, 
and fragmentation, as well as promoting integrated and seamless public service 
delivery. IGR take place through formal and informal mechanisms and processes, 
including executive, administrative, legislative, and judicial and non-judicial channels, 
all of which are geared towards effective intergovernmental coordination and 
cooperation to achieve common public policy objectives and outcomes.  
The system of IGR varies from country to country due to country-specific contextual 
factors (such as politics, law, history, religion, and culture), which have a significant 
bearing on the nature and character of each country’s system of IGR. These factors 
influence the structure and practice of IGR in different countries. The system of 
intergovernmental fiscal relations provides a key framework for the sharing and 
distribution of revenue between the different spheres of government in a state. It 
provides fiscal mechanisms and instruments to fund constitutional mandates and 
public policy priorities across the different spheres of government. The system also 
helps to correct fiscal imbalances and distortions that affect the capacity of the different 
spheres of government to deliver on their constitutional responsibilities.  
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Overall, IGR and cooperative governance involve a complex interplay and interaction 
of many different factors. Soft issues such as human relations and interpersonal skills 
are as important as hard issues such as structures and legal instruments in promoting 
effective IGR and cooperative governance. Sound institutional and administrative 
capacity at all levels of government is also key to effective IGR and cooperative 
governance.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
CONCEPTUALISING AND CONTEXTUALISING THE THEORETICAL AND 
CONCEPTUAL UNDERPINNINGS OF A FRAMEWORK FOR IGR 
3.1  Introduction 
Chapter Three provides the basis for addressing the following research objective as 
stated in Chapter One (see Section 1.4): To conceptualise and contextualise the 
theoretical and conceptual underpinnings to develop an analytical framework for IGR. 
Chapter Three provides the theoretical premise for the study. The purpose of the 
chapter is two-fold. Firstly, it provides a theoretical framework for the study and 
identifies and describes key theories relevant to the study. In this regard, the study 
adopts a multi-disciplinary and multi-theoretical framework and approach in that it 
draws from different and diverse theories to underpin important theoretical questions 
related to the application of the topic. This is mainly because the central questions of 
the study lend themselves to multi-disciplinary and multi-theoretical analyses. 
Secondly, this chapter reviews the relevant literature as it applies to the research 
objective. In this context, the relationship between the theoretical and conceptual 
framework is firstly based on broad theoretical premises of the topic and, secondly, 
the chapter attempts to construct an analytical framework on which the empirical 
analysis can be conducted. The purpose of the conceptual framework is to address 
the knowledge gap identified in the literature review. The theoretical and conceptual 
framework will inform the analysis and interpretation of the empirical data, as well as 
the construction of the theoretical abstractions and conclusions derived from the 
findings of the study in order to make an original contribution to the existing body of 
knowledge in relation to the theory and interrelationship of IGR and cooperative 
governance. This chapter focuses on relevant organisational and management 
theories that have a bearing on the management of IGR and cooperative governance, 
which is the central focus of this thesis.  
This chapter therefore pays attention to the theoretical and conceptual foundations 
and key aspects related to bureaucracy in a public sector organisational setting 
(including contextualising bureaucratic theory and the bureaucratisation of the state, 
defining the concept of bureaucracy, bureaucracy as an organisational configuration, 
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the influence of bureaucratic theory on public administration, and a critique of 
bureaucratic theory). It then discusses the theoretical and conceptual foundations and 
key aspects related to NPM and the modernisation of the public sector (including the 
concept, the theoretical underpinning of NPM, the influence of NPM on public 
administration, and a critique of NPM theory). It also explains the theoretical and 
conceptual foundations and key aspects related to systems thinking in a public sector 
setting (including systems theory and the systems thinking perspective, 
conceptualising systems theory, understanding the concept of a system, the 
importance of systems theory in the study of organisations, and a critique of systems 
theory).  
This is followed by a conceptualisation of collaborative management theory in the 
public sector (including the concept of collaborative management, the key benefits and 
considerations for collaborative management, as well as a critique of collaborative 
management). This is followed by a discussion of planning and collaborative planning 
(including strategic planning in organisations, the organisational dividends associated 
with strategic planning, key factors and considerations related to strategic planning, 
and collaborative planning as an alternative approach).  
Performance management is then conceptualised and contextualised to promote 
collaborative performance management in a public sector setting (including the 
importance of performance management in organisations, private and public sector 
performance management practices, the relevance of performance management 
practices to the public sector, a critique of performance management practices in the 
public sector, collaborative performance management, the unique features of 
collaborative performance management, and a critique of collaborative performance 
management). Finally, the chapter conceptualises a multi-theoretical analytical 
framework for IGR. These aspects include systems thinking as an approach to IGR 
and a collaborative approach to IGR (including intergovernmental collaborative 
management practices, an intergovernmental collaborative strategic planning 
approach, and an intergovernmental collaborative performance management 
approach).  
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3.2  Contextualising bureaucratic theory and the bureaucratisation of the 
state  
It is important to first trace and understand the origin of bureaucratic theory. 
Bureaucracy has a long history dating back many years and has proved to be the most 
resilient and enduring organisational system theory, having survived many political 
and social changes over time (Farazmand 2010a:206; Farazmand 2010b:245). The 
literature credits German sociologist Max Weber as the leading architect and theorist 
on bureaucracy (see Al-Habil 2011; Kaminski 2013; Mahmood and Basharat 2012; 
Philip 2013a; Steurer 2007; Weymes 2004). Weber’s theory of bureaucracy, also 
known as the theory of social and economic organisation, was formulated in 1947 with 
the central focus on organisational structure (Mahmood and Basharat 2012:519). This 
means that Weber’s theory of bureaucracy also made a significant contribution to the 
development of organisational theory.  
This bureaucratic approach “represented an early response to the emerging problems 
of complexity and scale in government, the quest for cost-effective service delivery, 
but also for legality, objectivity, integrity, consistency and coherence in the discharge 
of the functions of public management” (Argyriades 2010:277). Weber developed the 
concept of bureaucracy during the first wave of industrialisation in the Western nations, 
and a bureaucratic structure provided a framework to manage organisational 
complexities during that period (Weymes 2004:93). This period of bureaucratisation 
also happened during the time of transition from feudal aristocracy to capitalist 
democracy and from agrarian society to urban industrial society (Argyriades 
2010:278). During this period, bureaucratic structures served a limited purpose, 
namely to uphold the rule of law and as defence against internal and external threats 
(Argyriades 2010:281).   
3.2.1  Defining the concept of bureaucracy  
Defining bureaucracy is not a simple and straightforward exercise mainly because the 
concept itself means different things to different people. In other words, different 
meanings and definitions are associated with the concept of bureaucracy (Philip 
2013a:24). The word “bureaucracy” originates from two words: “bureau” and “kratos”. 
The word “bureau” refers to the office, and the Greek suffix “kratia” or “kratos” means 
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power or rule (Al-Habil 2011:106). This means that bureaucracy refers to the rule 
conducted from a desk or office (Al-Habil 2011:106). 
According to Meijer (2008:432), “the term bureaucracy refers to an organisation that 
is rigidly devoted to the details of administrative procedures”. Raadschelders 
(2014:854) defines bureaucracy as “the organisational form adopted by any 
organisation that reaches a certain threshold in personnel size”. Gabriel and Elena 
(2008:147) define bureaucracy in the ordinary sense and the usage of the concept as 
“a complex, specialised organisation (especially a governmental organisation) 
composed of non-elected, highly trained professional administrators and clerks hired 
on a full-time basis to perform administrative services and tasks”. Bureaucracy is 
sometimes confused with government or public administration (Raadschelders 
2014:854; Wolf 2005:189).  
In addition to the above definitions, Farazmand (2010b:246-247) contends that the 
meaning of bureaucracy can be defined and explained in terms of three different 
perspectives. In this regard, the first perspective relates to “the Weberian ideal-type 
concept of bureaucracy as the most efficient type of organisation characterised by 
hierarchy and unity of command, division of labor and task specialisation, merit-based 
staffing and promotion, rules and regulations universally applied to govern working 
systems, formal communication and interaction systems, and records for reference 
and administrative decisions or behaviors” (Farazmand 2010b:246). The second 
perspective refers to bureaucracy as “any large organisation or institution organised 
with structure, process, and normative values, rules, and regulations as well as a mix 
of merit and patronage and record systems” (Farazmand 2010b:246). The third 
perspective views bureaucracy as “the “machinery of government”, a system or 
complex of organisations and institutions – executive, judicial, and legislative – that 
makes the operations of government and governance possible, get things done, and 
run the government” (Farazmand 2010b:247). Although the above definitions of 
bureaucracy are characterised by some overlaps and similarities in certain respects, 
this thesis adopts the Weberian definition and conception of bureaucracy.  
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3.2.2   Understanding bureaucracy as an organisational configuration 
Weber’s bureaucratic theory is concerned with the ideal structure of an organisation 
(Mahmood and Basharat 2012:521). From the Weberian perspective, bureaucracy 
represents the most rational and efficient form of organisational structure (Al-Habil 
2011:107; Philip 2013a:24). It is also considered better than and superior to other 
types of organisations (Philip 2013a:24; Farazmand 2010b:246; Raadschelders 
2014:854). Bureaucratic organisations are divided into specialised departments and 
sub-divided into sub-functions with assigned specialised responsibilities and tasks 
(Gabriel and Elena 2008:147). This logically makes bureaucratic organisations bigger 
and more complex from a management and operational point of view. Therefore, for 
a bureaucratic organisation to function effectively, it needs clear coordination of its 
various aspects and clear policies and specifications of roles and responsibilities 
(Stein 1961:14). 
The key features of the ideal-type of bureaucracy as espoused by Weber include 
labour specialisation, well-defined hierarchical structure, clearly defined responsibility 
and authority, systems of rules and procedures, impersonal relations, discipline, and 
written records (Philip 2013a:25). Other important aspects of a bureaucratic 
organisation entail legality, professionalism, fixed monetary salaries, lifelong 
appointment of civil servants, separation of office and person, written rules, and written 
communication (Seibel 2010:721). Knowledge and expertise, as well as legalistic and 
rational decisions and actions, also represent the defining features of a Weberian 
bureaucratic organisation (Farazmand 2010b:246). More importantly, a Weberian 
bureaucracy is rule bound and functions within the framework of written rules and 
regulations (Kaminski 2013:2).  
A bureaucratic organisation is designed to serve a particular purpose. In this regard, 
the main intent of the Weberian bureaucratic organisation is to promote efficiency and 
rationality in the performance of functions, as well as the uniformity and predictability 
of processes (Welp, Urgell and Aibar 2007:300). The need to promote fairness and 
procedural justice is also at the centre of the bureaucratic organisational 
considerations (Van Buren 2008:636). In short, the higher-order objectives of 
bureaucracy could be summarised as stability, continuity, order, impartiality, fairness, 
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efficiency, standardisation and rationalisation of government administration 
(Farazmand 2010a:206; Farazmand 2010b:255). 
3.2.3   The influence of bureaucratic theory on public administration  
Bureaucratic theory has significantly influenced the organisational configuration and 
the operational practices of government and public administration in many countries. 
In this regard, Weber’s bureaucratic theory, in particular, is considered one of the most 
influential intellectual pieces of work in the public administration literature (Al-Habil 
2011:106). Farazmand (2010b:248) lends credence to this assertion through his 
description of bureaucracy “as a most powerful instrument of government and public 
administration”. The Weberian bureaucratic model of public administration – 
underpinned by the principles of accountability, professionalism, merit-based public 
service appointments, impersonality, objectivity, and specialisation – replaced the 
patronage system of public administration, which was based on personal loyalty and 
subjectivity in staff recruitment and public service delivery (Steurer 2007:207).  
A bureaucratic system of public administration has its origin mainly in the Western 
capitalist countries (Haque 2007:1301). Alford and Hughes (2008:134) trace the 
emergence of traditional public administration in Anglo-American democracies in the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries and contend that, in its ideal-typical form, this system 
of public administration was characterised by hierarchical control and standardisation 
of processes, as well as line-item budgeting and permanency of public service careers. 
The permanent public service career system was believed to be good for the 
continuity, consistency, and efficiency of public administration, but, more importantly, 
this system was designed to guard against favouritism and arbitrariness (Argyriades 
2010:279).  
The Weberian notion of bureaucracy considers public administration to be politically 
neutral, obedient, and a loyal arm of government whose role is to implement the will 
of the political masters (Givel and Spivak 2008:428; Seibel 2010:719-722; Wise 
2004:676). Bureaucracy has proved to be the most resilient and enduring system of 
organisational configuration and politicians have come and gone and the bureaucracy 
remained (Farazmand 2010a:206; Farazmand 2010b:245). Therefore, the assertion 
made by Raadschelders (2014:854) and Wolf (2005:189) that bureaucracy is 
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sometimes confused with government and public administration bears testimony to 
the deep-rooted institutionalisation of a bureaucratic system and culture in the 
institutions of government and public administration.    
3.2.4   Critique of bureaucratic theory  
The literature identifies key advantages and strengths associated with bureaucracy. 
The most obvious strength relates to the fact that bureaucracy has a long history and 
has proved its resilience over time through its survival of many social and political 
changes (see Farazmand 2010b:245). A bureaucratic organisational structure is 
therefore associated with stability (Stein 1961:14-15). It has also proved effective in 
promoting and fostering uniformity, centralised direction, top-down planning, and 
control (Argyriades 2010:284). The professionalisation and specialisation of 
government also count among the key positive contributions associated with the 
bureaucratic model of management and governance (Steurer 2007:207). There has 
also been a long-held belief in organisational theory that bureaucratic organisation is 
superior to other types of organisations in promoting administrative efficiency 
(Raadschelders 2014:854).  
There are also weaknesses and disadvantages related to bureaucracy. In this regard, 
the foremost important point to highlight is that bureaucracy has gained a negative 
reputation over the years as it is associated with red tape, delays, obstacles, and 
rigidity (Esau 2006:48; Farazmand 2010b:246). Traditional bureaucracy is also 
resistant to change (Persson and Goldkuhl 2010:51). Many bureaucrats are 
considered very conservative in their orientation, meaning that they are unable or very 
slow to change with the times and adapt to new ideas (Ionescu 2011:191).   
Bureaucracy has also not been effective in promoting diversity, consensus building, 
participative management, and innovation (Argyriades 2010:284). The bureaucratic 
organisational structure, characterised by its sectoral specialisation or 
departmentalisation, has turned the government into administrative silos, thus creating 
policy fragmentation rather than integration (Steurer 2007:207). In this regard, the 
negative consequences of bureaucracy are better summarised by Foster and Jones 
(1978:348), who contend that “rigid obedience to an organisation’s rules and lines of 
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authority may also have detrimental consequences [and that] sometimes rigid rule 
orientation can lead to stagnation and decline of an organisation”. 
It is therefore against this background that there is a general onslaught across the 
world against centralised and hierarchical structures, which are now considered 
irrelevant to modern conditions (Argyriades 2010:289). A critique against bureaucracy 
also relates to the fact that the core values that underpin public administration are now 
at variance with the changing values and needs of society (Argyriades 2010:290). 
Bureaucracy has also lost its currency and appeal in modern management theory and 
practice, which have found bureaucracy to be an ineffective organisational model 
(Weymes 2004:85). 
The hierarchical and top-down approaches to public policy implementation are no 
longer relevant and effective in addressing complex problems that face contemporary 
governments (Thornhill and Van Dijk 2010:103). This is because the nature of the 
problems that confront organisations cannot always be addressed through hierarchical 
structures (Al-Habil 2011:108). In summary, the rigidity and inflexibility associated with 
the bureaucratic hierarchical structures (traditional Weberian bureaucratic model) 
stifle effective responses to more complex contemporary challenges that face modern 
society (Welp et al. 2007:300).  
3.3  NPM theory and modernisation of the public sector  
The ascendancy of the concept of NPM can be traced to the public sector reforms in 
the United Kingdom (UK) and the USA in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Gruening 
2001:2; Simonet 2008:618). Its overall intent was to reform public administration 
(Zaharia 2012:72). NPM is associated with the emergence of a neo-liberal ideology in 
the UK and the USA (see Simonet 2008:618). In other words, these public sector 
reforms coincided (and are associated) with the period of Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher in the UK and the presidency of Ronald Reagan in the USA. In addition to 
the UK and the USA, NPM reforms were also adopted in New Zealand and Australia 
in the 1980s, which represented a different public sector management paradigm and 
alternative to the Weberian bureaucratic model of public administration (Cameron 
2009:912; Welp et al. 2007:300).  
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To be more specific, NPM was adopted to address the weaknesses and shortcomings 
of bureaucracy, including the lack of flexibility and responsiveness, poor customer 
service, inefficiencies, and process rather than outcomes orientation (Alford and 
Hughes 2008:134). In this regard, the bureaucratic public administration was criticised 
for being bloated, unproductive, ineffective, and inefficient (Argyriades 2010:286; 
Dawson and Dargie 1999:460).  
This criticism then positioned NPM as a critique to bureaucratic public administration. 
The understanding of the context under which neo-liberal ideology and its associated 
public sector management reforms (NPM) gained currency is also important for the 
purpose of providing a proper historical perspective. The economic recession and 
financial, fiscal, and budget crises that occurred during this period (1970s and 1980s) 
also account for other key factors that led to these fundamental public sector 
management (NPM) reforms (Gruening 2001:2; Simonet 2008:618; Thornhill and Van 
Dijk 2010:104).    
3.3.1   Understanding the concept of NPM 
Although there is some consensus in the literature on what the concept of NPM entails, 
there are also different conceptions and applications of this concept. How this concept 
is understood and applied varies from country to country depending on a country-
specific context. NPM is described as a management philosophy applied by 
governments to reform and modernise the public sector in line with the market-based 
principles of efficiency and effectiveness (Peters 2013:20; Fábián 2010:37; Hope 
2001:121). Put differently, it is a private sector model or technique used to reorganise 
and streamline the public sector to make it more efficient (Zaharia 2012:72). Van De 
Walle and Hammerschmid (2011:192) view NPM as “a set of managerial and service 
delivery innovations”.  
NPM is based on market ideologies and aims to improve public sector performance, 
effectiveness, innovation, and customer satisfaction, and to move away from inputs to 
outcomes (Rosenbloom 2013:388). As a philosophy associated with the re-
engineering and reinvention of the government, NPM also requires changes in the 
structure, culture, and management systems of governments (Hope 2001:121). The 
concept of NPM has also been associated with the concept of managerialism. In this 
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context, managerialism means “managerial reforms applied to Anglo-American public 
services from the early 1980s onwards” (Alford and Hughes 2008:135). 
Diefenbach (2009:893) better captures and summarises the overall essence of NPM 
by asserting that “NPM is a set of assumptions and value statements about how public 
sector organisations should be designed, organised, managed and how, in a quasi-
business manner, they should function”. In this regard, Diefenbach (2009:894-895) 
contends that the main intent of NPM is to change the orientation and operation of the 
public sector, and he identifies three strategic external orientations, namely market-
orientation (commodification of public services), stakeholder-orientation (meeting the 
needs of stakeholders), and customer-orientation (meeting the needs of customers). 
In addition to the above broader external orientations, Diefenbach (2009:894-895) 
further identifies internal orientations and objectives associated with the NPM 
philosophy and these include efficiency, effectiveness, productivity, and cost 
reduction.   
3.3.2  The theoretical underpinning of NPM 
NPM derives its theoretical inspiration and grounding from a number of theoretical 
perspectives ranging from public choice theory, management theory, principal-agent 
theory, to transaction cost economics (Gruening 2001:17). Corporate managerialism 
and private sector management approaches also form part of the theoretical mix, and 
the various combinations of these different theories have crystallised into NPM, which 
has been immensely influential in countries such as the UK, Australia, Canada, and 
New Zealand (Peters 2013:11). 
Public choice theory has a greater theoretical influence on NPM. There are a number 
of theoretical critiques and propositions made by public choice theory about 
government and public administration. As opposed to the Weberian theory of 
bureaucracy, which regards public administration as being politically neutral, public 
choice theory sees public administration as being characterised by individual self-
interest and rent-seeking behaviour of officials (Seibel 2010:719). Public choice theory 
therefore rejects the notion that government officials are neutral custodians of the 
public interest (Wise 2004:673).  
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This critique should be understood against the background of the theoretical 
assumption that underpins public choice theory, which states that “individuals pursue 
their own aims and act according to their preferences” (Gruening 2001:5). This implies 
that individual human beings are by nature self-interested. To address the 
shortcomings and weaknesses associated with bureaucratic public administration, 
including its process-orientated bureaucratic organisational culture, public choice 
theory and management theory contend that public sector managers can learn 
important lessons from private sector management (Bradley and Parker 2001:349). 
Part of the solution proposed by the public choice school of thought to the bureaucratic 
problems of government is to move away from monopolistic public service delivery to 
a competitive public service delivery to improve public sector efficiency (Boyne 
1998:475).   
Overall, the theoretical foundation for NPM is that public sector organisations are not 
fundamentally different from private sector organisations and therefore private sector 
management approaches and techniques can be adapted to the public sector (Fábián 
2010:38; Dawson and Dargie 1999:461). In other words, public and private sector 
organisations can be organised and managed in a similar manner and therefore the 
public sector can mirror the organisational and management models applied in the 
private sector (Dawson and Dargie 1999:461).  
The need for the public sector to adopt private sector management philosophy and 
approaches is based on the belief that the traditional bureaucratic configuration and 
management of the public sector have not been effective in managing costs and 
improving service quality and meeting the service needs and standards of citizens 
(Dawson and Dargie 1999:462). Therefore, NPM intends to provide more efficient 
mechanisms for efficient and effective public service delivery and improved 
government performance (Kelly 1998:201). 
3.3.3  The influence of NPM on public administration 
The 1980s saw the rise and currency of NPM in both the theory and the practice of 
public sector management in many countries of the world – including its influence on 
the wave of public sector reforms in sub-Saharan Africa (Ariely 2011:999; Hope 
2001:119-122). In this regard, various key factors influenced NPM reforms in many 
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African governments, which included economic, fiscal, and governance crises, as well 
as inefficient and ineffective public service (Hope 2001:123-128). This period marked 
a paradigm shift from the old model of public administration to NPM (Ariely 2011:999). 
In other words, managerialism or NPM replaced traditional approaches to public 
administration (Painter 1998b:44). The influence of NPM has been significant and 
unprecedented in the public sector in general and in public administration in particular. 
The manner in which NPM has changed the form and content of the public sector is 
very complex and cannot be explained in simplistic terms.  
Certain key broad observations and deductions are, however, worth mentioning in this 
regard:  
 Firstly, NPM has been used by many governments as a key template for public 
sector reform, re-engineering, and modernisation (Hope 2001:119).  
 Secondly, there has been a widespread application of private sector 
management models and techniques in the public sector, including the creation 
of business-like institutions and structures (Haque 2007:1305; Williams and 
Lewis 2008:656).  
 Thirdly, this new public sector management paradigm has brought about 
greater focus on efficiency and results, as well as the recasting of the notion of 
service users (citizens) as clients (Welp et al. 2007:300).  
 Fourthly, NPM has influenced personnel recruitment, appointment, and 
promotion practices, as well as the general attitude and behaviour of the public 
service (Argyriades 2010:292). In other words, NPM has brought about new 
values in the public sector (Van De Walle and Hammerschmid 2011:193).  
In summary, NPM has changed the broader strategic objectives and orientation as 
well the internal structures and processes of the public sector (Diefenbach 2009:897). 
In the African public sector context, NPM reforms have been used to build the 
institutional capacity of the public service for effective policy management and 
improved government performance with respect to public service delivery (Hope 
2001:123-128). 
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3.3.4   A critique of NPM theory  
Despite being hailed as a game-changing public sector management paradigm, NPM 
is not without criticism and limitations. The criticisms are wide-ranging and diverse. 
Some criticisms are philosophical and ideological in nature. In this regard, NPM is 
viewed as being “foreign” or rather ill-suited to the public sector and the notion of public 
service (Diefenbach 2009:897). This is because private and public sector 
organisations exist for completely different purposes in that the former is mainly about 
cost minimisation and profit maximisation, while the latter is about public service 
(Fábián 2010:43). NPM ignores and disregards public values intrinsically associated 
with public administration, including its greater preoccupation with the notion of public 
interests and the needs of citizens (Rosenbloom 2013:388). In other words, customer 
orientation and efficiency considerations have changed the understanding and the 
notion of public services (Diefenbach 2009:897). 
It is, however, the following critique and limitations that are of greater importance to 
this study. Firstly, NPM is said to be characterised by an intraorganisational focus, 
which ignores interorganisational dimensions associated with the nature of the 
contemporary public service delivery (Osborne, Radnor and Nasi 2012:137). This is 
antithetical to the notion of IGR and cooperative governance. In other words, NPM’s 
failure to appreciate the importance of interorganisational aspects amounts to its 
failure to appreciate the concurrent and interdependent nature of modern public 
administration and public service delivery.   
Secondly, NPM does not address but rather promotes or perpetuates silos in public 
administration mainly through the agencification of government (i.e. the creation of 
public agencies) (Steurer 2007:208). In other words, NPM has replaced old silos 
associated with traditional ministry or department-type configurations with a new brand 
of silos, thus creating new problems of fragmentation and coordination (Van De Walle 
and Hammerschmid 2011:193-194).  
3.4   Systems theory and the systems thinking perspective 
Systems theory and systems thinking have a very long history (Wang 2004:394; 
Yawson 2012:56). It was, however, the Austrian-born biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy 
who advanced the theoretical foundation for systems theory through the development 
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of the general systems theory in the 1940s (Amagoh 2008:2; Clark and Werder 
2007:526; Vanderstraeten 2004:257; Yawson 2012:56). Since the 1950s and 1960s, 
systems theory further gained prominence and currency across various scientific 
disciplines and sub-disciplines (Vanderstraeten 2004:257).   
Von Bertalanffy’s work on systems theory inspired the development of systems 
sciences and the founding of the Society for the Advancement of General Systems 
Theory in 1955, but more importantly, his work marked the rise of holistic thinking in 
the scientific research field, which, for many decades, had been dominated by 
analytical approaches (Corning 2014:181). Von Bertalanffy’s general systems theory 
aims to provide a general theoretical framework or template that can be applied to 
many different disciplines and his work on general systems theory inspired many other 
theorists to develop other systems theories (Wang 2004:394). Although there are 
different types of systems theories, the focus in this study is mainly on general systems 
theory as a broader theoretical framework that provides general principles for the 
understanding of systems and how systems function in a broader and general sense.  
3.4.1 Conceptualising systems theory  
The term “systems theory”, although common in the systems literature, has no 
universally acceptable definition (Adams et al. 2014:112). This means that the 
meaning of the term is highly contested; hence there is no one common definition 
acceptable to the systems science community. This could stem from the fact that 
systems theory is applied differently in different disciplines (Drack and Apfalter 
2007:542). This thesis takes a much broader and general perspective of systems 
theory. Therefore, systems theory is used interchangeably with general systems 
theory in this thesis. Against this backdrop, this thesis has therefore adopted Yawson’s 
(2012:56) definition: “Systems Theory, also referred to as General Systems Theory or 
systemics, is the theory underlying the study of systems. It [Systems Theory] is a trans- 
and interdisciplinary theory that underlies studies of complex systems in nature, 
society, organisations, and science. Systems Theory is therefore a theoretical 
framework by which elements that act in concert to produce some result are studied”.  
General systems theory is about general systems principles that can be applied to all 
systems (Dubrovsky 2004:109). A key universal assumption or principle that underpins 
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general systems theory is that “the whole is greater than the sum of its parts” (Wang 
2004:395). With its biological origin and orientation, systems theory or general 
systems theory takes an evolutionary perspective of system effectiveness and 
contends that better adaptation to the environment would ensure system (living 
system) prosperity and survival (Kast and Rosenzweig 1972:456). General systems 
theory is much broader in its scope as it covers the study of both living systems 
(organic and open systems) and non-living systems (mechanistic and closed systems) 
(Wang 2004:394). 
Systems theory is multi-disciplinary in both theory and application and it provides a 
framework through which practitioners can study and understand multi-disciplinary 
systems and their problems (Adams et al. 2014:120-121). Many problems cannot be 
understood and addressed through a single discipline, and systems theory is therefore 
important in bridging the theoretical and practical barriers between different disciplines 
(Hieronymi 2013:582). Systems theory helps us explain and understand real-world 
systems (Adams et al. 2014:119).   
Systems theory assumes a hierarchical order in which systems include sub-systems 
(Clark and Werder 2007:527). In other words, general systems theory postulates a 
system as an organised arrangement made up of interdependent components that 
exist in some form of relationship (Kast and Rosenzweig 1972:453). This implies that 
a system is mainly characterised by some form or level of order and complexity rather 
than chaos. It is therefore against this background that systems thinking is considered 
an important skill required to deal with interconnected and complex issues (Hieronymi 
2013:580). Systems thinking is about wholeness or a holistic view (see Yawson 
2012:57).  
3.4.2   Understanding the concept of a system  
The word “system” comes from the Greek word “systema”, which means “an 
assemblage of objects united by some form of regular interaction or interdependence” 
(Elnashaie et al. 2008:511). The concept of a system as theorised by Von Bertalanffy 
has its origin in biology with specific reference to the organism (Zexian and Xuhui 
2010:143). Despite its widespread usage and application, there is no common 
universal definition of a system and many different definitions are used to describe it 
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(Hieronymi 2013:585). It is used loosely in different discourses (Yawson 2012:56). 
Hieronymi (2013:585) ascribes the existence of multiple definitions of a system to its 
multi-dimensionality, ranging from its simplicity to its complexities.  
Notwithstanding the existing definitional variations, some degree of consensus exists 
in the academic literature on the definition of a system. A system is commonly defined 
as a whole consisting of interconnected and interrelated parts, components, or 
elements (Elnashaie et al. 2008:511; Hargreaves and Podems 2012:464; Kast and 
Rosenzweig 1972:450; Pickel 2007:394; Zexian and Xuhui 2010:143-147). A system 
is mainly characterised by parts (elements or components), unity (wholeness or 
synergy), and relationships (interrelationships or interactions) (Dubrovsky 2004:113). 
A system is also characterised by hierarchy, which means it is made up of hierarchical 
relationships between its components and sub-systems (Kast and Rosenzweig 
1972:450).  
More importantly, a system is associated with the notions of holism and synergism, 
which means that “the whole is not just the sum of the parts; the system itself can be 
explained only as a totality” (Kast and Rosenzweig 1972:450). According to Kast and 
Rosenzweig (1972:450), “holism is the opposite of elementarism, which views the total 
as the sum of its individual parts”. In other words, a system is not so much about its 
individual components, but rather the interface and interactions between its 
components (Clark and Werder 2007:526). A study or analysis of any system therefore 
requires that its components must first be identified and thereafter the hierarchy of the 
systems components and how these components work and interact (interdependence) 
must be understood (Clark and Werder 2007:527). 
There are different types of systems. The first type relates to open systems, which are 
those systems that exchange information and energy with their environments 
(Elnashaie et al. 2008:511; Kast and Rosenzweig 1972:450). The second type entails 
closed systems, which refer to rigid systems with closed boundaries (Kast and 
Rosenzweig 1972:450). Examples of open systems include biological and social 
systems, whereas closed systems may include mechanical systems (Kast and 
Rosenzweig 1972:450).  
In addition, Hieronymi (2013:583) provides five main categories of systems, namely 1) 
physical systems (earth, rivers, weather, atoms, and molecules), 2) living systems 
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(animals, organs, tissue, and cells), 3) cognitive systems (communication, ideas, 
consciousness, and learning), 4) social systems (countries, cities, markets, 
organisations, teams, families, and relationships), and 5) technological systems 
(computers, the Internet, and telecommunications). This study therefore falls within 
the category of social systems as IGR and cooperative governance are about 
organisations and their relationships.  
Organisations are described and explained in systems terms as consisting of 
interdependent components, structures, and sub-systems in the form of people and 
departments (Clark and Werder 2007:526; Pickel 2007:401; Millett 1998:3-4). The 
various components and sub-systems of the organisation define the structure and 
identity of the organisation (Millett 1998:4). As a system, the various components of 
an organisation work together in order to achieve organisational objectives (Johnson, 
Kast and Rosenzweig 1964:383).  
3.4.3  The importance of systems theory in the study of organisations 
General systems theory provides a broader framework for the study of organisations 
(Kast and Rosenzweig 1972:459). Systems theory is somewhat a critique of the 
traditional organisational theory as it applies a different approach to the study of 
organisations. Traditional organisational theory focuses on the different parts and 
elements of the organisational structure and does not pay great attention to issues of 
interrelationships and the integration of various organisational components and 
activities (Johnson et al. 1964:377-378). In other words, traditional organisational 
theory focuses on silos within organisations, while systems theory is about the 
wholeness of the organisation by taking a holistic view of the study of organisations.  
Systems theory holds the basic assumption that organisations exist to pursue their 
organisational goals, which include survival and growth (Wang 2004:395). The 
organisational implications of systems theory is that “organisations are dynamic 
systems of adaptation and evolution that contain multiple parts, which interact with 
one another and the environment” (Amagoh 2008:8). The understanding of systems 
theory is therefore important for the understanding of the interconnections, 
interactions, and interplay between the various components and sub-systems of 
organisations, which could help address complex organisational issues (Amagoh 
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2008:8-10). In this regard, the positive aspects of a systems approach are that it is 
flexible and situation-specific and does not make universal generalisations (Clark and 
Werder 2007:526). This allows the application to and adaptation of systems theory by 
different organisational situations and contexts. 
3.4.4   A critique of systems theory  
The literature highlights certain key criticisms and limitations in relation to general 
systems theory. The criticisms and limitations are mainly theoretical and 
methodological in nature. Apart from its principle of wholeness, general systems 
theory is said to have failed to devise general system principles or universal principles 
applicable to all systems, thus failing to achieve its goal of unifying science (Dubrovsky 
2004:109-110). At a practical level, general systems theory is criticised for its lack or 
paucity of substantive concepts and practical methodologies to guide systems 
practitioners in addressing complex practical problems (Zexian and Xuhui 2010:141).  
The other criticism has more to do with the biological analogy (organisms) associated 
with general systems theory. It is argued that social systems are different from 
biological systems (Low 1982:226). Implicit in this argument is a view or rather a 
caution to apply systems theory with a greater amount of care when it comes to social 
systems and other non-biological systems. Overall, what these criticisms imply is that 
more theoretical and methodological work is still required to further develop the area 
of systems theory, including practical tools and techniques to help systems 
practitioners deal with complex practical problems.  
3.5  Collaborative management theory in the public sector 
Collaboration is gaining currency and popularity in public administration (Cunningham, 
Olshfski and Abdelrazek 2009:58; Majumdar, Moynahan and Pierce 2009:55). In the 
contemporary public administration discourse, there is strong emphasis on the need 
for public officials to think and act in a collaborative manner (Catlaw and Jordan 
2009:290). Collaborative practices form part of the new approaches to public sector 
management and governance, which are increasingly being seen as offering potential 
solutions to the problems associated with the NPM philosophy (Alford and Hughes 
2008:136). In this regard, more attention has recently been paid to the concept of 
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collaborative public management (McGuire 2006:34). Collaboration is also viewed as 
a new form of governance (McGuire 2006:39). This form of governance places more 
emphasis on intergovernmental and intersectoral collaboration to provide public 
services (Hall and Jennings 2012:127). 
A number of factors have led to the emergence of collaborative management practices 
in the public sector. Firstly, the traditional bureaucratic management approaches have 
become outdated and inappropriate to address complex contemporary challenges 
(Battaglio and Khankarli 2008:139; McGuire 2006:34; Keast and Brown 2002:442; 
Silvia 2011:67). Secondly, the collaborative management approaches were born out 
of the realisation that complex contemporary issues and problems or so-called “wicked 
problems” cannot be solved and addressed by organisations through a traditional 
unitary or single agency approach (Abels 2012:34; Keast and Brown 2002:439). In 
other words, no single organisation can effectively solve these complex problems; 
hence a need for a collaborative approach.  
Thirdly, fragmentation and poor coordination have been identified as the major 
problems that hinder effective and efficient public service delivery (Keast and Brown 
2002:439). In addition, the changing nature of the state and its operations has also 
brought about greater focus on collaborative arrangements (Agranoff and McGuire 
2003:1403). This changing operational environment in the public sector entails a shift 
from the traditional hierarchical (bureaucratic) approach to a collaborative approach in 
order to achieve public policy objectives and create public value (Getha-Taylor 
2008:103). In other words, the strategic imperative for public officials to collaborate is 
motivated by the need to meet public expectations regarding development outcomes 
(Majumdar et al. 2009:56). 
3.5.1  Conceptualising collaborative management 
Like many other concepts, the concept of collaboration also suffers conceptual and 
definitional difficulties. There is no common definition for the term “collaboration” 
(O’Leary and Vij 2012:508). Collaboration is sometimes used interchangeably with 
other terms, such as “partnership” (Cornforth, Hayes and Vangen 2014:3). A brief 
conceptual distinction from other related concepts is therefore important before we 
can focus our attention on collaboration. The following quotation provides some 
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conceptual clarity in relation to how collaboration differs from cooperation and 
coordination: “[C]ollaboration needs to be distinguished from closely related concepts 
such as cooperation and coordination. Cooperation and coordination are similar to 
collaboration, but cooperation does not mean collaboration. One can cooperate but 
not collaborate when individuals or organisations act independently to achieve a 
common goal. Likewise, one can coordinate with another, but not collaborate, when 
delivering one’s own service in a planned, but not collaborative way” (Cunningham 
et al. 2009:59). 
In its broader conceptualisation, collaboration should entail coordination and 
cooperation (Aoki 2015:199). Having addressed the conceptual confusion between 
collaboration and other concepts, it is now important to focus attention on what 
collaboration means and what it entails. Despite the absence of a universally 
acceptable definition, the literature provides a helpful explanation and description of 
the concept of collaboration. In this regard, collaboration can be understood as 
“formalized, joint-working arrangements between organisations that remain legally 
autonomous while engaging in ongoing, coordinated collective action to achieve 
outcomes that none of them could achieve on their own” (Cornforth et al. 2014:3). A 
more substantive clarification of the concept of collaboration is as follows: 
“Collaboration is a more demanding process in which entities share information, 
resources and responsibilities to jointly plan, implement, and evaluate a program of 
activities to achieve a common goal and therefore jointly generating value. This 
concept is derived from the Latin collaborare meaning ‘to work together’ and can be 
seen as a process of shared creation; thus a process through which a group of entities 
enhance the capabilities of each other. It implies sharing of risks, resources, 
responsibilities, losses and rewards … Collaboration involves mutual engagement of 
participants to solve a problem together, which implies mutual trust and thus takes 
time, effort, and dedication” (Camarinha-Matos et al. 2009:48). 
In an organisational and management context, collaboration “involves interacting with 
others in carrying out the policy directive of a duly chosen decision maker or decision-
making body by working with others, together exploring options in deciding what to do 
or how to do it. Synergy, win-win, participation, and networking are also ideas or 
concepts that involve or describe working together” (Cunningham et al. 2009:59). More 
importantly, collaboration entails “building personal and organisational relationships 
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across institutional boundaries” (Cunningham et al. 2009:58). The imperative for 
collaboration is motivated by the need to avoid duplication and improve efficiency, 
effectiveness, and economies of scale (Hall and Jennings 2012:128). Put differently, 
collaboration seeks to maximise the collective capacity of organisations to ensure 
efficient and effective public service delivery (Kalu 2012:423).  
In terms of the concept of collaborative management or collaborative public 
management, there is no common consensus on defining these terms. It needs to be 
noted that, in the context of this thesis, collaborative management and collaborative 
public management are used interchangeably. McGuire (2006:33) defines 
collaborative public management as “a concept that describes the process of 
facilitating and operating in multi-organisational arrangements in order to remedy 
problems that cannot be solved – or solved easily – by single organisations”. From a 
collaborative public management perspective, collaboration is viewed as “an emerging 
management practice that facilitates problem solving in the complex environment of 
modern public management” (Oh and Bush 2014:3). This thesis adopted Agranoff and 
McGuire’s definition of collaborative public management: “Collaborative public 
management is a concept that describes the process of facilitating and operating in 
multi-organisational arrangements to solve problems that cannot be solved or easily 
solved by single organisations. Collaborative means to co-labor, to achieve common 
goals, often working across boundaries and in multi-sector and multi-actor 
relationships” (in O’Leary and Vij 2012:508).  
3.5.2   Key benefits of collaborative management 
Collaborative management or collaborative public management brings about 
important organisational, institutional, and service delivery benefits that many 
management approaches and practices are unable to offer. Collaboration allows for 
multi-sectoral or multi-organisational solutions to problems that cut cross jurisdictional 
and sectoral boundaries (O’Leary and Vij 2012:513). In other words, a collaborative 
approach is helpful in addressing complex and difficult problems (Majumdar et al. 
2009:55; Weber, Lovrich and Gaffney 2007:197).  
In this regard, Hall and Jennings (2012:128) describe collaboration as crucial in 
dealing with “tasks that are paramount to concurrent actions by independent 
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organisations”. Stated differently, this means that collaborative management is an 
appropriate management approach to deal with complex intergovernmental problems. 
In addition, it provides a new and innovative approach to public service delivery 
(Catlaw and Jordan 2009:290-291). A collaborative approach also provides more 
flexibility; hence it is preferable to a bureaucratic approach (O’Leary and Vij 2012:513). 
A collaborative management approach brings about a unique set of public sector 
management attributes and competencies required for effective public service 
delivery. In collaborative arrangements, parties bring to the table “their unique skills, 
resources, expertise, experience, perspectives, knowledge, diverse educational and 
cultural backgrounds, as well as values to collaborative endeavors” (O’Leary and Vij 
2012:512). In these arrangements, public sector managers do not only focus on their 
individual organisations but also operate in a multi-organisational context to address 
complex problems that require a multi-organisational approach (O’Leary and Vij 
2012:509).  
In other words, public sector managers operating in a collaborative management  
set-up are simultaneously involved in management across organisational and sectoral 
boundaries (McGuire 2006:35). In addition, a collaborative approach provides a 
mechanism to mobilise and leverage the capacities and strengths of different 
organisations and sectors (Catlaw and Jordan 2009:291; Rosenbloom 2013:389). It 
can therefore be argued that a collaborative approach improves and enhances the 
organisational and institutional capacity of the state for good governance and effective 
public service delivery.   
3.5.3   Key considerations for collaborative management 
There are certain strategic considerations or critical factors that need to be considered 
for effective implementation of collaborative management arrangements. The first 
strategic consideration relates to the adaptation of skills and behaviour to suit the 
unique requirements and context of the collaborative management endeavour 
(McGuire 2006:37; Silvia 2011:67). In addition to basic skills ordinarily required to 
manage organisations, new competencies and techniques are required for a 
collaborative management environment (McGuire 2006:40).  
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The second strategic consideration pertains to the need for public sector managers in 
collaborative arrangements to adopt a multi-jurisdictional strategic perspective and 
structure their administrative and managerial systems into collaborative operational 
systems (Abels 2012:38). This requires public sector management to take a macro 
holistic view of the government and its operations. In other words, it requires public 
sector managers to appreciate the complex cross-jurisdictional and sectoral nature of 
government. In this regard, strategic planning is viewed as a key instrument through 
which to develop an overall framework and purpose for collaborative arrangements 
(McGuire 2006:37). Other equally important strategic considerations include the need 
to build mutual relationships, trust, and communication, as well as reciprocity and 
respect for equality for all parties involved in collaborative arrangements (see 
Edelenbos and Klijn 2007:31-33; Kalu 2012:428-430; McGuire 2006:38).  
3.5.4   A critique of collaborative management  
Although collaborative management offers many organisational and institutional 
benefits, some critical issues of concern need to be highlighted. The first issue, 
although not necessarily peculiar to collaborative management, relates to contextual 
considerations. Multi-organisational arrangements, including intergovernmental, 
interorganisational, and intersectoral arrangements, are contextual or context specific 
(Agranoff and McGuire 2003:1412). This is not necessarily a bad thing, but the 
implication is that care and consideration should be afforded to the context in which 
collaborative arrangements are structured and implemented.  
The second issue pertains to the power dynamics associated with collaborative 
arrangements. The balance of power within collaborative arrangements is often 
unequal and this may lead to conflict, instability, and lack of trust among the parties 
involved (McGuire 2006:40; O’Leary and Vij 2012:513). The third issue is 
accountability. Collaborative arrangements can blur the normal lines of accountability 
and make accountability for parties more difficult (Catlaw and Jordan 2009:290-291; 
O’Leary and Vij 2012:513). In other words, it is not a clear-cut case of which party in 
a collaborative set-up should be held accountable in the event something in the 
collaborative arrangement goes wrong or in case the whole collaborative endeavour 
fails.  
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The other issue relates to the theoretical and conceptual weaknesses of collaborative 
public management. Collaborative public management suffers from the lack of a clear 
overarching theory and a distinct identity as a different discipline and a field of 
research, as well as clear conceptual boundaries that distinguish it from other 
concepts such as coordination, cooperation, coalition, alliances, mergers, and 
partnerships (O’Leary and Vij 2012:516-517). This could mainly be attributed to the 
relative newness of collaborative management or collaborative public management as 
a distinct field of theory and practice.  
The last issue is more a psychological one that speaks to a general ambivalent attitude 
towards collaborative thinking and action (Catlaw and Jordan 2009:290). This needs 
to be understood against the backdrop of the relative newness of collaborative 
management, but, more importantly, against the background of the fact that many 
public sector managers are steeped in traditional bureaucratic management theory 
and practice.  
3.6   Conceptualising and contextualising planning and collaborative 
planning    
Planning forms part of the core focus of this study. In the context of this study, planning 
is regarded as one of the key institutional anchors and drivers of IGR and cooperative 
governance. In other words, it is a key factor to drive effective IGR and cooperative 
governance. Many planning theories exist; however, only strategic planning and 
collaborative planning theories are relevant to this study.   
The next section deals with strategic planning in organisations, with the focus on 
historical background and key strategic issues and considerations.   
3.6.1  Strategic planning in organisations 
The precise origin and status of the concept of “strategic planning” remain debatable 
and contentious in the literature. On the one hand, strategic planning is seen in some 
quarters as a relatively new concept and discipline (Cervone 2014:156; Salkic 
2014:62). On the other hand, however, strategic planning appears to be an old concept 
with its historical origin traced to the military fraternity (Carter 1999:46; Nartisa, Putans 
and Muravska 2012:241). The principles of strategic planning have many similarities 
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with the principles that were applied in the military strategy or management of war 
during ancient and medieval periods (see Nartisa et al. 2012:241). Strategic planning 
has been applied in a military context for many centuries, but its application in business 
dates back to the 1920s with the development of the Harvard Policy Model by the 
Harvard Business School, which ushered in one of the first corporate strategic 
planning methodologies (Carter 1999:46).  
Strategic planning gained widespread prominence in many organisations in the 1950s 
and 1970s (Carter 1999:46; Kaufman and Jacobs 1987:24; Nartisa et al. 2012:240-
247; Salkic 2014:62). In public administration, however, the application of strategic 
planning principles gained increased currency and impetus in the 1980s (Nartisa et al. 
2012:247). The evolution of strategic planning has, however, been punctuated by 
twists and turns, as well as highs and lows. In the late 1970s and 1980s, strategic 
planning experienced a decrease in popularity and influence and fell out of favour 
(Carter 1999:46; Glaister and Falshaw 1999:107). This was mainly due to “evolving 
perspectives in management theory” (Cervone 2014:156) and the failure of strategic 
planning to perform in line with expectations (Glaister and Falshaw 1999:107). 
Nonetheless, strategic planning remains an important tool used in private and public 
sector organisations, although the approaches and application are different in these 
sectors (Nartisa et al. 2012:240). 
Like many other concepts, the concept of strategic planning also suffers from 
conceptual difficulties with regard to the definition thereof. There is no common, 
universally acceptable definition of strategic planning in the literature. However, for the 
purpose of this study, a simple and straightforward definition of strategic planning was 
identified. For this study, strategic planning is defined as “the process of developing a 
shared vision of the organisation’s future and then determining the best way to make 
this vision come about” (Ginty 1999:134).  
The strategic planning process entails key activities ranging from the definition of the 
organisational mission; environmental analysis focusing on strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities, and threats; to the development of strategic objectives, key strategies, 
and action plans (Ugboro, Obeng and Spann 2011:89). Strategic planning needs to 
be understood as part of the broader strategic management process (see Nartisa et 
al. 2012:244). Strategic management deals with organisational mission (mandate), 
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vision, values, objectives, environmental analysis, and key priorities, as well as 
organisational strategy and tactics (Nartisa et al. 2012:242-244).  
Strategic planning is therefore about strategy formulation (Poister 2010:247). The 
process results in the development of an organisational strategic plan. A strategic plan 
is a key “management and budgetary planning document” (Nartisa et al. 2012:242). 
Other levels of planning in the overall hierarchy relate to operational and tactical 
planning. Tactical planning is detailed planning that focuses on alternative courses of 
actions and resource allocation, while operational planning is mainly about 
“implementation planning of projects and actions” identified through tactical planning 
(Amdam 2014:12).  
Strategic planning serves an important purpose in organisations. It serves as a tool to 
position and direct organisations towards their goals (Wilkinson and Monkhouse 
1994:16). It enables organisations to analyse their environments, set their goals, and 
develop appropriate strategic measures to achieve the desired outcomes (Amdam 
2014:12; Salkic 2014:63). More importantly, strategic planning allows organisations to 
take a long-term future perspective (Amdam 2014:12; Poister 2010:247; Ugboro et al. 
2011:111). The overall strategic purpose of strategic planning can also be understood 
as follows: “In the long run, its [strategic planning’s] purpose is to promote strategic 
thinking, acting, and learning on an ongoing basis. Thus, strategic planning takes a 
‘big picture’ approach that blends futuristic thinking, objective analysis, and subjective 
evaluation of values, goals, and priorities to chart a future direction and courses of 
action to ensure an organisation’s vitality, effectiveness, and ability to add public value” 
(Poister 2010:247). 
3.6.2  The organisational dividends associated with strategic planning 
The literature points to important organisational dividends associated with strategic 
planning practice. In this regard, the organisational benefits of strategic planning 
broadly relate to better organisational planning and management, as well as improved 
organisational effectiveness and performance. With regard to organisational planning 
and management, some key specific benefits are worth highlighting. Strategic 
planning helps organisations to focus on key issues and their solutions and allows 
them to set clear strategic goals and make well-informed, forward-looking decisions 
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(Salkic 2014:63). More importantly, strategic planning provides organisations with a 
better understanding of their operating environment and a clear sense of strategic 
direction and focus in terms of what they want to achieve (Ugboro et al. 2011:95). In 
other words, strategic planning is an important tool for the improved organisational 
planning and strategic management of organisations.  
In addition, strategic planning contributes to organisational effectiveness and 
performance in a number of ways. Strategic planning is considered a critical 
precondition for successful organisations (Phillips and Moutinho 2000:370). It is key 
to improved organisational performance (Ugboro et al. 2011:95). Organisations that 
apply strategic planning have a better chance of achieving their goals and intended 
results than those that do not (Salkic 2014:62). In public sector organisations, strategic 
planning is important for improved service delivery and citizen satisfaction (Salkic 
2014:62).  
The need to improve value for money and performance has prompted public sector 
organisations to embrace strategic planning models (Wilkinson and Monkhouse 
1994:16). For example, an empirical study in Bosnia and Herzegovina found that the 
application of strategic planning in public sector organisations helps create more 
efficient and effective management of resources in organisations (Salkic 2014:61). It 
can therefore be deduced from this analysis that strategic planning has a positive 
impact on organisational performance, effectiveness, and efficiency in terms of the 
management of resources and the provision of services.  
3.6.3   Key factors and considerations related to strategic planning 
There are key factors that need to be considered to ensure that strategic planning in 
organisations is more effective and leads to improved organisational performance. In 
this regard, four broad factors or considerations have been identified. The first 
strategic consideration relates to the need to link strategic planning to performance 
management in organisations. It is important that public sector managers ensure a 
much closer connection and interface between strategic planning and performance 
management processes to improve results and promote accountability (Poister 
2010:249).  
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The second key strategic factor to be considered in relation to effective strategic 
planning in organisations pertains to senior management involvement and 
commitment. There is a greater degree of consensus in academic literature about the 
important role of managers in planning processes (Salkic 2014:63). Managers need 
to embrace strategic planning as a strategic management tool to define the strategic 
direction of their organisations (Nartisa et al. 2012:242). It is also critical that different 
levels of management work together in strategic planning to ensure that the strategic 
objectives and direction of the organisation are well understood and implemented 
(Ugboro et al. 2011:94).   
The third main consideration is understanding the broader operating environment in 
terms of internal and external factors that influence organisations. Better 
understanding and balancing of internal and external factors that influence 
organisations are important conditions for building successful organisations (Salkic 
2014:61). A realistic assessment of organisational strengths and weaknesses should 
form part of an effective strategic planning process (Ugboro et al. 2011:111). Lastly, 
effective strategic planning processes and implementation require the allocation of 
sufficient resources (Ugboro et al. 2011:111).    
3.6.4   Collaborative planning as an alternative approach 
The concept of collaborative planning emanated in the USA (Innes and Booher 
2015:204). The concept of collaborative planning has become an important framework 
to guide planning efforts that involve a multitude of organisations. It has gained 
widespread currency in the planning fraternity (Brand and Gaffikin 2007:284). 
Although the definition of collaborative planning remains contested in the literature, 
collaborative planning must, in the context of this study, be located within the broader 
theory of collaborative management or collaborative public management discussed in 
the previous section of this chapter.  
Collaborative planning involves different stakeholders and manifests itself in various 
forms such as networks and partnerships (Agger and Löfgren 2008:149). The principal 
objective of collaborative planning is to promote the involvement of relevant key 
stakeholders in planning processes to achieve common policy outcomes (Kumar and 
Paddison 2000:206). Collaborative planning is regarded as an important tool in 
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promoting an inclusive institutional framework for conversations among different 
stakeholders in a network society (Agger and Löfgren 2008:145).  
It is important for equalising and balancing power relationships and dynamics among 
the various stakeholders involved in a planning process (Cheng 2013:353). It is also 
premised on democratic decision making and consensus between different 
stakeholders (Bugg 2012:205-212). Interactions and trust among stakeholders are 
crucial conditions for effective collaborative planning (Kumar and Paddison 2000:206-
208). Transparency is also key to promoting legitimacy and trust among the key 
stakeholders in a collaborative planning process (Weston and Weston 2013:186).  
3.7    Conceptualising and contextualising performance management    
Performance management also forms part of the central focus of this study. Like 
planning, as discussed above, performance management is viewed in this study as 
one of the key institutional anchors and drivers of IGR and cooperative governance. It 
is a critical factor to promote and drive effective intergovernmental performance and 
service delivery. This study focuses on broad performance management theory with 
specific reference to collaborative performance management theory.    
Performance management is an old concept that dates back to the 1970s (Boland and 
Fowler 2000:417-418). The application of performance management in the public 
sector is, however, relatively new and dates back to the 1980s and 1990s when 
conservative governments introduced managerial reforms to the public sector (Boland 
and Fowler 2000:417-418). In this regard, the emergence of performance 
management in the public sector is associated with the emergence of the NPM 
paradigm in the public sector (Dreveton 2013:131; Gajda-Lüpke 2009:67; Hyndman 
and McGeough 2008:29; Verbeeten and Spekle 2015:953; Zhonghua and Ye 
2012:793). In other words, performance management experience in the private sector 
influenced public sector performance management practices and systems (Sun and 
Van Ryzin 2014:325-326).  
These NPM-related performance management reforms were inspired by the need to 
improve public sector performance and effectiveness (Hyndman and McGeough 
2008:32; Sun and Van Ryzin 2014:325; Norman 2002:619). The need to promote 
greater accountability in the public sector has also been a key driver for increased 
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focus on public sector performance management (see Hyndman and McGeough 
2008:29; Tillema 2007:502; Yusuf and Leavitt 2014:206).  
In this respect, the main contention of NPM is that “performance improvement requires 
a results-oriented culture that emphasises outcomes rather than inputs or processes; 
[and that] public sector organisations need to introduce performance management 
based on targets, monitoring and incentives” (Verbeeten and Spekle 2015:953). The 
NPM’s key focus on outcomes also relates to efficiency, effectiveness, and service 
quality (Dreveton 2013:131).  
Therefore, performance management systems in the public sector should be 
understood and appreciated against the above background. This is even more 
imperative in a democratic country like South Africa where government transparency 
and accountability are paramount.  
3.7.1   Conceptualisation of performance management  
The concept of performance management is, like many other concepts, riddled with 
conceptual difficulties. In this regard, it is important to first clarify the conceptual 
distinction between performance management and performance measurement. These 
are closely related but different concepts (see Goh 2012:32). Performance 
management is a broad management tool intended to improve organisational 
performance, while performance measurement is a key tool of performance 
management that focuses on metrics to measure organisational performance (Goh 
2012:32). In other words, performance measurement is a “practical and technical 
exercise within the much wider performance management practice” (Busi and Bititci 
2006:14). It provides the methodology through which organisational efficiency and 
effectiveness can be quantified, thus providing a management tool to improve 
organisational performance (Gajda-Lüpke 2009:69). An effective performance 
measurement system is important for building an effective performance management 
system (Goh 2012:38). At a more strategic level, performance management entails 
the setting of organisational goals and effective management to achieve intended 
outcomes (Poister 2010:251). 
It must be indicated that measuring performance is difficult (Phillips and Moutinho 
2000:370). Phillips and Moutinho (2000:371) define performance simply as “the 
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accomplishments or outcomes of an entity”. This definition was adopted for the 
purpose of this study. Certain key concepts or measures are commonly associated 
with performance management. These are inputs, outputs, quality, economy, 
efficiency, effectiveness, outcomes, and impacts. Output measures are the most basic 
measures that answer a simple question relating how many units (number or quantity) 
were produced in a particular time period (Gajda-Lüpke 2009:70).  
Output measures are, however, unable to answer more serious managerial questions 
relating to quality, efficiency, and effectiveness (Gajda-Lüpke 2009:70). Efficiency has 
different dimensions that involve output- and input-orientated efficiency with the former 
intended for the maximisation of outputs for a given amount of inputs, while the latter 
is about the minimal use of inputs to produce certain amount of outputs (Gajda-Lüpke 
2009:71). In other words, efficiency is about the relationship between outputs and the 
amount of resources used to produce these outputs (Gajda-Lüpke 2009:72). In simple 
terms, efficiency relates to input-output ratio (Boland and Fowler 2000:426; Hyndman 
and McGeough 2008:31). Stated differently, efficiency simply means “the ratio of 
outputs to inputs, or the amount of input per unit of output” (Hyndman and McGeough 
2008:31).  
Effectiveness and outcomes entail the extent to which organisations are able to 
achieve their objectives and meet their needs (Boland and Fowler 2000:420; Gajda-
Lüpke 2009:73). As higher-order measures, effectiveness and outcomes are more 
difficult to measure (Boland and Fowler 2000:420). Traditionally, performance 
measurement systems mainly focused on issues of inputs (economy) and efficiency 
(costs) and were unable to address issues of effectiveness and outcomes, but a call 
for a holistic performance management approach, which includes both financial and 
non-financial performance dimensions, has been gaining currency in many sectors 
(Kloot and Martin 2000:232). Different substantive and procedural theories explain the 
relationship between various measures of performance. For example, programme 
theory or the logic model (theory of change) deals with linear relationships ranging 
from programme inputs and activities to outcomes and impacts (Hargreaves and 
Podems 2012:466).  
3.7.2  The strategic importance of performance management in organisations 
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Performance management serves an important purpose in organisations. 
Performance measurement, as a practical technical tool of performance management, 
has both strategic and operational importance in organisations in that it provides 
information to support decision making in organisations and enables organisations to 
monitor their long-term plans (Pekkola 2013:72). It also serves as a tool to improve 
management and promote efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability in 
organisations (Hyndman and McGeough 2008:32).  
It is, however, important to note that effective performance management depends on 
the quality of management practices in an organisation (Sun and Van Ryzin 
2014:326). Furthermore, effective performance management requires both the 
clarification of goals and results-based management in order to lead to improved 
organisational performance (Poister, Pasha and Edwards 2013:626). It is also 
important that performance management takes a long-term strategic perspective by 
focusing not only on short-term results, but also on long-term performance 
improvement, innovation, and learning (Zhonghua and Ye 2012:794). 
3.7.3  Private and public sector performance management practices 
The application of performance management practices must appreciate the inherent 
contextual and institutional differences between the private and public sector. These 
differences are fundamental in nature and speak directly to differences in the 
institutional missions that underpin the existence of these sectors. The main objective 
of business or the private sector is profit making (Zhonghua and Ye 2012:794). It is 
therefore profit that “represents the ultimate measure of performance” in the private 
sector (Yusuf and Leavitt 2014:211). The private sector is also generally assumed to 
be characterised by a performance-based culture compared to the public sector where 
performance measurement is considered irrelevant, or rather too difficult (Kouzmin 
et al. 1999:121-122). 
In contrast to the profit-making objective of the private sector, the public sector exists 
to serve the public interest through the provision of public goods and services to 
citizens (Zhonghua and Ye 2012:794). The institutional uniqueness of the public sector 
also relates to the greater diversity and multiplicity of stakeholders and objectives it 
serves (Yusuf and Leavitt 2014:211; Zhonghua and Ye 2012:794). These include not 
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only economic objectives but social objectives as well (Mihaiu 2014:44). The 
measurement of public sector performance based only on narrow financial indicators 
is therefore an inappropriate and irrelevant approach to measure the real performance 
of the public sector (Mihaiu 2014:44). It is for the above reasons and considerations 
that public sector performance measurement was initially considered difficult, although 
it has recently been embraced in the public sector (Boland and Fowler 2000:417). 
There has also been a call for a multi-dimensional approach to public sector 
performance measurement (Hoque 2008:469).     
3.7.4   The relevance of performance management practices to the public 
sector 
The measurement of public sector performance has become a matter of greater 
necessity and importance (Mihaiu 2014:40-47). Performance management has also 
gained currency as an important aspect of contemporary public sector governance 
(Ohemeng 2009:109). The main strategic rationale for and importance of performance 
in the public sector can be justified in terms of the need to improve performance, 
productivity, efficiency, and effectiveness, as well as to promote transparency and 
enhance public confidence in the public sector (Mihaiu 2014:40-44; also see 
Diefenbach 2009:899). In this regard, performance management is generally 
associated with improved public sector performance (Poister et al. 2013:625).  
The promotion of public sector accountability also forms part of the key rationale for 
public sector performance management (Goh 2012:31). Performance management is 
an important management tool to help public sector managers with better 
management of resources and performance improvements; performance 
management is therefore associated with organisational effectiveness and improved 
outcomes in the public sector (Sun and Van Ryzin 2014:324-327). Performance 
management is also an important tool to support better decision making and facts-
based rational management (Diefenbach 2009:899; Hyndman and McGeough 
2008:30). Public sector performance measurement is multi-dimensional in that it 
entails balancing multiple interests and objectives, including social, economic, and 
environmental issues (Zhonghua and Ye 2012:794). 
 108 
Public sector performance is commonly viewed and approached in terms of a simple 
production model that focuses on inputs, outputs, and results (outcomes) and is 
measured in terms of common criteria based on efficiency and effectiveness 
(Hyndman and McGeough 2008:31). In other words, public sector performance or 
public service delivery is framed in terms of inputs, outputs, outcomes, and impact 
(Gajda-Lüpke 2009:69-70). In this context, inputs refer to resources used to produce 
and provide outputs (products and services), outputs refer to products or services, 
while results (outcomes) relate to the impact of outputs on society (Hyndman and 
McGeough 2008:31). Inputs are about doing things right, whereas outputs, outcomes, 
and impacts are about doing the right things (Mihaiu 2014:43).  
The quantity and quality of service delivery are also important dimensions or aspects 
of public sector performance management (Hyndman and McGeough 2008:31). The 
current public sector performance measurement approaches have moved beyond 
mere financial performance indicators to focusing on various dimensions of public 
sector performance (Mihaiu 2014:49). Overall, public sector performance 
measurement must be holistic and must address social and environmental issues, as 
well as efficiency, effectiveness, economy, financial performance, and the quality of 
services (Mihaiu 2014:42).  
Numerous models are used to measure public sector performance, including Total 
Quality Management and the Balanced Scorecard (Mihaiu 2014:45-46). The 
effectiveness of performance measurement and management in the public sector 
depends on certain key critical success factors. The first one relates to the need to 
develop a conducive organisational culture that promotes a learning and performance 
evaluation culture (Goh 2012:36). Management practices are also important for 
improved performance (Sun and Van Ryzin 2014:326). This is important because 
effective management practices enable organisations to use performance 
management as an effective management tool to improve organisational performance. 
In this regard, the value chain or the relationship between inputs, outputs, outcomes, 
and impact can be graphically represented (see Figure 3.1).  
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Figure 3.1: Results-based management pyramid/model 
 
Sources: The Presidency (2011) and National Treasury (2007)  
Alternatively, another way of measuring public sector performance can be approached 
in terms of the model illustrated in Figure 3.2. This model or approach does not 
fundamentally differ from the model in Figure 3.1, but it views public sector 
performance slightly differently.  
Figure 3.2: Measuring performance in the public sector 
 
Source: Mihaiu (2014) 
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3.7.5  Critique of performance management practices in the public sector 
Although performance management offers many organisational benefits to the public 
sector, it is not without challenges. These challenges relate mainly to institutional, 
conceptual, methodological, technical, and empirical issues. Institutional issues 
pertain to institutional capacity and culture, as well as the political context of the public 
sector. Institutional constraints, including capacity, culture, and leadership, have had 
a bearing on the implementation of performance management systems in many 
countries (Ohemeng 2009:109).  
The lack of competencies and skills has also proved to be a key constraint to the 
effective implementation of performance management practices in the public sector 
(Arnaboldi and Azzone 2010:267). This also relates to the orientation of public sector 
managers who are not used to non-financial indicators and outcomes (Arnaboldi and 
Azzone 2010:267). The political context of the public sector also presents major 
challenges in relation to the implementation of public sector performance management 
systems. The public sector has multiple stakeholders with different (and often 
conflicting) interests, priorities, and expectations and these present key challenges to 
public sector performance management systems (Yusuf and Leavitt 2014:212-213; 
Arnaboldi and Azzone 2010:267). 
With regard to conceptual, methodological, and technical issues, the main challenges 
relate mainly to definitional and measurement difficulties in relation to issues of 
performance, targets, and indicators, as well as appropriate methods for performance 
measurement. The role of the public sector is complex and it is therefore difficult to 
define, measure, and evaluate public sector performance, including performance in 
relation to environmental and social objectives (Mihaiu 2014:40-42). Part of the 
fundamental challenges of public sector performance management is that not all areas 
and goals of the public sector lend themselves to performance measurement (Gajda-
Lüpke 2009:85; Mihaiu 2014:41).  
Creating a link between performance measurement and performance improvement is 
also a complex exercise (Yusuf and Leavitt 2014:215). In other words, it is difficult to 
measure organisational performance and outcomes in the public sector (Sun and Van 
Ryzin 2014:325). The same conceptual difficulties also apply to the definition of 
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performance targets and indicators in the public sector (Arnaboldi and Azzone 
2010:267; Fryer, Antony and Ogden 2009:491; Mihaiu 2014:40-41). The lack of data 
also remains a key issue in public sector performance measurement (Zhonghua and 
Ye 2012:794). 
Scientific and empirical issues have also bedevilled the design and application of 
performance management systems in the public sector. In this regard, despite general 
acceptance of performance management and its purported value and benefits in the 
public sector, there is, however, scant or insufficient empirical evidence to support the 
assertion that performance management improves organisational performance and 
outcomes in the public sector (Poister et al. 2013:625; Sun and Van Ryzin 2014:325-
328; also see Yang 2009:81). Fundamental questions remain about whether or not 
performance management improves the efficiency, effectiveness, and performance 
outcomes of public sector organisations (Goh 2012:31; Ohemeng 2009:114; Sun and 
Van Ryzin 2014:328).  
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3.7.6   Understanding collaborative performance management 
The previous section discussed the importance of collaboration and collaborative 
management philosophy in modern public sector management and governance. The 
concept of collaborative performance management should therefore be located and 
understood within the broader context of collaborative management theory discussed 
previously. Collaboration has much broader significance and importance in the public 
sector. It provides immense opportunities for different spheres and sectors of the 
government to improve public sector performance, efficiency, and effectiveness, as 
well as development outcomes and impact.  
Collaborative performance management has therefore been identified and selected 
for analysis because of its potential theoretical contribution to this study. Although 
theory on collaborative performance management is still emerging in the literature, it 
does, however, provide key unique features and principles that could help improve 
intergovernmental performance management practices.  
The following section outlines the unique features and characteristics of collaborative 
performance management with a view to extract key principles that could be applied 
to intergovernmental performance management practices. The limitations of 
collaborative performance management theory are also identified and discussed to 
highlight potential weaknesses and gaps associated with the application of this theory.   
3.7.7   The unique features of collaborative performance management 
Collaborative performance management represents a fundamental departure from the 
traditional approach to performance management. The main focus of the traditional 
performance management approach is on an individual entity or organisation (Kapucu 
and Demiroz 2011:551). The collaborative enterprise business model breaks down the 
traditional boundaries and brings parties together and makes them behave as a single 
entity (Busi and Bititci 2006:15). It is this philosophy that transcends traditional 
organisational boundaries and distinguishes collaborative performance management 
from the traditional performance management approach.   
In this regard, there are three key factors or developments that explain the paradigm 
shift from a traditional to a collaborative performance management approach. The first 
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development relates to the fact that contemporary problems require collaborative 
solutions, and the achievement of results also requires collaborative performance (see 
Agranoff 2005:18). The second development relates to the fact that collaborative 
arrangements require a new approach and measures to manage performance (Busi 
and Bititci 2006:15). The third development has to do with the growing trend whereby 
public sector managers find themselves operating in multi-sectoral and 
interorganisational contexts in which they are expected to account for performance 
outcomes for services delivered through collaborative arrangements (Herranz 
2010:446). Different aspects are also involved in measuring the performance of parties 
or organisations that work in collaborative arrangements (Kapucu and Demiroz 
2011:551). Working in a collaborative environment therefore poses significant 
challenges to public sector managers because it requires them to be multi-
organisational in their focus and orientation (Agranoff 2005:18). The traditional 
performance management practices are ill-suited to deal with these complex multi-
organisational performance contexts and dynamics – hence the need for a 
collaborative performance management approach.  
Organisations involved in collaborative relationships should develop a performance 
management framework underpinned by clear objectives and performance indicators 
to enable them to monitor and manage their performance (Verdecho, Raul and 
Sanchez 2012a:249), including the intended collaborative results and outcomes. In 
this regard, it is important that performance measures are appropriate and relevant to 
the collaborative arrangements (Busi and Bititci 2006:18). In addition, consensus on 
common objectives (win-win situation) is crucial, and so is the trust between parties in 
a collaborative relationship (Verdecho et al. 2012a:249; Verdecho, Raul and Sanchez 
2012b:142). More importantly, information systems in a collaborative setting need to 
be synchronised for interoperability in order to support collaborative performance 
(Verdecho et al. 2012a:249).  
3.7.8   A critique of collaborative performance management 
Despite its immense potential contribution and benefits to intergovernmental 
performance management, collaborative performance management is also riddled 
with challenges and limitations. The concept itself, although it is now growing, has a 
fragmented history and has generally been a neglected area of study in performance 
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management literature (Folan and Browne 2005:671-672). Developing appropriate 
indicators and assessing multi-organisational performance pose conceptual and 
methodological difficulties (Herranz 2010:445-446). Measuring performance and 
results in a multi-organisational context, including an intergovernmental setting, is 
difficult because of the many stakeholders involved in decision making and 
implementation (Agranoff 2005:18). Theories and conceptual frameworks for the 
management of multi-organisational relationships and arrangements are not yet fully 
developed in the literature (Herranz 2010:446).  
The theoretical and conceptual challenges encountered in relation to multi-
organisational performance management cannot, therefore, be divorced and viewed 
in isolation from the much bigger theoretical and conceptual difficulties associated with 
the management of multi-organisational relationships in general. In this regard, Busi 
and Bititci (2006:15) better capture the fundamental challenges through their assertion 
that “the difficulty of developing a collaborative culture and the difficulty of developing 
appropriate performance measures have been identified as the major barriers to the 
successful implementation of a collaborative performance management system”.  
Furthermore, another dimension to these challenges relates to the limited knowledge 
on how to promote effective collaborative performance (Pekkola 2013:72). In this 
regard, collaborative relationships and arrangements are often not underpinned by 
collaborative performance management frameworks and mechanisms through which 
collaborative performance can be better structured and managed (Verdecho et al. 
2012b:142; also see Busi and Bititci 2006:17). 
3.8  Constructing a multi-theoretical conceptual framework for IGR 
The above theoretical analysis points to the following key fundamental issues for this 
study. The analysis of bureaucratic theory and NPM theory points to key issues related 
to the institutional and organisational context and culture, which hold significant 
implications for the management of IGR and cooperative governance. Systems theory 
highlights the critical importance of systems thinking and approach to effectively 
address complex issues that are interlinked and interrelated in nature and operation. 
Systems theory provides a relevant and logical theoretical frame of reference for this 
study mainly because IGR and cooperative governance are fundamentally about 
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managing a government system that involves complex interlinkages and 
interrelationships between different spheres of government. Collaborative planning, 
management, and performance management theories point to the importance of 
collaborative management practices in overcoming traditional organisational 
boundaries and promoting effective interorganisational relationships and performance 
management.  
These theories further highlight the importance of collaborative management practices 
in addressing complex contemporary challenges (“wicked problems”) that often 
require a multi-organisational and multi-sectoral collaborative approach. All these are 
issues that will be explored as part of the empirical analysis of this study in terms of 
how they affect the management of IGR and cooperative governance in the Gauteng 
province. The details of this multi-disciplinary and multi-theoretical conceptual 
framework are discussed below.      
A critical analysis of the bureaucratic and NPM theories points to key issues that have 
significant implications for the institutional and organisational context for the 
management of IGR and cooperative governance. It is clear from the analysis of these 
theories that the broader institutional and organisational context and culture, in which 
the management and administration of IGR and cooperative governance take place, 
cannot be ignored.  
In this regard, key pertinent issues arising from the critique of the bureaucratic theory 
are worth highlighting. Firstly, bureaucracy’s core values and principles of 
centralisation and top-down planning and control run counter to the values and 
principles of decentralisation, interdependence, partnership, and collaboration 
required for the effective management of IGR and cooperative governance. The 
pathologies of bureaucracy, such as bureaucratic red tape, rigidity, and lack of 
innovation, do not allow for the flexibility and innovation required to make IGR and 
cooperative governance work. Secondly, the silos associated with bureaucratic and 
hierarchical organisational configuration promote institutional and policy fragmentation 
rather than integration, thus working against the very intent and purpose of IGR and 
cooperative governance.  
Thirdly, bureaucratic theory has certain key limitations related to interorganisational 
focus and orientation. Bureaucratic theory’s central tenet is a single organisation, 
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therefore lacking interorganisational focus. In other words, bureaucratic theory is 
unable to deal with the complexities associated with interorganisational relationships 
and management. It is this single organisational orientation, coupled with hierarchy, 
rigidity, and a silos mentality, that has created a bureaucratic and inward-looking silo-
based culture within the government that does not allow or provide incentives for 
officials to collaborate and work across organisations to achieve policy coherence and 
integrated public service delivery.  
In this regard, certain internal organisational factors such as structure, authority, 
relationships, rules, and procedures are considered key in shaping and influencing 
bureaucratic culture (Zafarullah 2013:932). It is therefore against the above 
background that this thesis considers bureaucratic theory, with its associated values 
and principles, as well as pathologies and weaknesses, to be ill-equipped and 
inadequate as a framework to deal with and respond to the complex challenges 
associated with the management of IGR and cooperative governance.  
With regard to NPM theory, some important issues are worth mentioning. Firstly, NPM 
theory represents a critique of bureaucratic theory. NPM theory brings about different 
institutional and organisational dynamics compared to bureaucratic theory. 
Theoretically, NPM is intended to promote improved organisational efficiency and 
effectiveness through better coordination and integration.  
However, it does appear that, in practice, NPM does not necessarily provide an 
enabling institutional context and environment for effective IGR and cooperative 
governance across public sector organisations. In this regard, it could be argued that 
NPM’s intraorganisational (internal) focus and its preoccupation with issues of 
efficiency and cost minimisation do not provide incentives for public sector managers 
to collaborate with other public sector organisations to achieve broader public policy 
objectives and developmental outcomes. In other words, NPM-inspired public sector 
managers tend to sacrifice costly issues of interorganisational consultation, 
coordination, and cooperation in favour of internal issues of organisational efficiency, 
economy, and effectiveness.  
Overall, all these key issues warrant further enquiry during the empirical analysis of 
this study to explore whether or not they have a bearing on the institutional and 
organisational context within which IGR and cooperative governance are managed 
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and administered in the Gauteng province. In other words, these issues constitute part 
of the knowledge gap for this study as there is a paucity of knowledge on the effect of 
these key institutional and organisational issues on IGR and cooperative governance.  
3.8.1  Systems thinking as an approach to IGR  
Notwithstanding its critique and limitations as highlighted in the previous section, 
systems theory offers some key fundamental principles that could be applied to the 
study and practice of IGR and cooperative governance. In this regard, a study or 
analysis of road safety and road safety strategies in Sweden, the Netherlands, the UK, 
and Australia by Hughes, Anund and Falkmer (2015) provides important systems 
theory constructs or elements relevant to this thesis. Hughes et al. (2015:272) applied 
certain key constructs of systems theory to their study, namely 1) key components, 2) 
relationships, 3) objectives (purpose), and 4) interdependency, as criteria or 
approaches to study or analyse road safety and road safety strategies. These key 
systems theory constructs or elements were adopted, adapted, and applied in the 
context of this thesis. The operational description of these systems theory constructs 
is as follows: “Key components are the constituent parts which comprise the systems 
that are both essential for the system to operate and to make a contribution to 
achieving the intended purpose or outcome of the system. Relationships are 
descriptions of the type of connection between key components and how each 
individual component affect, or are affected by other parts. Relationships describe how 
the key components interact, for example physically, electrically, by information, or by 
some other means. Objectives are descriptions of what is intended to be achieved. 
Interdependency is a description of the contribution of the key components to 
achieving the purpose and/or the degree to which the purpose requires the key 
components to achieve the purpose. So, interdependency recognizes whether the 
objective is only achieved when all of the key components contribute, whether the 
objective is reduced or threatened if anyone of the key components fails to operate as 
required, and the complementary benefits of synergies where the whole is greater than 
the sum of the parts” (Hughes et al. 2015:274). 
The importance and relevance of systems theory to this thesis are that it offers a 
theoretical framework by which IGR and cooperative governance as an integrated 
system of national, provincial, and local government can be understood.  
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Using systems theory as an analytical framework for this study, key management 
functions such as planning and performance management in the provincial and local 
government can be understood as key interrelated components of the administrative 
IGR system in the Gauteng province.  
Systems theory therefore provides a holistic or integrated approach for the researcher 
to analyse and address fragmented and silo-based planning, budgeting, 
implementation, and performance management and accountability across the 
provincial and local government spheres in the Gauteng province. This is important 
because the fragmentation of these key components of the administrative IGR system 
(i.e. planning, budgeting, implementation, performance management, and 
accountability) leads to the failure or ineffectiveness of the system of IGR and 
cooperative governance in the Gauteng province.  
Overall, the systems theory constructs or elements used by Hughes et al. (2015) in 
their study were adapted, contextualised, and applied as a key analytical framework 
for this study in terms of the following:  
 Key intergovernmental management components: The system of IGR and 
cooperative governance in Gauteng is made up of a hierarchy of key 
components or sub-systems. The higher-order hierarchy of the system consists 
of provincial and local government (i.e. provincial and local spheres of 
government). The second-order hierarchy of the system comprises various 
departments in the provincial and local government. The lower-order hierarchy 
of the system relates to the operational, administrative, and management 
functions, namely planning, budgeting, implementation, performance 
management, and reporting. These are the operational, administrative, and 
management sub-systems of the IGR and cooperative governance in Gauteng. 
It is these operational, administrative, and management sub-systems that are 
the key focus of this thesis.  
 IGR: In the context of this study, this relationship refers to the mutual trust, 
communication, consultation, collaboration, and information sharing between 
the provincial government and municipalities in Gauteng to ensure policy 
coherence, good governance, and integrated and seamless public service 
delivery to the people of the province. A sound mutual relationship between the 
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provincial government and municipalities is a key prerequisite and a critical 
success factor for better intergovernmental planning, budgeting, 
implementation, performance management, and reporting. 
 Intergovernmental objectives: Intergovernmental objectives refer to 
government-wide public policy objectives that require different spheres of 
government to work together to achieve them. These objectives range from 
governance objectives to service delivery and socioeconomic development 
objectives. In the context of this study, these objectives can better be achieved 
through intergovernmental coordination and collaboration between the 
provincial government and municipalities in Gauteng.  
 Intergovernmental interdependency: The Constitution of 1996 explicitly 
states that all spheres of government in South Africa are distinctive, 
interdependent, and interrelated. This means that although all spheres of 
government have institutional autonomy and independence, they depend on 
one another for effective implementation of public policy. In other words, 
interdependency means that no sphere of government can achieve broader 
government objectives alone without collaboration and cooperation with other 
spheres of government. 
3.8.2   The collaborative approach to IGR 
Collaborative planning, management, and performance management theories point to 
the importance of collaborative management practices in overcoming traditional 
organisational boundaries and promoting effective interorganisational relationships 
and performance management. These theories further highlight the importance of 
collaborative management practices in addressing complex contemporary challenges 
(“wicked problems”), which often require a multi-organisational and multi-sectoral 
collaborative approach. In this regard, collaborative management practices entail the 
following key dimensions.  
3.8.2.1   Intergovernmental collaborative management practices 
Collaborative management provides another important theoretical framework that can 
be used to structure an intergovernmental collaborative management approach to 
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promote a sound relationship and cooperation between different spheres of 
government in the Gauteng province. However, there are key strategic considerations 
to be kept in mind in this regard.  
Firstly, it is imperative that both the structure and practice of intergovernmental 
collaborative management are sensitive to particular contextual considerations and 
factors associated with IGR and cooperative governance. These contextual 
considerations should, among others, include clear accountability mechanisms and 
boundaries to ensure that intergovernmental collaborative management practices do 
not undermine or blur lines of accountability for managers in both the provincial 
governments and municipalities.  
Secondly, it is important that managers in different spheres of government undergo a 
mindset or paradigm shift in order to embrace a collaborative approach and thinking 
to public sector management in the context of cooperative governance. This would 
require managers in both the provincial governments and municipalities to adopt a 
strategic intergovernmental management perspective, which means taking a macro 
holistic view of government and its complex multi-juridictional and multi-sectoral 
operational dimensions.  
Part of this broader paradigm shift should include an adaptation of public sector 
management skills and behaviour, as well as the development of new sets of 
competencies and techniques in both spheres of government to ensure more effective 
intergovernmental collaborative management practices. In other words, managers 
need to break from their traditional bureaucratic management mould to an 
intergovernmental collaborative management mode of operation. An equally important 
implication relates to the need for managers in both the provincial government and 
municipalities to build sound relationships and communication, as well as mutual 
respect and trust as equal partners, in order to avoid conflict and ensure the long-term 
stability of their collaborative environment.  
In their conceptual framework for collaboration, Verdecho et al. (2012a:251) identify 
strategy (joint vision), organisational structure (joint decision making), business 
processes and infrastructure (process alignment), and culture (trust, commitment, 
cooperation, information sharing, and conflict management) as key important factors 
for effective and sustainable collaborative relationship. This study adopted this 
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conceptual framework to explore intergovernmental collaborative management issues 
as part of the empirical analysis. The critical elements of this conceptual framework 
are described as follows: “Collaboration strategy defines the strategic aspects of the 
relationship with the purpose of providing a common understanding of what is desired 
to be achieved in the medium and long term by the collaborative association, 
identifying the function and role of each enterprise, defining the contribution, risks and 
share of benefits and formalizing the commitment of top management in the 
relationship. Business processes (BP) and infrastructure define the necessary 
requirements for adequate process development, as well as the infrastructure of 
support needed to execute them. Organisational structure is the hierarchical structure 
of the collaborative organisation, which comprises the definition of authorities, 
responsibilities, roles and tasks assigned to each member. Although each enterprise 
keeps its own organisational structure, it is necessary in some cases to define an inter-
enterprise structure that not only allows fast decision-making, but needs to be capable 
of managing the complexity of the collaborative association” (Verdecho et al. 
2012a:251).    
3.8.2.2   The intergovernmental collaborative strategic planning approach 
A combination and blending of both theories of strategic planning and collaborative 
planning can provide a powerful and innovative framework and approach to promote 
effective intergovernmental planning in the Gauteng province. A collaborative planning 
approach can support effective intergovernmental planning through fostering a more 
inclusive, transparent, and democratic environment for mutual partnership that 
balances power dynamics between different spheres of government in an 
intergovernmental planning process.  
Combined with the collaborative planning approach, strategic planning can become a 
more powerful tool for effective intergovernmental planning. The fact that strategic 
planning enables organisations to better understand their internal and external 
operating environment means that it is an important tool to help organisations to plan 
better and pursue well-informed strategic directions and organisational responses to 
short-, medium-, and long-term challenges. Although strategic planning has 
traditionally been used in the context of individual organisations, it can be used as a 
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tool to promote effective intergovernmental strategic planning and resource allocation 
to improve service delivery and the management of public finances.   
To promote effective strategic planning in this context, it is therefore important that 
decision making is coordinated across different levels and functions (Bryson and 
Roering 1987:15). It is also important that key organisational contextual factors and 
conditions such as resources, management support, commitment, and attitudes are 
better coordinated and managed to ensure effective strategic planning (Ugboro et al. 
2011:92-93). These issues will be explored further as part of the empirical analysis of 
this study to better understand how they can support effective intergovernmental 
planning in the Gauteng province.    
3.8.2.3   The intergovernmental collaborative performance management 
approach  
Performance management theory provides an important theoretical framework for 
intergovernmental performance management. In this regard, the collaborative 
performance management theory is a more instructive theoretical framework that can 
be used to inform the design and implementation of an intergovernmental performance 
management system to facilitate and promote effective intergovernmental reporting 
and accountability in the Gauteng province. Collaborative performance management 
theory deals with interorganisational performance management practices and moves 
beyond traditional performance management practices, which are mainly preoccupied 
with the performance management systems of individual organisations. It is therefore 
its interorganisational focus and orientation that make collaborative performance 
management theory an appropriate theoretical framework through which this study 
empirically explores issues of intergovernmental performance management, reporting, 
and accountability in the Gauteng province. A summarised graphical representation of 
the conceptual framework for the study is depicted in Figure 3.3.  
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Figure 3.3: An intergovernmental collaborative management model 
 
Source: (Author’s own construction) 
3.9  Summary 
This chapter paid attention the theoretical and conceptual foundations and key aspects 
related to bureaucracy in a public sector organisational setting. It then discussed the 
theoretical and conceptual foundations and key aspects related to NPM and the 
modernisation of the public service. It also explained the theoretical and conceptual 
foundations and key aspects related to systems thinking in a public sector setting. This 
was followed by a conceptualisation of collaborative management theory in the public 
sector. This was followed by a discussion of planning and collaborative planning. 
Performance management was then conceptualised and contextualised to promote 
collaborative performance management in the public sector. Finally, the chapter 
conceptualised a multi-theoretical analytical framework for IGR. These aspects 
included systems thinking as an approach to IGR and a collaborative approach to IGR. 
This chapter therefore provided a theoretical and conceptual framework for the study. 
The bureaucratic and NPM theories provided key theoretical lenses through which to 
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understand how institutional and organisational environments affect IGR and 
cooperative governance. Systems and collaborative management theories, including 
collaborative planning and collaborative performance management theories, were 
analysed, together with strategic planning theory, to construct a framework to address 
the knowledge gap in relation to the central research questions of the study.   
The multi-theoretical analysis in this chapter resulted in the construction of a multi-
theoretical and multi-disciplinary conceptual framework through which the study 
addressed the knowledge gap and constructed an alternative management model and 
approach to promote effective management of IGR and cooperative governance. The 
conceptual framework was graphically depicted in Figure 3.3 as an intergovernmental 
collaborative management model. In essence, this conceptual framework provides an 
analytical framework to make an original contribution to the existing body of knowledge 
on the management of IGR and cooperative governance.  
The nature of this study lends itself to a multi-disciplinary theoretical approach 
because of its different dimensions (i.e. planning and performance management). 
These dimensions are multi-disciplinary in nature in the sense that they belong to 
different disciplines and theories. The study draws on overarching theoretical 
approaches from different disciplines in order to understand and address the key 
dimensions of the research problem and questions. 
This study engages with relevant theoretical and conceptual issues related to the 
concept of IGR and cooperative governance in order to provide conceptual clarity. 
Related concepts such as federalism and decentralisation were also unpacked in 
terms of how they relate to IGR and cooperative governance. This analysis mainly 
provided a conceptual foundation for the study.  
The study also discussed systems theory to extract key theoretical principles and 
issues to help address the secondary research questions. Using systems theory as 
part of the analytical framework for this study helped to provide a holistic and 
integrated approach through which to analyse and understand intergovernmental 
planning, budgeting, implementation, performance management, and accountability 
across the provincial and local government spheres in the Gauteng province.  
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The concept of a “system” comes from the natural sciences and the development of 
the systems approach is credited to Ludwig von Bertalanffy, who developed the 
general systems theory in 1930s and through publications after World War II (Barker 
and Smith 1997:288). This theory views an organism or institution as a whole made 
up of sub-systems. Von Bertalanffy (1972:417) defines a system as a set of elements 
standing in interrelation among themselves and with the environment. Hence, a 
system is made up of interrelated parts and can be explained as a totality. 
Interrelationships are therefore a key aspect of system theory and provide an 
understanding of the interconnection and interactions between the sub-systems within 
the organisation. The interactions of the sub-systems affect the survival of the system 
and a change in one part of the system affects the entire system. Also, as open 
systems, organisations can experience decay, which can point to dysfunction or 
disorder within the system. However, organisations are also “dynamic systems of 
adaptation and evolution” (Amagoh 2008:8). The system of IGR is also subject to 
various factors (e.g. institutional and administrative factors) that can affect the 
evolution and functioning of the overall system.  
The study was also underpinned by the theories of public administration and 
management with a specific focus on bureaucratic and NPM theories in so far as they 
shape and affect the operating institutional context (environment) of IGR and 
cooperative governance in relation to intergovernmental planning, budgeting, and 
performance management. Planning and performance management theories were 
also analysed with a specific focus on strategic planning, collaborative planning, and 
performance management theories. In this regard, the purpose of this theoretical 
analysis was to understand the fundamental principles and limitations of these 
theories, as well their relevance and implications for intergovernmental planning and 
performance management.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
VARIABLES THAT INFLUENCE COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEMS AND PRACTICES 
4.1  Introduction 
Chapter Four addresses the following research objective as stated in Chapter One 
(see Section 1.4): To provide a systematic conceptualisation and contextualisation of 
the variables that influence comparative international intergovernmental systems and 
practices. This chapter provides comparative perspectives of various international 
systems and practices of IGR and cooperative governance by drawing on a cross-
section of diverse experiences and lessons from Australia, Canada, Germany, and 
Nigeria. These countries were selected for this study due to their long history, track 
record, and experience in multi-level governance and IGR. For example, Germany is 
renowned for its cooperative system of IGR. The principles of mutual friendly relations 
and cooperation between the spheres of government, which currently underpin South 
Africa’s system of IGR and cooperative governance, have mainly been inspired by the 
German cooperative system of government.    
Australia and Canada have a strong track record in public sector institutional re-
engineering and management reforms. They count among the first countries that 
experimented with and implemented neo-liberal and managerial practices in the form 
of NPM reforms since the 1980s. As noted previously, NPM is part of the theoretical 
and conceptual framework for this study. It is relevant to this study in as far as it affects 
the broader institutional context within which public administration and IGR operate. 
Nigeria provides a counter-balance in terms of experiences and lessons from an 
African and developing country perspective. A combination of this cross-section of 
countries from four different continents provides important experiences from which key 
comparative lessons can be drawn to inform and enhance intergovernmental 
institutional and management reforms in South Africa. As a quasi-federal state, South 
Africa can draw a number of valuable and instructive lessons from these four 
countries, which count among the oldest federations in the world.  
This chapter firstly addresses the Australian IGR framework. It includes public 
administration and public management reforms in Australia (including NPM, budget, 
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and performance management reforms), the “whole-of-government” approach to 
integrated governance, the system of IGR, intergovernmental politics and institutional 
power dynamics, the system of intergovernmental fiscal and funding relations, the 
politics of the intergovernmental fiscal system, and the institutional and systemic 
weaknesses of the Australian system.  
Secondly, this chapter addresses the Canadian IGR framework. It pays attention to 
the founding political philosophy of Canadian federalism, the constitutional 
architecture of the Canadian state, public administration and public management 
reforms, the system of IGR (including the Canadian intergovernmental institutional and 
administrative infrastructure and Canadian cooperative federalism and 
intergovernmental partnerships), the system of intergovernmental fiscal and funding 
relations, the politics of the intergovernmental fiscal system, and the institutional and 
systemic weaknesses of the Canadian system.  
The chapter thirdly addresses the German IGR framework. It pays attention to public 
administration and public management reforms in Germany, the system of IGR, and 
the system of intergovernmental fiscal relations, including the structure of the fiscal 
system and taxation powers and intergovernmental funding arrangements and 
modalities in Germany. 
Fourthly, the chapter pays attention to the Nigerian IGR framework. It addresses the 
constitutional architecture of the Nigerian state, public administration and public 
management reforms, the system of IGR in Nigeria, the system of intergovernmental 
fiscal relations, and the institutional and systemic weaknesses of the Nigerian system.  
The chapter concludes with a synthesis of the international comparative analysis.  
4.2   Australian IGR framework 
The Australian nation was born in 1901 when its constitution brought together six 
different and independent British colonies into a federation (Grewal 2010:81; Hollander 
2009:140; Robinson and Farrelly 2013:304-306). Australia did not have a central 
government prior to the founding of the federation in 1901 mainly because the six 
different British colonies that existed at the time governed themselves (Robinson and 
Farrelly 2013:306). Australia ranks among the oldest federations in the world 
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(Hollander 2009:140). Australia’s long history of federalism and its whole-of-
government approach to multi-level governance and IGR provide an important case 
from which South Africa can draw key lessons to improve its system of IGR and 
cooperative governance.  
The Australian constitution makes provision for only two levels of government, namely 
federal (national) government and state governments (OECD 2014:96). The 
Australian government is composed of the federal government, six state governments, 
and two self-governing territories (Robinson and Farrelly 2013:306). The Australian 
states are New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, Western Australia, South 
Australia, and Tasmania, and the self-governing territories are the Northern Territory 
and the Australian Capital Territory (Fletcher and Walsh 1992:593). Local government 
authorities do not have any formal recognition and status in the federal constitution, 
but exist under the auspices of the state government constitutions, legislation, and 
regulations, and perform traditional local government functions such as the provision 
of local infrastructure and services to communities such as roads and refuse collection 
(Fletcher and Walsh 1992:593).  
The coming together of the pre-existing autonomous British colonies into the 
federation influenced the constitutional configuration of the Australian state and its 
federal system, especially in relation to the allocation and balance of power between 
the federal government and the states (previous colonies). In this regard, the architects 
of the Australian constitution designed and framed the constitution in a manner that 
would limit government power and balance the distribution of powers between the 
federal government and state governments (Zimmermann and Finlay 2011:190).  
The original intention in the drafting of the constitution was also to preserve the 
financial independence (fiscal autonomy) of the states (Zimmermann and Finlay 
2011:213). As the newly created states (previous colonies) did not want to relinquish 
or lose their existing powers, the Australian constitution was structured in a manner 
that would allocate minimal roles and few powers to the federal government and more 
powers to the states, with some powers being shared (concurrent functions) between 
the federal and state governments (Hollander 2009:140-143; also see Grewal 
2010:81).  
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In terms of the overall constitutional design and allocation of powers, the Australian 
constitution provides for a system of exclusive and concurrent functions in which both 
the federal and state governments are each assigned exclusive powers while at the 
same time both levels of government are required to share powers in certain areas of 
public policy (concurrent functions) (Fletcher and Walsh 1992:593). For example, 
areas of exclusive federal government legislative competencies include customs and 
excise duties and state governments command exclusive legislative powers on a wide 
range of public policy areas such as law and order, education, health, land, housing, 
urban development, agriculture, rail and road transport, and local government control 
(Fletcher and Walsh 1992:593).  
Inspired by the American federal system, the design of the Australian federal state 
system is based on the primacy of the constituent states through the assignment of 
limited powers and functions to the federal government and the allocation of more 
powers and functions (including service delivery functions) to sub-national 
governments (state governments) (Fenna and Hollander 2013:223). In other words, 
the Australian federal system has been designed in favour of the autonomy of the 
states that make up the Australian federation. This is because many of the states 
wanted to maintain their own identities and autonomy (Zimmermann and Finlay 
2011:191).  
There has, however, been some variance and disjuncture between the constitutional 
theory and practice in the evolution of the Australian federal system. Although the 
Australian federal system is highly decentralised in terms of its constitutional design, 
it has evolved into a more centralised system (Grewal 2010:81). This centralisation of 
power has much to do with a more sympathetic and favourable judicial posture 
towards the federal government relative to sub-national governments. In this regard, 
the expansive judicial interpretation of the law by the Australian courts (i.e. expansive 
constitutional jurisprudence) has expanded the powers of the federal government, 
leading to the centralisation of more powers in the federal government (OECD 
2014:97; Zimmermann and Finlay 2011:190). This includes the expansion of the 
federal government’s taxation powers, which created the states’ fiscal dependence on 
federal funding (Zimmermann and Finlay 2011:213). “For example, in the 1942 
Uniform Tax Case, the Court effectively handed the commonwealth [national 
government] sole control of income tax thereby exacerbating a vertical fiscal 
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imbalance and providing the commonwealth with significant financial leverage in its 
relations with the states” (Hollander 2009:141). It is therefore against this background 
that “Australia [is] considered a relatively centralised federalism with high federal 
political and fiscal capacity, moderate state political capacity, and asymmetrical 
relation among its constituent units” (Mahon and Brennan 2012:91).  
The structure and practice of IGR in Australia cannot be understood outside the 
context of the country’s constitutional and federal system. The constitutional and 
federal character of the Australian state has a huge influence on the nature and 
character of the country’s system of IGR. In terms of the general character of 
federalism, it is important to appreciate the fact that jurisdictional concurrency, 
overlaps, and duplication of functions are the key features associated with many 
federal systems and the Australian federal system is no exception in this regard 
(Hollander 2009:138-157). In short, jurisdictional overlaps and duplications can best 
be described as the inherent curse of federalism, or rather the curse of concurrency 
or multi-level governance.  
The concurrency of powers and functions is a central feature of the Australian federal 
system and this has brought with it key issues of duplication, cooperation, 
coordination, and jurisdictional disputes (Hollander and Patapan 2007:280). This 
system of concurrent powers and functions has also created a high degree of 
jurisdictional overlaps between the federal government and state governments 
(Painter 1996:103). In this context, IGR problems stem mainly from the division of 
powers, which creates separate governments whose functions are interdependent, 
thereby creating overlaps and duplication in the system of government (Painter 
1998a:52). 
The Australian constitution is not, however, designed to support effective IGR and 
cooperative federalism. This is because the constitution makes little provision for IGR 
(Fenna and Hollander 2013:225). In fact, no mechanisms are provided for in the 
Australian constitution to manage and facilitate IGR mainly because the country’s 
federal system is based on the principles of “coordinate federalism” (Menzies 
2013:382). In this context, coordinate federalism means that different levels of 
government in Australia were structured to operate with little overlap and little 
coordination (Fenna 2007:304). This original philosophical and constitutional logic and 
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conception of the Australian federal system (i.e. coordinate federalism as opposed to 
cooperative federalism) partly explain the institutional weaknesses of the country’s 
system of IGR. This point will become much clearer later in the thesis. 
Coordinate federalism contrasts sharply with the principles of cooperative federalism, 
which require different levels of government to work together to achieve common 
public policy objectives. However, contrary to the original intentions of the Australian 
constitutional architects, the concurrency of powers and functions embedded in 
Australia’s constitutional framework makes the country’s federal system a cooperative 
federalism as different levels of government are required to work together to achieve 
common public policy objectives.  
The Australian system of IGR has evolved and developed over the years to address 
existing gaps mainly through practice rather than formal legal instruments (Fenna and 
Hollander 2013:225). This means that, despite the constitutional vacuum for IGR in 
Australia, the country has managed to develop resilient intergovernmental institutions 
and structures over many years (Phillimore 2013:235).  
It must be noted that, like many states, Australia is also caught up in the broader 
political and economic debate about the pros and cons of the unitary and federal 
systems of government. The debate mainly centres around the benefits and 
downsides associated with the federal system of government. There are those that 
favour political centralisation (unitarism) and those that support political 
decentralisation (federalism). However, it is argued that federalism is beneficial in that 
it improves democratic participation as it brings the government closer to the people 
and that it protects people through its checks and balances on government power 
(Zimmermann and Finlay 2011:196).  
4.2.1   Public administration and public management reforms in Australia 
An understanding of the Australian system of public administration, including the 
evolution and transformation of the system through NPM reforms, is important to gain 
better comprehension of the institutional and public administration context within which 
the implementation and institutionalisation of the country’s system of IGR and 
cooperative federalism (cooperative governance) take place.   
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4.2.1.1  NPM reforms  
The development and evolution of the system of public administration in Australia 
should be understood against the backdrop of the country’s colonial history. Due to its 
colonial connection with Britain, the Australian government system was inspired and 
influenced by the British Westminster parliamentary and public administration systems 
(Johnston 2004:171-172; Johnston 2000:345). Under the British Westminster 
tradition, ministers (political office bearers) make public policy decisions and public 
administrators (appointed employees of the state) implement them, thus giving 
ministers more powers and influence over public administration in their allocated 
portfolios and departments (Johnston 2004:172). Over time, the Australian public 
administration has moved to embrace the American system where departmental 
heads are political appointees whose careers are tied to a political party in office 
(Johnston 2000:347).   
Australia embraced market-based policy reforms in the 1980s (Galligan and Wright 
2002:149). During this period, Australia moved away from the traditional public 
administration philosophy to NPM philosophy – a managerial and market-based public 
sector management approach – to improve public sector productivity (Johnston 
2004:173-181). The philosophy that underpins NPM is based on the assumption that 
public and private sector organisations are not inherently different and therefore their 
management and performance (efficiency and effectiveness) practices and 
techniques should be similar (Rix 2004:33). NPM reforms in the Australian public 
administration were inspired mainly by the principles of managerialism from Britain 
(Thatcherism), the USA (Reaganism), and New Zealand (Johnston 2000:348-350).  
These far-reaching reforms included a paradigm shift from a traditional public 
administration preoccupation with inputs and processes to a managerial orientation 
that includes a focus on outputs (efficiency) and outcomes (effectiveness), as well as 
the adoption of corporate administrative practices such as corporate planning and 
programme budgeting and programme evaluation (Johnston 2000:350-351). This 
means the adoption of private sector management practices and techniques to make 
the Australian public service more efficient (Johnston 2000:362). Public sector reforms 
were also intended to improve government performance (MacKay 2011:3). 
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Australia’s public sector reforms also brought about fixed-term employment contracts 
(of between three and five years) for top management positions such as secretaries 
(Blondal et al. 2008:44). The public service in Australia is also subject to a performance 
management system (Blondal et al. 2008:47). This means that public servants are 
required to sign performance contracts against which their performance is assessed. 
In this regard, it is worth noting that the 1980s marked a period of a major focus on 
public sector reforms in many developed countries (Mascarenhas 1993:319). The 
wave of public sector reforms in Australia during this period should therefore be 
understood within this broader context.   
4.2.1.2   Budget and performance management reforms 
Budget and performance management reforms that were introduced in Australia 
warrant some attention in this study as these reforms have implications for the practice 
of IGR. In other words, these reforms frame the broader institutional and budgetary 
context within which IGR operate in Australia. Before public sector reforms were 
introduced in Australia in the 1980s, management systems in the Australian public 
administration were process and compliance driven with the focus on rules and inputs 
(Keating 1996:4). However, general dissatisfaction with the ineffectiveness of the state 
brought about greater public sector focus and emphasis on results, including 
outcomes and value-for-money considerations (Keating 1996:4). This prompted 
budget and performance management reforms within the Australian public 
administration system. Performance management, which forms part of the public 
sector (managerial) reforms introduced to the Australian public service in the 1980s, 
sought to make the public service more efficient, effective, and accountable (Down, 
Hogan and Chadbourne 1999:11).  
As part of these performance management reforms, the Australian government 
adopted a formal evaluation strategy in the late 1980s to support government decision 
making and prioritisation during the budget process, as well as to improve government 
programme performance, operational efficiency, service delivery improvements, and 
accountability (MacKay 2011:4-13). Many departments built their internal capacity 
through the establishment of their own monitoring and evaluation units and training of 
staff (MacKay 2011:9-11). The evaluation strategy was replaced by a new 
performance framework called the Outcomes and Outputs Framework in 1999 (which 
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was later replaced by the Outcomes and Programmes Reporting Framework in 2009) 
to strengthen the government’s orientation and focus on results and outcomes 
(MacKay 2011:17-32).  
Furthermore, Australia has also been involved in a continuous process of budget 
reforms since 1984 and the country has adopted a medium-term expenditure 
framework (multi-year budgeting framework) (Blondal et al. 2008:7-8). The medium-
term expenditure framework was introduced in 1987, making Australia a trendsetter 
for the world on multi-year budgeting systems (MacKay 2011:3). This approach to 
budgeting shifted the Australian government’s orientation from traditional zero-based 
budgeting towards a more strategic focus on policy issues, as well as efficient and 
effective public spending (MacKay 2011:4).  
The budget reforms also included a progression from a traditional cash-based 
budgeting system to an accrual-based budgeting framework and outcomes-based 
performance framework (the outcomes-based budgeting framework), starting with the 
1999/2000 budget (Blondal et al. 2008:20-33). These reforms were introduced to 
promote greater focus on performance and results, as well as a high level of 
accountability and transparency (Blondal et al. 2008:8-33). In addition, Australia 
adopted a system of strategic reviews of major government programmes to improve 
the appropriateness, efficiency, and effectiveness of programmes and to ensure their 
alignment to government priorities (Blondal et al. 2008:19). 
Australia has, however, experienced systemic performance management issues and 
challenges in relation to the use of performance information; the level of the 
government’s engagement with performance management; the alignment of goals, 
priorities, and performance management systems across the government; and 
inadequate support systems, which point to insufficient performance management 
capacity within some departments or agencies of the Australian government (Halligan 
2007:232). In practice, there has also been little alignment and integration of outcomes 
across departments, mainly because government departments or agencies have 
opted to focus on their own specific outcomes (Blondal et al. 2008:22).  
Other key challenges experienced in relation to the implementation of an outcomes-
based performance management approach include the quality of information, the 
paucity or unavailability of performance information, and the difficulties in creating 
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direct causal linkages or relationships between outputs and outcomes (poor results 
chain), as well as concerns relating to the measurability of some outcomes indicators 
(Blondal et al. 2008:24; MacKay 2011:23). Australia’s performance monitoring and 
evaluation capacity, according to the OECD (2014:121), needs to be strengthened 
through the development of outcomes-based performance indicators, the 
improvement of data quality, the availability and streamlining of reporting 
requirements, and improved focus on policy impacts (OECD 2014:121).  
These Australian experiences and lessons provide insight into the complexities 
associated with building and institutionalising a performance management culture and 
capacity in government. These complexities also have implications in relation to the 
development of intergovernmental performance management systems and practices 
to promote intergovernmental performance and accountability in a multi-level 
governance context. Chapter Three discussed performance management theory as a 
key theoretical and conceptual tool to improve intergovernmental performance 
management. In this regard, Chapter Three specifically identified collaborative 
performance management theory as a more instructive theoretical framework that can 
be used to inform the design and implementation of an intergovernmental performance 
management system to facilitate and promote effective intergovernmental reporting 
and accountability.  
4.2.2  The whole-of-government approach to integrated governance in 
Australia 
Australia has adopted an integrated governance model called the “whole-of-
government” approach (see Brook 2012:35; Halligan 2007:220-235). The whole-of-
government approach constitutes a new generation of public sector reforms following 
NPM reforms (Christensen and Lægreid 2007:1059). This new approach is  
“a response to the fragmentation in government arising from NPM” (Ross et al. 
2011:140). This approach has its own parallels in the UK in the form of “joined-up” 
government (Halligan 2007:235). 
Although there is no common universal definition in the literature, the whole-of-
government approach simply refers to “cooperation between agencies within a single 
government or cooperation among levels of government. The whole-of-government 
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redesign attempts to shift existing bureaucratic structures in a way that forces 
collaboration and cooperation between agencies” (Brook 2012:35). It also refers to 
“policy development, program management or service delivery approaches that 
emphasise shared goals, collaborative decision making and priority-setting, 
information sharing and cooperative or partnership-based operations” (Ross et al. 
2011:134). This approach has the potential to promote greater policy coordination and 
integrated service delivery (Ross et al. 2011:135). 
In the Australian context, the whole-of-government approach is defined as “agencies 
working across portfolio boundaries to achieve a shared goal and an integrated 
governance response to particular issues” (Halligan 2007:226). A common feature of 
the whole-of-government or integrated governance approach relates to the 
establishment of new organisational architecture in the form of ministerial or cabinet 
committees, intergovernmental councils, or collaborative units to promote 
collaborative and cooperative relationships (Ross et al. 2011:134). The Australian 
whole-of-government model seeks to integrate various key aspects of governance and 
foster cultural change and vertical and horizontal integration and collaborative 
relationship across the government, as well as to promote centralised strategic 
coordination and monitoring of government performance and delivery (Halligan 
2007:220-231). Under this integrated governance model, there is huge commitment 
to and emphasis on performance management and outcomes, including a stronger 
focus on intergovernmental performance management (Halligan 2007:233-234).  
The whole-of-government approach is, however, not without criticism and pitfalls. In 
this regard, the issues relate to definitional and conceptual difficulties, as well as 
methodological and technical challenges, especially in relation to the translation of 
policy into practice and the achievement of service delivery outcomes (Ross et al. 
2011:134-135). This approach also poses “organisational design and behavioural 
challenges” due to difficulties in bringing about cultural change and overcoming rigid 
organisational boundaries associated with functional organisational structures 
(Halligan 2007:232). This reinforces the critique of the bureaucratic theory advanced 
in Chapter Three regarding the institutional and behavioural or cultural pathologies 
associated with bureaucratic structures and practices.    
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The whole-of-government approach can be effective if certain critical success factors 
are attended to. Public officials need to foster collaborative working relationships 
without undermining their functional specialisation (Ross et al. 2011:135). Change in 
culture is also a critical success factor for the whole-of-government approach to work 
(Halligan 2007:231). The success of the whole-of-government approach also depends 
on key conditions or resources that include “a supportive management culture, the 
development of skills in communication and relationship management, common 
financial, information and communications technologies and appropriate 
accountability frameworks” (Ross et al. 2011:134).  
Overall, it is clear from the above discussion that the whole-of-government approach 
fosters a different paradigm and philosophy, namely integrated governance based on 
shared objectives and cooperative and collaborative relationships between and across 
different levels of government. The whole-of-government model also provides an 
overall approach, framework, and philosophy for a system of IGR and cooperative 
federalism in Australia. This approach offers important lessons and principles that can 
be applied in other jurisdictions for better institutionalisation and management of IGR 
and cooperative governance. This approach resonates well with the collaborative 
management approaches discussed in Chapter Three. Chapter Three contended that 
these approaches can be used to promote and strengthen better intergovernmental 
collaboration, planning, and performance management.   
4.2.3 The system of IGR in Australia 
This section outlines the constitutional and institutional framework that underpins the 
Australian system of IGR and cooperative federalism, as well as the institutional 
politics and power dynamics that characterise the system. 
The Australian system of IGR is highly institutionalised (Painter 1996:103). Australia 
has established different intergovernmental structures at different levels of 
government to facilitate vertical and horizontal policy coordination and integration 
across the entire government. Australia has a relatively long history of 
intergovernmental structures and institutions, which have evolved over time. For many 
decades, intergovernmental cooperation in Australia occurred mainly through the 
Premiers’ Conferences and Ministerial Council System (Hendy 1996:111-117).  
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The Premiers’ Conference, which is an intergovernmental structure composed of the 
prime minister and state premiers, evolved and gave birth to the Council of Australian 
Governments (COAG) in 1992 (Hendy 1996:111; Hollander 2009:142).   
The COAG, which is made up of the prime minister, state premiers, the territorial chief 
ministers, and the president of the Australian Local Government Association, is the 
apex intergovernmental structure in the Australian system of government (Bolleyer 
and Bytzek 2009:388; Menzies 2013:382; Phillimore 2013:232). The COAG is chaired 
by the prime minister and supported by the COAG Secretariat located in the 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (Menzies 2013:383; Bolleyer and 
Bytzek 2009:388).  
The COAG was established by the federal government with the consensus of the 
states and territories. The prime minister sets the agenda, convenes the meetings, 
and provides funding for COAG operations (Carroll and Head 2010:412-413). This 
apex intergovernmental structure was established to strengthen intergovernmental 
cooperation and it also provides a platform for policy coordination in Australia from the 
whole-of-government perspective (Hendy 1996:111). The establishment of the COAG 
marked an era of cooperative federalism in the Australian system of IGR (Painter 
1996:101). These IGR reforms were also influenced by globalisation, which brought 
about greater focus on efficiency in public service delivery, hence the need for the 
establishment of the COAG to foster more cooperative relations and better policy 
coordination between the federal government and state governments (Galligan and 
Wright 2002:149-153).    
In addition to the COAG, in 2007 Australia established a horizontal intergovernmental 
structure called the Council for the Australian Federation, which is made up of state 
premiers but excludes the federal government (Phillimore 2013:232). The 
effectiveness of this horizontal intergovernmental structure remains unclear 
(Phillimore 2013:235). Australia’s intergovernmental institutional architecture also 
includes a number of intergovernmental ministerial councils and administrative 
committees (Painter 1996:103). Ministerial councils deal with, among other issues, 
matters referred to them by the COAG (Bolleyer and Bytzek 2009:388). 
Further significant institutional developments in the evolution of the Australian system 
of IGR occurred in the late 2000s. The first development occurred in 2006 when the 
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COAG adopted a more structured and systematic approach to policy implementation 
through its decision to develop Intergovernmental Action Plans with clear outcomes, 
commitments, actions, milestones, and performance measures (Carroll and Head 
2010:413).  
The theoretical and conceptual framework in Chapter Three also speaks to the need 
for this kind of institutional innovation through intergovernmental collaborative 
planning and performance management approaches. Other recent major institutional 
reforms of the Australian system of IGR include the Intergovernmental Agreement on 
Federal Financial Relations and the reorganisation of the Ministerial Councils 
(Menzies 2013:385). Overall, the literature does not shed light on the kinds of 
administrative systems and practices that have been established to manage and 
support intergovernmental cooperation and collaboration across the entire Australian 
government.  
4.2.4   Intergovernmental politics and institutional power dynamics in 
Australia 
Australia’s party politics and institutional power dynamics between the federal and 
state governments have a huge bearing on the nature and character of the country’s 
system of IGR. The intergovernmental power relationship between the country’s 
federal and sub-national governments is dynamic, complex, and paradoxical. State 
governments find themselves in a continuous jurisdictional and political battle with the 
national government, thus creating adversarial IGR (Painter 1996:103). Like many 
other federal systems, Australia has its own intergovernmental tensions, 
controversies, and power plays. In this regard, there have been instances where the 
national government has used concurrent powers and conditional grants to intervene 
in policy functions that fall within the jurisdiction of the states (Davis 1998:148). It is 
important to note that IGR are by nature inherently prone to tensions and conflicts. 
The difference between countries often lies mainly in skilful diplomacy and 
management of these relations.   
However, despite intergovernmental tensions that occur in the federation from time to 
time, the Australian states generally defer to the national government and often do not 
take principled positions against the national government when it gets involved in their 
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policy functions (Lecours and Béland 2013:106). As a result, the national government 
has become more powerful in relation to the states and this has led to more centralised 
federalism in the Australian system of government (Lecours and Béland 2013:106). 
This is in sharp contrast to the intergovernmental politics in Canadian federalism, as 
will be shown later.  
Apart from the nature of power politics that characterises the relations between the 
different levels of government in Australia, the nature of the Australian party system 
also has a major influence on the country’s system of IGR. The Australian party system 
is said to be integrated across different levels of government, meaning that political 
parties are organisationally aligned and integrated at both the federal and sub-national 
level (Lecours and Béland 2013:109-110). Such a party system tends to reduce or 
minimise intergovernmental tensions as the relationship between different levels of 
government can be facilitated and managed politically within the party when the same 
party controls both the national and sub-national governments (Lecours and Béland 
2013:109-110). This partly explains the relatively less hostile and confrontational 
nature of Australian intergovernmental politics compared to other jurisdictions such as 
Canada. This does not suggest, however, that the Australian system of IGR is immune 
from the tensions and ruptures often associated with intergovernmental politics 
worldwide.  
Australia has also developed a political tradition and system based on “[a] majoritarian 
party [and a] strong-executive parliamentary government” (Painter 1996:103). This 
practically amounts to the nature of IGR and politics that is dominated by the majority 
party government executive at both the national and sub-national government levels. 
The literature characterises this system as “executive federalism”. This Australian 
system of government is often characterised by partisanship and ideological 
differences between parties, which sometimes affect intergovernmental decision 
making and cooperation (Menzies 2013:384). It is therefore not surprising that the 
functionality and effectiveness of the Australian system of IGR are also affected by the 
country’s electoral and political cycles (see Menzies 2013:384-385). 
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4.2.5   The system of intergovernmental fiscal and funding relations in 
Australia 
This section outlines the overall configuration and operational modalities of the 
Australian intergovernmental fiscal system. Although intergovernmental fiscal 
relations are not the main focus of this study, it is important to provide a holistic 
understanding and a complete picture of the country’s system of IGR and cooperative 
governance.   
The Australian system of intergovernmental fiscal relations is characterised by a 
greater degree of centralisation (OECD 2014:96). The structure of the Australian fiscal 
and tax system has been designed in favour of the federal government in that the 
national government controls major sources of government revenue, including the 
majority of direct and indirect taxes (Fenna and Hollander 2013:224). This means that 
the federal government has immense revenue-collection (fiscal) powers compared to 
sub-national governments (OECD 2014:97; Robinson and Farrelly 2013:304). The 
sub-national governments in Australia have limited tax bases and the constitution does 
not allow them to levy customs and excise duties (Gray 2011:18). 
This fiscal centralism has created a higher degree of vertical fiscal imbalances in the 
Australian system of intergovernmental financial relations in which the central 
government has fiscal powers that exceed its expenditure responsibilities compared 
to sub-national governments whose expenditure responsibilities are greater than their 
fiscal powers (OECD 2014:97; Robinson and Farrelly 2013:304). This phenomenon of 
vertical fiscal imbalances has been more prominent since the country’s federal system 
came into effect (Gray 2011:18). In addition to vertical fiscal imbalances, the Australian 
system of intergovernmental financial relations is also characterised by horizontal 
fiscal imbalances in which there are variations in the capacities of the states to raise 
revenue, as well as differences among the states in relation to cost of service delivery 
(Williams 2005b:108).  
Overall, the design of the Australian fiscal system accords with the principles and 
guidelines of public finance theory of fiscal federalism as discussed in Chapter Two. 
These broad principles and guidelines typically direct that macroeconomic stabilisation 
functions (monetary and fiscal policy) and redistributive functions (income tax) should 
be administered at the national government level, while allocative (service delivery) 
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functions should be performed at the sub-national levels of government (Ajam 
2001:126; Vo 2010:659-660). This automatically leads to vertical fiscal imbalances 
whereby there is a mismatch between the revenue and expenditure responsibilities of 
the different levels of government. The configuration of the Australian fiscal system 
should therefore be understood against this theory of fiscal federalism.  
The Australian intergovernmental fiscal regime has three main funding streams 
through which the national government funds sub-national governments, namely 
General Revenue Assistance, National Specific Purpose Payments, and National 
Partnership Payments (Robinson and Farrelly 2013:304). General Revenue 
Assistance provides unconditional grant funding, which allows the sub-national 
governments to finance their own specific policy and budget priorities without national 
conditions (Robinson and Farrelly 2013:305). This provides some degree of fiscal 
autonomy to the sub-national governments – a matter which is often contentious and 
controversial in the politics of intergovernmental fiscal relations in many countries.  
National Specific Purpose Payments are fiscal transfers from the national government 
to sub-national governments designed to fund specific service delivery sectors such 
as education, health, and housing (O’Loughlin 2013:377). This funding allows the sub-
national governments to exercise some degree of discretion in terms of expenditure; 
provided that the money is spent within the specific sector for which the funding was 
allocated (Robinson and Farrelly 2013:305). National Specific Purpose Payments are 
linked to national agreements between the national and state governments, which 
outline policy objectives, outcomes, outputs, and performance indicators for each 
service delivery sector, as well as roles and responsibilities between the national and 
state governments (O’Loughlin 2013:377). National Partnership Payments are used 
to support specific projects or reforms (Robinson and Farrelly 2013:306). These 
payments are managed and regulated through the Intergovernmental Agreement on 
Federal Financial Relations, which is an agreement between the national government 
and sub-national governments (Robinson and Farrelly 2013:304-305). 
In addition, Australia also has a policy framework on horizontal fiscal equalisation, 
which intends to address and correct imbalances in the fiscal capacities of the states 
due to their differences in geographic, demographic, and economic profiles 
(O’Loughlin 2013:378). Equalisation is a system of territorial transfer designed and 
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intended to address regional inequalities (Lecours and Béland 2009:571). The 
Australian system of horizontal fiscal equalisation considers both the fiscal capacity 
and expenditure needs of different states when it corrects horizontal fiscal imbalances 
(Béland and Lecours 2011:200). The system is horizontal in a sense that the fiscal 
transfer is between states (from affluent to poor states) to address imbalances and 
disparities in fiscal capacities of the poor states and their costs of service delivery 
(Eccleston and Woolley 2014:9).  
Australia has an independent statutory body called the Commonwealth Grants 
Commission, which is similar to South Africa’s Financial and Fiscal Commission. The 
Commonwealth Grants Commission was created in 1933 and its main purpose is to 
assess the fiscal capacity and expenditure needs of the states and make 
recommendations to the federal government on fiscal allocations to be transferred to 
each state (Béland and Lecours 2011:200). This commission deals only with issues of 
horizontal fiscal equalisation and makes recommendations on the division and 
distribution of goods and services tax revenue to different states (Williams 2005b:108). 
This arms-length agency (the Commonwealth Grants Commission) means that 
experts (as opposed to politicians) determine appropriate equalisation funding to be 
divided between the states from goods and services tax, thus ensuring political 
neutrality and providing an effective buffer against the politisation of the equalisation 
allocations to the states (Lecours and Béland 2013:104).  
In addition, Australia’s Intergovernmental Agreement on Federal Financial Relations 
outlines the overall approach and framework to address vertical fiscal imbalances 
inherent in the country’s federal fiscal system (O’Loughlin 2013:376). The overall intent 
of this intergovernmental fiscal agreement is to provide an enabling framework to 
improve the quality, efficiency, and effectiveness of public service delivery (OECD 
2014:103).  
The Intergovernmental Agreement on Federal Financial Relations is an outcomes- and 
incentives-based intergovernmental fiscal instrument that incentivises performance 
and promotes an outcomes-based approach to service delivery (Robinson and Farrelly 
2013:305). This intergovernmental agreement sets out an intergovernmental financial 
transfers and associated performance and accountability framework (O’Loughlin 
2013:376). In other words, this framework has introduced a performance-based 
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accountability system that requires states to report against predetermined 
performance indicators and benchmarks specified in the national agreements (Carroll 
and Head 2010:417). The Intergovernmental Agreement on Federal Financial 
Relations allows flexibility and promotes experimentation at the state government level 
(O’Loughlin 2013:380).  
4.2.6   The politics of the intergovernmental fiscal system 
The Australian system of intergovernmental fiscal relations is not without its political 
tensions and controversies. In this regard, critical issues relate mainly to fiscal 
centralism and the federal government’s fiscal dominance over the states, as well as 
the politics of fiscal equalisation allocations between the states. The financial relations 
between the Australian federal and state governments remains a matter of serious 
controversy and contention, especially the country’s high level of vertical fiscal 
imbalances (see Zimmermann and Finlay 2011:213). This state of affairs stems from 
unequal fiscal powers between the federal and sub-national governments.  
The overall situation and tension could be attributed to certain key factors. Firstly, 
specific purpose payments, with their attached conditions, have undermined the fiscal 
autonomy and freedom of the states and further allowed the federal government to 
dictate policy direction to the states, thereby undermining the overall policy jurisdiction 
and sovereignty of the states (Zimmermann and Finlay 2011:223). In other words, the 
country’s fiscal centralism has allowed the national government to expand its policy 
jurisdiction and dominance (Galligan and Wright 2002:155). Secondly, the expansive 
judicial interpretation of the national government’s constitutional powers on taxation 
has resulted in a limited tax base for the sub-national governments (Gray 2011:37). 
The overall effect has been the weakening of the fiscal position of the states, thereby 
rendering them financially dependent on the federal government (Lecours and Béland 
2013:107). Overall, this general political posture by the national government goes 
against the normative classical principles of federalism that hold the primacy of 
institutional and jurisdictional autonomy and sovereignty of the states sacrosanct.  
Apart from the above vertical dimensions of the country’s intergovernmental fiscal 
politics and tensions, the Australian intergovernmental fiscal system has also been 
characterised by horizontal political tensions between the states over the fiscal 
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equalisation system. In Australia, fiscal equalisation politics is between the states 
firstly because the states compete for the fixed pool of money and secondly because 
some states complain about the unfairness of the system, arguing that it benefits some 
states at the expense of other states (Lecours and Béland 2013:99-105). It must, 
however, be noted that the discontent over the fiscal equalisation system is not 
peculiar to the Australian federalism but is a common feature found in many federal 
systems (Lecours and Béland 2009:570).  
4.2.7  Institutional and systemic weaknesses of the Australian system  
Certain critical institutional and systemic weaknesses affect IGR in Australia. Despite 
its bureaucratic talent, Australia suffers from institutional deficiencies when it comes 
to the management of the relationship between the national and state governments 
(Menzies 2013:382). In this regard, the first and foremost institutional weakness of the 
system relates to the fact that intergovernmental cooperation in Australia is voluntary 
and often occurs where there are mutual benefits for all the parties (Painter 1996:106). 
This exposes the system to the politics of self-interests of parties, which could be 
detrimental to the broader public interest of the Australian nation, thus defeating the 
overall objectives of the country’s system of federalism.  
The second key institutional weakness relates to the constitutional and legal standing 
of the COAG, which is Australia’s apex intergovernmental structure. The COAG lacks 
formal constitutional or legal status (Hollander 2009:142; Phillimore 2013:232). This 
relates to the point made earlier about the much broader constitutional weaknesses of 
the Australian federalism as it relates to constitutional provisions for IGR. This 
constitutional lacuna means that Australia’s intergovernmental structures are legally 
toothless and therefore their decisions are not legally binding and enforceable. This 
obviously undermines the overall effectiveness and efficacy of the country’s 
intergovernmental structures. In addition, the COAG’s institutional weaknesses also 
include the ad hoc nature of its arrangements and practices, coupled with its short-
term approach and its lack of long-term strategic orientation to key issues that face the 
country’s federal system (Menzies 2013:383-387).  
The third fundamental weakness of the system relates mainly to the conflict and 
contradiction between the inherent systemic flaws of federalism and the NPM-inspired 
 146 
ideological orientation of Australia’s contemporary public administration. The sub-
national governments in Australia are the key administrative machinery in terms of 
service delivery, but challenges of coordination, duplication, and inefficiencies remain 
(Johnston 2004:170). These challenges are structural in nature due to jurisdictional 
concurrency and overlaps associated with the system of federalism. These are 
inherent systemic weaknesses of federalism, or rather the curse of federalism. Due to 
its inherent jurisdictional overlaps and duplications, federalism therefore runs counter 
to the principles and values of simplicity and streamlining associated with the 
contemporary public management approach (Hollander 2009:157). Therefore, the 
Australian federal system, which is characterised by jurisdictional concurrency and 
overlaps, does not reconcile well with the principles of economy and efficiency 
associated with the modern public administration discourse (Hollander 2009:141). 
Herein lies the contradictions and paradoxes. Despite its professed theoretical 
intention for integrated and seamless service delivery, the NPM paradigm does not, 
as the literature review has shown, necessarily address duplication but often creates 
new forms of duplication and fragmentation in the system.  
In the final analysis, Australia’s current configuration of roles and responsibilities (i.e. 
powers and functions) require reforms to ensure service delivery efficiency, 
effectiveness, and accountability, especially in health, education, housing, and 
infrastructure delivery (OECD 2014:102-110). Furthermore, Australia needs a greater 
focus on institutional investment and development to improve its policy and technical 
capacity to develop and manage intergovernmental agreements and joint programmes 
between the national and state governments (Menzies 2013:386).  
The institutionalisation of the COAG, including the strengthening of its capacity, is also 
critical to the implementation and monitoring of intergovernmental agreements 
(Menzies 2013:386). Overall, Australia needs to develop a long-term strategic 
approach and strong permanent institutional mechanisms to strengthen the country’s 
system of IGR (Menzies 2013:387). This includes the need to develop and implement 
better cooperative mechanisms to effectively manage and coordinate concurrent 
functions in order to promote cooperative federalism in Australia (Zimmermann and 
Finlay 2011:218). 
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4.3   The Canadian IGR framework  
Canada, which is a former British colony, is a federation founded in 1867 (Baker and 
Rennie 2012:31; Bakvis and Brown 2010:490; Béland and Lecours 2005:684; Hail and 
Lange 2010:366-375; McBride 2003:257). Canada is also considered one of the most 
highly decentralised federal systems in the world (Baier 2005:206; Gamkhar and 
Vickers 2010:352; Hinarejos 2012:544; Montpetit and Foucault 2012:638; Simeon and 
Radin 2010:362). The Canadian federalism consists of federal government, ten 
provinces, three territories, and municipalities (Studlar 2010:394).  
Language, regionalism, and provincial autonomy are key issues in Canadian 
federalism (Simeon and Radin 2010:360). In fact, the country’s move towards a more 
decentralised federal system has in the main been driven by French-speaking 
Quebec’s long-term quest for provincial autonomy and sovereignty (Simeon and Radin 
2010:362; also see McRoberts 2001:696). This points to the importance and influence 
of the Canadian cultural and language identities in shaping the character of the 
country’s federal system. In contrast to the founding philosophy of American 
federalism, which is underpinned by the need to prevent tyranny and safeguard 
individual liberties through a system of limited government, the founding of Canadian 
federalism in 1867 was a result of a peaceful transition from a British colony to a more 
independent nation (Hail and Lange 2010:375). 
4.3.1   The founding political philosophy of Canadian federalism  
Canada is a parliamentary democracy (Gow and Simard 1999:72; Studlar 2010:394). 
As a former British colony, Canada was founded on British political philosophy and 
tradition (Hail and Lange 2010:366-367). In other words, the country has inherited the 
British parliamentary tradition (Montpetit and Foucault 2012:636). In this regard, the 
Canadian colonialists sought to establish a British parliamentary system of 
government based on the fusion of legislative and executive powers, as opposed to 
the American system of government based on the separation of powers (Hail and 
Lange 2010:379). However, Canada has settled for a federal model based on a 
combination of the British parliamentary system and a modified version of American 
federalism (Hail and Lange 2010:381; McRoberts 2001:695; Simeon and Radin 
2010:362). In this regard, it is worth noting that Canada is the first country to adopt 
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such a hybrid political system and is also the first nation in which federalism was 
crafted to accommodate and safeguard cultural and language diversity (McRoberts 
2001:695).  
In line with the British Westminster parliamentary system, which promotes executive 
dominance over the legislature through party discipline and cabinet solidarity, 
Canadian federalism is characterised by a powerful government in which the executive 
(the prime minister and the provincial premiers) dominates the legislature both at the 
national and provincial level (Bakvis and Brown 2010:491; also see Simeon and Radin 
2010:362). Although the Canadian party system has some degree of influence from 
the British Westminster political tradition, policy issues in Canada are driven mainly by 
regional interests rather than party political ideology and partisanship (Braun et al. 
2002:125-126; Studlar 2010:395). This suggests that party discipline in Canada’s 
highly federalised party system is not as strong as party discipline found in more 
unitary party systems such as Britain.   
4.3.2   The constitutional architecture of the Canadian state 
Canadian federation came into effect on 1 July 1867 in terms of the British North 
America Act, also called the Constitution Act of 1867, which outlined a political 
framework for the new nation, including the division of powers and functions between 
the different levels of government (Baker and Rennie 2012:31). Canada’s Westminster 
parliamentary system, underpinned by majoritarian political culture and a powerful 
executive, influenced the division and allocation of power in the country’s federal state 
(Braun et al. 2002:125). In other words, it influenced the constitutional architecture of 
the Canadian federal state. The British parliamentary practices and constitutional 
doctrines, as embodied in the British North America Act, which later became the 
Constitution Act of 1982, were modified and tamed by the country’s federal design, 
especially the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy, which became subject to judicial 
jurisdiction in Canada (McBride 2003:257).  
The British North America Act took a centralist perspective and sought to establish a 
strong and powerful federal government compared to sub-national governments 
(McBride 2003:258). To that effect, Canadian federalism was originally designed as a 
quasi-federal system as the British North America Act granted limited powers to the 
 149 
provinces (Hail and Lange 2010:378). However, Canada’s historical and political 
evolution and trajectory have moved the country’s centralised federal system under a 
powerful federal government to a decentralised system in which provinces have 
assumed greater importance and significance (Hail and Lange 2010:367-378; also see 
Simeon and Radin 2010:360).  
As previously indicated, a political trend towards a more decentralised federal system 
in Canada is mainly due to Quebec’s push for regional autonomy (Simeon and Radin 
2010:362; also see Bakvis and Brown 2010:502). Despite the fact that the Canadian 
federal government enjoys greater significance and a dominant position in terms of 
the British North America Act, the country’s provinces today command a higher degree 
of fiscal autonomy than their formal constitutional powers (Grewal 2010:80; Simeon 
2000:238; Thorlakson 2009:158). In addition to political pressure from the provinces, 
this fiscal decentralisation is partly due to a favourable judicial interpretation of the 
constitution that has broadened the taxation powers of the provinces (Grewal 
2010:89). This contrasts sharply with the Australian experience where the judicial 
interpretations of the constitution have expanded the powers of the national 
government, thereby creating a centralised federalism contrary to the country’s 
constitutional design of decentralised federalism.  
In terms of formal anatomy of power, the Canadian constitution divides legislative 
powers and public policy functions between the federal and provincial governments 
(Béland and Lecours 2005:684; Montpetit and Foucault 2012:639-644; Wood and 
Klassen 2008:336). It allocates exclusive powers and functions in relation to health, 
social services, and education to the provincial governments and those that relate to 
the economy, defence, and foreign affairs to the federal government (Montpetit and 
Foucault 2012:639; Béland and Lecours 2005:684; McCormack 2008:4; Wood and 
Klassen 2008:336).  
Only a few concurrent powers (jurisdictional concurrency) are provided for in the 
Canadian constitution, namely agriculture, immigration, pricing regulation for natural 
resources, and criminal justice (Bakvis and Brown 2010:491). This watertight division, 
or rather the compartmentalisation of powers, between the federal and provincial 
governments makes the Canadian federal system a dual or jurisdictional federalism 
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(Bakvis and Brown 2010:490). In practice, this system has been difficult to sustain and 
maintain in different policy areas (Montpetit and Foucault 2012:646).  
The literature on federalism broadly points to the difficulties and complexities 
associated with the watertight compartmentalisation of powers and functions, 
especially in modern states. In this regard, the most fundamental problem relates 
mainly to the fact that many policy functions in modern states do not lend themselves 
to a neat and clear-cut jurisdictional separation. Many of these policy functions have 
evolved into complex challenges that transcend jurisdictional boundaries. As also 
indicated in Chapter Three, many contemporary policy issues have become complex 
challenges with multi-jurisdictional spillover effects (i.e. “wicked problems”) and 
therefore require a more integrated and collaborative intergovernmental approach. 
This fundamentally explains why Canadian federalism cannot sustain such a 
compartmentalised jurisdictional system in modern times.    
Furthermore, it is worth noting that the federal and provincial governments in the 
Canadian federal system have equal legal status and neither is subordinate to the 
other (McCormack 2008:4; Wood and Klassen 2008:334). Notwithstanding this formal 
equality, the federal government has, however, relied on constitutional reforms and its 
fiscal (spending) powers to take part in areas of provincial jurisdictions such as health 
(Béland and Lecours 2005:684). This is not only a controversial issue in Canadian 
federalism, but also a common matter of contention in many federal jurisdictions. The 
Canadian provinces, however, jealously guard their jurisdiction and autonomy against 
federal government intrusions (Simeon and Radin 2010:360).  
It is important to indicate that autonomy is of lesser importance to the poorer provinces 
than the issue of federal funding (Simeon 2000:240). Finally, it is also worth noting 
that the Canadian municipalities do not have constitutional status and fall under the 
control and jurisdiction of the provinces (Cameron and Simeon 2002:69). This 
constitutional jurisdictional dispensation for local government is similar to the 
Australian system. This kind of dispensation renders municipalities not only weaker 
and powerless in the overall system of government, but also more vulnerable to the 
whims of the provinces.   
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4.3.3   Public administration and public management reforms in Canada 
As in many other nations, the historical evolution of the Canadian public service needs 
to be understood within the context of the broader historical evolution of the Canadian 
nation as a whole. In its evolution, Canada became a welfare state with many universal 
social programmes ranging from medical and unemployment insurance to pension and 
social safety nets for the poor to free school education (Glor 2001:128; also see 
Tupper 2001:144). The expansion of the role and prominence of the Canadian public 
service was a development related to the country’s welfare state and the expansion of 
the role of the government in the economy during and after World War II (Tupper 
2001:144).  
The Canadian public service has been influenced by both the British and American 
public administration practices and traditions (Tupper 2001:144). The Canadian public 
service is mainly staffed by appointed employees, with very few political appointees, 
and this points to the relative institutional stability of the country’s public service in that 
changes in governments do not significantly affect the public service (Gow and Simard 
1999:72). The principles of political neutrality and the separation of administration and 
politics have also been the defining features of the Canadian public service (see 
Johns, O’Reilly and Inwood 2007:31). It therefore appears that the philosophical and 
theoretical underpinnings of the Canadian public service are based mainly on the 
combination of Anglo-Saxon and Weberian bureaucratic traditions.  
Like many public services across the world, the Canadian public service has not been 
immune to and insulated from the wave of the global public management revolution. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, Canada went through public sector reforms driven by the 
NPM philosophy and ideology (Free and Radcliffe 2009:202; Tupper 2001:143-147). 
The implementation of NPM reforms began in 1989 when the federal government 
launched its Public Service 2000 Reform (Bilodeau, Laurin and Vining 2007:126). 
NPM was also adopted in many of the country’s provinces (Baines 2004:5). However, 
in the context of Canadian federalism, the principles of NPM were applied differently 
by the different levels of government (Tupper 2001:147).  
The reforms were occasioned by a combination of political and economic challenges 
coupled with the notion that public service bureaucracy is not better suited to deliver 
services, and this prompted the re-engineering of the government and the search for 
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alternative service delivery models, including partnerships, privatisation, contracting 
out, and co-production to bring in external skills and expertise in order to promote and 
maximise the government’s administrative efficiency and effectiveness (Tupper 
2001:148-156; also see Free and Radcliffe 2009:189).  
The institutional and organisational restructuring and re-engineering of the 
government in Canada included the downsizing of the public service, the creation of 
specialised delivery agencies, the decentralisation of functions to lower levels of 
government, the creation of partnerships and the privatisation and outsourcing of 
services to for-profit and non-profit organisations, as well as the modernisation of 
administrative systems and practices through advanced computer technology (Free 
and Radcliffe 2009:192; Glor 2001:127; Tupper 2001:150).  
These public management reforms were also accompanied by the adoption of private 
sector management (business) concepts, ethos, culture, and language and 
terminology such as stakeholders, customers, clients, business plans, performance 
indicators, measurement and results, service standards and excellence, value for 
money, profit, and incentives (Glor 2001:124; Tupper 2001:143). These reforms 
amount to a critique of the Weberian bureaucratic model, which is generally regarded 
as outdated and inefficient (see Tupper 2001:143). In addition to the broader public 
sector reforms associated with NPM, there have also been pressures for Canada to 
reform its intergovernmental system towards a more collaborative federalism (Johns, 
O’Reilly and Inwood 2004:627). The central question, as argued in Chapter Three, is 
whether the institutional ethos and culture associated with NPM promote a conducive 
environment (institutional incentives) for intergovernmental cooperation and 
collaboration.    
In addition, NPM reforms were accompanied by performance management reforms 
that shifted government accountability orientation away from inputs, activities, and 
outputs towards performance, results, and outcomes (Free and Radcliffe 2009:189-
193; McCormack 2008:11). To this effect, the Canadian government has established 
strong performance measurement and reporting infrastructure and systems 
(McCormack 2008:11). Performance indicators are now widely used by the Canadian 
government to measure government performance and, in some cases, departmental 
funding and the performance pay of senior government officials are linked to 
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quantifiable performance indicators and improved organisational performance (Tupper 
2001:148-150). These are important institutional innovations associated with the NPM 
philosophy from which important lessons can be learned.   
As indicated in Chapter Three, it is important to note that NPM has certain systemic 
flaws and limitations. As argued in Chapter Three, the performance management 
orientation of NPM paradigm lacks intergovernmental focus as it is preoccupied with 
a single organisation, hence a need for intergovernmental collaborative performance 
management approaches. Furthermore, the practices associated with NPM, such as 
outsourcing, the multiplicity of service providers, and public-private partnerships, often 
lead to fragmentation (Free and Radcliffe 2009:202). NPM’s preoccupation with 
building managerial expertise in the public service (coupled with the downsizing of the 
public service) tends to undermine and diminish the public service’s policy capacity 
and capabilities (Tupper 2001:154). This does not augur well for the institutional 
capacity required for intergovernmental coordination and cooperation.  
At a more philosophical and ideological level, NPM (private sector management) 
reforms do not only represent a managerial re-invention and modernisation of 
government, but also a major onslaught on the classical philosophical and political 
conception and foundation of the government and the state, as well as the political 
rights of citizens. In other words, these reforms offend the very basic political essence 
and legitimacy of the state and its fundamental relationship with citizens.  
4.3.4   The system of IGR in Canada 
The nature and character of IGR are framed by a country’s constitutional framework. 
The Canadian system of IGR is no exception in this regard. The Canadian constitution 
created the Canadian state as a dual jurisdictional federal system in which each level 
of government has its own jurisdictional autonomy in terms of policy and administration 
(Bakvis and Brown 2010:487; Gamkhar and Vickers 2010:352-354). The constitutional 
configuration of the country’s federal system also means that the national and 
provincial governments are equal partners with their own jurisdictional powers and 
competencies (Simeon 2000:238; Wood and Klassen 2008:335).  
This dual federal system means that the different levels of government in Canada have 
very few imperatives and incentives to cooperate in public policymaking and 
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implementation (Thorlakson 2009:158). It is for this reason that there is very little 
constitutional provision for IGR mechanisms in the Canadian federalism (see 
Phillimore 2013:231; Braun et al. 2002:139). Despite the institutional and systemic 
limitations and constraints associated with the country’s jurisdictional federalism, the 
Canadian system of IGR has evolved into a cooperative system (Bakvis and Brown 
2010:491). The following section on cooperative federalism provides more details in 
this regard.  
As one of the oldest federations in the world, Canada has a long history and much 
experience in IGR, spanning more than 140 years (Wood and Klassen 2008:334). IGR 
have therefore driven Canada’s public policy processes for many years (Montpetit and 
Foucault 2012:639; Simeon 2000:238). Like Britain and Australia, with which it shares 
common political history and tradition, Canada has also adopted the whole-of-
government approach to foster stronger collaboration and cooperation between the 
different levels of government (Brook 2012:35). Canada’s whole-of-government model 
links government planning, funding, performance, and accountability to government-
wide priorities and outcomes (Brook 2012:36). Similar to the Australian whole-of-
government approach, the Canadian model also resonates with collaborative 
management and systems approaches as discussed in Chapter Three.   
The adoption of this whole-of-government approach needs to be understood against 
the backdrop of the currency and influence of NPM philosophy on the institutional 
cultural orientation and practices of the Canadian government. The NPM philosophy 
places a higher premium on reducing duplication and overlaps to achieve greater 
efficiency and to save costs, hence its preoccupation with performance measurement 
and results (Simeon 2000:240). This management philosophy also advocates for 
intergovernmental institutional innovation and capacity to promote seamless and 
efficient public service delivery (Johns et al. 2004:628). However, as indicated in the 
previous discussion, contrary to its professed theoretical intentions, the NPM approach 
tends to create new forms of institutional fragmentation.  
The NPM philosophy and the whole-of-government approach have brought about a 
new orientation and paradigm shift in the Canadian system of IGR, including the nature 
and character of the country’s intergovernmental practices and relationships. 
Provincial identities also influence the nature and character of IGR in Canada (Lecours 
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and Béland 2009:582). Overall, a combination of the above key factors provides the 
broader background, context, and milieu for IGR in Canada.  
4.3.4.1 Canadian intergovernmental institutional and administrative 
infrastructure  
Executive federalism is a dominant feature of IGR in parliamentary systems as the 
relations between the different levels of government mainly take place at the executive 
level between political and administrative officials (Phillimore 2013:232).  
As highlighted in the previous section, Canada inherited the British parliamentary 
tradition as part of its federal system. As a result, the Canadian system of IGR is also 
dominated by executive federalism that involves the interactions and relations 
between the prime minister, provincial premiers, and territorial leaders (Alcantara 
2013:27-37; Bakvis and Brown 2010:488; Johns et al. 2004:629; also see Cameron 
and Simeon 2002:49). This system dates back to more than 140 years and involves 
federal-provincial, interprovincial, and bilateral interactions between political and 
senior administrative officials (Wood and Klassen 2008:335).  
The Canadian system of IGR is made up of different intergovernmental political and 
administrative structures and mechanisms. Canada has a number of 
intergovernmental political structures that serve as key institutional mechanisms and 
platforms for IGR and policy coordination across the different levels of government. 
The first key intergovernmental structure is the First Ministers’ Conference (FMC) 
(Alcantara 2013:31-37).  
Although the Constitution Act of 1867 did not make explicit provision for it, the FMC is 
an old structure dating as far back as early 1900s and has for a long time served as a 
key institutional mechanism to facilitate federal and provincial relations (initially 
excluding territories until their permanent inclusion in 1992) in the Canadian federal 
system (Alcantara 2013:29-33). This structure, which is made up of the prime minister 
and premiers, is at the apex or the pinnacle of the Canadian system of executive 
federalism and IGR (Bolleyer 2006:484; Simeon 2000:239; also see Studlar 
2010:396). The informal and infrequent nature of the FMC means, however, that this 
vertical intergovernmental structure is less institutionalised, thus limiting the degree of 
vertical integration in the system (Bolleyer 2006:484-485) 
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Other key intergovernmental structures in the Canadian federal system are the Council 
of the Federation (CoF) and various ministerial councils. The CoF is a horizontal 
intergovernmental structure that was established in 2003 by Canadian sub-national 
governments to promote and strengthen interprovincial relations (Bolleyer 2006:484-
485; Bolleyer and Bytzek 2009:389; Johns et al. 2004:632; Phillimore 2013:232). The 
CoF forms part of the broader institutional measures to strengthen interprovincial 
capacity in different areas of public policy (Johns et al. 2004:632).  
Notably, decision making in the CoF is based on the principle of consensus as 
governments do not want to compromise their autonomy (Bolleyer and Bytzek 
2009:389; Bolleyer 2006:484). The ministerial councils have also become a critical 
element of the country’s system of IGR and play an important role in different areas of 
public policy (Cameron and Simeon 2002:62). In addition, there are many other 
intergovernmental committees that operate in different policy sectors within the 
country’s system of executive federalism and IGR (Johns et al. 2007:38). 
Effective IGR require sound administrative support. To this effect, Canada has 
intergovernmental administrative machinery in place – what Johns et al. (2004:635) 
refers to as “intergovernmental bureaucratic machinery” – to support and drive the 
country’s system of executive federalism and IGR. The country’s intergovernmental 
bureaucratic and administrative machinery includes key departments (such as finance 
departments), intergovernmental units in government departments, intergovernmental 
secretariats, and technical structures (Johns et al. 2007:22-29; Bolleyer 2006:484; 
Bolleyer and Bytzek 2009:389).  
Intergovernmental administrative machinery (government officials) is mainly 
responsible for monitoring and advisory functions, as well as the coordination of 
vertical and horizontal intergovernmental activities, including preparations for 
meetings (Johns et al. 2007:29-38). The literature is, however, silent on the kinds of 
administrative systems and practices that exist to manage and support IGR and 
cooperation in Canada. This is the fundamental knowledge gap that this study seeks 
to address in order to make a theoretical contribution to the stock of knowledge on 
intergovernmental administrative systems and practices.   
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4.3.4.2  Canadian cooperative federalism and intergovernmental partnerships 
In the past (1975-1995), the Canadian system of IGR was highly confrontational in 
nature due to issues relating to constitutional reforms, provincial autonomy (mainly 
Quebec), regional redistributive issues, and many other national policy issues (Bakvis 
and Brown 2010:492). This amounted to competitive federalism. In the recent past, 
both the federal and provincial governments embraced collaborative federalism, which 
is an approach to IGR that avoids competition and promotes partnership, equality, and 
non-hierarchical relationship between the different levels of government (Bakvis and 
Brown 2010:492). Although the different levels of government continue to protect and 
guard their own jurisdictional autonomy, they have adopted a more collaborative 
approach to IGR to manage complex and overlapping public policy issues (Baier 
2005:207).  
In this context, collaborative federalism is about the nature of IGR that requires the 
different levels of government to decide and work together in partnership as equals 
and to coordinate policies among themselves both vertically and horizontally in order 
to promote effective governance, public policymaking, and service delivery (Cameron 
and Simeon 2002:49-55; Simeon 2000:238). This system of cooperative federalism 
also implies that the original constitutional allocation of powers to the different levels 
of government as per the Canadian constitution of 1867 has become somewhat 
irrelevant to the complexities associated with modern governance (Baier 2005:215). 
As indicated previously in this chapter, a system of coordinate federalism, or rather a 
compartmentalised jurisdictional federal system, as designed by the original 
constitutional configuration of the Canadian federalism, cannot be sustained in a 
contemporary context in which modern states are grappling with complex cross-cutting 
public policy issues. It is, however, worth noting that Canada is grappling with serious 
institutional and systemic issues that militate against effective institutionalisation and 
implementation of the country’s system of collaborative or cooperative federalism. 
These issues will be addressed later in the section that discusses key challenges 
facing the system.  
The practical instruments and tools of Canada’s collaborative federalism model 
include various intergovernmental partnerships, agreements, accords, and 
declarations that exist across the different levels and sectors of the government 
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(Cameron and Simeon 2002:55; Johns et al. 2004:637-640; Johns et al. 2007:30; 
Simeon 2000:239). These intergovernmental institutional arrangements are intended 
to reduce duplication and overlap and promote greater policy harmonisation, 
efficiencies, cost savings, and integrated service delivery (Cameron and Simeon 
2002:63; Johns et al. 2004:640). In line with the philosophy of NPM, these agreements 
also seek to promote a results-based management culture and the sharing of best 
practices within and across government (Cameron and Simeon 2002:63-64).  
Although some agreements are incorporated into the legislation, most of these 
agreements are not legally binding or enforceable as governments want to maintain 
their formal constitutional jurisdiction and autonomy (Cameron and Simeon 2002:62-
63). The other important point to note is that these agreements further reinforce 
executive federalism and executive dominance over the country’s system of IGR in 
that these agreements are concluded at the executive level and therefore cannot be 
easily changed by the legislatures (McBride 2003:258). In this regard, the notion of 
executive dominance in Canadian federalism speaks more to the effect of the British 
parliamentary tradition on the nature and character of the Canadian system of IGR. 
The role of public servants in the country’s system of collaborative federalism is 
crucial. To this effect, there have been government-wide measures and initiatives to 
engender a culture in which the Canadian public servants can begin to think and 
operate in an intergovernmental manner across the vertical and horizontal levels and 
dimensions of the system (Johns et al. 2004:642; also see Johns et al. 2007:31). 
Although there are pockets of effective intergovernmental collaborative partnerships 
in certain sectors, the extent to which paradigm shifts and cultural change are taking 
place within the country’s public service remains debatable, as many challenges 
continue to affect the system (Johns et al. 2004:642-643).  
In this regard, key challenges include the turnover of officials, cultural barriers (“us” 
and “them” culture), turf battles, poor institutional relationships, and the fact that the 
country’s bureaucratic machinery still remains traditional in structure and orientation 
with more focus on processes rather than outcomes (Johns et al. 2004:642-644). This 
reinforces the argument made in Chapter Three regarding the pathologies associated 
with the bureaucratic theory, including the difficulties associated with changing deeply 
institutionalised bureaucratic structures, practices, and cultures in the public service. 
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As argued in Chapter Three, this points to the effect of the bureaucratic theory on the 
institutional environment and context for IGR and cooperative relations. In other words, 
this shows how bureaucratic structures, practices, and cultures militate against 
effective IGR and cooperation.   
Overall, despite taking a more cooperative posture, the Canadian system of federalism 
and IGR is not without institutional politics and tensions. Canadian federalism has a 
complex system of IGR that is characterised by a combination of both cooperation and 
conflict varying across different policy sectors (Gamkhar and Vickers 2010:352-353; 
Simeon and Radin 2010:360). Fiscal arrangements, regional interests, and ideological 
differences (mainly between the liberals and conservatives) are some of the key 
factors that drive intergovernmental conflicts and tensions in the Canadian federal 
system (Simeon 2000:240-242).  
The Canadian party system also has a bearing on the country’s intergovernmental 
conflicts and tensions. The Canadian federal party system, in which provincial political 
parties are organisationally distinct from the federal parties, has created a situation 
whereby intergovernmental conflicts do not occur along party lines because of weaker 
party loyalty and discipline between the federal and provincial political parties (Lecours 
and Béland 2009:582-588; Lecours and Béland 2013:109). This partly explains the 
relatively confrontational nature of Canadian IGR compared to Australian 
intergovernmental politics. It must, however, be noted that Canadian 
intergovernmental conflicts tend to be minimal when the ruling party has support 
across the country (Simeon 2000:242).   
4.3.5   The system of intergovernmental fiscal and funding relations in Canada  
This section outlines the structure and functioning of the Canadian intergovernmental 
fiscal system. Although intergovernmental fiscal relations are not the main focus of this 
study, it is important to provide a holistic understanding and a complete picture of the 
country’s system of IGR and cooperative governance.   
The Canadian fiscal federalism is characterised by some degree of fiscal imbalances 
(Baier 2005:216; Lecours and Béland 2009:574-575). The Canadian constitution 
accords the federal government unlimited taxation powers compared to the provinces, 
whose powers are formally limited to direct taxation (Braun et al. 2002:119-120; 
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Grewal 2010:83). Contrary to the original constitution’s intent and design in favour of 
a strong national government with more powers, the Canadian provinces today enjoy 
a much greater degree of fiscal autonomy in terms of taxation and spending priorities 
than their formal powers provided for in the Canadian constitution (Grewal 2010:80).  
The country’s fiscal decentralisation is in sharp contrast to the Australian fiscal 
centralisation in that the Canadian provinces generate their own revenue from a much 
broader tax base, which includes personal and corporate income tax and sales tax 
(Gray 2011:18; Grewal 2010:80; Lecours and Béland 2013:107). As a result of greater 
fiscal decentralisation and provincial fiscal autonomy, the Canadian provincial revenue 
exceeds federal revenue (Grewal 2010:80-85). It is therefore logical to contend that 
the evolution of the Canadian fiscal system in favour of greater fiscal decentralisation 
and provincial fiscal autonomy has somewhat ameliorated the degree of fiscal 
imbalances inherent in the constitutional architecture of the country’s federal system. 
Besides the revenue side, there is the expenditure side that makes the Canadian fiscal 
system somewhat interdependent through the federal government funding of public 
policy areas in provincial jurisdictions such as education, health, and welfare (Braun 
et al. 2002:121). 
The Canadian intergovernmental fiscal system has different intergovernmental 
funding instruments. The first major intergovernmental funding mechanism includes a 
combination of conditional and non-conditional fiscal transfers (grant funding) from the 
federal government to the provinces and territories to finance key public policy 
programmes such as health, education, and other social services (Grewal 2010:89; 
McCormack 2008:4; Wood and Klassen 2008:335). The second major 
intergovernmental funding instrument relates to fiscal equalisation transfers. Canada’s 
fiscal equalisation funding regime aims to address the provincial fiscal disparities 
through a fiscal transfer system that redistributes the resources from the wealthy to 
poor provinces to enable them to provide comparable levels of public services 
(McAllister 2011:492-493; McCormack 2008:4; Grewal 2010:87; Lecours and Béland 
2013:96-99). 
In contrast to the Australian system, the Canadian fiscal equalisation system is 
provided for in the country’s constitution (Lecours and Béland 2013:96-107; Lecours 
and Béland 2009:571). Unlike the Australian fiscal equalisation system, the Canadian 
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system only addresses the revenue aspects of the provincial fiscal disparities and not 
the provincial differentials in terms of the cost of public service delivery (Lecours and 
Béland 2013:99; Eccleston and Woolley 2014:11). Furthermore, unlike Australia, 
which has an arms-length fiscal agency in the form of the Commonwealth Grants 
Commission to ensure political and technical neutrality in the country’s fiscal 
equalisation system, the Canadian equalisation system is subject to federal executive 
discretion, thus exposing the system to political controversies (Lecours and Béland 
2013:102; Lecours and Béland 2009:580). 
4.3.6   The politics of the intergovernmental fiscal system in Canada 
Canadian intergovernmental fiscal politics centres mainly around historical conflict 
over provincial fiscal autonomy, the federal government’s intrusion into the provincial 
jurisdictions, and tensions over the country’s fiscal equalisation system. The evolution 
of Canadian federalism has been characterised by a long-standing conflict between 
the national and provincial governments, with Quebec leading the provincial battle for 
the return of the provincial taxation powers rented to the national government in 1942 
during World War II, as well as the provincial push for greater fiscal decentralisation 
and provincial fiscal autonomy (Grewal 2010:105-111). Federal government spending 
in public policy areas considered to be exclusive provincial jurisdiction has also been 
a source of intergovernmental conflict in the country’s federal system (Grewal 
2010:112). 
Fiscal equalisation politics and tensions also remain at the centre of the country’s 
intergovernmental conflict (Lecours and Béland 2013:95). In this regard, 
intergovernmental tensions over the country’s fiscal equalisation system manifest in 
different ways. Firstly, federal executive (political) discretion over the fiscal 
equalisation allocations has opened up the programme to provincial accusation or 
perception of political manipulation by the ruling party for electoral gains and other 
political considerations (Lecours and Béland 2013:102).  
Secondly, the fiscal equalisation system ignites conflicts between affluent (resource-
rich) provinces and poor provinces in that revenue is redistributed from the former to 
the latter provinces through the equalisation system to address provincial fiscal 
disparities and inequalities (Lecours and Béland 2013:103; Lecours and Béland 
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2009:571-585). Finally, it is worth noting that party lines and affiliations do not have 
any significant bearing on Canadian intergovernmental conflicts mainly due to two 
fundamental factors, namely that the provincial parties are independent and 
autonomous from their national counterparts, and because provincial identities and 
interests are more prominent than party affiliation in Canadian federalism (Lecours 
and Béland 2009:588-589). 
4.3.7  Institutional and systemic weaknesses of the Canadian system 
Similar to the Australian system, the Canadian system of IGR and cooperative 
federalism is riddled with institutional and systemic challenges and weaknesses. 
Despite a professed commitment to cooperative or collaborative federalism through 
intergovernmental agreements, the practice of cooperation and collaboration remains 
poorly internalised and institutionalised within the Canadian system of IGR mainly due 
to mistrust that characterises the relationship between the different levels of the 
Canadian government (Cameron and Simeon 2002:50-68). A highly 
compartmentalised allocation of powers to the different levels of the Canadian 
government, coupled with a limited degree of concurrency, makes intergovernmental 
coordination in Canada more difficult to achieve (Bakvis and Brown 2010:485).  
The most glaring institutional and systemic deficiency of the Canadian system of IGR 
and cooperative federalism relates to the poor or weak institutionalisation of the 
system itself. In this regard, limited or weak institutionalisation of IGR and cooperative 
federalism in Canada stems from the fact that intergovernmental institutional 
machinery (institutions and structures) is largely informal and ad hoc in nature, with no 
constitutional and legislative standing, compounded by non-binding and non-
enforceable intergovernmental agreements, as well as few bureaucratic or permanent 
support mechanisms (Bakvis and Brown 2010:488; Bolleyer 2006:484-486; Bolleyer 
and Börzel 2010:174-175; Bolleyer and Bytzek 2009:389; Cameron and Simeon 
2002:50-64; Simeon 2000:239; also see Johns et al. 2004:629). As a result, the 
country’s intergovernmental policy coordination remains challenging, weak, ad hoc, 
and inefficient compared to other systems (Bolleyer and Börzel 2010:174-175; Simeon 
and Radin 2010:361). 
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Another fundamental institutional and systemic pathology that afflicts the Canadian 
system of IGR arises from the inherent tension between the principles and logic of 
cooperative federalism and Westminster-based parliamentarism (Cameron and 
Simeon 2002:62-68). In this regard, the logic of cooperative federalism, which requires 
the different levels of government to be accountable to one another through 
intergovernmental agreements, does not accord with the requirements and constraints 
of the Westminster parliamentary tradition, which requires both the national and 
provincial governments in Canada to be accountable to their respective legislatures 
(Cameron and Simeon 2002:62-68). This inherent contradiction in the constitutional 
architecture of the Canadian federalism poses serious accountability and cooperation 
dilemmas to the country’s system of IGR and cooperative federalism.   
Other weaknesses of the system are more political in nature. The Canadian systems 
of cooperative federalism and IGR are largely an undemocratic and elitist affair 
between political and administrative executives of the national and provincial 
governments (executive federalism) without the participation of citizens, legislatures, 
and other affected stakeholders (Alcantara 2013:37; Baier 2005:206; Bakvis and 
Brown 2010:488; Cameron and Simeon 2002:67; Simeon 2000:242).  
Despite its institutional and systemic weaknesses, the Canadian system of IGR and 
cooperative federalism has been characterised by innovative, flexible, adaptive, and 
differentiated approaches to addressing intergovernmental conflicts and 
accommodating and responding to provincial differences and needs (Grewal 
2010:107-112). This offers a profound lesson about how other sovereign jurisdictions 
can structure and conduct IGR in a manner that effectively responds to their country-
specific contexts and needs.  
4.4  The German IGR framework 
Germany is a federal state founded in 1949 and has 16 states (Hepp and Von Hagen 
2011:237; Keller 2011:2331; Moore and Eppler 2008:491). The German federal 
system has three levels of government, namely the federal government (Bund), state 
governments (Länder), and municipalities (Gemeinden) (Herwartz and Theilen 
2014:123).  
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Two important points need to be noted about the German political culture. Although it 
is a federal state, Germany is characterised by a unitary political culture (Scharpf 
2008:510). The need for uniform norms and standards for public service delivery 
across the German federation may be a key factor with regard to the country’s 
centralised political culture (see Moore and Eppler 2008:491). The second point to 
note is that German politics are influenced mainly by a combination of territorial 
interests and partisan party politics (Braun et al. 2002:127). These points are raised 
mainly because they may have implications for the nature and character of the 
German system of IGR.  
Like many federal systems, the German constitution provides for a system of division 
and allocation of powers and functions to the different levels of government. Contrary 
to other federal systems such as the American system in which legislative powers and 
jurisdictions are divided horizontally, the German federal system is based on a vertical 
allocation of powers and functions between the different levels of government 
(Halberstam and Hills 2001:175). The former gives the different levels of government 
separate areas of legislative competencies and autonomy, and the latter allocates 
legislative competencies to the national government and implementation 
responsibilities to sub-national governments (Halberstam and Hills 2001:175).   
To this effect, the German constitution of 1949 assigns legislative powers and 
functions to the federal government and responsibilities for implementation of policy, 
legislation, and programmes to the states (Länder) (Bach and Jann 2010:446; Benz 
1999:55; Braun et al. 2002:121-129; Burkhart 2008:343; Halberstam and Hills 
2001:175; Schwager 1999:284). The German states enjoy very limited exclusive 
powers and functions mainly in the domain of cultural and education policy and law 
enforcement (Döring and Schnellenbach 2011:89). This constitutional configuration of 
the German federal system represents a compromise by striking a balance between 
centralisation and decentralisation (Benz 1999:61).  
The German federal model can also be described as administrative federalism due to 
the fact that policy and legislative functions rest largely with the national government, 
whereas implementation and administrative functions are assigned mainly to sub-
national governments (Bakvis and Brown 2010:487; Braun et al. 2002:121-122; 
Broschek 2011:668; Schwager 1999:284). In this regard, the German constitution 
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provides a greater degree of clarity in terms of vertical allocation and the definition of 
powers and functions assigned to the different levels of government, thus leaving little 
space for interpretation; hence the limited role of the country’s constitutional court in 
matters of IGR (Döring and Schnellenbach 2011:92). This is in sharp contrast to the 
other federations such as Australia and Canada where the judicial interpretation of the 
constitutional powers and competencies (jurisdictional autonomy) of the different 
levels of government is a central feature of the federal system and IGR.  
4.4.1   Public administration and public management reforms in Germany 
The German public administration has a different tradition and history (Seibel 
2010:720). Despite its immense influence on public administration science and 
practice in many countries across the globe, the Weberian bureaucratic theory did not 
influence the German public administration tradition (Seibel 2010:720-722). Contrary 
to the political neutrality of public administration bureaucracy espoused by the 
Weberian theory, the German public administration has long played an important role 
as a political integrator in the country’s political history long before the emergence of 
parliaments and political parties in Germany (Seibel 2010:720-722).  
Max Weber’s limited influence on the German public administration theory and 
practice is ironic considering that Weber is a German national who is regarded across 
the world as one of the great scholars and forefathers of public administration. Due to 
the fact that legislative and policy formulation functions mainly reside with the national 
government and policy implementation (administrative) responsibilities with sub-
national governments, Germany has a relatively small federal public administration 
bureaucracy compared to sub-national government bureaucracy (Braun et al. 
2002:121-122; Broschek 2011:668). In this regard, common sense and logic would 
therefore dictate that the sub-national governments would be a sphere of government 
with huge bureaucratic machinery due to their policy implementation and 
administrative responsibilities.   
Notwithstanding its different public administration tradition and history, the German 
public administration, like many other countries across the globe, has not been 
immune to the global wave of NPM reforms. The main difference is, however, that 
these NPM reforms came late to Germany compared to Commonwealth countries 
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such as Britain, Australia, and New Zealand. Contrary to these other countries where 
NPM reforms were introduced between the 1970s and the 1980s, Germany only 
embraced NPM reforms in the 1990s under the banner of a managerial reforms 
programme called the New Steering Model (NSM) (Vogel 2012:370; also see Bach 
and Jann 2010:451). Despite being a laggard in terms of NPM-inspired public sector 
managerial reforms, Germany has a long history of agencies and bodies at the 
national government level (Bach and Jann 2010:443).  
The NSM as the German version of NPM reforms has also been a key framework for 
the reform and modernisation of local government administration in Germany 
(Kuhlmann, Bogumil and Grohs 2008:853). In this regard, it must be noted that 
Germany has not strictly followed an ideal-type NPM institutional model and template 
(Bach and Jann 2010:463-464). The NSM was introduced to promote efficiency and 
improved quality of services through internal institutional reorganisation and 
modernisation of administrative systems, including decentralisation and the 
managerial autonomy of public agencies, as well as increased competition and 
performance management (Vogel 2012:370-381; Kuhlmann et al. 2008:854-855).  
The overall rationale of this model was to transform the German public administration 
into a decentralised, high-performance, results-based, and customer-centric 
organisation through, among others, the implementation of process innovation and 
customer-orientated reform measures such as improved administrative turnaround 
times, single window of access to services, extended service hours, customer surveys, 
and complaints management systems (Kuhlmann et al. 2008:854-855). NSM reforms 
were not, however, accompanied by a complete paradigm shift from the traditional 
public administration practices to NSM managerial practices and approaches 
(Kuhlmann et al. 2008:860). This reinforces the argument advanced in Chapter Three 
regarding the institutional and cultural rigidities associated with the traditional public 
administration practices espoused by bureaucratic theory.    
4.4.2   The system of IGR in Germany 
The constitutional configuration of powers and functions in German federalism has 
created a relationship of concurrency and interdependence between the different 
levels of government (Broschek 2011:668-669; Döring and Schnellenbach 2011:95; 
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Scharpf 2008:511). Many policy areas in German federalism fall under concurrent 
legislative competencies and jurisdictions (Broschek 2011:668). Mutual 
interdependence and joint decision making among the different levels of government 
constitute a key institutional feature of German federalism and the country’s system of 
IGR (Broschek 2011:668-669; Scharpf 2008:511).  
Although Germany’s constitutional framework of 1949 laid the basis for a highly 
centralised federal system, the greater degree of interdependence embedded in the 
German constitution between the different levels of government led to the emergence 
and evolution of a cooperative system of governance (cooperative federalism) within 
German federalism (Döring and Schnellenbach 2011:95-89). Cooperative federalism 
in Germany does not, however, have any constitutional grounding (Erk 2003:301-302). 
In the context of the German federalism, cooperative federalism can better be 
described as follows: “It [cooperative federalism] is an extension of the principle of 
federal friendly behaviour, an informal political principle which restricts Länder 
autonomy since it calls for concerted action. Cooperative federalism does not include 
a constitutional reallocation of competences but, instead, is based on a network of 
coordination, cooperation, joint responsibilities and federal financing … In other words, 
cooperative federalism and federal comity can be seen as extra-constitutional paths 
to circumvent the federal division of responsibilities, since they do not include an 
official transfer of competences. These two principles were not integral to the 1949 
federal structure, but they have come to be seen as constitutional conventions guiding 
the [German] federal structure … Centralizing tendencies are often explained by using 
these principles, but a more correct interpretation would be to see cooperative 
federalism and federal comity as reflecting already existing centralizing tendencies” 
(Erk 2003:302). 
The German system of cooperative federalism has been lauded for the success of the 
post-war German governance model for promoting policy consensus and ensuring 
public policy consistency and continuity within the federation (Scharpf 2008:511). In 
addition to vertical cooperation as required by the constitution, the German systems 
of cooperative federalism and IGR have strong mechanisms for horizontal 
coordination and cooperation between the different sub-national governments (Döring 
and Schnellenbach 2011:89-95). 
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It must, however, be noted that the German systems of cooperative federalism and 
IGR are highly complex and somewhat paradoxical. They are characterised by 
increased federal powers combined with the increased need and necessity for 
cooperative federalism (Scharpf 2008:509). In other words, they are characterised by 
the centralisation of powers by the federal government, but at the same time a strong 
necessity for cooperation and consensus among the sub-national governments.  
The system has therefore created “high consensus requirements”, resulting in diluted 
and reduced autonomy for both the federal and sub-national governments (Scharpf 
2008:509). The need to accommodate different territorial interests through consensus 
means that almost everything in German federalism requires negotiation (Braun et al. 
2002:129). Furthermore, the country’s general “orientation towards unity and equality” 
has created “a system of interlocking politics” in German federalism (Benz 1999:55-
56).  
It is therefore against the above background that some key criticisms have been 
levelled against the German system of cooperative federalism and IGR. The first main 
criticism relates to the country’s system of joint decision making (Burkhart 2008:343). 
The system is blamed for high policymaking costs (transaction costs) and for creating 
stalemates in respect of key policy and institutional reforms (Benz 1999:56). In short, 
the system impedes effective and quick decision making within the German federalism 
(Moore and Eppler 2008:491).  
4.4.3   The system of intergovernmental fiscal relations in Germany 
This section outlines the overall configuration and operational modalities of the 
German intergovernmental fiscal system. Although intergovernmental fiscal relations 
are not the main focus of this study, it is important to provide a holistic understanding 
and a complete picture of the country’s system of IGR and cooperative governance.   
4.4.3.1  The structure of the fiscal system and taxation powers 
The German system of intergovernmental fiscal relations is provided for and regulated 
by the constitution (Pitlik, Schneider and Strotmann 2006:642). Tax legislation and 
revenue powers in German federalism are centralised at the federal level (Braun et al. 
2002:122; Scharpf 2008:510). The German states are not allowed to determine their 
 169 
own tax rates and levy taxes through their own legislative authority (Braun et al. 
2002:122; Burkhart 2008:344). This is because all taxes, including taxes exclusively 
levied by the sub-national governments such as vehicle licences or taxes, are 
legislated at the national level (Döring and Schnellenbach 2011:89).  
Against this background, German federalism is said to be characterised by limited tax 
(revenue) autonomy of the states (Buettner 2002:197; Feld and Baskaran 2010:374). 
As a result, the states are fiscally and financially dependent on the federal government 
(Erk 2003:302). The administrative nature of German federalism, coupled with limited 
federal powers and control over the sub-national governments, means that the states 
have relatively more control and autonomy over their own budgets and expenditure 
(Braun et al. 2002:124-134). In other words, the German sub-national governments 
have very limited autonomy on the revenue (tax) side of the fiscal equation, but 
relatively more autonomy on the expenditure side of the country’s intergovernmental 
fiscal system (see Jochimsen 2008:552). 
4.4.3.2  Intergovernmental funding arrangements and modalities 
Germany has a constitutionally grounded and formula-based system of vertical and 
horizontal intergovernmental funding and fiscal equalisation mechanisms (Hepp and 
Von Hagen 2011:235-236). In terms of vertical funding and an equalisation regime, 
the German intergovernmental fiscal system provides for the sharing of revenue from 
major taxes, including personal income tax, corporate income tax, and VAT, between 
the different levels of government according to specific criteria or formulae (Buettner 
2002:197; Burkhart 2008:344; Feld and Baskaran 2010:374; Herwartz and Theilen 
2014:123; Jochimsen 2008:542; Pitlik et al. 2006:641-642; Scharpf 2008:510).  
As a key vertical intergovernmental funding instrument, VAT revenue distribution is 
regulated by the law, and personal and corporate income taxes are distributed 
according to a 50-50 formula prescribed by the German constitution. Changes to this 
tax distribution regime require constitutional or legislative amendments by a 
parliamentary majority (Braun et al. 2002:122). Both the federal and state 
governments receive a proportionally significant share of revenue from personal tax, 
corporate tax, and VAT compared to municipalities (Herwartz and Theilen 2014:123). 
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Besides shared taxes (i.e. personal tax, corporate tax, and VAT), there are also other 
vertical federal (supplementary) grants to sub-national governments for various 
development purposes, including the stimulation of regional and local investments and 
economic growth (Braun et al. 2002:123; Buettner 2002:197; Hepp and Von Hagen 
2011:238; Herwartz and Theilen 2014:123; Pitlik et al. 2006:642). States also generate 
additional revenue from their own taxes, which account for approximately 10% of their 
total tax revenues (Herwartz and Theilen 2014:123). States may also borrow to finance 
shortfalls in revenue (Feld and Baskaran 2010:374). It must, however, be noted that 
the 2009 constitutional reform did not allow states to have budget deficits without any 
compensatory sub-national fiscal instruments or measures – the reform measures are 
described as another step towards centralisation (Döring and Schnellenbach 
2011:89). A trend towards (fiscal) centralisation, coupled with a limited amount or 
share of own tax revenue for the states, confirms the limited tax (revenue) autonomy 
of the states in the German intergovernmental fiscal relations architecture.  
In addition to the vertical funding and fiscal equalisation mechanisms described above, 
the German system of intergovernmental fiscal relations further provides for a system 
of horizontal fiscal equalisation. The German fiscal equalisation system is considered 
one of the world’s most comprehensive systems alongside the Australian system 
(Fenna and Hollander 2013:225). The horizontal fiscal equalisation system is a 
redistributive mechanism to address regional fiscal (revenue) imbalances and 
disparities between the rich and poor states in order to ensure equivalent levels and 
standards of public services and living conditions across the country (Buettner 
2002:197; Burkhart 2008:344; Gunlicks 2002:140-142; Herwartz and Theilen 
2014:123; Pitlik et al. 2006:642-645; Scharpf 2008:510). In terms of the German fiscal 
equalisation regime, affluent states (those with above average per capita revenues) 
make fiscal equalisation transfers to poor states (those with below average revenues) 
(Gunlicks 2002:140).  
The German system of fiscal equalisation is said to have produced relatively positive 
outcomes through uniform living conditions compared to other major European 
countries, including Britain and France (Gunlicks 2002:142). The system is not, 
however, without controversies or unintended consequences. The system has been 
criticised for promoting inefficiencies and counter-productivity, as well as creating 
disincentives for tax (revenue) collection since additional tax (revenue) collection by 
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the states is shared with other states (Burkhart 2008:344; Herwartz and Theilen 
2014:123). The fiscal (revenue) effect of the fiscal equalisation system has been the 
increased revenue of poor states and the reduced tax revenues of the wealthy states 
(Herwartz and Theilen 2014:123). This horizontal fiscal equalisation system has long 
been associated with controversies and tensions, especially between affluent and poor 
states in Germany (Gunlicks 2002:140).  
4.5   The Nigerian IGR framework  
Federal models and practices in developed countries are well documented in 
comparative literature on federalism. There is, however, limited comparative literature 
on federalism in Africa, partly because each federal system on the continent is seen 
as unique and therefore inappropriate for comparative analysis (Dickovick 2014:554). 
Comparative lessons from the Nigerian analysis will contribute to the literature on 
comparative federalism in Africa. Nigeria has been selected for two main 
considerations. Firstly, Nigeria is the largest and oldest federal system in Africa 
(Adamolekun 2005:383; Kendhammer 2014:396). Secondly, Nigeria and South Africa 
are considered powerful nations and economies on the continent. These 
considerations make Nigeria an appropriate African case on federalism from which 
profound lessons can be learned regarding federal practice, multi-level governance, 
and IGR.  
Nigeria and South Africa share certain key similarities. Both countries are multi-ethnic 
and multi-cultural nations. They have a common history of British colonialism and 
imperialism. Nigeria was colonised by Britain in 1914 (Umukoro 2014:1), and formally 
became a federal state in 1954 (Babalola 2015:75-80; Ighodalo 2004:39; Umukoro 
2014:1; also see Odubajo 2011:1). In this regard, it is worth noting that Nigerian 
federalism is a product of British colonialism (Festus 2015:265). The federal system 
of government was adopted to bring together the different ethnic and cultural identities 
of the Nigerian nation in order to promote diversity, unity, and stability within the 
country (Festus 2015:265; Umukoro 2014:1-2; Odubajo 2011:2-5). The unitary system 
of government was considered ill-suited to the Nigerian context, hence federalism was 
considered the only viable political framework to address the ethnic and cultural 
diversity of the country’s people (Babalola 2015:75-80). 
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The country gained its political independence from Britain in 1960 (Anazodo and 
Okoye 2012:18; Sekwat 2002:498). In summary, Nigerian federalism has a chequered 
and complex history. It has undergone different political phases and epochs spanning 
colonial, post-independence civilian, military, and post-military democratic civilian 
dispensations (Adejumobi 2004:218-227; Anazodo and Okoye 2012:19; Babalola 
2015:75-80; Bolarinwa 2014:42; Ighodalo 2004:39-45; Omitola 2012:79-84; Suberu 
2015:555-575). This complex history has influenced the nature and character of the 
country’s federal architecture and practices. Nigeria is currently a democratic state, 
but its association with militarised political culture remains strong. The return of the 
former military ruler, Mr Mohammadu Buhari, as the current civilian president of 
Nigeria, attests to this point.    
4.5.1  The constitutional architecture of the Nigerian state 
Nigeria formally became a federal state in 1954 through the Lyttleton Constitution of 
1954 (Ighodalo 2004:39; Umukoro 2014:1; Odubajo 2011:1). This constitution laid a 
solid foundation for IGR in Nigeria through the division and distribution of powers to 
the different levels of government within the country’s federal system (Bamgbose 
2008:78-79). Since its founding as a federal state, Nigeria underwent political and 
constitutional evolution until 1999 when the country returned to a democratic political 
and constitutional dispensation. The country’s current constitutional and federal 
architecture is based on the 1999 constitution.  
The country’s 1999 constitution provides for a system of exclusive and concurrent 
legislative powers and functions to the different levels of government within the 
country’s federal system (Lawson 2011:202; Odubajo 2011:8). In terms of the 1999 
constitution, exclusive legislative powers are reserved for the national government and 
concurrent powers are shared between the national and state governments, with 
national legislation superseding state legislation in the event of conflict between the 
national and state legislation (Bassey 2014:227). The allocation of key public policy 
responsibilities to the different levels of government has created interdependencies 
within the federation, thereby making intergovernmental coordination and cooperation 
critical aspects of the country’s federal architecture (Lawson 2011:200). Nigeria’s 
current federal architecture is made up of the national government, 36 states, and 774 
local government authorities that exist under the auspices of the states (Akume 
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2014:172; Lawson 2011:202). This configuration means limited local government 
autonomy within the Nigerian federal system (Aworawo 2004:10; Lawson 2011:203).  
As a product of a military regime, the 1999 constitution is designed in favour of national 
government hegemony and dominance over the sub-national governments (Bassey 
2014:227). This constitution empowers the federal government to supersede state 
laws and executive action in the event of conflict with federal policy and legislation 
(Lawson 2011:202; also see Odubajo 2011:8). This over-concentration of powers and 
authority in the national government is said to have created unitary (centralised) 
federalism in Nigeria (Ighodalo 2004:44; Suberu 2015:552). This centralisation of the 
country’s federalism is mainly attributed to the country’s unitary political culture due to 
its long history of colonialism and military dictatorship, as well as the political economy 
of oil (Olaiya 2016:21-22; Osadolor 2010:193; Suberu 2010:459). 
Different military regimes and dictatorships have influenced the institutional 
architecture and character of Nigerian federalism through the centralisation and 
personalisation of power and resources (Adejumobi 2004:218-219; Ighodalo 2004:41; 
Olaiya 2016:21-22). Nigeria’s military history has also influenced the nature and 
character of the country’s public administration and governance, as well as the nature 
and style of IGR (Ibietan 2011:65-66). 
It is for these reasons that Nigerian federalism is often described in the literature as 
“military federalism” (Adamolekun 2005:383). This institutional characterisation of the 
country’s federalism mainly derives from the unitary command and control structures 
and culture associated with the military rule and dictatorship (see Adamolekun 
2005:383-387; Ighodalo 2004:41).   
4.5.2  Public administration and public management reforms in Nigeria 
The Nigerian public service emanates from the country’s history and politics 
(Magbadelo 2016:75-76). As indicated above, Nigeria has a complex history involving 
British imperialism and colonialism, post-independence civil war, military dictatorships, 
and the current democratic civilian dispensation. Therefore, the history and character 
of the country’s public administration cannot be divorced from the broader political 
history and evolution of the Nigerian federation.     
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The precise origin of modern public administration in Nigeria remains unclear and 
contested in the literature due to different reference points and periods used to trace 
its historical evolution (Yagboyaju 2013:75-76). The historical origin of Nigerian public 
administration can be traced as far back as the establishment of the British colonial 
administration in Lagos in 1861 (Omitola 2012:77). However, a more formal and 
unified civil service structure for Nigeria was established by the British colonial 
administration in 1914 (Sekwat 2002:500). This period coincides with the founding of 
a united colonial Nigeria in 1914 by the British colonial masters.  
Nigerian public administration has therefore been founded and modelled on the British 
system of public administration (Ibietan 2013:56; Omotoso 2014:121). The British 
system of public administration has also influenced the institutional configuration 
(including ministries and departments) and practices of post-independence Nigerian 
public administration, including its centralised control culture (Anazodo and Okoye 
2012:17-24; Ibietan 2013:56; Sekwat 2002:509). As a British colonial heritage and 
construct, the Nigerian public service can therefore be associated with the classical 
Weberian bureaucratic tradition of public administration, which has been a hallmark of 
the British system of public administration for a long period of time.   
Like many developing countries, Nigeria has also embraced NPM practices (Ikeanyibe 
2016:563). Nigeria underwent further public service reforms in line with NPM reforms 
in the 1980s, which intensified after the country’s return to democratic governance in 
1999 (Ikeanyibe 2016:564). In this regard, it is worth noting that post-independence 
Nigerian public administration went through a series of reforms under different military 
and civilian regimes to improve public service management, accountability, and 
delivery (Anazodo and Okoye 2012:22). These reforms did not, however, significantly 
improve the quality of public services for Nigerian citizens (Anazodo and Okoye 
2012:24). 
Nigeria’s NPM reforms included public sector organisational restructuring and 
downsizing, privatisation, commercialisation, and re-engineering of public sector 
performance management and accountability systems (Ikeanyibe 2016:569). The 
performance management system, with key performance indicators, has also been 
introduced within the Nigeria public service through the country’s National Planning 
Commission (Ibietan 2013:57). Effective implementation of this performance 
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management system remains to be seen given the country’s deep-seated institutional 
weaknesses when it comes to the implementation of public policy programmes (Ibietan 
2013:57-59). 
Public sector restructuring did not, however, lead to the “de-bureaucratisation” of the 
Nigerian public administration as key issues related to hierarchical structures and 
centralisation have not been addressed (Ikeanyibe 2016:570-572). Nigeria’s public 
administrative systems are still based mainly on the traditional public administration 
philosophy despite the adoption of NPM principles and practices (Philip 2013b:13). 
The Nigerian public administration remains conservative, inflexible, and resistant to 
change, including its aversion to modern public sector management approaches and 
practices (Ibietan and Joshua 2015:63). In other words, it has been resistant to 
institutional innovation and cultural change, including its inability to break away from 
the influence and legacy of past military regimes (Magbadelo 2016:86). As a result, 
the hierarchical structures and control practices of the Nigerian public administration 
have a negative bearing on its creativity and productivity (Magbadelo 2016:81).  
What this means is that the centralised public service management (control) culture, 
as inherited from the British colonial administration, still remains part of Nigerian public 
administration and this has hampered effective and responsive service delivery in the 
country (Anazodo and Okoye 2012:24-27). This centralised institutional character of 
Nigerian public administration accords with the centralised institutional character of 
the country’s federal system. Overall, the institutional orientation, culture, and 
practices of Nigerian public administration resonate with the argument made in 
Chapter Three relating to the pathologies and rigidities associated with bureaucratic 
theory, especially regarding institutional cultural change and adaptation to new 
approaches and practices. The reform of Nigeria’s bureaucratic practices is therefore 
important to bring the country’s public administration in line with modern administrative 
best practices (Philip 2013a:31).  
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4.5.3   The system of IGR in Nigeria 
Nigeria has a myriad of key intergovernmental institutions and structures that include 
the Federal Executive Council; National Council of States; Federal Character 
Commission; National Revenue Mobilization, Allocation, and Fiscal Commission; 
National Council for Economic Planning; National Council on Development Planning; 
Joint Planning Board; National Sectoral Councils; and the National Planning 
Commission (Akume 2014:172; Bassey 2014:228; Freinkman 2007:4). These 
structures represent key institutional infrastructure for IGR, or rather key institutional 
mechanisms for coordination and facilitation of IGR and cooperation within the 
Nigerian federal system.   
The analysis of the Nigerian system of IGR needs to be juxtaposed against the 
institutional dynamics and politics of the country’s broader federal system. In other 
words, Nigerian IGR and politics need to be located and understood within the context 
of the broader system of Nigerian federalism. The broader institutional character and 
politics of the Nigerian federal system have a significant bearing and influence on the 
nature and character of the country’s system of IGR and cooperation.  
Nigerian federalism has long been characterised by the centralisation of power and 
dominant national government due to key political and economic factors, ranging from 
military dictatorship and civil war to the politics of the country’s oil revenue (Elaigwu 
2002:76). Political hegemony (dominance) of the national government over the sub-
national governments has become a key factor that defines and shapes the nature, 
character, substance, and style of IGR within the country’s federalism (Ibietan 
2011:66).  
The asymmetrical power configuration and relations resulted in national government 
dominance over the sub-national governments within the country’s system of IGR 
(Lawson 2011:200; Odubajo 2011:7-8). To that effect, Osadolor (2010:206-208) 
characterises the relationship between the national and sub-national governments 
within Nigerian federalism as a relationship based on “federal supremacy and 
excessive centralisation”, stemming from the wartime period in the 1960s to 1970s. In 
other words, the nature and character of the Nigerian system of IGR mirror the nature 
and character of the country’s federal system.  
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The country’s asymmetrical power configuration has had negative consequences for 
the country’s system of IGR in many respects. The centralisation of power under the 
national government during the military regimes (the militarisation of the Nigerian 
federal system), which has been imported into the 1999 constitution, has undermined 
the institutional status of the sub-national governments within the Nigerian federation 
with detrimental effects for the effective functioning of IGR within the country (Olaiya 
2016:26). The centralisation of power in favour of the national government has also 
been detrimental to sub-national governments’ independence and autonomy within 
the Nigerian federalism, with local government being at the mercy of the states 
(Osunbor 2006:16).  
Furthermore, IGR in Nigeria have been characterised by various tensions (Ojo 
2014:44-49). The country’s system of IGR has been characterised by conflict and 
militaristic conduct mainly due to the country’s deeply entrenched centralised 
(command and control) political culture inherited from the previous military regimes 
(Elaigwu 2002:78-79). Akume (2014:174-178) also attributes intergovernmental 
tensions within the Nigerian federal system to “military unilateralism and 
centralisation”, thus lending further credence to the negative impact of the country’s 
military history and culture on IGR and cooperation in Nigeria. The culture and 
practices associated with the country’s past era of military dictatorship remain part of 
the historical legacies that continue to bedevil Nigeria’s current democratic system of 
governance (Smith 2005:138). 
Nigeria’s divisive party politics have also been a key factor in fuelling 
intergovernmental tensions and poor cooperative relations between the levels of 
government controlled by different political parties, thus obstructing effective service 
delivery in the country (Ighodalo 2004:40). These long-standing intergovernmental 
frictions have further escalated into various intergovernmental litigations in which 
some sub-national governments have taken the national government to court over 
constitutional and jurisdictional disputes (Ojo 2014:44-49).  
These legislative issues generally point to fundamental weaknesses or failure of the 
non-judicial intergovernmental dispute-resolution mechanisms and structures within 
the Nigerian federal system. The ongoing intergovernmental conflict in some key areas 
of public policy further points to the failure of the country’s system of IGR to promote 
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harmonious relations between the different levels of government within the Nigerian 
federalism (Akume 2014:171).  
Overall, these intergovernmental tensions have created a toxic institutional and 
political context for IGR in Nigeria. Mutual resentment dominates the relations between 
the national and sub-national governments in Nigeria. The federal government does 
not treat state and local governments in a manner that promotes mutual cooperation 
and respect and the state governments display a similar attitude towards local 
government authorities, with general accusations of intrusion and interference by other 
levels of government into the functional areas of other levels of government (Elaigwu 
2002:78-82). In the final analysis, the practice and politics of IGR in Nigeria are 
counter-productive and diametrically opposed to the very essence of IGR as a tool to 
smooth out conflicts and create harmonious co-existence and relations between 
governments within the country’s federation. In the Nigerian context, IGR are a key 
political imperative and mechanism to manage conflicts and promote efficient service 
delivery (Bello 2014:69).  
4.5.4   The system of intergovernmental fiscal relations in Nigeria 
The 1999 constitution provides a framework for Nigeria’s intergovernmental fiscal 
relations in terms of the division and allocation of revenue and grants from the national 
government to sub-national governments within the federation (Lawson 2011:202). 
Like many federal jurisdictions, Nigerian federalism is characterised by vertical fiscal 
imbalances in which there is a mismatch between constitutional (functional) 
responsibilities and fiscal (revenue-raising) powers of the different levels of 
governments (Angahar 2013:113-117). 
Nigeria’s system of intergovernmental fiscal relations is highly centralised in favour of 
the national government and this has created heavy reliance and dependence of the 
sub-national governments on national fiscal transfers (Lawson 2011:202-203; 
Odubajo 2011:8). The political economy (centralisation) of oil revenue has also 
contributed to the country’s unitary fiscal federalism (Babalola 2015:76). In this 
context, the sub-national governments have very weak own revenue sources 
(Babalola 2015:84).   
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The country’s major taxes and revenues (including oil revenue) are collected by the 
national government and shared vertically and horizontally between the different levels 
of government in terms of a specified distribution formula mandated by legislation 
(Suberu 2009:80-81). Nigeria has a specialised fiscal institution (the National Revenue 
Mobilization, Allocation, and Fiscal Commission) similar to countries such as Australia 
and South Africa. In this regard, it is worth noting that Nigeria’s fiscal federalism 
(intergovernmental fiscal) system is characterised by a greater degree of dependence 
on oil revenue and this makes the country an oil-dependent federal country (Suberu 
2010:467).   
This unitary fiscal federalism has implications for power relations and politics between 
the national and sub-national governments within Nigerian federalism. In this regard, 
the country’s centralised fiscal authority is often used to influence intergovernmental 
power relations between the national and sub-national governments (Odubajo 
2011:9). In practice, the system has promoted fiscal hegemony and dominance of the 
national government, as well as the fiscal subordination and complacency of the sub-
national governments (Suberu 2010:468; Suberu 2009:82). Overall, this has 
undermined the fiscal autonomy and sovereignty of the sub-national governments 
within the Nigerian federal system.   
As in many other federal jurisdictions, intergovernmental fiscal relations have also 
been a major source of intergovernmental tensions within the Nigerian federal system 
(Akume 2014:175, Babalola 2015:84-85; Odubajo 2011:9-12). Vertical and horizontal 
revenue allocation (and related formulae) remains a long-standing controversial and 
conflictual issue within the Nigerian system of intergovernmental fiscal relations (Ikeji 
2011:121-134). These tensions extend to the allocation of national oil revenue to oil-
producing states (Babalola 2015:84-85). In fact, oil remains one of the key factors in 
intergovernmental tensions within Nigerian federalism (Ibietan 2011:65). Nigeria’s 
reliance on oil revenue means that its system of federalism and IGR will remain conflict 
ridden as oil-producing states will continue to fight with poor states over the sharing 
and allocation of oil revenue.      
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4.5.5  Institutional and systemic weaknesses of the Nigerian system 
Despite the existence of the country’s key intergovernmental institutions and 
structures, Nigeria’s system of IGR continues to encounter a catalogue of serious 
institutional and administrative challenges. These include ineffective 
intergovernmental structures, poor administrative mechanisms, and inadequate 
institutional capacity for intergovernmental policy coordination, uncoordinated and 
fragmented public service delivery, a lack of intergovernmental performance 
management and reporting systems, and an institutionalised culture of poor 
cooperation and accountability and non-sharing of information between the different 
levels of government (Bassey 2014:229; Freinkman 2007:1-7). In this regard, it needs 
to be further noted that the lack of clear and measurable objectives has also been a 
key institutional weakness in Nigeria with regard to planning (Phillips 1991:229).  
Poor intergovernmental policy coordination in Nigeria is partly due to deep-seated 
acrimonious relationships and long-standing intergovernmental tensions over the 
sharing and allocation of financial resources between the national and sub-national 
governments (Angahar 2013:113-114). The country’s conflictual IGR also have to do 
with the deeply entrenched resentment of the sub-national governments towards the 
persistent centralism (centralisation of power) within the country’s federal system 
(Adamolekun 2005:397). Overall, Nigeria’s military federalism has undermined the 
core principles of federalism (including relative autonomy of the sub-national 
governments) and entrenched national government dominance over the country’s IGR 
(Omotola 2006:34-35).  
4.6   Overall synthesis and synopsis of the international comparative 
analysis   
This section provides a synthesis of key issues, differences, parallels, and experiences 
from the above international comparative analysis. Notwithstanding existing 
differences, Australia, Canada, and Nigeria share a common history. As former British 
colonies, these countries inherited the British political philosophy and tradition that 
influenced their political, constitutional, and administrative systems. The British 
tradition and influence extend to a majoritarian political culture and executive 
dominance within Australian and Canadian federalism. In addition to the British 
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tradition, both the Australian and Canadian systems have been influenced by the 
American tradition, including public administrative systems and the institutional design 
of Canadian federalism. Germany has a different political history and tradition 
compared to the other predominantly Anglophone countries mentioned above.  
In terms of constitutional design, Australia is a decentralised federal system with more 
powers and autonomy in favour of the sub-national governments. In contrast, the 
Canadian, German, and Nigerian federal systems are centralised federal systems with 
significant powers and functions allocated to the federal government relative to the 
sub-national governments. The constitutions of these federal countries provide for a 
system of exclusive and concurrent powers and functions between the different levels 
of government. However, the Canadian constitution provides for very few concurrent 
powers and functions, thereby making the Canadian system a dual (jurisdictional) 
federalism. A combination of country-specific historical, political, economic, social, and 
institutional factors have influenced the evolution of these federal systems and their 
practical character. The impact of the history of military dictatorship on the character 
and practice of the Nigerian federalism, or rather the militarisation of the Nigerian 
federal system, is good example in this regard. Despite having characteristics of 
decentralised federalism in terms of its constitutional design, in practice, Australia has, 
however, evolved into a centralised federal system with a more powerful federal 
government. Two main factors explain this centralisation of powers. The first factor 
relates to a political culture of deference by the sub-national governments to the 
national government. The second factor has to do with the manner in which the courts 
have interpreted the constitutional powers and functions of the different levels of 
government, thereby expanding the powers of the national government. In other 
words, the country’s sympathetic and favourable judicial posture towards the federal 
government has partly driven the centralisation tendencies and trends in the practical 
evolution of the Australian federal system. This has changed both the anatomy and 
balance of power in favour of national government hegemony and dominance. 
Australia’s disciplined and unitary political party system is also a key factor in this 
political equation.  
In contrast, Canadian federalism has evolved from a centralised to a highly 
decentralised federal system, mainly due to immense pressure from the provinces 
(especially the French-speaking Quebec) for more decentralisation and provincial 
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autonomy. Canada’s identity politics (language and cultural diversity), provincial 
assertiveness, and favourable judicial interpretation of provincial fiscal (taxation) 
powers have been the key drivers of the country’s evolution towards a more 
decentralised federal system. Both Nigeria’s and Germany’s predominantly 
centralised federalism can mainly be explained in terms of these countries’ unitary 
political culture, with the history of military command and control culture being a key 
factor and legacy in the centralisation of Nigerian federalism.   
Except for the German public administration system, the Australian, Nigerian, and 
Canadian public administration systems have been influenced by the British and 
American public administration practices and traditions. Public administration in these 
three predominantly Anglophone countries has, to a varying degree, also been 
influenced by the Weberian principles of political neutrality and separation of 
administration and politics. This has ensured the relative institutional stability of the 
public services in these countries, mainly through the insulation of the public service 
from periodic political changes in governments. In contrast, the German public 
administration was not founded on the Weberian tradition and principles of political 
neutrality of the public service. It is in fact a complete opposite in that the German 
public service has been a political integrator of the German federal state. This is ironic 
as the Weberian tradition of public administration originates from the German national 
and scholar, Max Weber.   
Like many other countries across the globe, Australia and Canada also embraced 
NPM reforms in the 1980s and Germany in the 1990s. Except for Germany, which 
took a different approach to NPM reforms, Australia and Canada implemented far-
reaching and wide-ranging institutional, organisational, and managerial reforms 
(mainly inspired by Thatcherism and Reaganism), including the downsizing of the 
public service, the creation of agencies and partnerships, the privatisation and 
outsourcing of public services, the adoption of private sector management ethos and 
culture, and the modernisation of administrative systems and practices, including 
results-based budgeting and performance management reforms (shift from inputs and 
processes to outcomes and impacts). Nigeria has also not been immune to the global 
wave of NPM reforms.  
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These NPM reforms amounted to a critique and rejection of the Weberian bureaucratic 
theory and practice. As argued in Chapter Three, bureaucratic theory and practice are 
associated with certain institutional pathologies such as red tape, rigidity, lack of 
innovation, resistance to change and adaptation to new ideas, institutional silos, and 
policy fragmentation (mainly due to sectoral specialisation and departmentalisation) 
and the inability to respond to complex governance, public policy, and service delivery 
challenges that face modern governments.  
The fact that NPM reforms in almost all countries under review have not been 
accompanied by a complete shift in paradigm and mindset from traditional public 
administration practices to managerial practices and approaches confirms the 
assertion made in Chapter Three that it is difficult to change deeply entrenched 
organisational and institutional cultures and practices. For example, the Nigerian 
public administration remains hierarchical, conservative, rigid, and resistant to new 
institutional innovation and cultural change, including its inability to break away from 
the influence and legacy of the past military regimes, as well as its aversion to modern 
public sector management approaches and practices. The international comparative 
analysis confirm and resonate with the theoretical arguments advanced in Chapter 
Three regarding the institutional and systemic pathologies associated with 
bureaucratic theory and practice. 
NPM reforms have, however, further created service delivery fragmentation in the 
countries under review (mainly through multiple service providers, agencification, 
privatisation, and outsourcing) and the depletion of public service capacity (mainly 
through public service downsizing and de-skilling). This is consistent with the 
theoretical critique and flaws advanced in Chapter 3 regarding NPM theory, which 
relate to the perpetuation or creation of new forms of institutional silos and 
fragmentation. This militates against effective IGR and cooperation.  
As argued in Chapter Three, NPM theory is preoccupied with intraorganisational 
issues and ignores interorganisational aspects, thus failing to appreciate issues of 
concurrency and interdependence that characterise modern governance and service 
delivery complexities. For example, although these NPM reforms have engendered a 
results-based performance management culture in the countries under review 
(especially in Australia and Canada), performance management systems and 
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practices, with some exceptions, are still mainly orientated towards individual 
organisations and lack intergovernmental orientation and focus. This is antithetical to 
the principles of IGR and cooperative governance.    
Australia and Canada have adopted an integrated governance model called the whole-
of-government approach. It is an equivalent of the joined-up government philosophy 
in Britain. The whole-of-government approach is an overarching integrated 
governance philosophy and framework that underpin IGR and cooperative federalism 
in these countries. It seeks to address fragmentation and strengthen cooperation and 
collaboration across the government to ensure greater policy coordination and 
coherence, as well as integrated and seamless public service delivery. Similarly, the 
German system of IGR is underpinned by strong conventions of cooperative 
federalism, which, like the whole-of-government approach, promotes mutual 
cooperation, collaboration, and joint decision making between the different levels of 
government.  
This integrated governance philosophy (in the form of the “whole-of-government 
approach and cooperative federalism) accords well with collaborative management 
theory (including collaborative planning and performance management theories) and 
systems theory (as discussed in Chapter Three), which take a more holistic and 
integrated view of organisations and institutions. This is the philosophy, or rather the 
approach, to IGR and cooperative governance advanced by the conceptual framework 
for this study as discussed in Chapter Three.  
In terms of the structure and practice of IGR, all countries under review (Australia, 
Canada, Germany, and Nigeria) are old federations with a long history of IGR practice 
and tradition underpinned, to a varying degree, by vertical and horizontal institutional 
coordination mechanisms, systems, and structures. Australia and Canada also take a 
much more strategic approach to the management of IGR and cooperative federalism 
through a whole-of-government approach and various intergovernmental agreements, 
partnerships, and accords.  
In this regard, Australian intergovernmental agreements are underpinned by results-
based accountability systems and mechanisms, which include specified performance 
targets, indicators, milestones, and outcomes. This makes Australia one of the 
countries with a strong outcomes-based intergovernmental performance management 
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culture and system that promote accountability and an outcomes-based approach to 
public service delivery. Canada has also established a strong results-based 
performance management culture. The culture of results-based management in 
Australia and Canada has mainly been inspired by NPM reforms in these countries. 
A number of key institutional and systemic factors and weaknesses militate against 
the effective institutionalisation of IGR and cooperative federalism in these countries. 
The lack of supportive constitutional or legislative provisions, mechanisms, 
instruments, and enablers; non-binding and non-enforceable intergovernmental 
agreements; and limited bureaucratic or administrative support mechanisms have 
essentially rendered the system of IGR and cooperative federalism in Canada (and, 
to a varying degree, in Australia and Germany) largely informal and ad hoc.  
Systems of IGR and cooperative federalism in these two Anglophone countries (and 
Germany to some extent due to its lack of constitutional provision for IGR) came about 
and evolved more as a practice resulting from tradition and convention rather than a 
legal requirement and prescription.  
The difficulties in changing the public service culture (paradigm shift), turf battles, poor 
institutional relationships (due to a trust deficit), and deeply entrenched bureaucratic 
traditions, structures, practices, and orientation towards processes (inward-looking 
orientation) remain key institutional and systemic weaknesses, challenges, and 
impediments to the effective implementation and institutionalisation of collaborative or 
cooperative system of IGR (i.e. cooperative federalism) in Canada in particular and, 
to a varying degree, in Australia, Germany, and Nigeria.  
In Australia, critical institutional challenges to the effective institutionalisation of the 
whole-of-government approach and cooperative federalism include the difficulties in 
changing the organisational culture and breaking organisational silos associated with 
functional bureaucratic structures, poor alignment and integration of priorities, 
performance management systems, and outcomes across government. Many of these 
institutional and systemic weaknesses experienced by the countries under review 
confirm the theoretical postulations and arguments made in Chapter Three regarding 
the inherent limitations and flaws associated with bureaucratic theory and its militating 
effect on intergovernmental cooperation and collaboration.  
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Furthermore, Nigeria’s long history of colonialism and military dictatorship has 
engendered a unitary command and control culture within the country’s federalism and 
body politic. In terms of Nigerian intergovernmental politics, the centralisation of power 
under the national government and the militarisation of Nigerian federalism, which 
have somewhat been imported into the 1999 constitution, undermined both the 
institutional status and autonomy of the sub-national governments and IGR within the 
country’s federalism. Long-standing intergovernmental tensions over constitutional 
and jurisdictional issues and revenue distribution (including oil revenue) and the 
somewhat hostile and militaristic manner (command and control culture and style) in 
which IGR are often conducted have also undermined the harmonious relations and 
cooperation between the national and sub-national governments within the Nigerian 
federalism. In other words, Nigeria’s military federalism has undermined the core 
principles of federalism and IGR.   
As a result, the Nigerian system of IGR also continues to encounter a catalogue of 
institutional and administrative challenges, including ineffective intergovernmental 
structures, poor administrative mechanisms, inadequate institutional capacity for 
intergovernmental policy coordination, the lack of an intergovernmental performance 
management and reporting system, and the institutionalised culture of poor 
cooperation and accountability. The legalistic posture approach that is often adopted 
by sub-national governments towards the settlement of intergovernmental 
(constitutional and jurisdictional) disputes is another fundamental institutional 
weakness, which points to failure of non-judicial intergovernmental dispute-resolution 
mechanisms and structures within Nigerian federalism.  
In summary, the practice and politics of IGR in Nigeria are counter-productive and 
diametrically opposed to the very essence of IGR as a tool to smoothen conflicts and 
create harmonious relations within the country’s federation. However, the complexities 
and tensions associated with IGR cannot be divorced from the country’s complex 
history of colonialism and militarism, and ethno-political and religious tensions.   
The nature of the party system affects the nature of intergovernmental politics.  
A unitary and disciplined party system (Australia) tends to minimise intergovernmental 
tensions if the ruling party is the same across the different levels of government.  
A decentralised (federalised) party system with autonomous provincial parties 
 187 
(Canada) tends to promote weaker internal party discipline, loyalty, and cohesion, 
which in turn weaken party political management of IGR and associated tensions. This 
partly explains relatively more adversarial IGR in Canada compared to the Australian 
system of IGR.  
A cooperative system of IGR, especially the interlocking cooperative system found in 
Germany, has also proved to be complex with high consensus requirements and high 
transaction (policymaking) costs, thus often leading to intergovernmental stalemates 
that impede effective and efficient decision making within the system. In almost all the 
countries under review, IGR are largely an elitist and undemocratic affair dominated 
by government officials (executive federalism), without the involvement and 
participation of citizens and other key non-governmental actors.  
With regard to intergovernmental fiscal relations, all countries under review are 
characterised by a greater degree of fiscal centralisation (centralisation of taxation 
powers) at the national government level and limited sub-national fiscal autonomy and 
higher dependence on national fiscal transfers. This situation is described in the 
literature as a vertical fiscal imbalance between national and sub-national 
governments. It is for this reason that these countries have formula-based 
intergovernmental fiscal transfer systems and mechanisms to correct this fiscal 
problem. The Canadian provinces have in practice pushed the country’s federalism 
towards greater decentralisation, including greater fiscal decentralisation and 
provincial fiscal autonomy in terms of revenue collection and spending priorities.  
All the countries under review have a horizontal fiscal equalisation system to address 
provincial fiscal disparities and inequalities. Australia and Germany count among the 
world’s federal countries with the most comprehensive horizontal fiscal equalisation 
systems. The Australian fiscal equalisation system, for instance, addresses both the 
revenue and expenditure sides of the fiscal equation. In contrast, the Canadian 
horizontal fiscal equalisation system is limited to the revenue side and does not 
address the expenditure aspects of provincial fiscal disparities.  
Furthermore, unlike Canada, Australia has an arms-length fiscal institution in the form 
of the Commonwealth Grants Commission to ensure political neutrality and technical 
rigour in the determination of fiscal equalisation transfers to sub-national governments. 
Nigeria has a similar institution in the form of the National Revenue Mobilization, 
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Allocation, and Fiscal Commission. Horizontal fiscal equalisation, however, remains a 
major source of intergovernmental controversy and tension between the affluent and 
poor provinces across all the countries under review. In this regard, the Nigerian 
system of intergovernmental fiscal relations has been characterised by long-standing 
tensions over resource allocation and revenue allocation formulae, including the share 
of oil revenue for oil-producing states.  
It was also observed from the international comparative analysis that politics rather 
than the law tends to define and shape the actual anatomy and balance of power 
between the different levels of government, which sometimes results in institutional 
relationships and political outcomes different to those envisaged in the constitutional 
frameworks. This also applies to the nature of IGR demonstrated by Canadian 
intergovernmental politics.  
Another key notable observation relates to the constitutional status of local 
government in the federal systems under review. Municipalities do not feature 
prominently in these countries’ systems of executive federalism, IGR, and cooperative 
federalism. This has to do mainly with the underdog status of municipalities within 
these countries’ institutional and constitutional architecture, especially within 
Australian, Canadian, and Nigerian federalism. Unlike South African municipalities, 
which enjoy equal constitutional status and protection with the other spheres of 
government, the Australian, Canadian, and Nigerian municipalities are not accorded 
such status and fall under the state or provincial legislative jurisdictions.  
This state of affairs renders municipalities politically vulnerable and makes them 
weaker players in the overall system of governance, including IGR. This international 
comparative experience runs contrary to the South African constitutional dispensation 
and the system of IGR and cooperative governance in which municipalities – as well 
as through the South African Local Government Association – play a major role in the 
country’s overall cooperative governance system as equal key partners to the other 
spheres of government. 
Finally, the key overall finding from the international comparative literature review is 
that there is a limited body of knowledge on the role of public administration in IGR. 
There is a serious knowledge gap in the international comparative literature in relation 
to administrative systems, mechanisms, and practices that exist in the countries under 
 189 
review to support practical implementation of intergovernmental cooperation and 
collaboration at an administrative level.  
The literature only makes a passing reference to intergovernmental bureaucratic 
machinery that supports IGR and cooperative federalism in these countries in the form 
of secretariats and advisory and monitoring support. It is this knowledge gap that this 
study seeks to address to contribute to theory building on intergovernmental 
administrative and management practices and systems.  
4.7  Summary   
This chapter discussed the Australian IGR framework. It included public administration 
and public management reforms in Australia (including NPM reforms and budget and 
performance management reforms), the whole-of-government approach to integrated 
governance, the system of IGR, intergovernmental politics and institutional power 
dynamics, the system of intergovernmental fiscal and funding relations, the politics of 
the intergovernmental fiscal system, and the institutional and systemic weaknesses of 
the Australian system.  
The chapter then explained the Canadian IGR framework. It paid attention to the 
founding political philosophy of Canadian federalism, the constitutional architecture of 
the Canadian state, public administration and public management reforms, the system 
of IGR (including the Canadian intergovernmental institutional and administrative 
infrastructure and Canadian cooperative federalism and intergovernmental 
partnerships), the system of intergovernmental fiscal and funding relations, the politics 
of the intergovernmental fiscal system, and institutional and systemic weaknesses of 
the Canadian system.  
The chapter thereafter addressed the German IGR framework. It paid attention to 
public administration and public management reforms, the system of IGR, and the 
system of intergovernmental fiscal relations (including the structure of the fiscal system 
and taxation powers and intergovernmental funding arrangements and modalities). 
This was followed by a discussion of the Nigerian IGR framework. It addressed the 
constitutional architecture of the Nigerian state, public administration and public 
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management reforms, the system of IGR, the system of intergovernmental fiscal 
relations, and the institutional and systemic weaknesses of the Nigerian system.  
The chapter concluded with an integrated synthesis of key comparative experiences, 
lessons, and observations. Overall, the principal purpose of the chapter was to extract 
key lessons from the international comparative analysis, more broadly in relation to 
existing IGR models, and specifically in relation to the kinds of administrative culture, 
systems, and practices that exist in the countries under review to support effective 
management of IGR and cooperative governance. 
This chapter studied four of the oldest federal states in the world, namely Australia, 
Canada, Germany, and Nigeria, to draw key comparative experiences and lessons on 
IGR and cooperative governance. There are key lessons that South Africa can learn 
from the international comparative analysis in relation to system designs, structures, 
and practices of IGR and cooperative governance.  
The first important lesson relates to the philosophy of and approach to IGR and 
cooperative governance. In this regard, South Africa can learn lessons from the whole-
of-government philosophy and approach that underpin the Australian and Canadian 
systems of IGR and cooperative federalism. This is an integrated governance 
philosophy that takes a holistic and systems view and approach to government 
operations in order to promote stronger vertical and horizontal policy coordination, 
cooperation, and integration across all levels and sectors of government to achieve 
common government-wide objectives and outcomes. A strong culture of results-based 
management and accountability in Australia and Canada could also benefit South 
Africa. This includes a results-based (outcomes-based) approach to government 
planning, budgeting, performance, and accountability.  
In terms of the design of a more equitable and redistributive system of 
intergovernmental fiscal relations, the Australian, Canadian, and German experiences 
demonstrate how horizontal fiscal equalisation funding mechanisms can be used to 
address fiscal and socioeconomic disparities between the affluent and poor regions in 
a state. Such mechanisms could help address South Africa’s apartheid legacy of 
spatial disparities and socioeconomic inequalities between the country’s provinces 
and regions within the provinces. Furthermore, horizontal IGR structures and 
institutions in Australia and Canada represent an institutional innovation from which 
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key lessons can be drawn to strengthen interprovincial relations, cooperation, and 
capacity in South Africa. Canada’s flexible, adaptive, and differentiated approach to 
IGR and cooperative federalism, especially in managing and accommodating regional 
diversity and interests, also offers a progressive lesson on how other countries can 
design and implement a differentiated and accommodative system of IGR to better 
respond to diverse regional circumstances and needs.  
Notwithstanding the above positive international comparative lessons, there are, 
however, other key experiences and lessons that need to be avoided in the design 
and practice of IGR and cooperative governance. For example, the centralised and 
militarised character of the Nigerian system of federalism and IGR does not augur well 
for friendly relations, mutual respect, and cooperation between different levels of 
government. Although the high negotiation and consensus requirements associated 
with the German system of IGR and cooperative federalism are good for mutual 
relations, cooperation, harmony, and trust between the different levels of government, 
these could also prolong intergovernmental decision making and lead to policy 
stalemates.   
The next chapter focuses on the South African system of IGR and cooperative 
governance, drawing and building on the theoretical and conceptual framework 
outlined in Chapter Three, as well as the international comparative experiences and 
lessons discussed in this chapter.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONTEXTUAL AND EMPIRICAL VARIABLES THAT INFLUENCE THE SOUTH 
AFRICAN AND GAUTENG PROVINCE CONTEXT OF IGR 
5.1  Introduction  
Chapter Five addresses the following research objectives as stated in Chapter One 
(see Section 1.4): To provide a contextualisation of the empirical variables that 
influence the context of IGR in South Africa and the Gauteng province; to identify the 
key institutional factors that impede effective IGR and cooperative governance in the 
Gauteng province; to explore how the existing administrative mechanisms, systems, 
and practices in the provincial government and municipalities support 
intergovernmental planning, budgeting, implementation, performance management, 
and reporting in the Gauteng province; and to explain the nature of reforms required 
to improve the structure and practice of IGR and cooperative governance in the 
Gauteng province.   
South Africa’s current democratic dispensation represents a fundamentally different 
political order from the country’s past colonial and apartheid systems. The previous 
apartheid regime was underpinned by the ideology of separate development based on 
race, a fragmented state with different homeland administrations, a unitary system of 
governance with a strong central government and weak provincial and local 
government administrations, and hierarchical relations between central government 
and sub-national administrations. The system created uneven service delivery and 
development outcomes for different race groups in the country, with the white 
communities enjoying better quality of life compared to non-white communities. In 
1994, the post-apartheid democratic government inherited greater socioeconomic 
inequalities and disparities between the different races on the one hand and between 
rural and urban areas on the other hand. These resulted in major service delivery and 
development backlogs in non-white communities, which remain an enduring legacy 
that continue to hamper the government in the present dispensation.  
To level the playing field and correct the injustices of the past, the 1994 democratic 
government had to transform and democratise the state to make it non-racial, non-
sexist, transparent, accountable, and inclusive in its orientation and operation.  
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These noble normative democratic principles were codified in the new constitution of 
1996 to give birth to the new character of the post-apartheid state and society. As part 
of this democratic transformation, new values and principles were also introduced to 
usher in a new system of IGR and cooperative governance in post-apartheid South 
Africa. Since the dawn of the post-apartheid democratic dispensation, a cooperative 
system of IGR has been at the centre of governance and service delivery in South 
Africa. This chapter places South Africa’s system of IGR and cooperative governance 
under the spotlight, with specific focus on administrative systems and mechanisms 
that are in place to support collaboration and cooperation between the different 
spheres of government.      
Chapter Five discusses the constitutional framework for the post-apartheid democratic 
state. It then pays attention to state transformation and public management reforms. 
This is followed by a discussion of the structure and practice of IGR and cooperative 
governance in terms of the rationale for IGR; the IGR strategy and policy framework; 
the IGR model, institutions, and structures; intergovernmental fiscal relations and 
funding model; and the institutional, structural, and systemic weaknesses of the IGR 
system (including poor bureaucratic practices and culture, poor integrated planning, 
poor intergovernmental performance management, and the overall effects and 
consequences of poor IGR).   
This chapter also contextualises the key empirical findings focusing on the Gauteng 
province, in terms of the institutional context of IGR and cooperation (including the 
institutional configuration of the provincial and local government and the institutional 
culture and politics of provincial government). This is followed by a presentation of the 
findings in terms of the existing management practices and IGR (including the 
coordination of internal organisational business functions and the coordination of 
intergovernmental business functions and IGR resources and capacity). The chapter 
then discusses the findings in terms of systems thinking applications and practices 
and concludes with a discussion of collaborative management and IGR.  
5.2  Constitutional framework for the post-apartheid democratic state 
Prior to the country’s democratic transition, South Africa was a unitary state made up 
of central, provincial, and local government in which the local authorities existed under 
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the auspices of the provincial authorities (Cameron 2002:116). The constitutional 
design and orientation of the post-apartheid democratic state represent a fundamental 
departure from the previous colonial and apartheid state configuration. In terms of the 
post-apartheid democratic constitution, South Africa is one sovereign, democratic 
state made up of national, provincial, and local spheres of government, which are 
distinctive, interdependent, and interrelated. This interdependence of spheres, as 
embedded in the country’s system of cooperative governance, places IGR at the 
centre of the country’s overall system of government (Simeon and Murray 2001:74).  
The institutional status and functions of each sphere of government are protected by 
the Constitution, and all spheres of government are equal under the Constitution. This 
equality of status differs from the apartheid system in which provincial and local 
government administrations were subjected to the authority of the national 
government, with no real powers and independent institutional status. Under the 
apartheid regime, provinces were mere administrative units as real power was 
centralised in the national government (Simeon and Murray 2001:68). In terms of the 
electoral system, South Africa has adopted a multi-party parliamentary electoral 
system as opposed to a presidential democratic system (see Dickovick 2006:5). This 
has implications for the country’s system and character of IGR as parliamentary 
systems often promote executive federalism, which simply means an executive 
dominance over IGR. The executive dominance in South Africa on matters relating to 
IGR relative to other branches of government should be understood against this 
backdrop.    
South Africa’s post-apartheid democratic state is a home-grown product of a complex 
multi-party bargaining and negotiation process. The Constitution of 1996 is a 
compromise and negotiated outcome that combines both a unitary and a decentralised 
system of government. This constitutional dispensation was designed to 
accommodate the needs of the former ruling National Party and the Inkatha Freedom 
Party, which favoured a strong system of federalism, and the African National 
Congress (ANC), which preferred a unitary system of government to address the 
inherited disparities and to avoid divisive tribal politics (Wehner 2000:47). The ANC 
did not view federalism as a conducive framework for majority rule, political 
transformation, and harmonious ethnic relations (Wehner 2003:1). In other words, the 
multi-party political debate that preceded the post-apartheid democratic constitutional 
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dispensation reflected a tension between the need for provincial devolution and central 
control of state power (Tapscott 2000:122).     
This pre-1994 political tension produced the nature of the state that is uniquely South 
African in design with an institutional configuration that does not neatly conform to 
either unitary or federal descriptions. As a result of this non-conformity to a normal 
traditional dichotomy between classical unitarism and federalism, the precise nature 
and character of the South African state have posed and continue to pose serious 
conceptual and definitional difficulties. This has led to different descriptions and 
characterisations of the country’s system in academic literature. On the one hand, the 
country is described as a unitary system of state combined with strong features of 
federalism (Edwards 2008a:67). On the other hand, South Africa is described in the 
literature as one of Africa’s three major federal states alongside Ethiopia and Nigeria 
(Dickovick 2014:553-555; Erk 2014:542). South Africa is also considered a quasi-
federal state (Dickovick 2005:184; Ibietan 2011:54; Mello and Maserumule 2010:285; 
Simeon and Murray 2001:65-66).  
This conceptual confusion regarding the institutional nature and character of the South 
African state is better summarised by Dickovick (2006:3) through his contention that 
South Africa is “sometimes considered a federal or quasi-federal state and sometimes 
a unitary state with significant federal features”. Based on these different descriptions, 
South Africa can best be described as a hybrid system combining both unitary and 
federal features. This hybrid system lends itself to unitary federalism due to significant 
constitutional powers accorded to the national government relative to the provincial 
and local spheres of government. In contrast to the South African model, all 
international comparative case studies (Australia, Canada, Germany, and Nigeria) 
conform to a classical definition and description of federalism. 
In this regard, Dickovick (2014:553-567) further argues that Ethiopia, Nigeria, and 
South Africa have adopted federalism as a political framework to accommodate their 
own ethnic pluralism and diversity. Simeon and Murray (2001:70-71), however, 
contest the notion that federalism in South Africa was designed mainly to 
accommodate ethnic differences and argue that the opposite is true as it was feared 
that federalism would perpetuate ethnic polarisation in a country with an apartheid 
history of deep divisions based on race and ethnicity. Contrary to the Ethiopian and 
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Nigerian federal configurations, the South African system was not designed to provide 
different ethnic groups with their own distinct political institutions (Simeon and Murray 
2001:70-71). Such a system would have amounted to ethnic federalism akin to the 
apartheid system of ethno-racial compartmentalisation and segregation. 
Regarding the allocation of powers and functions, the Constitution provides for a 
system of concurrent and exclusive legislative competence. In this regard, Schedule 4 
of the Constitution enumerates areas of concurrent national and provincial legislative 
powers. Schedule 5 of the Constitution stipulates areas of exclusive provincial 
legislative competence. Local government functions are set out in Part B of both 
Schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution. It is worth noting that a system of concurrent 
and exclusive powers and functions was found to be applicable in the international 
case studies of Australia, Canada, Germany, and Nigeria. South Africa’s constitutional 
configuration and allocation of legislative powers and functions make interdependence 
and overlapping an inherent feature of the institutional design of the country’s system 
of government (Simeon and Murray 2001:72).  
This, in turn, makes IGR and cooperation a key governance imperative and an 
indispensable feature of the country’s overall system of government. This overall 
institutional design of South Africa’s multi-sphere system of government is based 
mainly on the German system of “shared or integrated federalism” (Simeon and 
Murray 2001:70). As indicated in Chapter Four, in the German federal system policy 
and legislative powers are mainly reserved for the national government and sub-
national governments are primarily responsible for policy implementation. Similar to 
the German model, South Africa’s provinces also have many administrative 
responsibilities for a wide range of public policy functions, including health, welfare, 
and primary and secondary education (Wehner 2003:1).  
In addition to the formal allocation of concurrent and exclusive powers and functions 
to different spheres of government, the Constitution of South Africa has other 
significant provisions, which have far-reaching implications for the intergovernmental 
balance of power within the overall system of government. For example, Section 100 
of the Constitution provides for a national intervention in provincial administration in 
the event the provinces fail to fulfil their constitutional or other legislative obligations. 
Section 139 of the Constitution makes similar provisions in relation to provincial 
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intervention in municipalities. Furthermore, Section 146 of the Constitution allows for 
a national legislative override over provincial legislation for various reasons, including 
the maintenance of national norms and standards, national security, economic unity, 
and other national policy considerations.  
This clearly shows that although the provinces and municipalities have a certain 
degree of institutional autonomy and independence in terms of the Constitution, in 
practice the national government commands a greater amount of power and authority 
that allows its intrusion into sub-national jurisdictional areas and functions (Dickovick 
2005:201). Overall, these much wider legislative powers and authority of the national 
government relative to the provincial and local spheres of government signify a more 
unitary character of the South African state, despite some formal federal trappings. 
This has significant implications for the nature and character of the country’s system 
of IGR and cooperation. The following section will shed more light on this issue.   
5.3  State transformation and public management reforms 
It is important to note that IGR take place in a public administration context (Edwards 
2008a:68). In fact, the public service is central to effective implementation of the 
country’s system of IGR and cooperative governance. In the South African context, 
the capacity of the public service to drive an effective system of IGR and cooperative 
governance cannot be considered in isolation from the country’s apartheid history. The 
legacy of apartheid has been one of the key challenges hampering the country’s public 
service (Sindane 2009:493; Sindane 2003:3). The public service during apartheid had 
highly centralised management systems and practices (Cameron 2010:683). It was 
also characterised by “fragmentation and duplication, poor and outdated management 
practices and a regulatory bureaucratic culture” (Bardill 2000:104).  
The remnants and the legacies of the apartheid public service continued into the 
democratic dispensation. In 1994, the country’s democratic government inherited a 
racially segregated, hierarchical, inefficient, and fragmented public service from the 
different national, provincial, and homeland (Bantustan) bureaucracies that existed 
under the apartheid dispensation (Naidoo 2015:29-30; Sindane 2003:4). The inherited 
public service was underpinned by a top-down, centralised, and control-orientated 
management paradigm and rule-based and input-driven bureaucratic structures, 
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practices, and culture, which makes it uncreative and unresponsive to people’s needs 
(Harrison-Rockey 1999:169; Ministry for the Public Service and Administration 1995; 
Naidoo 2015:29-30). This represented a flawed and weak system of public 
administration in terms of management attitudes, values, processes, and systems, as 
well as in terms of the accessibility and quality of public services (Harrison-Rockey 
1999:169). 
This inherited legacy of the apartheid public service was out of kilter with the 
fundamental principles, ethos, values, and imperatives of the country’s democratic 
dispensation. It is against the above background that South Africa’s transition from an 
apartheid regime to a democratic dispensation was accompanied by the 
transformation and restructuring of state bureaucracy (Naidoo 2015:23-24). The 
purpose of post-apartheid public service (administrative) reform was to reorient the 
public servants from the rule-based and command-and-control management approach 
associated with the apartheid regime towards a people-centred and -orientated public 
service paradigm (Ncholo 2000:88). In this regard, the transformation imperatives also 
included the need for the transformation of the organisational design and management 
and human resource systems and practices (Harrison-Rockey 1999:170). This 
culminated into the Public Service Act (PSA) of 1994, which integrated different 
administrations into a single, unified public service at the national and provincial 
government level in post-apartheid democratic South Africa (see Maluka 2014:1021).  
Apart from the imperatives of state transformation as part of the country’s democratic 
transition, South Africa has not been immune to the global pressures of public 
management reforms that led to public service restructuring and re-engineering in 
many countries across the world. In response to these global public sector reform 
imperatives, South Africa introduced NPM-inspired managerial reforms in the 1990s, 
which included public service reforms, financial reforms, decentralisation, 
agencification, privatisation, corporatisation, the introduction of the Senior 
Management Service, contract appointments, and performance management  (Ayee 
2013:270; Cameron 2010:684).  
These reforms also included policy and legislative reforms; for example, the 
introduction of the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) in 1999 to reform and 
modernise public sector budgeting and financial management and to do away with 
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rule-based financial management systems (Cameron 2010:690; Fourie 2005:679). In 
addition, the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) was also introduced to 
set a framework for a multi-year budgeting process and to provide a strategic approach 
to public sector expenditure planning and management (Fourie 2005:680). This public 
sector financial management dispensation, with its focus on transparency and 
accountability, represents a fundamental departure from the notion of budgeting as a 
mere “technical and bureaucratic exercise” (Fourie 2005:679).  
As argued in Chapters Three and Four, NPM has led to greater fragmentation, which 
necessitates greater focus on issues of integration and coordination in government 
(Kraak 2011:346). Overall, state transformation and public management reforms that 
have taken place in post-apartheid South Africa provide a broader historical and 
contextual background to promote a better understanding of the complex institutional 
and administrative context within which the country’s system of IGR and cooperative 
governance is implemented. In other words, this section foregrounds key institutional 
issues that affect management and coordination of IGR and cooperative governance. 
The relevance and significance of this section will become much clearer later in this 
chapter when dealing with key institutional factors that militate against effective 
intergovernmental cooperation and collaboration between the different spheres of 
government.      
5.4  The structure and practice of IGR and cooperative governance 
Compared to the older and well-established federations (i.e. Australia, Canada, 
Germany, and Nigeria) studied in Chapter Four, South Africa does not have a long 
history and tradition of IGR and cooperative governance. This could mainly be 
attributed to the country’s unitary political system that existed under the past colonial 
and apartheid regimes. Although some form of IGR existed under the country’s 
colonial and apartheid dispensations, cooperative governance is a fairly new concept 
that can be traced to the advent of democracy in South Africa. However, the concept 
has a long history of internationally manifesting in different forms and applications, 
including its equivalent concept of cooperative federalism found in other jurisdictions.   
As noted previously, there is a conceptual distinction between cooperative governance 
and IGR (Edwards 2008a:67). Cooperative governance is about the philosophy and 
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partnership that underpin the relationship between the different spheres of government 
(see Edwards 2008a:68). “This philosophy rests on constitutional guidelines, 
principles and values” (Coetzee 2010:86). The concept of cooperative governance has 
its origin in the German Bundestreue concept, which is a philosophy that embodies a 
set of unwritten principles and values (good faith and mutual trust) that underpin the 
relationship between the national and sub-national governments (De Villiers 1997:472; 
Edwards 2008a:66). In South Africa, cooperative governance enjoins all spheres of 
government to work as “a single, unified system, collaborating rather than competing” 
(Simeon and Murray 2001:71). On the other hand, IGR relate to the political, financial, 
and institutional arrangements that facilitate the relationship and interactions between 
the different spheres of government and organs of state (Edwards 2008a:68).  
In the South African context, IGR and cooperative governance could metaphorically 
be seen as mutually complementary twins and two sides of the same coin. In simple 
terms, IGR should be viewed as a set of mechanisms that drive cooperative 
governance as an integrated governance philosophy to promote seamless service 
delivery and harmonious and collaborative relations between the different spheres of 
government. In other words, IGR are a means and cooperative governance is an end 
or outcome that the government seeks to achieve. It is this outcome that will enable 
the government to achieve much broader developmental and societal outcomes.  
5.4.1  The rationale for IGR  
Governments exist to meet and address the needs of the citizens (Coetzee 2010:84). 
Effective and seamless service delivery requires an effective system of IGR and 
cooperative governance. Poor service delivery, public protests, and instability are 
considered to be associated with, among other factors, poor intergovernmental 
cooperation, implementation, and coordination (Coetzee 2010:85). The importance 
and effectiveness of the IGR system need to be judged against the extent to which “it 
promotes good governance and the translation of development policy intent into actual 
service delivery outcomes through cooperative government in policy and planning, 
budgeting, implementation and monitoring and evaluation processes across and 
within the three spheres of government. IGR are therefore not an end in itself, but adds 
value only to the extent it supports effective service delivery and good governance 
across the three spheres of government” (Department of Provincial and Local 
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Government [DPLG] 2008:10). In other words, cooperative governance should lead to 
better coordination, integrated planning, budgeting, and service delivery within and 
across all spheres of government (Edwards 2008a:74). South Africa’s perennial 
development and service delivery challenges on the one hand and the National 
Development Plan’s vision for more inclusive socioeconomic development and 
integrated public service delivery on the other hand call for a much stronger system of 
IGR and cooperative governance.  
5.4.2 IGR strategy and policy framework  
The Constitution of South Africa provides an enabling framework for the development 
of the country’s system of IGR (Tapscott 2000:119). South Africa’s post-apartheid 
democratic constitution brought about a fundamental shift in the philosophy, approach, 
structure, and practice of IGR. In this regard, the first important fundamental shift 
relates to a departure from the term “levels” (tiers) to the notion of “spheres” to signify 
equal status and a non-hierarchical relationship that should underpin the country’s 
system of IGR and cooperative governance in post-apartheid democratic South Africa 
(Cameron 2010:682). The second fundamental shift is about new principles and 
values. Chapter 3 of the Constitution sets out key normative principles and values that 
should underpin IGR and cooperative governance between the different spheres of 
government in South Africa.  
These include a need for mutual cooperation, friendly relations, consultation on 
matters of mutual interest, and coordination of actions and legislation, as well as 
support to one another and avoidance of litigation against one another. Through these 
principles and values, the Constitution seeks to promote cooperative relations and 
avoid confrontation, hostility, and competition between the different spheres of 
government. More importantly, it enjoins all spheres and organs of state to settle their 
disputes amicably through non-judicial (political) mechanisms. The South African 
Constitution stands among the most revolutionary and progressive constitutional 
frameworks in the world for its explicit provisions on the nature of IGR and cooperative 
governance that need to be practised under the post-apartheid democratic 
dispensation.  
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Constitutions in older federal democracies such as Australia and Canada do not have 
such explicit provisions for IGR. Their IGR systems have developed and evolved as a 
matter of tradition and convention rather than constitutional design. It must, however, 
be noted that, notwithstanding its progressive principles and values for IGR, the 
Constitution provides little guidance on the operationalisation of a new system of IGR 
and cooperative government, especially in terms of the coordination and integration of 
activities across the different spheres of government (Tapscott 2000:122).  
In addition to the country’s constitutional framework, there are other pieces of 
legislation that provide a further operational framework for South Africa’s system of 
IGR and cooperative governance. These include the IGRFA (No. 13 of 2005), the 
IFRA (No. 97 of 1997), the PFMA (No. 1 of 1999), the Local Government: Municipal 
Systems Act (MSA) (No. 32 of 2000), and the Local Government: Municipal Finance 
Management Act (MFMA) (No. 56 of 2003). As the principal IGR legislation, the IGRFA 
of 2005 provides a statutory framework to promote and facilitate IGR in South Africa, 
including key intergovernmental mechanisms and structures, as well as procedures to 
be followed for the settlement of intergovernmental disputes. Other pieces of 
legislation are discussed later in this chapter.  
5.4.3   IGR model, institutions, and structures   
South Africa has established numerous institutions and structures to facilitate and 
promote IGR and cooperative governance in a wide range of public policy functions 
and sectors. IGR political and technical structures for different sectors exist at the 
national, provincial, and local government levels in accordance with the institutional 
framework provided for in the IGRFA of 2005. At the national level, a myriad of national 
intergovernmental structures include the Presidential Coordinating Council (made up 
mainly of the president and the premiers) and various sectoral structures between 
ministers and their provincial counterparts (MinMECs), such as the Budget Council 
(made up of the Minister of Finance and MECs for Finance in the different provinces).  
Provinces also have their own intergovernmental structures, which include the 
Premier’s Coordination Council (made up of the premier and the mayors) and sectoral 
structures that bring together MECs and Members of the Mayoral Committees in 
municipalities. All these intergovernmental structures are supported by technical 
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structures composed of officials from the different spheres of government. The 
functionality and effectiveness of these structures, however, remain uneven.   
In terms of the IGR model for South Africa, it is important to first highlight the fact that 
there are three key models of IGR, namely a partnership model, a principal-agent 
model, and a functional dualism model (Ibietan 2011:57-59). The partnership model is 
underpinned by cooperation and equality between the different levels of government, 
and the principal-agent model is based on the Weberian notion of the hierarchical 
superior-subordinate relationship between the different levels of government. The 
functional dualism model combines some aspects of the other two models with greater 
emphasis on concurrent functional competencies allocated to the different levels of 
government (Ibietan 2011:57-59).  
The institutional and constitutional design of the South African system of IGR and 
cooperative governance is mainly based on the partnership model to promote mutual 
cooperation and friendly relations between the different spheres of government. 
Although the Constitution provides for a system of cooperative governance based on 
equality and a partnership between the different spheres of government, the practice 
of IGR is mainly a top-down relationship (Edwards 2008a:80; Simeon and Murray 
2001:85). In other words, South Africa’s actual institutional practice and culture also 
conform to the principal-agent model, which promotes hierarchical and top-down 
relationship.  
This practice of IGR and cooperative governance in South Africa reflects “tensions 
between a unitary and a federal model of the state” (Tapscott 2000:119). In terms of 
intergovernmental balance of power, this hierarchical and top-down  relationship is 
manifested through national government dominance over the sub-national 
governments (Simeon and Murray 2001:87). This dominance can mainly be explained 
in terms of the country’s constitutional architecture that assigns significant legislative 
and fiscal powers to the national government (Simeon and Murray 2001:87). Another 
dimension of the intergovernmental balance of power relates to the nature of the 
relationship between the executive and legislative branches of government in South 
Africa. The executive branch dominates IGR in South Africa and the explanation for 
this state of affairs is captured as follows: “IGR at the executive level are far more 
effective than at the legislative level through the NCOP [National Council of Provinces]. 
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National and provincial executives interact frequently through the MinMECs 
[intergovernmental sectoral meetings between ministers and MECs in provinces]. 
Accommodations reached there have already been incorporated into national 
legislation, so there is little work for the NCOP to do, and little incentive for provincial 
executives to participate in its work. This is in large part a function of the coexistence 
of multi-sphere government in South Africa with a Westminster-style parliamentary 
system that concentrates power in the hands of executives; ‘executive federalism’ 
characterises all these cases” (Simeon and Murray 2001:86).   
It must be noted that these asymmetrical power relations between the national and 
sub-national governments are not unique to South Africa. It is a common institutional 
feature of many federal systems, including Australia and Nigeria. In the South African 
context, this mainly speaks to the country’s unitary political culture – a situation that 
runs counter to the constitutional values, principles, and philosophy that underpin IGR 
and cooperative governance in post-apartheid democratic South Africa. This culture 
partly comes from the history of the superior-subordinate relationship that existed 
between the different levels of government under the apartheid regime and the 
hierarchical, top-down, and centralised management paradigm that characterised the 
government in South Africa for a long time.   
5.4.4   Intergovernmental fiscal relations and funding model 
The Constitution, the IFRA, and the Annual Division of Revenue Act provide the main 
policy and legislative framework for intergovernmental fiscal relations in South Africa. 
The Constitution sets out fiscal and taxation (revenue-raising) powers for national, 
provincial, and local spheres of government. South Africa has a greater degree of 
fiscal centralism in favour of the national government and limited fiscal (revenue-
raising) autonomy of the provincial governments (Dickovick 2014:553-561; Simeon 
and Murray 2001:73-74). The country’s revenue sources and taxation powers are 
highly centralised and the provinces are not allowed to levy major taxes such as 
income tax, VAT, general sales tax, and customs duties (Wehner 2000:59-61). These 
taxes are assigned to the national government (Edwards 2008a:78). 
The provincial revenue sources are mainly limited to user charges and licence fees 
such as road traffic fees, motor vehicle licences, hospital patient fees, and horse racing 
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and gambling fees, thereby creating greater imbalances between provincial revenue 
powers and expenditure responsibilities, as well as a higher degree of provincial 
reliance on national fiscal transfers (Amusa and Mathane 2007:271-276; Wehner 
2003:1). In contrast to the provinces, municipalities command a relatively higher 
degree of fiscal autonomy in the form of property rates and taxes, as well as service 
fees and charges for municipal services, including electricity, water, and sanitation 
(Amusa and Mathane 2007:272).  
The constitutional design of the country’s overall fiscal system means that the national 
government has significant fiscal powers and hegemony over the provincial and local 
spheres of government. It must be noted, however, that South Africa’s highly 
centralised fiscal system conforms to conventional wisdom in the theory of fiscal 
federalism discussed in the previous chapters, which holds that macroeconomic 
stabilisation and redistributive functions (monetary, fiscal, and tax policies) should be 
administered at the national government level, while allocative (service delivery) 
functions should be performed at the sub-national government level. This practice is 
not unique to South Africa. It is a common institutional feature of many fiscal systems 
found in many countries across the world, including Australia, Canada, Germany, and 
Nigeria.  
To address the mismatch between the revenue powers and expenditure 
responsibilities of the sub-national governments in line with common international 
practice, the Constitution further compels the national, provincial, and local spheres of 
government to share nationally collected revenue through equitable share allocations 
and other types of allocation to enable the provinces and municipalities to deliver basic 
services and perform their other constitutional functions. South Africa has an elaborate 
system of intergovernmental fiscal transfers in the form of conditional and 
unconditional grants (equitable share) (Wehner 2000:61). The country’s revenue 
allocation system is based on a prescribed formula that takes into account a number 
of factors, including fiscal capacities, economic disparities, and the development 
needs of provinces and municipalities.  
The provincial and local government equitable share allocation is a general purpose 
(unconditional) funding mechanism intended to address fiscal imbalances within the 
intergovernmental system and enables the sub-national governments to deliver 
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services and perform other constitutional or legislative functions, while the conditional 
grants are specific-purpose grants meant to fund specific national policy and 
development priorities (Amusa and Mathane 2007:281). The Financial and Fiscal 
Commission was established to advise on the determination and allocation of revenue 
to different spheres of government. Similar fiscal structures exist in other countries 
such as the Commonwealth Grants Commission in Australia.   
As a subordinate act, the IFRA of 1997 has been enacted to promote 
intergovernmental cooperation on fiscal, budgetary, and financial matters through key 
intergovernmental fiscal structures in the form of the Budget Council and the Local 
Government Budget Forum (made up of the Minister of Finance, MECs for Finance, 
and the South African Local Government Association). The IFRA further provides for 
a process to be followed when determining the equitable share allocation between the 
national, provincial, and local spheres of government.  
5.4.5  Institutional, structural, and systemic weaknesses of the IGR system  
Despite the existence of an enabling statutory framework and a plethora of 
intergovernmental structures, the South African system of IGR and cooperative 
governance continues to face serious institutional and systemic challenges. At the 
core of the country’s systemic weaknesses is poor intergovernmental coordination, 
alignment and integration, inefficiencies, and duplication and fragmentation within the 
public service delivery system. Intergovernmental coordination challenges manifest at 
both vertical and horizontal levels (Kraak 2011:353-354). Legislative, administrative, 
and fiscal capacities are major challenges that hamper the effective implementation of 
IGR and cooperative governance (Edwards 2008a:77-78).  
Policy and legislative challenges relate to the ambiguities and confusion associated 
with the concurrent functions and competencies between the different spheres of 
government in relation to the exact powers and roles of the provinces, thereby raising 
questions about whether the provinces are mere implementers of national policy or 
whether provinces can determine their own policy direction (Tapscott 2000:122). Clear 
delineation of roles and responsibilities between the spheres of government is 
therefore important in order to avoid duplication (South African Cities Network [SACN] 
2016:210). The voluntary nature of the country’s system of IGR, including the ad hoc 
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nature of the intergovernmental structures, also hampers effective cooperation and 
coordination between the different spheres of government (Kraak 2011:354; Simeon 
and Murray 2001:85).  
South Africa has a dominant party system in the form of the ANC’s political hegemony 
and electoral dominance at all levels of government in the country (Dickovick 
2014:559-562). Internally, the ANC is a top-down and centralised organisation 
(Dickovick 2014:559-560). Theoretically, the ANC’s electoral dominance and its 
disciplined organisational culture should facilitate better political management of IGR 
for effective policy coordination and cooperation across the different spheres of 
government.  
This has, however, proved to be difficult, thus raising fundamental questions about the 
effectiveness of party politics in smoothing IGR and cooperative governance in South 
Africa. The 2016 local government elections brought about major changes to the 
country’s political landscape by denting the ANC’s electoral dominance at the local 
government level. It remains to be seen whether or not this electoral trend will extend 
to the national and provincial government elections in 2019 and what its impact will be 
on intergovernmental politics. 
Furthermore, it is also worth highlighting the skewed and unbalanced nature of the 
country’s system of IGR. In South Africa, more attention has been paid to IGR between 
the national and provincial governments, but local government has been somewhat 
neglected in this equation (De Villiers 1997:469). The lack of or deficiencies in 
structures and processes in the provinces to facilitate local government involvement 
in policy issues demonstrate this point (De Villiers 1997:469).  
This scenario accords with the practice and experience from international comparative 
case studies discussed in Chapter Four, which also point to the limited role of local 
government in IGR in these jurisdictions.  
In South Africa and other countries such as Germany, little attention has been paid to 
local-provincial IGR both in terms of research and the development of institutional 
mechanisms (formal structures and processes) compared to national-provincial IGR 
(De Villiers 1997:470-489). As noted in Chapter One, it is this knowledge gap that this 
thesis aims to address to provide deeper insight into and better understanding of the 
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system of local-provincial IGR and cooperation, with specific focus on the local-
provincial intergovernmental administrative culture, mechanisms, and practices, as 
discussed below. The key weaknesses outlined above are more general challenges 
that face the country’s system of IGR. The analysis in the next sections deals with key 
specific challenges related to the central questions of the study (see Section 1.3).  
5.4.5.1  Poor bureaucratic practices and culture 
Bureaucracy is an important administrative machinery required to drive effective IGR 
and cooperation; however, bureaucracy has been identified as one of the main 
impediments to cooperative governance in South Africa (Edwards 2008a:75). The 
management of IGR is a key challenge across all spheres of government that results 
in poor coordination (Edwards 2008a:66-74). Although administrative capacity 
constraints exist at all levels of government, this problem is more pronounced at the 
provincial and local government level (Amusa and Mathane 2007:274; Cameron and 
Tapscott 2000:82; Simeon and Murray 2001:81-82). It has been difficult for the 
provinces to establish effective administrative structures, systems, and processes to 
support effective service delivery (Edwards 2008a:77; Simeon and Murray 2001:81). 
The administrative capacity challenges also extend to the domain of intergovernmental 
implementation (Coetzee 2010:85). This mainly relates to the inability of the provinces 
to “plan and implement multi-sectoral programmes” (Cameron and Tapscott 2000:82). 
Municipalities are no exception in this regard. As a result, IGR have not been fully 
institutionalised at the provincial and local government level (DPLG 2008:62). 
This study contends that the current bureaucratic or administrative challenges relating 
to the management and implementation of IGR and cooperative governance in South 
Africa have a lot to do with the legacies of the former apartheid government. The post-
apartheid democratic government inherited deeply institutionalised and flawed 
apartheid bureaucratic practices and culture. This legacy continues to hamper the 
post-apartheid public service and public policy implementation under the country’s 
democratic dispensation. The post-apartheid public service remains highly 
hierarchical (Von Holdt 2010:16). The current management practices, coupled with the 
mentality based on hierarchy and functional silos, remain deeply entrenched, which 
makes cross-organisational integration and cooperation more difficult (SACN 
2016:220).  
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This implies that the deep-seated legacy of the apartheid institutional culture and 
administrative practices based on hierarchical control structures and a silo mentality 
continue to characterise the current post-apartheid public service. Centralised 
hierarchical structures and functional silos are institutional impediments to effective 
IGR and cooperation. The enduring legacy of the apartheid bureaucratic practices and 
culture on the character, values, and performance of the post-apartheid public service 
is depicted as follows: “The new democratic government in 1994 inherited the 
apartheid public service, which combined the so-called former ‘independent’ states, 
homelands and Bantustans, which all had distinct administrative cultures. Even though 
genuine attempts have been made since 1994 to transform the apartheid-inherited 
public service, by democratising it, making it developmental, effective and accountable 
– changing its culture – the results have at best been uneven. A key part of the post-
1994 transformation reforms of the public service was a strong emphasis on changing 
the racial make-up of the public administration, not only to make it more 
representative, but also to transform the racially discriminatory developmental outlook 
of the state. The ANC government has mostly succeeded in transforming the racial 
make-up of the public service, but that has not transformed its administrative culture. 
In the post-1994 era, some of the apartheid and Bantustan administrative cultures 
have been entrenched in the democratic public service … Aspects of the character of 
the apartheid, Bantustan and homelands public services have endured. The inability 
to transform the administrative culture of South Africa’s public service is at the root of 
its poor performance. The problem of the poor performance of the public service and 
low administrative capacity in South Africa is much more than technical incompetence, 
its root causes are deeply embedded in the social norms, behaviour patterns and 
administrative culture, entrenched in the apartheid state” (Gumede 2015:589-597). 
5.4.5.2  Poor integrated planning  
The democratic dispensation brought with it new values and principles to underpin the 
post-apartheid planning system. These values and principles include the need for 
public participation and cooperation as mandated by the Constitution and subordinate 
statutory frameworks. In this regard, the MSA of 2000 is a principal piece of legislation 
that sets out South Africa’s new planning philosophy and system called the IDP. The 
MSA provides a regulatory framework for the IDP in local government. It requires 
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municipalities to develop and adopt an IDP by taking into account the development 
plans of the national and provincial spheres of government, as well as other organs of 
the state, to give expression to the principles of cooperative governance.  
The IDP is essentially a strategic plan to direct short-, medium-, and long-term 
development and budget priorities in local government. The IDP provides an important 
basis for the alignment and integration of policies, planning, and budgeting across all 
spheres of government (DPLG 2008:12). Policy intent and the aspirational character 
and substance of IDPs can be summarised as follows: “IDPs are intended to be 
holistic, integrated, participatory [and] multi-sectoral strategic plans guiding the work 
of the municipality [and] the future development of the locality, giving direction to both 
the municipality and other spheres of government operating in the area … IDPs are 
intended to give direction to the actions of national and provincial government ... They 
are [also] expected to give effect to a notion of ‘developmental local government’, 
namely to align resources around the chosen development directions of the 
municipality, and to ensure both horizontal integration between sectors within local 
government, and vertical integration with other spheres of government. IDPs are 
[further] seen as prime vehicles for redressing poverty and inequality, and for 
restructuring urban and rural areas away from the apartheid legacy. The IDP includes 
a strategic component, a spatial framework, and a set of programmes and projects to 
be implemented over a five-year period. South Africa’s IDPs [further] reflect an interest 
in multi-sectoral, integrated, bottom-up approaches to local and regional development, 
and with new forms of governance based on participatory approaches and high levels 
of decentralisation” (Todes 2004:844-849). 
Overall, the IDP represents an important instrument to drive and facilitate 
intergovernmental planning for the government as a whole (DPLG 2008:12; Edwards 
2008b:91). An effective system of IGR at the local government level is also crucial for 
IDP (Edwards 2008a:72). This dialectic points to a dynamic and mutually reinforcing 
relationship that exists between IGR and integrated development planning. In addition 
to the MSA of 2000, which regulates the IDP as a strategic intergovernmental planning 
tool, the MFMA of 2003 regulates municipal budgeting and financial management. 
At the national and provincial government level, the PSA together with public service 
regulations and the PFMA in conjunction with Treasury regulations regulate 
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departmental strategic and annual performance planning in national and provincial 
government. The PFMA also regulates annual and medium-term departmental 
financial planning and budgeting at the national and provincial government level. The 
PFMA provides a framework for the alignment of planning and budgeting to promote 
performance-based budgeting in national and provincial government departments 
(Ajam 2008:48). 
Overall, the PSA and the PFMA collectively regulate annual and medium-term 
departmental planning and budgeting for the national and provincial governments. On 
the other hand, the MSA and the MFMA perform the same function at the local 
government level, including the development and implementation of annual municipal 
service delivery and budget implementation plans and annual performance planning 
and management, especially in respect of the signing of the annual performance 
agreements of the municipal senior management. 
Despite the existence of the above statutory and regulatory frameworks for planning 
at the national, provincial, and local government level, key challenges remain in 
relation to the country’s system of intergovernmental planning. Various factors hamper 
effective intergovernmental planning in South Africa. The country’s public service still 
works in functional silos (SACN 2016:210). This points to the legacy of inherited 
apartheid bureaucratic practices and culture. Other key factors include the current 
fragmented statutory and regulatory framework that govern the national, provincial, 
and local government planning and budgeting system in South Africa. The fact that 
local government planning and budgeting take place under a different set of regulatory 
and policy regulations than those applicable to national and provincial planning and 
budgeting means that South Africa has a fragmented system of intergovernmental 
planning and budgeting. This practice does not accord with the notion of the whole-of-
government philosophy and the principles of a systems approach and collaborative 
planning and management as discussed in the previous chapters of this study.   
Different budgeting and planning cycles and processes that exist at the national, 
provincial, and local spheres of government make intergovernmental synchronisation 
and alignment of programmes more difficult (Khalo 2008:223). Departments across all 
spheres of government develop their service delivery plans in isolation, thus creating 
intergovernmental planning fragmentation, which undermines the need for a shared 
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understanding and visioning for the achievement of common development outcomes 
(Khalo 2008:223). The overall outcome is poor alignment and fragmentation in fiscal 
planning and service delivery processes across all spheres of government (SACN 
2016:210).  
This study contends that the current intergovernmental planning fragmentation is the 
result of silo-based bureaucratic mentality, systems, and practices across all spheres 
of government.  
As argued in Chapter Three, this kind of institutional and organisational configuration 
creates functional silos and fragmentation. The overall philosophy and ideology of 
apartheid, coupled with its highly bureaucratic and hierarchical government structures, 
created functional silos and fragmentation in many areas of public policy. Government 
planning under the apartheid dispensation was therefore no exception. Despite the 
existence of enabling statutory, regulatory, and policy frameworks created to support 
integrated planning across all spheres of government, apartheid institutional malaise 
(silo-based fragmented planning) continues to affect planning in post-apartheid South 
Africa. Chapters Three and Four made the point about how difficult it is to effect 
change in an organisational culture. This explains why it has been very difficult for 
South Africa to make a complete transition and shift from a long-standing and highly 
institutionalised silo-based and fragmented apartheid bureaucratic culture and 
mentality to a new system of public service that fully embraces the principles of 
intergovernmental integration, cooperation, and collaboration.     
5.4.5.3  Poor intergovernmental performance management  
Effective performance monitoring is an important tool to promote integrated service 
delivery and the achievement of public policy objectives in a multi-level system of 
government with overlapping powers and functions (DPLG 2008:53). The post-
apartheid democratic government has embraced performance management as a key 
instrument to promote effective service delivery and transformation (Manyaka and 
Sebola 2012:300). The adoption of a performance management system forms part of 
the broader public sector reforms that have been introduced by the country’s 
democratic government to promote an accountable, efficient, and effective system of 
government.  
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A performance management paradigm is embodied in a number of key policy and 
statutory frameworks that govern government planning, performance, and reporting. 
These include the PFMA, Treasury regulations, the PSA, and related regulations that 
provide the main regulatory framework for performance management at the national 
and provincial government level. At the local government level, key statutory and 
regulatory instruments include the MSA of 2000 and the MFMA of 2003.    
The PFMA represents an important aspect of the public sector budgeting and financial 
management reforms to promote efficient, effective, and performance-based 
budgeting and management of public finances in the country (Mkhize and Ajam 
2006:765). More importantly, the PFMA represents a fundamental departure from a 
procedural and compliance-based accountability system to a results-based approach 
through the MTEF, which integrates strategic planning and budgeting with a specific 
focus on economy, efficiency, effectiveness, outputs, and outcomes (Mkhize and Ajam 
2006:765-769). The same budgeting and financial management reform and 
modernisation principles have been extended to local government through the MFMA 
(Mkhize and Ajam 2006:765). The Treasury regulations require national and provincial 
government departments to develop and implement their departmental strategic plans 
based on their respective constitutional, legislative, and policy mandates and their 
MTEFs, and must include measurable objectives, expected outcomes, programme 
outputs, indicators, and targets.  
At the local government level, the MSA of 2000 requires municipalities to establish a 
performance management system that includes key performance targets and 
indicators against which to monitor and measure development (service delivery) 
outcomes and impacts in line with key municipal objectives and priorities as outlined 
in municipal IDPs. The MSA requires municipalities to provide annual reports on their 
service delivery and financial performance. The MSA further provides for the national 
and provincial monitoring of municipalities, including the requirement for the MECs of 
local government in the provinces to establish mechanisms, processes, and 
procedures through which to monitor and support municipalities.  
The MFMA of 2003 regulates municipal financial performance, management, and 
reporting. Overall, the PSA and the PFMA provide the general statutory framework for 
financial and non-financial performance management and reporting at the national and 
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provincial government level. The MSA and the MFMA perform the same function at 
the local government level in terms of annual financial and non-financial (service 
delivery) reporting, as well as employee performance management.  
The quality of public service delivery and development outcomes has not been 
commensurate with public expenditure and public expectations since the country’s 
democratisation (The Presidency 2009:4-15). Against this backdrop, the government 
adopted an outcomes-based approach to strengthen and improve government 
performance and accountability with a specific focus on government-wide outcomes 
(The Presidency 2009:4-15).  
This new outcomes-based approach represents a fundamental departure and 
paradigm shift from a more procedural and compliance-based performance 
management system in individual government departments to a results-based 
performance management system that focuses on key sectoral and intergovernmental 
priorities and outcomes (The Presidency 2009:4-15). The adoption of an outcomes-
based approach to government performance also represents a major attempt to shift 
the government away from an individualistic and silo-based mentality to a holistic and 
collective focus on government-wide (system-wide) outcomes (Kraak 2011:357-359). 
Despite the above key government measures and interventions, performance 
management still remains a serious challenge in the public service, which negatively 
influences public service delivery (Manyaka and Sebola 2012:300). There is a general 
poor performance (results-based) culture in the government due to the prevailing 
dominant culture of compliance (Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation 
[DPME] 2014:5-6). Performance monitoring and evaluation are also seen as policing 
functions rather than a tool for ongoing learning and performance improvement (DPME 
2014:5). In this regard, key factors that account for the existing performance 
management weaknesses in government include insufficient managerial and technical 
skills, inadequate capacity building, and the failure to instil and enforce a performance 
culture in government (Manyaka and Sebola 2012:300). This also applies to 
intergovernmental performance management.   
This study takes the argument further and contends that South Africa’s poor 
intergovernmental performance management practices and system are the result of 
fragmented and silo-based bureaucratic management practices and culture inherited 
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from the Weberian system of public administration and different organisational cultures 
that characterised the former apartheid government and different homeland 
administrations. Chapters Three and Four demonstrated that it is difficult to effect 
culture change in organisations. Changing a culture of poor performance management 
in the South African government also remains a major challenge (The Presidency 
2009:14). The state of the country’s intergovernmental performance management 
system is better summarised as follows: “Powerful influences within the public sector 
management culture militate against collaboration. Although government has been 
promoting the coordination of government activities since 1998, it has not achieved 
the intended results. Furthermore, there are different management cultures in the 
three spheres of government, especially in the local sphere. These differences will 
prove difficult to reconcile to obtain successful collaboration across the spheres. 
Traditional management is still entrenched in government and therefore many 
managers will be inhibited from embracing collaboration as a new management 
approach/paradigm” (Khalo 2008:222). 
The existing statutory prescripts limit the accountability of government officials to their 
line function responsibilities and there is a voluntary system of cooperation within and 
between the different spheres of government (Kraak 2011:354). This further reinforces 
the silo-based mentality and fragmentation in the government based on functionalism 
and departmentalism. The lack of performance incentives and sanctions within the 
current IGR system also weakens the intergovernmental performance and 
accountability system (SACN 2016:210). It is against this background that 
“performance contracts of managers may have to be amended to ensure that joint 
work is seen as a fundamental part of their core business rather than an optional add-
on” (DPLG 2008:40). 
5.4.5.4  Overall effects and consequences of poor IGR  
The institutional and systemic weaknesses that affect the country’s system of IGR and 
cooperative governance have certain serious consequences and effects for 
governance and public service delivery. “The consequences of the poor functioning of 
cooperative governance and IGR are catastrophic” (Coetzee 2010:102). Poor 
alignment between policymaking, planning, budgeting, and monitoring and evaluation 
has led to serious fragmentation, ineffectiveness, and inefficiencies in the overall 
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system of public service delivery across the different spheres and sectors of 
government (DPME 2014:5). Poor intergovernmental cooperation and integration 
have also hampered effective service delivery at the local level (Madzivhandila and 
Asha 2012:373). As a result of poor IGR, services are not properly coordinated, 
integrated, and facilitated across the different spheres of government, with a negative 
impact on service delivery (Coetzee 2010:95-96).  
In this regard, poor intergovernmental cooperation and collaboration between 
municipalities and sector departments exist and it appears to be in part due to poor 
commitment and attitudes, as well as a mindset or mentality based on 
departmentalism (functional silos) (Madzivhandila and Asha 2012:373). This silo 
mentality across the different spheres of government accounts for vertical and 
horizontal intergovernmental fragmentation, which in turn undermines the overall 
efficiency of the country’s system of governance (SACN 2016:210-211). As noted 
previously, the legacies inherited from the former apartheid public service (including 
Bantustans and homeland administrations) have continued to perpetuate silo-based 
practices in the post-apartheid democratic dispensation (Gumede 2015:594-595).  
Despite the departure from the notion of tiers to a system of a non-hierarchical 
relationship between spheres as embodied in the Constitution, hierarchical 
relationships remain part of the practice of IGR in the post-apartheid democratic 
dispensation (Tapscott 2000:121). National and provincial governments continue to 
define (and sometimes impose) policy and strategic priorities for local government – a 
practice that runs counter to the principles of cooperative governance (SACN 
2016:210). This is a clear demonstration that the apartheid legacy of departmentalism 
and hierarchical relationships continue to define and perpetuate a silo-based practice 
of IGR and cooperative governance in the post-apartheid South Africa, with a negative 
impact on governance and service delivery. As argued in Chapter Three, it is worth 
repeating the argument here that administrative silos are an inherent feature and 
outcome of the traditional structure of government in which departments are based on 
a hierarchical design and are often resistant to change (Kraak 2011:347). The 
country’s silo-based system of IGR and cooperative governance should therefore be 
understood against this broader background.  
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5.5   Presentation and contextualisation of the key empirical findings 
The key empirical findings that were obtained from the interviews were organised, 
classified, and analysed in themes as an outcome of the thematic analysis. Table 5.1 
provides an overview of the key focus areas (themes) of the interviews and major 
findings.  
 
Table 5.1: Summary of interview responses 
Interviews focus areas Summary of key findings 
Institutional and organisational context for IGR 
and cooperative governance in Gauteng 
 A fragmented and ad hoc approach to IGR in 
Gauteng  
 Silo-based (territorialism) and compliance-
orientated institutional mentality and culture 
 Inward focus and preoccupation with 
individual organisational mandates and 
functions rather than intergovernmental 
priorities  
 IGR practice is based on a hierarchical (top-
down) approach, thereby undermining the 
principle of equality of government spheres 
as enshrined in the Constitution  
 Fragmented institutional arrangements for 
IGR coordination, including overlapping and 
duplication of functions with provincial and 
local government agencies and entities 
 The lack of a strategic centre or window of 
IGR coordination, which results in parallel 
IGR processes and structures 
 Fragmented policy and legislative frameworks 
Existing management (administrative) practices 
and IGR in Gauteng 
 Fragmented management and administrative 
systems and mechanisms for 
intergovernmental coordination and 
cooperation, resulting in service delivery 
fragmentation 
 Weak intergovernmental alignment between 
various sectoral plans due to poor IDP 
coordination 
 Misalignment between provincial and local 
government planning, budgeting, and 
reporting cycles and processes  
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Interviews focus areas Summary of key findings 
Systems approach and IGR in Gauteng  Fragmentation in relation to the structural 
configuration of the government, including 
existing political and territorial boundaries 
between spheres of government, militates 
against a systems approach to IGR in 
Gauteng 
 The adoption of a systems approach to IGR 
will engender a holistic government approach 
and promote common visioning, integrated 
service delivery, efficiencies, and economies 
of scale in Gauteng  
Collaborative management and IGR in Gauteng  Existing silo-based institutional mindsets and 
practices undermine an intergovernmental 
collaborative approach to service delivery in 
Gauteng   
 Properly structured joint collaborative 
arrangements through formal service level 
agreements will break existing silos, leverage 
collaborative solutions, harmonise 
administrative systems and processes, and 
improve service delivery synergies, 
efficiencies, and effectiveness, as well as 
public confidence in government  
Source: (Author’s own construction) 
 
These findings indicate that the existing institutional context and management 
(administrative) mechanisms, systems, and practices in the Gauteng Provincial 
Government and municipalities undermine IGR and cooperative governance in the 
province. In this regard, the structural configuration of the government, top-down and 
silo-based institutional culture and practices, and fragmentation in administrative 
systems and statutory and policy frameworks emerged from this study as key factors 
responsible for poor IGR and cooperative governance in the Gauteng province. These 
factors have created misalignment and fragmentation between provincial and local 
government planning, budgeting, implementation, and performance monitoring and 
reporting processes and activities. Finally, collaborative management and systems 
approaches emerged from the findings as alternative public sector management and 
governance paradigms that could be adopted to improve the structure and practice of 
IGR and cooperative governance in the Gauteng province.   
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5.5.1   Analysis and synthesis of key findings 
This section provides an overall analysis and synthesis of IGR and cooperative 
governance in the Gauteng province. Gauteng’s governance and socioeconomic 
complexities and its ambition to become a globally competitive city region made the 
province an interesting case for the study of IGR and cooperative governance. The 
changes in the province’s political landscape following the previous local government 
elections have created another dimension to the complexities of intergovernmental 
politics and governance between the ANC-run provincial government and the 
opposition-led municipalities. This section begins with the empirical analysis and 
synthesis of the research findings to answer the main guiding research question of the 
thesis (see Section 1.2).  
5.5.2  Institutional context for IGR and cooperation 
This section focuses on the institutional configuration of the provincial and local 
government, as well as the culture and politics that play out between these two 
spheres of government in the province. The institutional configuration speaks to the 
effect of structural and institutional arrangements on IGR and cooperative governance 
in the province. The institutional culture and politics relate to how the organisational 
culture within the provincial government and municipalities and the politics between 
them affect IGR and cooperative governance. A combination and interplay of these 
key fundamental factors or issues provide a broader institutional context for IGR and 
cooperative governance in the province.    
5.5.2.1  Institutional configuration of the provincial and local government  
This empirical study addressed the institutional configuration of the provincial and local 
government in Gauteng to understand the broader institutional context and 
environment within which IGR and cooperative governance take place in the province. 
The study found that the current structural configuration of the provincial and local 
government stems from the country’s constitutional and legislative architecture. In this 
regard, the results of the interviews with provincial and local government officials 
indicated that the constitutional provisions for the different spheres of government with 
different powers, mandates, and functions have created different institutional 
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arrangements in terms of the macro structure and organisation of the national, 
provincial, and local government in South Africa. It was further indicated during the 
interviews that South Africa’s constitutional design makes the national government 
mainly responsible for policy functions and sub-national governments for 
implementation (service delivery) functions.  
The separation and differentiation of powers, mandates, and functions between the 
provincial government and municipalities require effective IGR and cooperative 
governance arrangements to ensure integrated governance and service delivery. 
However, the empirical study found that the current structural configuration of the 
provincial and local government in Gauteng poses major institutional and systemic 
challenges to the structure and practice of IGR and cooperative governance in the 
province. The first area of institutional challenge relates to the misalignment in the 
institutional configuration and the location of functions between the provincial 
government and municipalities. In this regard, it was indicated that certain sector 
functions are structured differently in the provincial government compared to their 
configuration in municipalities. For example, a tourism function is located under the 
Economic Development department in the provincial government, but the same 
function is placed under different departments (such as Arts and Culture) in 
municipalities, thereby creating institutional fragmentation and complications in 
relation to intergovernmental sectoral coordination and cooperation in the province.  
The second major challenge pertains to confusion and lack of clarity in relation to 
functional mandates, roles, and responsibilities between the different spheres of 
government. The lack of clarity of the roles of the Office of the Premier and the 
Gauteng Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (CoGTA) was 
cited as a classic example of institutional fragmentation or confusion in relation to 
intergovernmental coordination in the province. Further confusion was also raised 
regarding the roles of the Gauteng CoGTA and the Provincial Treasury in relation to 
local government monitoring and support in the province.  
It was further indicated that the lack of a single central point of intergovernmental 
coordination in the province has resulted in parallel provincial IGR processes and 
structures that target the same officials in municipalities. In this regard, it was indicated 
that these parallel provincial IGR processes sometimes lead to competing or 
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contradictory demands and requirements for municipalities. This points to operational 
and administrative inefficiencies of the IGR system in the province.  
The current two-tier institutional system of the district and local municipalities was also 
found to be problematic in the context of an urban province such as Gauteng where 
local municipalities have relatively better resources and stronger institutional capacity 
than the district municipalities. The interviews essentially questioned the value or 
relevance of the district municipalities in the province and described the system as 
unnecessary duplication and fragmentation of functions that could better be performed 
by local municipalities.   
The third structural challenge or weakness identified speaks to institutional 
fragmentation and duplication resulting from the creation of provincial and municipal 
public agencies and entities in Gauteng. There was almost general consensus among 
all provincial and local government officials interviewed that the establishment of public 
agencies and entities seeks to improve government operational performance and 
service delivery efficiency and effectiveness. This view is in line with the theoretical 
postulation of NPM as discussed in Chapter Three. Some public agencies and entities, 
especially the metropolitan municipal agencies and entities, were generally described 
as being relatively effective in driving intergovernmental coordination and cooperation 
with other organs of government at the operational and service delivery level.  
However, according to some interviewees, many public agencies and entities have in 
practice proved to be highly bureaucratic and inefficient due to higher oversight, 
compliance, and administrative (operational) costs. Higher fees for the boards of 
directors of these public agencies and entities were cited as an example in this regard. 
Overlapping mandates and the duplication of functions and programmes between 
public agencies and provincial and municipal line departments were also found to be 
further contributory factors to institutional fragmentation and inefficiencies within the 
overall public sector delivery system. Other challenges mentioned during the 
interviews related to ineffective governance models and poor oversight over public 
agencies and entities. An interviewee further pointed to a phenomenon of “othering” 
that often exists between public agencies and entities and their shareholder 
departments and municipalities. This describes difficult and complex relationships that 
sometimes undermine mutual intergovernmental cooperation between public 
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agencies and entities and their shareholder departments and municipalities. These 
institutional and governance complexities appear to resonate and accord with the 
public pronouncements made by the Executive Mayor of the City of Johannesburg to 
abolish existing municipal agencies and entities.  
Despite identified institutional and governance challenges, the provincial and local 
government officials interviewed during the study still saw value and merit in public 
agencies and entities. They maintained that a better structured and rationalised 
(streamlined) institutional model for public agencies and entities with a clear functional 
mandate and focus supported by strong oversight mechanisms could eliminate 
duplication and improve service delivery efficiencies and effectiveness. In this regard, 
the interviewees indicated that, where public agencies and entities are established for 
core service delivery functions, the mandate of the shareholder department or 
municipality should be limited to policy, strategy, and oversight, as well as norms and 
standards, to avoid functional and programme overlap and duplication. 
5.5.2.2  Institutional culture and politics of provincial and local government  
Beyond the structural configuration of the government, this study also focused on the 
institutional culture and politics that characterise the provincial and local government 
in Gauteng as part of the analysis of the broader institutional milieu that underpins IGR 
and cooperative governance in the province. Notwithstanding the institutional 
fragmentation that results from the structural configuration of the government, the 
results of the interviews with the provincial and local government officials identified the 
existing organisational culture within the provincial government and municipalities as 
a major impediment to effective IGR and cooperative governance in the province. In 
this regard, this study pointed out that the existing culture is manifested through the 
commitment, mentality, attitudes, and mindset of government officials. In other words, 
the study found that the current psychology of the government officials militates 
against effective IGR and cooperative governance in the province.   
Overall, the analysis of data from the interviews points to at least five key 
manifestations of the existing organisational culture that characterise the different 
spheres of government in the province. The first manifestation relates to the general 
prevalence of a silo-based (territorial) mentality and mindset among officials in both 
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the provincial government and municipalities in the Gauteng province. Both the 
provincial government and municipalities are territorially preoccupied with their own 
legislative mandates and functional competencies, as well as their own organisational 
priorities rather than common intergovernmental priorities and outcomes.  
The findings of the interviews indicated that this state of affairs was mainly due to the 
current performance management and accountability frameworks and systems that 
require officials to focus on their own immediate organisational performance priorities 
and targets rather than intergovernmental priorities. There are neither incentives nor 
consequences for officials in relation to intergovernmental cooperation and 
performance. In the main, this could be attributed to different (fragmented) policy and 
regulatory frameworks and regimes for provincial government and municipalities, 
which promote and perpetuate silo-based operations across the different spheres of 
government.  
A mentality of competition further perpetuates intergovernmental fragmentation and 
runs counter to the normative values and principles of cooperation as set out in the 
Constitution and subordinate pieces of legislation. The silo-based approach to service 
delivery does not only create vertical intergovernmental coordination challenges 
between the provincial government and municipalities, but also horizontal coordination 
difficulties between different municipalities.  
With regard to the second cultural manifestation, the analysis points to a more 
compliance-orientated culture in both the provincial government and municipalities in 
the province. In this regard, the study found that IGR are mainly viewed and treated 
as a compliance issue and a secondary function rather than a core strategic function 
of all government officials. As a result, there is a greater focus on and orientation 
towards IGR compliance and procedural (process) issues at the expense of building 
a coherent, systematic, and results-based (outcomes-based) IGR culture and 
practices. The current orientation often creates mechanical (superficial) rather than 
substantive coordination and cooperation between the provincial government and 
municipalities.  
The third manifestation pertains to a hierarchical and top-down relationship that exists 
between the provincial government and municipalities. The findings of the interviews 
indicated that both the national and provincial spheres of government often adopt and 
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display a hierarchical and top-down posture and approach to their relationship with 
municipalities. A classic example cited was that the national and provincial 
governments sometimes impose priorities on local government instead of adopting a 
bottom-up approach to the setting of intergovernmental priorities. For example, the 
provincial sector departments often just communicate or inform municipalities of their 
own plans that need to be included in municipal IDPs, instead of engaging 
municipalities in joint planning and prioritisation as equal partners.  
This “big brother” approach or practice runs contrary to normative values and 
principles of cooperative governance as encapsulated in the Constitution. Although 
the Constitution talks about spheres of government (i.e. equality of spheres of 
government), the current practical conception and operationalisation of IGR reflect a 
notion of a hierarchical superior-subordinate relationship that characterised the 
apartheid system of government. The interviewees considered the nature of this 
relationship antithetical to the letter and spirit of cooperative governance between the 
provincial government and municipalities in the province.   
The fourth manner in which the organisational culture in both the provincial 
government and municipalities is manifested is through poor accountability and a lack 
of consequences for poor intergovernmental cooperation. The interviewees advanced 
a number of systemic and institutional factors that account for this state of affairs. The 
first factor has to do with the voluntary nature of the current system of IGR and 
cooperative governance, which makes it difficult to enforce cooperation between the 
different spheres of government. The second factor relates to the institutional 
autonomy and independence and different accountability regimes for the different 
spheres of government in the province. The provincial government is constitutionally 
accountable to the provincial legislature and municipalities to their respective 
municipal councils.  
As a result, these spheres of government cannot hold each other accountable. This 
complicates IGR and cooperative governance as intergovernmental decisions cannot 
be enforced by one sphere against another independent and autonomous sphere of 
government. This represents what is described in the literature as a conflict between 
the concepts of “parliamentarism” and “intergovernmentalism”, as discussed in 
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Chapter Four. This simply refers to the complexities of enforcing intergovernmental 
cooperation in a parliamentary system where the executive accounts to parliament.    
The fifth manifestation of the organisational culture relates to decision-making 
processes in both the provincial government and municipalities. The interviewees 
raised bureaucratic red tape and lengthy decision-making processes as having a 
negative impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of the whole government’s service 
delivery value chain from planning, budgeting, programme and project 
implementation, to performance reporting. This points to a lack of urgency that 
militates against efficient, effective, and responsive public service delivery at the 
different levels of government, which results in community dissatisfaction and protests.    
In addition to the above structural and cultural factors, the interviews further 
highlighted issues of institutional politics that also complicate IGR and cooperation 
within the local government sphere on the one hand and between the provincial and 
local spheres of government on the other hand. Ongoing contestations and tensions 
between the district and local municipalities on issues of constitutional powers and 
functions, as well as the institutional autonomy and independence of local 
municipalities, have proved to be an impediment to effective IGR and cooperative 
governance at the local government level. This often results in a poor relationship and 
cooperation between the district and local municipalities.  
The results of the interviews also identified party politics as a key factor in IGR and 
cooperative governance. In this regard, it was pointed out that IGR often work better 
when the ruling party is the same across the provincial government and municipalities 
as this fosters a common political vision and priorities between the provincial and local 
government leadership and facilitates better political management of 
intergovernmental differences and conflicts.  
However, as the interviews contended, having different ruling parties at the provincial 
and local government level complicates IGR and cooperation due to sharp differences 
in political ideology and priorities. This scenario does not permit intergovernmental 
tensions to be mediated and addressed through party political mechanisms. Although 
it is still too early to make definitive conclusions, changes in the province’s political 
landscape following the 2016 local government elections complicate IGR and 
cooperative governance between the ANC-led provincial government and 
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municipalities under the control of the opposition coalition. This may further escalate 
and heighten institutional turf battles that often characterise the normal politics of IGR. 
Apart from party politics, the five-year electoral cycle for the national, provincial, and 
local government was also found as being disruptive to long-term intergovernmental 
plans and priorities as elections bring about changes in electoral mandates and 
priorities, as well as the strategic programmes and focus of the government.  
5.5.3  Existing management practices and IGR 
This section deals with the existing management practices in the Gauteng Provincial 
Government departments and municipalities in the province, focusing on both internal 
(organisational) and external (intergovernmental) coordination of planning, 
programme and project implementation, and performance monitoring, evaluation, and 
reporting.   
5.5.3.1  Coordination of internal organisational business functions 
During the interviews, provincial and local government officials were asked questions 
related to the coordination of both internal organisational and intergovernmental 
business functions in relation to planning, programme and project implementation, and 
performance monitoring, evaluation, and reporting. Although there is still room for 
improvement, the interviewees generally painted a broad picture of better and effective 
internal cooperation and coordination of organisational business functions within the 
individual provincial departments and municipalities. This was attributed mainly to 
internal management and governance structures that have been established by 
different provincial departments and municipalities to facilitate consultation, 
coordination, and alignment of planning, budgeting, implementation, and performance 
reporting processes within their respective organisations.  
Some municipalities have established centralised project management units to 
coordinate planning and implementation of major infrastructure (capital) projects and 
others have adopted a cluster system in which similar or related functions are grouped 
together into functional clusters to facilitate better synergies, integration, and 
alignment for improved operational efficiency and effectiveness. As part of the 
modernisation of their internal business systems and processes, some municipalities 
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further expressed their intentions to move away from a paper-based to an automated 
reporting system to enhance their operational efficiencies and effectiveness. Overall, 
the data analysis points to effective organisational mechanisms in relation to the 
coordination of internal business functions between various business units within the 
provincial government departments and municipalities. This confirms the internal 
orientation (focus) of the government (departmentalism) that is part of the hallmark of 
traditional bureaucratic organisational structures and associated management 
traditions and practices.  
5.5.3.2  Coordination of intergovernmental business functions 
In terms of intergovernmental coordination between the different spheres of 
government, the findings of the interviews with provincial and local government 
officials mainly highlighted existing political and technical intergovernmental structures 
as key institutional mechanisms currently being used to facilitate and drive 
intergovernmental planning, budgeting, and implementation of performance 
monitoring, evaluation, and reporting in the province. These IGR structures range from 
the Premier’s Coordination Forum, which is an apex provincial IGR structure that 
brings together the Gauteng premier and the mayors of different municipalities, to 
various sectoral IGR structures between different MECs and Members of the Mayoral 
Committees and their respective sector departments, to district IGR forums for the 
district and local municipalities.  
Political IGR structures are supported by different technical IGR structures made up 
of relevant provincial and local government officials, including heads of departments 
and municipal managers, as well as heads of agencies and entities. The interviewees 
indicated that intergovernmental cooperation in the province has improved over time 
with the relative maturity of the system itself and its structures compared to when the 
concept of IGR was first introduced at the inception of the country’s democratic 
dispensation. The adoption of a cluster system or approach and a decentralised 
(regional) institutional model by some provincial departments was also mentioned as 
one of the key institutional innovations that have helped to improve intergovernmental 
coordination and cooperation in the province.  
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The interviewees also identified a number of key institutional and systemic challenges 
and weaknesses that have and continue to militate against the effective 
institutionalisation and operationalisation of a strong and robust system of IGR and 
cooperative governance in the province. The first key institutional weakness relates to 
the ad hoc and haphazard nature of the IGR system that has proved to undermine the 
overall efficacy of the structure and practice of IGR and cooperative governance in the 
province. This is part of a broader institutional and systemic problem that has to do 
with the voluntary nature of the country’s overall system of IGR and cooperative 
governance. It was, however, argued that a more structured and systematic approach 
to IGR and cooperative governance would go a long way in ameliorating this problem.  
The second institutional challenge has to do with the fragmented institutional model or 
approach in that there is currently no single central point or mechanism of 
intergovernmental coordination in the province, including functions related to 
municipal reporting to the province and the coordination of provincial support to 
municipalities. Due to deficient institutional mechanisms and a lack of clear 
overarching institutional arrangements for intergovernmental coordination, national 
and provincial departments run parallel processes in municipalities in terms of 
planning programmes and project implementation, which results in unnecessary 
duplication and fragmentation.  
Weak institutional mechanisms do not only affect vertical coordination between the 
provincial government and municipalities, but also the horizontal cooperation and 
collaboration between municipalities despite clear statutory requirements that require 
neighbouring municipalities to ensure better coordination and alignment of their 
development priorities through IDP processes. The lack of effective institutional 
mechanisms makes it difficult to leverage and optimise intergovernmental synergies 
between and across the different spheres of government.  
The third institutional challenge is highly systemic and was highlighted during the 
interviews as a fundamental problem that hampers effective intergovernmental 
coordination and cooperation between the provincial government and municipalities in 
Gauteng. This problem relates to different provincial and local government planning, 
budgeting, and reporting systems and cycles. This was mainly attributed to different 
statutory and policy frameworks that govern and regulate provincial and local spheres 
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of government. For example, the PSA and the PFMA regulate strategic and 
operational planning, budgeting, reporting, and accountability at the provincial 
government level, while a completely different regime applies to municipalities in terms 
of the MSA and the MFMA. This fragmentation in the policy and regulatory 
environment creates misalignment and fragmentation in intergovernmental planning, 
budgeting, implementation, and reporting processes. As a result, there is a disjuncture 
between municipal IDP and provincial planning processes and timelines. At the 
practical and operational level, this impedes the effective synchronisation and 
alignment of projects and budgets between provincial departments and municipalities. 
The interviewees further pointed out that misalignment and fragmentation in planning 
processes are more pronounced in relation to spatial and transport planning and 
transformation. In this regard, an example was provided in terms of the current 
fragmentation and incompatibility of the existing bus rapid transit (BRT) systems of the 
metropolitan municipalities, as well as the lack of a single automated and integrated 
ticketing system to facilitate seamless intermodal transport mobility in the province. 
The interviewees indicated that these challenges of intergovernmental alignment and 
integration do not only occur at a vertical level between the provincial government and 
municipalities, but also play out at the horizontal level between different municipalities.  
Overall, the existing fragmented policy and statutory frameworks undermine the 
overall strategic intent of municipal IDPs as a key intergovernmental planning 
instrument as envisioned by the MSA. In this regard, the interviewees identified a 
single public service as a key measure that could address these institutional and 
systemic challenges of intergovernmental misalignment and fragmentation.  
The fourth institutional weakness speaks to the lack of a common and standardised 
approach to IGR and cooperative governance in the province. In this regard, the 
interviewees highlighted the fact that the development and adoption of key planning 
instruments such as spatial development frameworks and integrated development 
plans, including a district-wide strategic planning approach, have somewhat helped in 
ameliorating intergovernmental fragmentation and promoted alignment and integration 
of provincial and local government plans in the province. This involves the plans of 
district and local municipalities, as well as provincial sector departments and public 
entities and agencies.  
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It was, however, indicated that the lack of province-wide uniform policy and strategic 
frameworks, guidelines, systems, and norms and standards undermine effective IGR 
and cooperative governance at both strategic and operational level, including 
intergovernmental planning, budgeting, programme and project implementation, and 
performance monitoring, evaluation, and reporting. Different examples were cited in 
this regard. The officials first identified the lack of common and standardised 
intergovernmental performance indicators and an integrated reporting system as 
perpetuating intergovernmental fragmentation. This creates a significant 
administrative burden for municipalities as they are currently required to report to 
different national and provincial sector departments.  
The lack of proper integrated systems and mechanisms to track and monitor the 
implementation of resolutions and decisions that arise from the IGR structures were 
also identified as another example. The interviewees further attributed the current 
fragmentation in the municipal BRT transport systems to the lack of common minimum 
norms and standards in relation to technical design specifications, as well as the 
management and operational models for the implementation of these 
intergovernmental transport systems. The officials contended that this fragmentation 
in the transport systems could hamper the achievement of the government’s vision to 
make Gauteng a spatially integrated and globally competitive city region.     
The fifth institutional weakness pertains to poor participation of provincial sector 
departments in municipal IDP processes. The interviewees pointed to the tendencies 
of the provincial sector departments to delegate junior officials with no decision-making 
powers and authority to attend IDP engagements with municipalities. The interviewees 
described this practice as highly problematic as it undermines both the strategic 
orientation of the intergovernmental planning processes and the quality of the 
substantive (content) inputs into the ultimate plans. This often results in poor alignment 
and integration between provincial and local government sector plans and budgets.  
The interviewees attributed this situation to the prevailing institutional culture whereby 
officials view and approach the IDP process as nothing more than a compliance issue 
to meet minimum legislative requirements. This undermines the strategic and 
substantive quality of the IDP as an intergovernmental tool and reduces it to a mere 
procedural bureaucratic process with no significant value.  
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In this regard, an analysis of the 2017/2018 IDPs of some municipalities in Gauteng, 
which was conducted as part of this study, also pointed to institutional and systemic 
weaknesses associated with IDPs, which further explains the existing fragmentation 
in intergovernmental planning. The analysis showed that intergovernmental alignment 
in IDPs is generally pitched at a more abstract level that focuses on high-level and 
broader national and provincial strategic and policy priorities and plans.  
The analysed IDPs did not clearly demonstrate or articulate programme- and project-
level alignment of the national, provincial, and local government plans at a practical 
and operational level, except for the listing of projects and budgets of the national and 
provincial sector departments in some IDPs, which appeared to have been cut and 
pasted from other plans or determined through a top-down rather than a bottom-up 
joint planning approach. There was no clear demonstration or evidence of joint 
collaborative planning and budgeting in the IDPs reviewed for this research.   
Furthermore, apart from vertical misalignment between the provincial and local 
spheres of government, the interviewees further pointed to horizontal misalignment of 
plans between the district and local municipalities mainly due to perennial tensions 
and contestations over powers and functions. In this respect, the interviewees 
indicated that, contrary to common practice in other provinces where district 
municipalities are mainly responsible for bulk infrastructure functions, local 
municipalities in Gauteng perform this function, thereby rendering district 
municipalities superfluous and irrelevant. 
Finally, poor communication and consultation mechanisms were also mentioned as 
areas of systemic weaknesses whereby national and provincial government would 
sometimes make public statements about programmes and projects to be 
implemented in municipal jurisdictions without proper consultation and joint planning 
with municipalities, yet municipalities are expected to support or provide bulk 
infrastructure and services for such projects.   
5.5.3.3  IGR resources and capacity 
The findings of the interviews identified the institutional location of the IGR function, 
leadership, human capital capacity and capability, financial resourcing and 
management, and administrative systems as key factors that have a significant 
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bearing on the efficiency and effectiveness of the overall system of IGR and 
cooperative governance in Gauteng. It was indicated during the interviews that the 
current institutional location of IGR within the organisational structures of the provincial 
government departments and municipalities, as a secondary (ancillary) rather than a 
core strategic function, undermine the strategic positioning and centrality of IGR as a 
key tool to drive integrated service delivery and governance in the province. This 
attitude accords with the prevailing organisational culture within the provincial 
government departments and municipalities, which was discussed as part of the 
broader institutional context that currently underpins the structure and practice of IGR 
and cooperative governance in the province.  
With regard to human resources capacity and capability, the main challenges relate to 
poor capacitation and resourcing of the IGR function in both the provincial government 
departments and municipalities. In this regard, it was found that many provincial 
government departments and municipalities have only one official at a junior level 
responsible for the coordination of IGR and cooperative governance for the whole 
organisation. The issue of IGR skills and expertise also came to the fore in that many 
IGR officials still lack the required strategic and technical competencies to drive and 
coordinate complex IGR programmes and processes, as well as to facilitate delicate 
relationships and interfaces between the different spheres of government in the 
province.  
Poor leadership was also identified as a key factor that affects intergovernmental 
coordination and cooperation. The interviewees made a strong point about the need 
for top leadership in all spheres and at all levels of government to take the lead and 
set the right tone to improve IGR and cooperative governance. Limited budget and 
poor financial resourcing, as well as the lack of proper management and administrative 
systems (e.g. IGR tracking, monitoring, and evaluation systems), for the IGR function 
were also highlighted as critical institutional and systemic issues that hamper effective 
IGR and cooperative governance in the province.   
5.5.4  Systems thinking and IGR 
This study explored the relevance and applicability of systems thinking to the practice 
of IGR and cooperative governance. According to the provincial and local government 
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officials who were interviewed, systems thinking provides an important paradigm 
through which the government can engender an integrated and seamless approach to 
public service delivery and governance. The interviewees indicated that systems 
thinking is already embedded within the current constitutional and legislative 
framework that underpins South Africa’s system of IGR and cooperative governance.  
In this regard, they cited Chapter 3 of the Constitution, which provides for a cooperative 
system of government and other subordinate pieces of legislation such as the IGRFA 
and the MSA that mandate the different spheres of government to cooperate and work 
together to ensure alignment of their plans and priorities through IDP processes. 
Although there are some pockets of a systems approach, such as the current province-
wide Ntirhisano community outreach programme, the interviewees identified certain 
key institutional factors that currently militate against a systems approach to IGR and 
cooperative governance in the province.  
The first key mitigating factor relates to the current structure and configuration of the 
system of government. The compartmentalisation of government through the creation 
of the different spheres of government without a single central point for IGR 
coordination was found to be a key institutional factor that militates against the 
institutionalisation of a systems approach in government. In this regard, it was 
contended that the different spheres of government see themselves as separate and 
independent (autonomous) entities rather than interdependent parts of an overall 
integrated government system.  
It was further indicated that the current political, statutory, and geographical 
boundaries that exist between the provincial government and municipalities have 
created artificial borders that militate against a systems approach to IGR and 
cooperative governance in the province. This speaks to territorial and silo-based 
attitudes and mindsets that have already been discussed as part of the broader 
organisational culture that currently prevails in both spheres of government. In other 
words, talking cooperation, but walking and practising silos, is an institutional 
pathology that undermines a systems approach to IGR and cooperative governance 
in the province.    
The other important institutional factor that works against a systems approach to IGR 
and cooperative governance relates to the lack of common vision and systems.  
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The interviewees highlighted the lack of a common strategic agenda, objectives, and 
priorities, as well as poor mechanisms and channels of communication, engagement, 
and information sharing, as other institutional weaknesses that work against a systems 
approach.  
Party political differences and priorities between the ANC-run provincial government 
and opposition-led municipalities came to the fore as a classic example in this regard. 
More importantly, the current systems fragmentation whereby the provincial 
government and municipalities operate with different and incompatible management 
and administrative systems, including financial, performance management, and 
accountability systems, were also cited as demonstrating the lack of a systems 
approach to IGR and cooperative governance in the province.  
However, despite the challenges identified above, there was a greater degree of 
consensus among provincial and local government officials that the adoption and 
application of a systems approach will improve the structure and practice of IGR and 
cooperative governance in the province in many respects. Firstly, it was asserted that 
systems thinking could help the government navigate through the complexities 
associated with the current system of cooperative governance. Secondly, the 
interviewees indicated that systems thinking would promote a greater degree of 
interdependence and cooperation between the provincial government and 
municipalities through common visioning, decision making, communication, 
accountability, and governance.  
Thirdly, the interviewees contended that a systems approach would promote seamless 
service delivery and economies of scale and eliminate intergovernmental 
fragmentation and duplication by fostering a more structured and systematic approach 
to intergovernmental planning, budgeting, and programme implementation. In this 
regard, it was pointed out that a systems approach would engender a results-based 
practice of IGR and cooperative governance in the province. To amplify the inherent 
integrative value of a systems approach, one official remarked that “leveraging the 
embedded holism of systems thinking and approach would help address the 
fragmented approach to the implementation of government programmes within the 
whole IGR framework”.  
 235 
Lastly, the interviewees indicated that a systems approach would improve the image 
and reputation of the government as a whole through seamless delivery of an 
integrated package of services to communities. This is important as communities 
cannot differentiate between national, provincial, and local spheres of government. 
Communities just see them as “government” and not necessarily different institutions 
or structures of government – hence the need for cooperative governance.  
5.5.5  Collaborative management and IGR  
In addition to a systems approach, the study also explored the relevance of the 
concept of a collaborative management approach to IGR and cooperative governance. 
The concept was explained and simplified to the officials as simply referring to 
formalised joint cooperative arrangements between organisations to achieve common 
objectives. The provincial and local government officials who participated in the 
interviews held the view that the interorganisational and cross-cutting nature of IGR 
necessitates collaborative approaches and solutions to service delivery.  
They maintained that, due to its inherent binding effect, a collaborative management 
approach has the potential to improve the structure and practice of IGR and 
cooperative governance in the province. They further contended that, in contrast to 
traditional bureaucratic management practices that have proved ineffective in 
promoting cooperative governance, collaborative management practices would help 
the provincial government departments and municipalities to harmonise their 
management and administrative processes, systems, and practices to achieve 
seamless service delivery and broader development outcomes.  
A common view from the interviewees was that, if properly structured and 
implemented, a collaborative management approach would create a commonality of 
purpose and vision, eliminate silo-based practices, leverage collaborative solutions 
and shared learning, and improve service delivery synergies, efficiencies, and 
effectiveness, as well as public confidence in government in the province. In this 
regard, memoranda of understanding and service-level agreements were identified as 
key management instruments that could be used to ensure collaborative planning, 
budgeting, and implementation and performance reporting and accountability between 
the provincial government and municipalities in the province.  
 236 
Overall, the interviewees identified radical change in the mindset and attitude, as well 
as statutory, policy, and institutional reforms, as the main preconditions or critical 
success factors that are necessary for the successful implementation and 
institutionalisation of a collaborative management and systems approach within the 
provincial government departments and municipalities in the province. In this regard, 
the required paradigm shift should include the dismantling of existing bureaucratic 
hierarchies and the creation of a new kind of relationship and cooperation based on 
mutual respect and equality between the different spheres of government. In other 
words, the success of collaborative management and a systems approach would 
depend to a greater extent on how the provincial governments and municipalities treat 
each other and relate to one another. 
With regard to the statutory, policy, and institutional reforms required to support a 
collaborative management and systems approach, the interviewees brought to the fore 
the need to align and synchronise provincial and local government planning, budgeting 
and reporting cycles, processes and systems, as well as fundamental changes to the 
organisational configuration of government in the province, including the creation of 
centralised structures with the necessary powers and authority to bring together all 
key stakeholders and enforce intergovernmental cooperation. An effective change 
management process also emerged as one of the most critical interventions that would 
facilitate change and minimise resistance to these required policy, legislative, and 
institutional reforms.  
5.6  Summary  
Chapter Five discussed the constitutional framework for the post-apartheid democratic 
state and paid attention to state transformation and public management reforms. This 
was followed by a discussion of the structure and practice of IGR and cooperative 
governance in terms of the rationale for IGR; the IGR strategy and policy framework; 
the IGR model, institutions, and structures; intergovernmental fiscal relations and 
funding model; and the institutional, structural, and systemic weaknesses of the IGR 
system (including poor bureaucratic practices and culture, poor integrated planning, 
poor intergovernmental performance management, and the overall effects and 
consequences of poor IGR).   
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The chapter also contextualised the key empirical findings focusing on the Gauteng 
province, in terms of the institutional context for IGR and cooperation (including the 
institutional configuration of the provincial and local government and the institutional 
culture and politics of provincial government). This was followed by a presentation of 
the findings in terms of the existing management practices and IGR (including the 
coordination of internal organisational business functions, the coordination of 
intergovernmental business functions, and IGR resources and capacity). The chapter 
then discussed the findings in terms of systems thinking applications and practices 
and concluded with collaborative management and IGR.  
The overall finding from the literature review and international comparative analysis, 
as well as the review of the South African experience, is that there is limited knowledge 
on the role of the public service (public administration) in IGR. In the literature, the role 
of public administration in IGR is generally limited to monitoring, advisory, and 
secretariat functions. There is a general paucity of knowledge pertaining to 
intergovernmental administrative machinery (systems, mechanisms, and practices) 
that exists to coordinate, facilitate, and manage intergovernmental planning, 
budgeting, implementation, performance monitoring, evaluation, and reporting across 
all spheres of government, both in South Africa and in the other countries analysed in 
this study.  
Chapter Three argued that the limited role of public administration, or rather the lack 
of intergovernmental administrative systems and mechanisms, is partly due to the 
institutional and cultural rigidities and limitations associated with traditional public 
administration structures and practices espoused by bureaucratic theory. These 
structures and practices have created deeply institutionalised functional silos 
(departmentalism) and an inward-looking orientation, thereby creating fragmentation 
and hampering intergovernmental cooperation. It is against this background that the 
theoretical and conceptual framework outlined in Chapter Three presents an 
alternative framework through which to analyse and promote effective management 
and administration of IGR and cooperative governance.  
Governing in modern society has become highly complex, which requires an 
integrated approach to service delivery in which functional, planning, and operational 
systems should be integrated. Officials are required to shift away from process- and 
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rule-based practices to a more innovative and pragmatic approach (SACN 2016:210-
220). The time has come for “a complete re-engineering of the public services to create 
a coherent integrated model of public administration and management” (Muthien 
2014:139). This transformation is extremely important to drive the country’s policy 
intention and commitment to a vision of becoming a developmental state that has the 
capacity to deliver and achieve its development outcomes (Ayee 2013:267). 
It is within this context that the South African government’s intention to move to a 
single public service should be appreciated. A single public service embodies the 
whole-of-government approach to achieve shared objectives across government as a 
whole (SACN 2016:211). The rationale for a single public service in South Africa also 
includes the need to strengthen intergovernmental policy coordination and integrated 
service delivery across all spheres of government (Abrahams et al. 2009:1048).  
A single public service in South Africa has the potential to improve government 
coordination and integration, as well as efficient and effective service delivery, through 
alignment of administrative systems and practices across the different spheres of 
government (Kroukamp 2008:153-154).  
Based on the theoretical and conceptual framework, as well as the lessons and 
experiences from the international comparative analysis in Chapter Four, the empirical 
analysis in Chapter Five explored central issues or themes to address the knowledge 
gap regarding intergovernmental administrative systems based on the data analysis 
and interpretation. These themes included, firstly, the institutional and organisational 
context within which the management of IGR and cooperative governance takes place 
in the Gauteng Provincial Government and municipalities. Secondly, it explored 
systems thinking and a systems approach to the management and coordination of IGR 
and cooperative governance in the Gauteng Provincial Government and 
municipalities. Thirdly, it explored a collaborative management paradigm as an 
alternative approach to traditional bureaucratic management practices.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
SYNTHESIS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1  Introduction 
Given the emphasis in praxis and in the literature on ways to improve IGR and 
cooperative government through better implementation and coordination processes at 
all levels of government, the aim of this chapter is to consolidate the assumptions and 
research findings contained in all the chapters of this thesis. This chapter also aims to 
propose improvements to IGR in general and for the Gauteng province in particular, 
for future implementation. The thesis explored, described, explained, evaluated, and 
predicted a number of aspects in terms of the theoretical underpinning and practical 
application of cooperative governance and IGR between provincial and local 
government in Gauteng. 
This chapter finally attempts to provide answers to the following primary guiding 
research question posed in Chapter One (see Section 1.2): To what extent do the 
existing institutional context and management (administrative) mechanisms, systems, 
and practices in the Gauteng Provincial Government and municipalities affect IGR and 
cooperative governance in the province?  
This chapter also presents a synthesis of the research by taking the key findings into 
account to draw conclusions on the problem statement. The study followed a multi-
stage qualitative research approach by bringing into play a combination of mixed data-
collection methods. The methods were triangulated to strengthen the research 
approach utilised to draw on a number of theoretical perspectives and literature that 
are not commonly related to one another in the scholarly field of IGR. Conclusions are 
drawn that reflect the research objectives listed below that provide useful answers to 
the research questions posed in this study in all the chapters of the thesis, to reduce 
the gap in the literature for more insight and input into future research. 
To facilitate research and to investigate the problems identified in this study, the focus 
was sub-divided into seven research objectives (see Section 1.4), which were 
analysed in the foregoing chapters of this thesis.  
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The following objectives were addressed by means of establishing a clear and 
meaningful basis for their interpretation and utilisation in the context of the chapters in 
this thesis:  
 Objective One (discussed in Chapter Two) aimed to provide a systematic 
conceptualisation and contextualisation of the variables that influence IGR. 
 Objective Two (discussed in Chapter Three) aimed to conceptualise and 
contextualise the theoretical and conceptual underpinnings to develop an 
analytical framework for IGR. 
 Objective Three (discussed in Chapter Four) aimed to provide a systematic 
conceptualisation and contextualisation of the variables that influence 
comparative international intergovernmental systems and practices. 
 Objective Four (discussed in Chapter Five) aimed to provide a contextualisation 
of the empirical variables that influence the context of IGR in South Africa and 
the Gauteng province. 
 Objective Five (discussed in Chapter Five) aimed to identify the key institutional 
factors that impede effective IGR and cooperative governance in the Gauteng 
province.  
 Objective Six (discussed in Chapter Five) aimed to explore how the existing 
administrative mechanisms, systems, and practices in the provincial 
government and municipalities support intergovernmental planning, budgeting, 
implementation, performance management, and reporting in the Gauteng 
province. 
 Objective Seven (discussed in Chapter Five) aimed to explain the nature of 
reforms required to improve the structure and practice of IGR and cooperative 
governance in the Gauteng province.   
6.2   Synthesis, findings, and conclusions of the chapters in terms of the 
research objectives  
Information was collected that would address all the research objectives, individually 
and/or collectively, to ensure that this study is also seen as an appraisal of a process 
and not only as a description based on information from the preceding chapters that 
culminated in various objectives. New insights and recommendations will also be 
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provided in this chapter to substantiate the findings and conclusions made in the 
previous chapters.  
6.2.1 Chapter Two: Conceptual and contextual variables that influence IGR  
Chapter Two addressed the following secondary research questions as stated in 
Chapter One (see Section 1.3): 
 What do the concept, context, and variations of federalism entail? 
 How are powers and functions institutionally assigned in a federal state? 
 What are the key implications of federalism for IGR?  
 What do the concept and context of decentralisation entail? 
 What are the key implications of decentralisation for IGR? 
 What do the concept and context of cooperative governance entail? 
 How does cooperative governance influence IGR? 
 What do the concept and context of IGR entail? 
This chapter established the theoretical and conceptual foundation for the 
interrelationship of IGR and cooperative governance that laid the basis for the rest of 
the chapters of the thesis. It provided the context for understanding the concept of 
federalism and the definition of federalism for the purposes of this thesis. It also 
provided different typologies and variations of federalism and explained fiscal 
federalism and how powers and functions are institutionally assigned to a federal state. 
The key implications of federalism for IGR were highlighted.  
The context for understanding the concept of decentralisation, the rationale, and key 
strategic preconditions for decentralisation, as well as the key implications of 
decentralisation for IGR, were discussed. This was followed by a discussion of the 
context of IGR in terms of cooperative governance. It also defined cooperative 
governance. The chapter defined IGR and explained the core purpose and role of IGR. 
Different models and other contextual factors that influence IGR practices were also 
provided. It explained intergovernmental fiscal relations, as well as the institutional 
mechanisms, of IGR.  
The concept of federalism relates to the division of state power and authority 
(sovereignty) between the different levels of government in a political system.  
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The institutional existence and autonomy of the different levels of governments in a 
federal system are constitutionally protected and guaranteed. This creates a non-
hierarchical relationship between the national and sub-national governments, thus 
configuring power relations and politics of equality between governments in a federal 
political system. Federal systems tend to exist in countries with large populations and 
a vast geography. Federalism stands out in the literature as a more suitable 
institutional mechanism to create national unity and stability in countries characterised 
by ethnic and cultural diversity.  
The literature on federalism also deals with fiscal federalism, which speaks to the 
financial and fiscal arrangements in a federal system. There is also the related concept 
of fiscal decentralisation, which relates to the decentralisation of fiscal functions from 
the national government to the sub-national governments. Overall, the concept of 
federalism gave rise to the concept of IGR as an institutional mechanism to address 
challenges of policy overlaps, duplication, and fragmentation inherent in a federal 
system. 
A unitary system differs significantly from a federal system in that the sub-national 
governments in a unitary system derive their existence and authority from the central 
government. Unitarism is about the centralisation of state power and authority in the 
central government. This power configuration makes the sub-national governments 
subservient and subordinate to the central government, thus creating a relationship of 
hierarchy and dominance by the central government. In contrast to federalism, which 
is central to the structure and character of the state, decentralisation is more about 
policy choices and service delivery modalities. In simple terms, decentralisation is 
about the best possible mechanisms to improve public sector performance, efficiency, 
and effectiveness. Decentralisation requires intergovernmental capacity to coordinate 
and manage decentralised functions.    
The concept of cooperative governance is closely related to the concept of IGR. While 
IGR are mainly concerned with institutional mechanisms and processes, cooperative 
governance deals with governance philosophy and values that should underpin the 
relationships and interactions between governments in a political system. Although it 
draws inspiration from the German system of cooperative federalism, cooperative 
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governance is mainly a home-grown South African philosophy that defines and 
underpins the character, principles, and values of the country’s system of IGR.   
Despite its original and traditional association with federalism, IGR evolved over time 
to become an important institutional mechanism for policy coordination in many multi-
level systems of government, including decentralised unitary systems. IGR enable 
governments to address intergovernmental disputes and policy overlaps, duplication, 
and fragmentation, as well as promoting integrated and seamless public service 
delivery. IGR take place through formal and informal mechanisms and processes, 
including executive, administrative, legislative, judicial, and non-judicial channels, all 
of which are geared towards effective intergovernmental coordination and cooperation 
to achieve common public policy objectives and outcomes.  
The system of IGR varies from country to country due to country-specific contextual 
factors, such as politics, law, history, religion, and culture, which have a significant 
bearing on the nature and character of each country’s system of IGR. These factors 
influence the structure and practice of IGR in different countries. The system of 
intergovernmental fiscal relations provides a key framework for the sharing and 
distribution of revenue between the different spheres of government in a state. It 
provides fiscal mechanisms and instruments to fund constitutional mandates and 
public policy priorities across the different spheres of government. The system also 
helps to correct fiscal imbalances and distortions that affect the capacity of the different 
spheres of government to deliver on their constitutional responsibilities.  
Overall, IGR and cooperative governance involve a complex interplay and interaction 
of many different factors. Soft issues such as human relations and interpersonal skills 
are as important as hard issues such as structures and legal instruments in promoting 
effective IGR and cooperative governance. Sound institutional and administrative 
capacity at all levels of government is also key to effective IGR and cooperative 
governance.  
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6.2.2   Chapter Three: Conceptualising and contextualising the theoretical and 
conceptual underpinnings of a framework for IGR 
Chapter Three addressed the following secondary research questions as stated in 
Chapter One (see Section 1.3): 
 What do the theoretical and conceptual foundations and key aspects related to 
bureaucracy in a public sector organisational setting entail? 
 What do the theoretical and conceptual foundations and key aspects related to 
NPM and modernisation of the public sector entail? 
 What do the theoretical and conceptual foundations and key aspects related to 
systems thinking in a public sector setting entail?  
 How can cooperative governance be conceptualised? 
 What are the key benefits and considerations to promote collaborative 
management? 
 How can collaborative planning be conceptualised and contextualised? 
 How can performance management be conceptualised and contextualised to 
promote collaborative performance management in a public sector setting? 
 How can a multi-theoretical analytical framework for IGR be conceptualised? 
Chapter Three paid attention the theoretical and conceptual foundations and key 
aspects related to bureaucracy in a public sector organisational setting. It discussed 
the theoretical and conceptual foundations and key aspects related to NPM and 
modernisation of the public service. It also explained the theoretical and conceptual 
foundations and key aspects related to systems thinking in a public sector setting. This 
was followed by a conceptualisation of collaborative management theory in the public 
sector and a discussion of planning and collaborative planning. Performance 
management was then conceptualised and contextualised to promote collaborative 
performance management in the public sector. Finally, the chapter conceptualised a 
multi-theoretical analytical framework for IGR. These aspects included systems 
thinking as an approach to IGR and a collaborative approach to IGR. 
The chapter provided a theoretical and conceptual framework for the study. The 
Bureaucratic and NPM theories provided key theoretical lenses through which to 
understand how institutional and organisational environments affect IGR and 
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cooperative governance. Systems and collaborative management theories, including 
collaborative planning and collaborative performance management theories, were 
analysed, together with strategic planning theory, to construct a framework to address 
the knowledge gap in relation to the central questions of the study.   
The multi-theoretical analysis in this chapter resulted in the construction of a multi-
theoretical and multi-disciplinary conceptual framework through which the study 
addressed the knowledge gap and constructed an alternative management model and 
approach to promote effective management of IGR and cooperative governance. The 
conceptual framework was depicted as an intergovernmental collaborative 
management model. In essence, this conceptual framework provided an analytical 
framework to make an original contribution to the existing body of knowledge on 
management of IGR and cooperative governance.  
The nature of this study lends itself to a multi-disciplinary theoretical approach 
because of its different dimensions (i.e. planning and performance management). 
These dimensions are multi-disciplinary in nature in the sense that they belong to 
different disciplines and theories. The study drew on overarching theoretical 
approaches from different disciplines in order to understand and address the key 
dimensions of the research problem and questions. 
The study engaged with relevant theoretical and conceptual issues related to the 
concept of IGR and cooperative governance in order to provide conceptual clarity. 
Related concepts such as federalism and decentralisation were also unpacked in 
terms of how they relate to IGR and cooperative governance. This analysis mainly 
provided a conceptual foundation for the study.  
The study further discussed systems theory to extract key theoretical principles and 
issues to help address the secondary research questions. Using systems theory as 
part of the analytical framework for this study helped to provide a holistic and 
integrated approach through which to analyse and understand intergovernmental 
planning, budgeting, implementation, performance management, and accountability 
across the provincial and local government spheres in Gauteng.  
The concept of a “system” comes from the natural sciences, and the development of 
the systems approach is credited to Ludwig von Bertalanffy, who developed the 
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general systems theory orally in 1930s and through publications after World War II 
(Barker and Smith 1997:288). This theory views an organism or institution as a whole 
made up of sub-systems. Von Bertalanffy (1972:417) defined a system as a set of 
elements standing in interrelation among themselves and with the environment. 
Hence, a system is made up of interrelated parts and can be explained as a totality. 
The interrelationships are therefore a key aspect of systems theory and provided an 
understanding of the interconnection and interactions between the sub-systems within 
organisations. The interactions of the sub-systems affect the survival of the system 
and a change in one part of the system affects the entire system. Also, as open 
systems, organisations can experience decay, which can point to dysfunction or 
disorder within the system. However, organisations are also “dynamic systems of 
adaptation and evolution” (Amagoh 2008:8). The system of IGR is also subject to 
various factors (e.g. institutional and administrative factors) that can affect the 
evolution and functioning of the overall system.  
The study was also underpinned by the theories of public administration and 
management, with a specific focus on the bureaucratic and NPM theories in so far as 
they shape and affect the operating institutional context (environment) for IGR and 
cooperative governance in relation to intergovernmental planning, budgeting, and 
performance management. Planning and performance management theories were 
also analysed with specific focus on strategic planning, collaborative planning, and 
performance management theories. In this regard, the purpose of this theoretical 
analysis was to understand the fundamental principles and limitations of these 
theories, as well their relevance and implications for intergovernmental planning and 
performance management.  
6.2.3  Chapter Four: Variables that influence comparative international 
intergovernmental systems and practices 
Chapter Four addressed the following secondary research questions as stated in 
Chapter One (see Section 1.3): 
 How can the Australian IGR framework be conceptualised and contextualised 
to determine the relevance of the strengths and weaknesses for the purposes 
of this study?  
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 How can the Canadian IGR framework be conceptualised and contextualised 
to determine the relevance of the strengths and weaknesses for the purposes 
of this study?  
 How can the German IGR framework be conceptualised and contextualised to 
determine the relevance of the strengths and weaknesses for the purposes of 
this study?  
 How can the Nigerian IGR framework be conceptualised and contextualised to 
determine the relevance of the strengths and weaknesses for the purposes of 
this study?  
Chapter Four provided comparative perspectives of various international systems and 
practices of IGR and cooperative governance by drawing on a cross-section of diverse 
experiences and lessons from Australia, Canada, Germany, and Nigeria. These 
countries were selected for this study due to their long history, track record, and 
experience in multi-level governance and IGR, as presented in Table 6.1.   
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Table 6.1: Summary of key findings from the South African and international comparative analyses 
Context Australia Canada Germany Nigeria South Africa 
The nature of the political 
system (state) 
Federalism founded in 1901. Federalism founded in 1867. Federalism founded in 1949. Federalism founded in 1954. A hybrid system combining 
unitarism and federalism 
founded in 1994 (unitary 
federalism). 
Levels of government Three levels of government 
made up of federal (central), 
state, and local government. 
Three levels of government 
made up of federal, 
provincial, and local 
government. 
Three levels of government 
made up of federal, state, 
and local government. 
Three levels of government 
made up of federal, state, 
and local government. 
Three levels of government 
made up of national 
(central), provincial, and 
local government. 
Assignment of legislative 
powers and functions 
The constitution allocates 
exclusive and concurrent 
legislative functions and 
powers to the different levels 
of government. 
The constitution allocates 
exclusive and concurrent 
legislative functions and 
powers to the different levels 
of government. Canada, 
however, has very limited 
concurrent powers and 
functions, thus making the 
country a jurisdictional 
federalism.  
The constitution allocates 
exclusive and concurrent 
legislative functions and 
powers to the different levels 
of government. Germany 
has relatively more 
concurrent powers and 
functions, thus making the 
country a concurrent 
(integrated) federalism.  
The constitution allocates 
exclusive and concurrent 
legislative functions and 
powers to the different levels 
of government. Only the 
central government has 
exclusive powers and 
functions, thus making the 
country a more centralised 
federalism. 
The constitution allocates 
exclusive and concurrent 
legislative functions and 
powers to the different levels 
of government. This also 
includes local government, 
which is not a common 
practice in other countries as 
local government in most of 
the countries studied falls 
under the state or provincial 
legislation. 
A degree of legislative and 
functional concurrency 
A greater degree of 
concurrency due to many 
concurrent legislative 
powers and functions 
provided for in the 
constitution. 
Limited concurrency due to 
limited concurrent legislative 
powers and functions 
provided for in the 
constitution.  
 
A greater degree of 
concurrency due to many 
concurrent legislative 
powers and functions 
provided for in the 
constitution.  
A greater degree of 
concurrency due to many 
concurrent legislative 
powers and functions 
provided for in the 
constitution. 
A greater degree of 
concurrency due to many 
concurrent legislative 
powers and functions 
provided for in the 
constitution. 
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Context Australia Canada Germany Nigeria South Africa 
The character of the 
political system (state) 
Centralised federalism due 
to a powerful federal 
government due, in part, to 
intergovernmental politics 
and favourable judicial 
rulings that have expanded 
the powers of the federal 
government (this practice 
runs counter to the country’s 
original constitutional 
configuration of powers, 
which favours the states 
more than the federal 
government).  
Decentralised federalism 
due to powerful provinces 
due, in part, to the 
assertiveness of provinces 
such as Quebec for 
provincial autonomy and 
favourable judicial rulings 
that have expanded the 
powers of the provinces (this 
practice runs counter to the 
country’s original 
constitutional configuration 
of powers, which favours the 
federal government more 
than the provinces).  
Centralised federalism 
mainly due to constitutional 
allocation of powers 
between the federal 
government and sub-
national governments (i.e. 
legislative powers mainly 
rest with the federal  
government and sub-
national governments are 
responsible for 
administrative or policy 
implementation functions). 
Centralised federalism 
mainly due to constitutional 
allocation of powers 
between the federal 
government and sub-
national governments, as 
well as the deeply 
institutionalised unitary 
political culture of the 
country due to Nigeria’s 
history of military 
dictatorship.   
A unitary federalism mainly 
due to constitutional 
allocation of powers 
between the national 
government and sub-
national governments, as 
well as the nature of  
intergovernmental politics, 
which have, for a long time, 
favoured the national 
government because of the 
political dominance and 
hegemony of the ruling ANC. 
The changing political 
landscape may, however, 
change intergovernmental 
politics going forward.  
Constitutional assignment 
of fiscal powers and 
functions 
The federal government has 
more fiscal powers than sub-
national governments (i.e. 
taxation and revenue 
collection). 
The federal government has 
more fiscal powers than sub-
national governments (i.e. 
taxation and revenue 
collection).  
The federal government has 
more fiscal powers than sub-
national governments (i.e. 
taxation and revenue 
collection).  
The federal  government has 
more fiscal powers than sub-
national governments (i.e. 
taxation and revenue 
collection).  
The national government 
has more fiscal powers than 
sub-national governments 
(i.e. taxation and revenue 
collection) 
Intergovernmental funding 
arrangements 
The country’s 
intergovernmental funding 
regime is based on a system 
of conditional and 
unconditional grants to fund 
sub-national governments, 
including a comprehensive 
system of horizontal fiscal 
equalisation funding to 
address fiscal imbalances 
and disparities between the 
different regions. 
The country’s 
intergovernmental funding 
regime is based on a system 
of conditional and 
unconditional grants to fund 
sub-national governments, 
including a comprehensive 
system of horizontal fiscal 
equalisation funding to 
address fiscal imbalances 
and disparities between the 
different regions. 
The country’s 
intergovernmental funding 
regime is based on a system 
of conditional and 
unconditional grants to fund 
sub-national governments, 
including a comprehensive 
system of horizontal fiscal 
equalisation funding to 
address fiscal imbalances 
and disparities between the 
different regions. 
The country’s 
intergovernmental funding 
regime is based on a system 
of conditional and 
unconditional grants to fund 
sub-national governments, 
including some degree of 
horizontal fiscal equalisation 
to address fiscal imbalances 
and disparities between the 
different regions. 
The country’s 
intergovernmental funding 
regime is based on a system 
of conditional and 
unconditional grants to fund 
sub-national governments, 
including some degree of 
horizontal fiscal equalisation 
to address fiscal imbalances 
and disparities the between 
different provinces or 
regions. 
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Context Australia Canada Germany Nigeria South Africa 
The character of the fiscal 
system 
Although the country’s original 
constitutional intent and 
design gave the sub-national 
governments a greater degree 
of fiscal autonomy, practical 
politics and judicial rulings 
have given the federal 
government more fiscal 
powers and hegemony, 
thereby creating centralisation 
of the fiscal system in 
Australia. 
 
The distribution of revenue 
from natural resources taxes / 
royalties remains a bone of 
contention between 
resources-rich and resource-
poor states.   
Although the country’s original 
constitutional intent and 
design gave the federal 
government a greater degree 
of fiscal powers, practical 
politics, the assertiveness of 
provinces, and judicial rulings 
have given the provinces 
more fiscal powers and 
hegemony, thereby creating 
decentralisation of the fiscal 
system in Canada. 
 
The distribution of revenue 
from natural resources taxes / 
royalties remains a bone of 
contention between 
resources- rich and resource-
poor states.   
Germany has a centralised 
fiscal system due to the 
constitutional configuration of 
powers and functions, which 
is designed in favour of the 
federal government.  
Nigeria has a centralised 
fiscal system due to the 
constitutional configuration of 
powers and functions, which 
is designed mainly in favour of 
the federal government, 
including oil revenue, which is 
managed centrally by the 
federal  government.  
 
The distribution of oil revenue 
remains a bone of contention 
between oil-producing states 
and poor states.   
South Africa has a centralised 
fiscal system due to the 
constitutional configuration of 
powers and functions, which 
is designed in favour of the 
national government. 
The system of IGR  
 
 
 
Australia has a voluntary 
system of IGR.  
Canada has a voluntary 
system of IGR. 
Although Germany has a 
voluntary system of IGR, the 
nature and configuration of 
German federalism make IGR 
a key central feature of the 
system.  
Nigeria has a voluntary 
system of IGR. 
Although South Africa has a 
voluntary system of IGR. The 
country’s constitutional 
provisions for normative IGR 
values and principles 
represent an important 
institutional innovation.  
The strength of IGR 
institutions and structures 
Although the country’s IGR 
institutions and structures 
remain, to a greater degree, 
voluntary in nature, Australia 
has over time managed to 
build relatively strong and 
resilient IGR institutions and 
structures mainly due to the 
country’s long history as a 
federal state. 
Although the country’s IGR 
institutions and structures 
remain, to a greater degree, 
voluntary in nature, Canada 
has over time managed to 
build relatively strong and 
resilient IGR institutions and 
structures mainly due to the 
country’s long history as a 
federal state. 
Although the country’s IGR 
institutions and structures 
remain, to some degree, 
voluntary in nature, Germany 
has over time managed to 
build relatively strong and 
resilient IGR institutions and 
structures mainly due to the 
country’s long history as a 
federal state and the 
integrated nature of its 
federalism. 
Nigeria has relatively weak 
IGR institutions and structures 
mainly due to the country’s 
militarised federalism and 
unitary political culture.    
South Africa has fairly strong 
IGR institutions and 
structures, although many of 
them remain voluntary in 
nature.  
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Context Australia Canada Germany Nigeria South Africa 
The nature of 
intergovernmental 
administrative systems 
and mechanisms 
 
Limited knowledge and 
information exist on the 
country’s intergovernmental 
administrative systems and 
mechanisms that support 
and drive the country’s 
intergovernmental planning, 
implementation, and 
performance management. 
Limited knowledge and 
information exist on the 
country’s intergovernmental 
administrative systems and 
mechanisms that support 
and drive the country’s 
intergovernmental planning, 
implementation, and 
performance management. 
Limited knowledge and 
information exist on the 
country’s intergovernmental 
administrative systems and 
mechanisms that support 
and drive the country’s 
intergovernmental planning, 
implementation, and 
performance management. 
Limited knowledge and 
information exist on the 
country’s intergovernmental 
administrative systems and 
mechanisms that support 
and drive the country’s 
intergovernmental planning, 
implementation, and 
performance management. 
Limited knowledge and 
information exist on the 
country’s intergovernmental 
administrative systems and 
mechanisms that support 
and drive the country’s 
intergovernmental planning, 
implementation, and 
performance management. 
Common contentious IGR 
issues 
Disputes over powers and 
functions and revenue 
sharing remain the most 
contentious IGR issues.  
Disputes over powers and 
functions and revenue 
sharing remain the most 
contentious IGR issues. 
Disputes over powers and 
functions and revenue 
sharing remain the most 
contentious IGR issues. 
Disputes over powers and 
functions and revenue 
sharing remain the most 
contentious IGR issues. 
Disputes over powers and 
functions and revenue 
sharing remain the most 
contentious IGR issues. 
IGR dispute-resolution 
mechanisms 
There is a relatively greater 
degree of judicial 
involvement in the country’s 
intergovernmental dispute 
resolution. 
There is a relatively greater 
degree of judicial 
involvement in the country’s 
intergovernmental dispute 
resolution. 
There is a relatively limited 
degree of judicial 
involvement in the country’s 
intergovernmental dispute 
resolution. 
There is a relatively greater 
degree of judicial 
involvement in the country’s 
intergovernmental dispute 
resolution. 
There is a relatively limited 
degree of judicial 
involvement in the country’s 
intergovernmental dispute 
resolution. 
Overall IGR power 
relations 
The federal government 
enjoys a greater amount of 
political power and 
dominance over the sub-
national governments mainly 
due to its legislative and 
fiscal powers. Furthermore, 
the executive branch of 
government dominates the 
country’s system of IGR 
(executive federalism). 
The assertiveness of the 
provinces for provincial 
autonomy means that 
Canada has more balanced 
IGR power relations 
between the federal 
government and the 
provinces. Furthermore, the 
executive branch of 
government dominates the 
country’s system of IGR 
(executive federalism). 
The federal government 
enjoys a greater amount of 
political power and 
dominance over the sub-
national governments mainly 
due to its legislative and 
fiscal powers. Furthermore, 
although the parliament 
plays a significant role in 
intergovernmental legislative 
matters, the executive 
branch of government 
dominates the country’s 
system of IGR (executive 
federalism).  
The federal government 
enjoys a greater amount of 
political power and 
dominance over the sub-
national governments mainly 
due to its legislative and 
fiscal powers. Furthermore, 
the executive branch of 
government dominates the 
country’s system of  IGR 
(executive federalism). 
The national government 
enjoys a greater amount of 
political power and 
dominance over the sub-
national governments mainly 
due to its legislative and 
fiscal powers. Furthermore, 
although the parliament 
plays a significant role in 
intergovernmental legislative 
matters, the executive 
branch of government 
dominates the country’s 
system of IGR (executive 
federalism).  
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Chapter Four discussed the Australian IGR framework. It included public 
administration and public management reforms (including NPM reforms and budget 
and performance management reforms), the whole-of-government approach to 
integrated governance, the system of IGR, intergovernmental politics and institutional 
power dynamics, the system of intergovernmental fiscal and funding relations, the 
politics of the intergovernmental fiscal system, and the institutional and systemic 
weaknesses of the Australian system.  
The chapter then explained the Canadian IGR framework. It paid attention to the 
founding political philosophy of Canadian federalism, the constitutional architecture of 
the Canadian state, public administration and public management reforms, the system 
of IGR (including intergovernmental institutional and administrative infrastructure and 
cooperative federalism and intergovernmental partnerships), the system of 
intergovernmental fiscal and funding relations, the politics of the intergovernmental 
fiscal system, and the institutional and systemic weaknesses of the Canadian system.  
The chapter then addressed the German IGR framework. It paid attention to public 
administration and public management reforms, the system of IGR, and the system of 
intergovernmental fiscal relations, including the structure of the fiscal system and 
taxation powers and intergovernmental funding arrangements and modalities. 
This was followed by the Nigerian IGR framework. It addressed the constitutional 
architecture of the Nigerian state, public administration and public management 
reforms, the system of IGR, the system of intergovernmental fiscal relations, and the 
institutional and systemic weaknesses of the Nigerian system.  
The chapter concluded with an integrated synthesis of key comparative experiences, 
lessons, and observations. Overall, the principal purpose of the chapter was to extract 
key lessons from the international comparative analysis, more broadly in relation to 
existing IGR models, and specifically in relation to the kinds of administrative culture, 
systems, and practices that exist in the countries under review to support effective 
management of IGR and cooperative governance. 
This chapter studied four of the oldest federal states across four continents in the 
world, namely Australia, Canada, Germany, and Nigeria, to draw key comparative 
experiences and lessons on IGR and cooperative governance. There are key lessons 
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South Africa could draw from this international comparative analysis in relation to 
system designs, structures, and practices of IGR and cooperative governance.  
For example, Germany is well renowned for its cooperative system of IGR. The 
principles of mutual friendly relations and cooperation between the spheres of 
government, which currently underpin South Africa’s system of IGR and cooperative 
governance, have mainly been inspired by the German cooperative system of 
government. Australia and Canada have a strong track record in public sector 
institutional re-engineering and management reforms. They count among the first 
countries that experimented with and implemented neo-liberal and managerial 
practices in the form of NPM reforms since the 1980s. As noted previously, NPM is 
part of the theoretical and conceptual framework for this study. It is relevant to this 
study in as far as it affects the broader institutional context within which public 
administration and IGR operate. Nigeria provides a counter-balance in terms of 
experiences and lessons from an African and developing country perspective.  
A combination of this cross-section of countries from four different continents provides 
important experiences from which key comparative lessons could be drawn to inform 
and enhance intergovernmental institutional and management reforms in South Africa. 
As a quasi-federal state, South Africa can draw a number of valuable and instructive 
lessons from these four countries, which count among the oldest federations in the 
world.  
The first most important lesson relates to the philosophy and approach to IGR and 
cooperative governance. In this regard, South Africa can draw lessons from the whole-
of-government philosophy and approach that underpin the Australian and Canadian 
systems of IGR and cooperative federalism. This is an integrated governance 
philosophy that takes a holistic and systems view and approach to government 
operations in order to promote stronger vertical and horizontal policy coordination, 
cooperation, and integration across all levels and sectors of the government to achieve 
common government-wide objectives and outcomes. A strong culture of results-based 
management and accountability in Australia and Canada could also benefit South 
Africa. This includes a results- or outcomes-based approach to government planning, 
budgeting, performance, and accountability.  
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In terms of the design of a more equitable and redistributive system of 
intergovernmental fiscal relations, the Australian, Canadian, and German experiences 
demonstrate how horizontal fiscal equalisation funding mechanisms can be used to 
address fiscal and socioeconomic disparities between the affluent and poor regions in 
a state. Such mechanisms could help address South Africa’s apartheid legacy of 
spatial disparities and socioeconomic inequalities between the country’s provinces 
and regions within the provinces. Furthermore, horizontal IGR structures and 
institutions in Australia and Canada represent an institutional innovation from which 
key lessons can be drawn to strengthen interprovincial relations, cooperation, and 
capacity in South Africa. Canada’s flexible, adaptive, and differentiated approach to 
IGR and cooperative federalism, especially in managing and accommodating regional 
diversity and interests, also offers a progressive lesson about how other countries can 
design and implement a differentiated and accommodative system of IGR to better 
respond to diverse regional circumstances and needs.  
Notwithstanding the above positive international comparative lessons, there are, 
however, other key experiences and lessons of what needs to be avoided in the design 
and practice of IGR and cooperative governance. For example, the centralised and 
militarised character of the Nigerian system of federalism and IGR does not augur well 
for friendly relations, mutual respect, and cooperation between the different levels of 
government. Although high negotiation and consensus requirements associated with 
the German system of IGR and cooperative federalism are good for mutual relations, 
cooperation, harmony, and trust between the different levels of government, these 
could also prolong intergovernmental decision making and lead to policy stalemates.   
6.2.4  Chapter Five: Contextual and empirical variables that influence the 
South African and Gauteng province context of IGR 
Chapter Five addressed the following secondary research questions as stated in 
Chapter One (see Section 1.3): 
 What does the constitutional framework for the post-apartheid democratic state, 
state transformation, and public management reforms entail? 
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 What do the structure and practice of IGR and cooperative governance in terms 
of the rationale for IGR and the IGR strategy and policy framework in South 
Africa entail?  
 What do the IGR model, institutions and structures; intergovernmental fiscal 
relations; and funding model in South Africa entail?  
 What are the institutional, structural, and systemic weaknesses of IGR in the 
Gauteng province?  
 How does the current institutional context (environment) in the Gauteng 
Provincial Government and municipalities affect IGR and cooperative 
governance in the province? 
 How do existing management (administrative) mechanisms, systems, and 
practices in the Gauteng Provincial Government and municipalities support 
intergovernmental planning, budgeting, implementation, performance 
management, and reporting in the province? 
 What kinds of reforms are required to improve the structure and practice of IGR 
and cooperative governance in the Gauteng province? 
Chapter Five discussed the constitutional framework for the post-apartheid democratic 
state and paid attention to state transformation and public management reforms. This 
was followed by a discussion of the structure and practice of IGR and cooperative 
governance in terms of the rationale for IGR; the IGR strategy and policy framework; 
the IGR model, institutions, and structures; intergovernmental fiscal relations and 
funding model; and the institutional, structural, and systemic weaknesses of the IGR 
system (including poor bureaucratic practices and culture, poor integrated planning, 
poor intergovernmental performance management, and the overall effects and 
consequences of poor IGR).   
The chapter also contextualised the key empirical findings focusing on the Gauteng 
province, in terms of the institutional context for IGR and cooperation (including the 
institutional configuration of the provincial and local government and the institutional 
culture and politics of provincial government). This was followed by a presentation of 
the findings in terms of existing management practices and IGR, including the 
coordination of internal organisational business functions, the coordination of 
intergovernmental business functions, and IGR resources and capacity. The chapter 
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then discussed the findings in terms of systems thinking applications and practices 
and concluded with collaborative management and IGR.  
The overall finding from the literature review and international comparative analysis, 
as well as the review of the South African experience, was that there is limited 
knowledge on the role of the public service (public administration) in IGR. In the 
literature, the role of public administration in IGR is generally limited to monitoring, 
advisory, and secretariat functions. There is, however, a general paucity of knowledge 
pertaining to intergovernmental administrative machinery (systems, mechanisms, and 
practices) that exists to coordinate, facilitate, and manage intergovernmental planning, 
budgeting, implementation, performance monitoring, evaluation, and reporting across 
all spheres of government, both in South Africa and the other countries analysed in 
this study.  
This thesis has argued that the limited role of public administration, or rather the lack 
of intergovernmental administrative systems and mechanisms, is partly due to 
institutional and cultural rigidities and limitations associated with traditional public 
administration structures and practices espoused by bureaucratic theory. These 
structures and practices have created deeply institutionalised functional silos 
(departmentalism) and an inward-looking orientation, thereby creating fragmentation 
and hampering intergovernmental cooperation. It is against this background that the 
theoretical and conceptual framework outlined in Chapter Three presented an 
alternative framework through which to analyse and promote effective management 
and administration of IGR and cooperative governance.  
Governing in the modern society has become highly complex, which requires an 
integrated approach to service delivery in which functional, planning, and operational 
systems should be integrated. Officials are required to shift away from process- and 
rule-based practices to more innovative and pragmatic approaches (SACN 2016:210-
220). The time has come for “a complete re-engineering of the public services to create 
a coherent integrated model of public administration and management” (Muthien 
2014:139). This transformation is extremely important to drive the country’s policy 
intention and commitment to a vision of becoming a developmental state that has the 
capacity to deliver and achieve its development outcomes (Ayee 2013:267). 
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It is within this context that the South African government’s intention to move to a 
single public service should be appreciated. A single public service embodies the 
whole-of-government approach to achieve shared objectives across the government 
as a whole (SACN 2016:211). The rationale for a single public service in South Africa 
also includes the need to strengthen intergovernmental policy coordination and 
integrated service delivery across all spheres of government (Abrahams et al. 
2009:1048). A single public service in South Africa has the potential to improve 
government coordination and integration, as well as efficient and effective service 
delivery through the alignment of administrative systems and practices across the 
different spheres of government (Kroukamp 2008:153-154).  
Based on the theoretical and conceptual framework, as well as the lessons and 
experiences from the international comparative analysis, the empirical analysis in 
Chapter Five explored central issues or themes to address the knowledge gap on 
intergovernmental administrative systems based on the data analysis and 
interpretation. These themes included, firstly, the institutional and organisational 
context within which the management of IGR and cooperative governance takes place 
in the Gauteng Provincial Government and municipalities.  
Secondly, it explored systems thinking and a systems approach to the management 
and coordination of IGR and cooperative governance in the Gauteng Provincial 
Government and municipalities. Thirdly, it explored a collaborative management 
paradigm as an alternative approach to traditional bureaucratic management 
practices.  
6.3  Conclusions 
According to the final analysis, this study points to a complex interplay of theoretical, 
conceptual, institutional, organisational, and management (administrative) issues and 
nuances that affect the structure and practice of IGR and cooperative governance. 
Overall, several key conclusions can be drawn from this study in relation to key 
fundamental factors or issues that undermine effective IGR and cooperative 
governance between the different spheres of government in the Gauteng province.  
The first main conclusion relates to the inherent design flaws and weaknesses in the 
structural and organisational configuration of the government, which in turn affect the 
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effective institutional coordination of IGR and cooperative governance in the province. 
These weaknesses are manifested in weak and fragmented institutional arrangements 
(structures) for coordination of intergovernmental cooperation; the horizontal and 
vertical confusion of roles and responsibilities within and between spheres of 
government; ongoing intergovernmental contestation over powers, functions, and 
mandates; and the duplication of functions between provincial government 
departments, municipalities, public agencies, and entities. 
Contrary to the theoretical postulation of NPM theory, with regard to the creation of 
public entities and agencies as a better institutional model to modernise the 
government and to promote public sector efficiency, effectiveness, productivity, and 
cost reduction, the practical experience from this empirical study paints a somewhat 
different picture about public agencies and entities in Gauteng. Gauteng’s experience 
indicates that agencification creates new sets of oversight, governance, management, 
and financial (cost inefficiencies) challenges, including institutional complexities in 
relation to management of intergovernmental coordination and alignment. This seems 
to support the theoretical critique of NPM advanced in Chapter Three.  
On a much broader theoretical and philosophical level, the institutional weaknesses 
highlighted above have to do with the institutional constraints and limitations 
associated with federal-type arrangements in the configuration of the constitutional 
and jurisdictional powers, functions, and mandates of the different spheres of 
government. IGR and cooperative governance cannot supersede the constitutional 
and jurisdictional powers and autonomy of governments within federal or semi-federal 
states.  
It is this institutional autonomy of governments within states that makes it difficult, if 
not impossible, to enforce intergovernmental cooperation as one sphere of 
government cannot hold another autonomous sphere of government accountable for 
non-cooperation. This is the primary reason why IGR remain voluntary in South Africa 
and in all countries studied as part of the international comparative analysis. This 
predominantly voluntary nature of the concept of IGR partly explains poor 
intergovernmental cooperation between the different spheres of government.  
The second conclusion speaks to the negative effect of institutional culture and politics 
on IGR and cooperative governance. In this regard, key institutional and cultural 
 259 
factors that work against effective IGR and cooperative governance relate mainly to 
the prevailing silo-based and compliance-orientated mentality and operational 
practices, hierarchical and top-down (superior-subordinate) relationships between 
spheres, lack of accountability and consequences for non-cooperation, bureaucratic 
red tape, and sluggish decision making within the government.   
These institutional pathologies stem from a poor combination of much deeper 
structural issues, which include the rule-based culture and procedural practices 
associated with existing traditional bureaucratic structures and practices found in 
government (i.e. bureaucratisation of the state), the territorial psychology and 
behaviour of government officials (i.e. territorialism), fragmented policy and legislative 
frameworks that govern and regulate the provincial and local government, the 
voluntary nature of the country’s system of IGR, and the constitutional autonomy and 
independence of the different spheres of government.  
Furthermore, this study suggests that these institutional pathologies were also rooted 
in the apartheid public administration’s culture and values. In this regard, this study 
found that, despite the country’s democratisation in 1994 and the departure from the 
apartheid notion of tiers (hierarchies) to a system of equality and non-hierarchical IGR 
between spheres of government as embodied in the country’s constitution, hierarchical 
relationships remain part of the practice of IGR in the post-apartheid democratic 
dispensation (Tapscott 2000:121).  
This practice is antithetical to the normative constitutional values and principles that 
underpin South Africa’s system of IGR and cooperative governance. This is a clear 
demonstration that the apartheid legacy of functional silos (departmentalism) and 
hierarchical relationships continues to define and perpetuate silo-based and top-down 
practice of IGR and cooperative governance in post-apartheid South Africa. This 
practice conforms to the principal-agent model of IGR discussed in Chapter Two.  
The institutional pathologies identified through the empirical study share parallels with 
the international comparative experiences of Australia, Canada, and Nigeria. Despite 
embracing NPM-inspired public sector management reforms, these countries have not 
undergone a complete mindset and paradigm shift from traditional bureaucratic public 
administration structures and practices. In other words, these countries have not 
achieved a complete de-bureaucratisation of the public service culture. For example, 
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in Australia and Canada, critical institutional challenges remain in relation to the 
institutionalisation of the whole-of-government approach and cooperative federalism. 
These include difficulties in dismantling the organisational culture and silos associated 
with the traditional functional bureaucratic structures, as well as challenges in forging 
intergovernmental alignment and integration across the government mainly due to a 
general preoccupation with individual departmental priorities and outcomes.  
This supports the theoretical assertion made in Chapter Three that it is difficult to 
change deeply entrenched institutional and organisational cultures and practices. On 
a broader theoretical level, this further supports the theoretical postulations and 
arguments made in Chapter Three regarding the inherent limitations and flaws 
associated with bureaucratic theory (i.e. bureaucratisation of the state) and its 
militating effect against effective intergovernmental cooperation and collaboration. 
With regard to institutional politics, the outcomes of the 2016 local government 
elections created complex political dynamics and dimensions in terms of IGR and 
cooperation between the ANC-run provincial government and the opposition-led 
municipalities in the province. Although it is premature to make a definitive conclusion 
about the trajectory of the relations between the ANC-run provincial government and 
the opposition-led municipalities, it does appear that a trust deficit and clash of political 
priorities are at the centre of the emerging intergovernmental politics in the province.  
Apart from party politics, fiscal and financial powers also play an influential role in 
intergovernmental politics in the province. This is not dissimilar to the international 
comparative experiences discussed in Chapter Four. Key instructive lessons can be 
drawn from Canada’s highly flexible and differentiated IGR approach to help the 
Gauteng province navigate and manage intergovernmental politics between the ANC-
run provincial government and the opposition-led municipalities. The province could 
also learn from Australia and Canada regarding the institutional approach to 
strengthening horizontal intergovernmental cooperation, including matters relating to 
interprovincial and intermunicipal relations and policy capacity. 
The third conclusion relates to the poor management and administrative architecture, 
infrastructure, and capacity for IGR and cooperative governance in the province. There 
are no clear business processes, systems, and procedures within the provincial 
government departments and municipalities for the management, coordination, and 
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alignment of intergovernmental planning, budgeting, implementation, and 
performance monitoring, evaluation, and reporting. These include the lack of common 
standard operating procedures and uniform performance indicators, as well as 
integrated systems and mechanisms to monitor and track key intergovernmental 
decisions and resolutions made by various political and technical IGR structures in the 
province.  
The current statutory and policy frameworks and the lack of an overarching province-
wide strategic IGR framework, norms, and standards make it difficult for the provincial 
government departments and municipalities to develop and implement common IGR 
management and operational business processes, systems, and procedures. In this 
regard, the current fragmented provincial and local government policy and legislative 
(regulatory) frameworks have institutionalised intergovernmental fragmentation in 
relation to planning, budgeting, project implementation, and performance monitoring, 
evaluation, and reporting, thereby undermining the normative principles and values of 
cooperative governance as enshrined in the country’s constitution.  
Furthermore, poor institutional location, capacitation, and resourcing of the IGR 
function and poor IGR leadership have colluded to undermine the province’s 
intergovernmental strategic and operational management (administrative) capacity 
and capability to deliver an integrated package of services to citizens across all 
spheres of government in the province. The appointment of junior officials to manage 
IGR functions and the delegation of junior officials to attend to IGR engagements, 
including IDP engagements, have further compounded the institutional capacity 
weaknesses of the provincial government and municipalities to drive IGR and 
cooperative governance in the province. 
The last conclusion relates to the relevance and possible application of the principles 
and approaches associated with collaborative management and systems theory to the 
theory and practice of IGR and cooperative governance. Based on the analysis where 
the relevance and applicability of collaborative management and systems approaches 
to IGR and cooperative governance were explored, certain fundamental conclusions 
can be made. Firstly, there is currently a lack of collaborative and systems thinking in 
the manner in which provincial and local government officials in Gauteng conduct IGR 
and cooperative governance. This is mainly because government officials are still 
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steeped in traditional bureaucratic management tradition, which promotes silo-based 
territorial thinking and practices. 
Secondly, collaborative management and systems approaches offer an alternative 
public sector management paradigm, as well as a holistic analytical framework and 
perspective to the theory and practice of IGR and cooperative governance. In this 
regard, these complementary approaches and paradigms could improve the practice 
of IGR and cooperative governance in numerous respects. Firstly, they could foster 
collaborative strategic planning and performance management approaches and help 
the different spheres of government to find joint solutions to address complex service 
delivery and development challenges that transcend and cut across organisational, 
jurisdictional, and sectoral boundaries.  
In other words, these approaches could help the different spheres of government to 
break free from their artificial boundaries (territorial mentality) and embrace their 
mutual interdependence and interconnection as components of the overall 
government system. These approaches could also engender the whole-of-
government approach and help the government to leverage embedded synergies and 
economies of scale that exist between the different spheres of government in the 
province. Finally, and more importantly, these approaches could bring about a radical 
paradigm shift and inclusive perspective to the matter in which the different spheres 
of government interact and relate to one another. 
6.4   General implications and proposals for the way forward  
Various key statutory, regulatory, policy, institutional, governance, and management 
implications emerged from the final analysis. These implications point to key strategic 
considerations, interventions, and measures required to improve the macro structure 
and practice of IGR and cooperative governance in the Gauteng province. It is clear 
from this study that significant investment is required to improve the institutional, 
governance, and management architecture, infrastructure, and systems for IGR and 
cooperative governance in the province – another sphere of government that Keating 
(2012:219) refers to as the “fourth order of government”. As the fourth sphere of 
government, IGR bring together the other three spheres of government (national, 
provincial, and local spheres of government) for effective governance and service 
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delivery. Although this empirical study was limited to the Gauteng province, its 
implications stretch far beyond the confines of this province.  
6.4.1  Statutory and policy implications 
This study points to four broad policy and legislative implications that need to be 
considered and addressed to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the system 
of IGR and cooperative governance. The first implication relates to the need for policy 
and legislative (regulatory) reforms to ensure better alignment and integration of the 
current fragmented planning, budgeting, and reporting cycles, processes, and 
systems across all spheres of government. This would bring about seamless 
intergovernmental planning, budgeting, implementation, and performance monitoring, 
evaluation, and reporting across all spheres of government.    
The second implication speaks to the need for the development and implementation 
of common and uniform government-wide minimum policy norms and standards to 
ensure vertical and horizontal uniformity in respect of service delivery functions across 
all spheres of government. This will help address fragmentation in the current 
dispensation, whereby certain standards for public infrastructure, facilities, and 
services vary from one sphere or organ of government to another, with the BRT 
systems between the metropolitan municipalities in Gauteng being the classic 
example in this regard.  
The third policy implication pertains to the desirability of further decentralisation and 
devolution of key service delivery functions (e.g. housing) from the provincial 
government to high-capacity municipalities to ensure better service delivery 
coordination, efficiency, and effectiveness, as well as improved citizen and community 
satisfaction and experience at the local level. 
The fourth policy implication relates to the need for fundamental public service reforms 
to create a single, integrated, and seamless public service across all spheres of 
government to improve overall state capacity, effectiveness, and efficiency; to ensure 
better coordination; and to address the current silo-based and fragmented public 
administration and service delivery systems. In this regard, the required reforms 
should include the re-engineering, alignment, and integration of human resources and 
performance management frameworks, practices, and systems, including the 
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introduction of performance-based scorecards and incentive bonuses for good 
intergovernmental collaborative performance and consequence management, and 
accountability measures for non-cooperation between provincial and local government 
officials.   
To make an intergovernmental performance management system work, IGR and 
cooperative governance priorities need to form part of key performance areas in the 
formal performance agreements of all provincial and local government senior officials 
– from the accounting officers (heads of departments and municipal managers) down 
to programme and project managers. These reform measures will incentivise 
intergovernmental cooperation between provincial and local government officials and 
strengthen consequence management (accountability) for poor or non-cooperation.    
6.4.2  Institutional and governance implications 
In addition to the broader statutory and policy implications, this study further points to 
a number of institutional and governance implications in relation to the structure and 
practice of IGR and cooperative governance in the Gauteng province. These 
implications are set out below.   
6.4.2.1  Re-engineering and rationalising institutional arrangements 
There are key institutional reforms that are required to re-engineer, rationalise, and 
streamline structural and institutional arrangements to improve the management and 
coordination of IGR and cooperative governance in the province. The first institutional 
reform speaks to the need to create or establish a single strategic centre or central 
point for overall intergovernmental coordination with the necessary capacity and 
powers to drive and enforce cooperation and integration in the province. This should 
include an integrated and centralised reporting system (i.e. whole-of-government 
reporting) to address the current fragmented and parallel institutional arrangements 
that create confusing and overlapping roles and responsibilities, as well as 
inefficiencies within the overall government system.  
The second institutional reform pertains to the need to explore the creation or 
establishment of common province-wide shared service models or institutions, 
including joint planning and funding models to eliminate intergovernmental 
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fragmentation and duplication and to maximise overall institutional efficiencies, 
effectiveness, and economies of scale in the operations of the government and 
implementation of collaborative programmes and projects in the province. The third 
main institutional reform calls for a more decentralised or regionalised institutional 
model or structure of the provincial government through the creation of a regional and 
district service delivery model to ensure better service delivery coordination and 
cooperation with municipalities, as well as overall government responsiveness to 
citizens and communities.   
6.4.2.2  Institutional location, capacitation, and resourcing of the IGR function 
The institutional location, capacitation, and resourcing of the IGR function were all 
identified in this empirical study as key institutional weaknesses and limitations that 
face both the provincial government departments and municipalities in the Gauteng 
province. This therefore calls for proper strategic institutional location, positioning, and 
resourcing of the IGR function and capacity within the upper echelons of the 
organisational structures of both the provincial government departments (e.g. offices 
of heads of departments) and municipalities (e.g. offices of municipal managers).  
Placing the IGR function in strategic offices with the necessary capacity, powers, and 
authority will support the effective management and championing of IGR as a core 
strategic function rather than a low-level administrative or operational function of the 
government. In this regard, there is also a need to align the institutional structure and 
location of functions and portfolios across the provincial departments and 
municipalities to promote better alignment and coordination.  
Furthermore, there is a need to professionalise IGR practice through the appointment 
of skilled and experienced professionals, as well as the implementation of structured 
capacity-building and training programmes in order to build an effective system of IGR 
and cooperative governance in the province. This is also key to transforming the 
government into a learning and resilient organisation that is able to adjust and adapt 
to ongoing changes in the socioeconomic environment, which include the ever-
changing and growing needs and demands of the citizens. Provincial government 
support and capacitation of municipalities would also be more helpful in this regard.  
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All these institutional reform and re-engineering measures will enable both the 
provincial government departments and municipalities to drive IGR as a strategic tool 
and instrument to transcend territorial, functional, and jurisdictional boundaries to forge 
effective cooperation and collaboration towards a common service delivery and 
development vision.  
6.4.2.3  Paradigm shift in the culture, orientation, and approach to IGR  
An effective system of IGR and cooperative governance requires a paradigm shift from 
the current silo-based and compliance-orientated institutional and organisational 
culture to a substantive and results-based IGR practice and culture within both the 
provincial government departments and municipalities in the province. The required 
paradigm shift will need an effective change management process to alter the current 
silo-based and territorial psychology (behaviour, attitude, and mindset) of provincial 
and local government officials in the province. 
There is also a need for a strategic orientation and structured approach to the manner 
in which the provincial government departments and municipalities conduct IGR and 
cooperative governance in the province. In this regard, the government needs to 
develop a common, overarching, province-wide vision, framework, and agenda 
(including an annual IGR calendar) to provide a strategic blueprint to guide the 
provincial government departments and municipalities in terms intergovernmental 
planning, budgeting, implementation, and reporting. This macro strategic IGR 
framework and agenda will need to be implemented through intergovernmental 
partnerships or cooperative agreements or memoranda of agreements, which should 
be supported by detailed short-, medium-, and long-term priorities and funding models 
with clear performance indicators, targets, and outcomes. This would institutionalise a 
more structured and results-based approach to IGR and cooperative governance in 
the province.      
Furthermore, it will be important to ensure that long-term intergovernmental priorities 
and plans are de-linked from the five-year political terms of office (electoral cycles) of 
the government to ensure institutional and implementation continuity, consistency, and 
stability in order to achieve government-wide development outcomes and impacts. A 
more nuanced and differentiated approach to IGR and cooperative governance in the 
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province will also be important to enable the spheres of government to effectively 
respond to different contextual realities, needs, and challenges.  
6.4.2.4  Clarity and certainty on institutional powers and functions 
The ongoing confusion and contestation over powers and functions, as well as roles 
and responsibilities, between the different spheres of government, especially between 
the district and local municipalities, were identified during this study as one of the major 
sources of intergovernmental tensions that impede effective coordination and 
cooperation. This requires structured institutional mechanisms and processes to help 
address these tensions and provide clarity and certainty to ensure better 
intergovernmental cooperation and delivery.    
6.4.2.5  Intergovernmental strategic leadership and diplomacy 
Effective IGR and cooperative governance mainly depend on human relations. The 
manner in which the different spheres of government treat or relate to one another 
determines the tone, style, and character of IGR and cooperative governance. This 
study identified hierarchical and top-down relationships between the spheres of 
government and poor communication as some of the key factors that undermine 
cooperative relations, as well as the constitutional normative values and principles that 
underpin IGR and cooperative governance in post-apartheid democratic South Africa.  
Leadership also emerged as a key area of weakness that hampers effective IGR and 
cooperative governance in the province. All these weaknesses point to the paucity of 
soft skills required to smooth out and facilitate IGR and cooperative governance in the 
province. Investment in intergovernmental strategic leadership and diplomacy will 
therefore be critical to improving human relations and trust. This will help the 
government to navigate and manage tensions that may arise from time to time. The 
required investment includes the need for visionary and transformational leadership to 
champion IGR and strengthen the political-administrative interface between the 
political and administrative leadership at all levels of the government to achieve 
common development objectives and outcomes.  
The changes in the province’s political landscape following the 2016 local government 
elections have further heightened the need for intergovernmental or cooperative 
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diplomacy to manage and address complex intergovernmental politics between the 
ANC-run provincial government and the opposition-led municipalities in Gauteng.   
6.4.3  Management and administrative implications 
This study identified silo-based planning, budgeting, implementation, and performance 
monitoring, evaluation, and reporting mechanisms, systems, and practices in the 
provincial government departments and municipalities as key systemic factors that 
cause intergovernmental fragmentation in the province. This calls for management 
and administrative reforms to remedy the current state of affairs and bring about 
integrated intergovernmental business systems and practices.   
In this regard, the government needs to develop a results-based intergovernmental 
collaborative management framework or model to guide the provincial government 
departments and municipalities towards integrated planning, budgeting, 
implementation, and performance monitoring, evaluation, and reporting processes, 
systems, and practices. Such a framework or model should, in line with the broader 
theoretical principles and parameters of the conceptual framework outlined in Chapter 
Three, include the following intergovernmental operational management sub-models: 
i. Intergovernmental collaborative service delivery model: This should 
address alignment and integration of provincial and local government strategic 
and operational service delivery priorities, budgets, programmes, plans, and 
projects to deliver services to citizens and communities in an integrated and 
seamless manner.   
ii. Intergovernmental collaborative business process model: This should map 
intergovernmental macro business processes in relation to integrated planning, 
budgeting, implementation, and performance monitoring, evaluation, and 
reporting to support the abovementioned intergovernmental collaborative 
service delivery model. In addition, this model should address critical business 
process alignment and integration (including common key performance 
indicators and outcomes, as well as reporting and data management systems, 
integrated service delivery complaints management, and rapid response 
systems) between the provincial government departments and municipalities in 
the Gauteng province. 
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iii. Intergovernmental collaborative standard operating model: This should set 
out detailed operational modalities, including practical guidelines and 
procedures, as well as intergovernmental business process flows to 
standardise the manner in which the provincial government departments and 
municipalities align and integrate their work to deliver services to citizens and 
communities in an integrated and seamless manner.  
iv. Intergovernmental collaborative service charter and standards: This 
should outline a joint government-wide service pledge and commitment in terms 
of the level and quality of services that citizens and communities can expect 
from the provincial government and municipalities in the province. This could 
also serve as an instrument or tool to strengthen intergovernmental service 
delivery accountability to citizens and communities in the province.      
6.5  Key areas for further research 
The following broad areas warrant in-depth academic inquiry to contribute to the 
further development of the theory and practice of IGR and cooperative governance in 
South Africa:   
 IGR and cooperative governance between the district and local municipalities.  
 Organisational and behavioural factors that influence IGR and cooperative 
governance.  
 Democratic public participation in IGR structures and processes to create a 
citizen-centric cooperative governance system for effective service delivery.  
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